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Network Working GroupD. Schwartz
Internet-DraftXConnect Global Networks
Intended status: InformationalJuly 07, 2008
Expires: January 8, 2009 


RUCUS Test Cases
draft-schwartz-rucus-test-cases-00

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Abstract

This document is meant to serve as a repository for test cases assoicated with taking some action upon receipt of unwanted communications.

Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).



Table of Contents

1.  Introduction
2.  Test Case 1: Use of draft-wing-sipping-spam-score-02
    2.1.  Test Architecture
    2.2.  Use Cases
        2.2.1.  No Spam Score is generated
        2.2.2.  ’Whitelist’ score from ’trusted’ upstream server
        2.2.3.  ’Whitelist’ score from ’un-trusted’ upstream server
        2.2.4.  ’Graylist’ score from upstream server
        2.2.5.  ’Blacklist’ score from upstream server
    2.3.  Test Configurations
        2.3.1.  Allow All
        2.3.2.  Allow all containing a SPAM header
        2.3.3.  Allow with no score header or header with specific score
        2.3.4.  Allow only with score header or header with specific score
    2.4.  Test Parameters
        2.4.1.  Response Code
        2.4.2.  ’X’ Upper limit of the ’whitelist’ range
        2.4.3.  ’Y’ Upper limit of the ’graylist’ range
        2.4.4.  Primary Route Address
        2.4.5.  Secondary Route Address
    2.5.  Example Test Messages
        2.5.1.  Whitelist Trusted Score
        2.5.2.  Whitelist Un-Trusted Score
        2.5.3.  Graylist Score
3.  Security Considerations
4.  Acknowledgements
5.  IANA Considerations
6.  Normative References
§  Author's Address
§  Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements




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1.  Introduction

As part of the ongoing work to qualify the unwanted communication threat there is a need to document potential approaches being tried throughout the industry. This draft is meant to serve as a repository for these approaches and is intended for informative puroposes only.



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2.  Test Case 1: Use of draft-wing-sipping-spam-score-02

[I‑D.wing‑sipping‑spam‑score] (Wing, D., Niccolini, S., Stiemerling, M., and H. Tschofenig, “Spam Score for SIP,” February 2008.) defines a mechanism for SIP proxies to communicate a spam score to downstream SIP proxies and to SIP user agents. This test case discusses a test setup making use of some parts of this spam score draft. To recap, it is desirable for SIP proxies to insert a spam score so that downstream SIP proxies and downstream SIP user agents can use a high score to decide that special handling is required.



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2.1.  Test Architecture

The architecture chosen for this test is quite simple and involves an upstream Spam-Score generation server, a downstream receiving SBC and further downstream destinations (both primary and alternate). The idea is to generate the score and have the SBC behave differently depending on both the presence of a score as well as the actual score.



                                         _____________
                                        |             |
                                        | Primary     |
                                        | Destination |
          _________       ________     /|             |
         /         \     |        |  /  |_____________|
        |   Spam    |    | User   |/
        |   Score   |----| Agent  |\     _____________
        | Generator |    | Server |  \  |             |
         \_________/     |________|    \|             |
                                        | Secondary   |
                                        | Destination |
                                        |_____________|

 Figure 1: Test Case 1 Architecture 



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2.2.  Use Cases

The test consists of five basic scenarios or use cases. For all cases the assumption is that the variable ’X’ marks the upper limit of a whitelist indication and that the variable ’Y’ marks the upper limit of a graylist indication.



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2.2.1.  No Spam Score is generated

This is a baseline of sorts and is there to test one of two possible outcomes; message dropped and message allowed through, nonetheless.



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2.2.2.  ’Whitelist’ score from ’trusted’ upstream server

This test has the upstream server generate a ’whitelist’ score (0 <= score < X) and the assumption is that there is a trust relationship between the upstream server and the receiving UAS.



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2.2.3.  ’Whitelist’ score from ’un-trusted’ upstream server

This test has the upstream server generate a ’whitelist’ score (0 <= score < X) and the assumption is that there is no trust relationship between the upstream server and the receiving UAS.



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2.2.4.  ’Graylist’ score from upstream server

This test has the upstream server generate a ’graylist’ score (X <= score < Y) and the assumption is that there is a trust relationship between the upstream server and the receiving UAS.



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2.2.5.  ’Blacklist’ score from upstream server

This test has the upstream server generate a ’blacklist’ score (Y <= score < 100) and the assumption is that there is a trust relationship between the upstream server and the receiving UAS.



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2.3.  Test Configurations

For each of the use cases listed above we would like to test the following configurations



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2.3.1.  Allow All

In this configuration all calls are allowed to proceed downstream unhindered regardless of both the presence of a score header or the value therein.



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2.3.2.  Allow all containing a SPAM header

In this configuration all calls are allowed to proceed downstream unhindered ONLY if they contain a score header REGARDLESS of the value contained therein.



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2.3.3.  Allow with no score header or header with specific score

In this configuration all calls are allowed to proceed downstream unhindered with no score header. If a header exists, however, the following behavior is followed:



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2.3.3.1.  ’Whitelist’ score

Route to Primary destination.



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2.3.3.2.  ’Graylist’ score

Route to Secondary destination.



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2.3.4.  Allow only with score header or header with specific score

In this configuration all calls are allowed to proceed downstream unhindered ONLY in presence of score header and than only as per the following behavior:



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2.3.4.1.  ’Whitelist’ score

Route to Primary destination.



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2.3.4.2.  ’Graylist’ score

Route to Secondary destination.



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2.4.  Test Parameters

The following are configurable per realm:



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2.4.1.  Response Code

This is the response code returned upstream upon blocking of a call due to the suspicion of SPAM.



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2.4.2.  ’X’ Upper limit of the ’whitelist’ range

This is the value above which calls are assumed to be ’gray’. By default this value is assumed to be 75.



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2.4.3.  ’Y’ Upper limit of the ’graylist’ range

This is the value above which calls are assumed to be ’black’. By default this value is assumed to be 100.



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2.4.4.  Primary Route Address

Where to route calls not suspected to be SPAM.



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2.4.5.  Secondary Route Address

Where to route calls suspected to be SPAM. This could be a voice mail box for instance.



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2.5.  Example Test Messages

Only the relevant parts of the message are shown:



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2.5.1.  Whitelist Trusted Score



      INVITE ...
      Via: SIP/2.0/TLS trusted.upstream.com;branch=z9hG4bK-14362-1-0
      From: white <white@trusted.upstream.com>;tag=1
      ...
      Spam-Score: 0 ;spam-realm=trusted.upstream.com
      Subject: Spam Score Whitelist Test
      ...
 Figure 2: Whitelist Trusted Score 



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2.5.2.  Whitelist Un-Trusted Score



      INVITE ...
      Via: SIP/2.0/TLS questionable.upstream.com;branch=z9hG4bK-14
      From: white <white@questionable.upstream.com>;tag=1
      ...
      Spam-Score: 0 ;spam-realm=questionable.upstream.com
      Subject: Spam Score Graylist Test
      ...
 Figure 3: Whitelist unTrusted Score 



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2.5.3.  Graylist Score



      INVITE ...
      Via: SIP/2.0/TLS trusted.upstream.com;branch=z9hG4bK-14362-1-0
      From: white <white@trusted.upstream.com>;tag=1
      ...
      Spam-Score: 75 ;spam-realm=trusted.upstream.com
      Subject: Spam Score Graylist Test
      ...
 Figure 4: Graylist Score 



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3.  Security Considerations

This draft does not address the inherent security risks associated with communicating SPAM information in the clear as it is assumed that owing to the prior relationship betweent the sending and receiving parties there is a scure infrastructure in place (e.g. TLS) for the message transfer.



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4.  Acknowledgements

TBD.



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5.  IANA Considerations

None. This document is informational



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6. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” RFC 3261, June 2002 (TXT).
[I-D.wing-sipping-spam-score] Wing, D., Niccolini, S., Stiemerling, M., and H. Tschofenig, “Spam Score for SIP,” draft-wing-sipping-spam-score-02 (work in progress), February 2008 (TXT).


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Author's Address

  David Schwartz
  XConnect Global Networks
  Malcha Technology Park
  Building # 1
  Jerusalem 90961
  Israel
Phone:  +972 52 347 4656
Email:  dschwartz@xconnect.net
URI:  www.xconnect.net


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Full Copyright Statement

Intellectual Property