EMILIA Protocol, Inc.

US team@emiliaprotocol.ai

sec AI agents authorization evidence effect boundary replay prevention reconciliation Consequential agent actions can cross identity, transport, authorization, policy, and execution systems. Each system can produce a valid artifact while the executor still lacks a safe rule for joining the artifacts to the exact effect, consuming one-time authority, and handling an uncertain outcome. This document defines the Action Evidence Boundary (AEB), an executor-side processing model for that lifecycle. AEB requires native artifact verification, exact-action binding, a relying-party authorization decision, stable replay identity, durable atomic consumption or reservation, provider entry, closed effect outcomes, and authenticated reconciliation. CAID matching is used when independently encoded native representations must be joined. AEC is used when local policy requires multiple evidence legs. A native authorization decision accepted and enforced by the effect-owning PEP does not require a second PDP. AEB defines no receipt or token format, no policy language, no universal evidence taxonomy, and no new registry. Native workload credentials, OAuth artifacts, AuthZEN decisions, AP2 mandates, message signatures, permits, authorization receipts, and status mechanisms retain their own semantics and verifiers.

Introduction A remote executor can receive several independently useful inputs: a workload credential and protected request, a delegation or capability, a pre-execution permit, a human-authorization artifact, and a policy decision. None of those inputs alone answers every question the consequence-owning system has to answer before changing its system of record. The missing contract is at the effect boundary after authorization. The executor must determine what exact material action it is about to perform; verify each native artifact; preserve the authorization result produced by the selected native path; correlate independently encoded representations without guessing when such a join is required; derive a stable replay identity; consume or reserve any one-time or bounded authority; enter the provider once; and preserve uncertainty when the effect cannot be observed conclusively. This document defines that contract. Its required order is: EXECUTED +--> FAILED +--> INDETERMINATE --> authenticated reconciliation ]]> The CAID and AEC stages are conditional. A native authorization path can bind one operation directly and satisfy the relying party without a cross-format join or a multi-leg requirement. A signature is not authority. Native verification is not action correlation. Action correlation is not evidence satisfaction. Evidence satisfaction is not authorization. Authorization is not provider entry or execution. An invocation error is not proof that no effect occurred.

Scope and Non-Goals AEB specifies processing requirements for a boundary that controls a consequential effect. It can be implemented at a protocol gateway, service mesh component, application middleware, execution adapter, or system-of-record write path, provided the deployment states which effect paths the boundary actually mediates. AEB does not define:

• a new authorization receipt, access token, attestation token, permit, credential, or execution-evidence format;
• a native signature, credential, revocation, status, or transparency verification algorithm;
• a policy language, universal authorization decision, or universal human-approval inference;
• a second policy decision point, a replacement for an existing protocol-to-authorization mapping, or a requirement that an authorization result be re-decided under AEB;
• general semantic equivalence between actions;
• provider truth, physical truth, legality, safety, wisdom, or complete mediation merely because an AEB implementation is present; or
• a registry for evidence types, states, action mappings, or verifier names.

Conventions and Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. BCP 14 is indexed by the RFC Editor at .

Effect boundary:

The last control point that can withhold the protected mutation before it is submitted to the effecting system.

Relying party:

The party that selects trust inputs, action definitions, mapping profiles, evidence requirements, freshness rules, and local authorization policy, and that relies on the resulting decision.

Native artifact:

An evidence, credential, permit, token, receipt, status, or message-protection object defined outside AEB and verified under its own specification.

Native authorization result:

A permit or refusal produced under the selected authorization protocol and enforced by its policy enforcement point. The native protocol remains authoritative for the mapping, decision, and enforcement semantics it defines.

Field-origin assertion:

A native artifact in which an issuer asserts how exact fields of an action representation were sourced or transformed, and optionally the point-in-time snapshot on which that assertion rests. Verification establishes the issuer's signed assertion under pinned trust inputs; it does not independently establish where the bytes truly originated.

Observed action:

The immutable material action constructed by the effect boundary from executor-controlled parsing and system-of-record facts.

Material field:

A field whose change can alter the protected consequence, as declared by the selected CAID action-type definition.

Invocation:

The first dispatch of the frozen authorized action to a component that can cause the protected effect.

Authoritative reconciliation:

An authenticated, audience-bound observation from the effecting provider or system of record that is matched to the original action and operation identifier.

Non-Collapsing Decision and Lifecycle Vocabulary AEB uses the following decisions with the meanings established by the EMILIA architecture and its component drafts:

VERIFIED:

One native artifact passed its native verifier under relying-party-selected trust inputs.

MATCH:

Independently verified artifacts denote the same material action directly or under exact relying-party-pinned CAID mapping profiles. This state is needed when the boundary joins independently encoded representations; it is not an extra requirement for a single native representation whose exact-action binding is preserved through provider entry.

SATISFIED:

Verified and matched evidence fills every slot in the relying party's AEC requirement. This state applies when local policy selects a multi-leg AEC requirement.

AUTHORIZED:

The effect-owning PEP accepts a native authorization result, or the consequence-owning relying party's local policy permits, this exact action at this time. AEB records this result; it does not require a second PDP.

EXECUTED:

The executor records, or an accepted native artifact attests, that the exact effect occurred. This meaning remains bounded by the native source and its trust assumptions.

AEB also names operational lifecycle states:

CONSUMED:

A one-time authorization, challenge, operation key, or equivalent native replay unit has been durably made unavailable for another invocation.

RESERVED:

Bounded state, such as a capability budget, has been durably fenced for the exact operation before invocation.

DISPATCH_PENDING:

A durable intent record binds the frozen action, operation identifier, provider environment, and reservation before any effecting dispatch can occur. Recovery treats a stranded intent as uncertain, not as unused authority.

INVOKED:

The protected effect was dispatched using the frozen authorized action and operation identifier.

FAILED:

Authoritative executor or reconciliation evidence establishes that the invoked operation did not cause the protected effect. A local exception or timeout alone is not sufficient.

INDETERMINATE:

Invocation began, but available authoritative evidence does not establish whether the protected effect occurred.

CONSUMED, RESERVED, DISPATCH_PENDING, INVOKED, FAILED, and INDETERMINATE are lifecycle terms, not new evidence types or IANA registry values. A deployment MAY use different local labels if their semantics are at least as strict.

Relying-Party Inputs and Pins The requester, presenter, agent, and mutable intermediary context are untrusted inputs. They MAY propose an action and present native artifacts. They MUST NOT select or weaken the controls used to accept that request. Before evaluating an action, the relying party MUST configure or pin, as applicable:

• the supported native artifact revisions, verifier adapters, algorithms, trust anchors, issuers, audiences, and status sources;
• when field-origin evidence is required, the accepted assertion profile and digest, trusted issuers and keys, allowed origin classes and transformations for each exact field, snapshot policy, maximum snapshot age, and unavailable-state behavior;
• when independently encoded representations require a cross-format join, the CAID suite, action-type definition source, exact source descriptors, and mapping-profile digests;
• when local policy requires multiple evidence legs, the AEC requirement and the admissible native evidence roles for each slot;
• local policy identifiers, policy epochs, tenant and organization boundaries, and any separation-of-duty rule;
• the trusted clock, maximum ages, validity windows, allowed skew, and revocation or status freshness requirements;
• the durable replay, consumption, reservation, and operation-key namespaces; and
• the protected executor, provider environment, reconciliation endpoint, and authenticated provider or system-of-record identities.

A label, key, profile identifier, requirement, status assertion, or policy identifier carried only in presenter-controlled data MUST NOT become its own trust anchor. Missing, conflicting, unsupported, or ambiguous required configuration MUST fail closed.

Required Processing Model

Construct the Observed Material Action The effect boundary MUST construct an immutable observed action from effect-relevant facts it controls. Depending on the application, those facts can include the protocol operation, tool or method, target resource, tenant, account, amount, currency, destination, environment, input digest, and unique operation identifier. The boundary MUST resolve the exact native operation profile used for authorization and include every field that profile makes material to the protected consequence. When a cross-format join is required, it MUST also resolve a relying-party-pinned CAID action-type definition and include every field that definition declares material. It MUST NOT copy a requester-supplied action digest, CAID, amount, destination, or resource reference without deriving or checking the corresponding fact at the protected boundary. If the boundary cannot determine all material fields required by the selected native or cross-format profile, it MUST refuse before invocation. The observed action MUST be frozen for the remainder of the lifecycle. A later adapter MUST NOT reconstruct a different action from mutable request state after authorization. When emitting or comparing a CAID, the boundary MUST validate the constructed action against the complete pinned action-type definition. A source representation is construction-compatible only when a pinned mapping can derive every material target field without guessing. Construction compatibility is distinct from content equivalence: compatible inputs can still map to different actions, while a missing, ambiguous, or unverified material field yields INDETERMINATE. A boundary that does not perform a cross-format join still MUST preserve the native protocol's exact-operation binding through provider entry.

Verify Each Native Artifact Each required native artifact MUST be verified independently under its own specification and relying-party-selected trust inputs before CAID mapping or AEC evaluation. The AEB implementation MUST use the integrity-protected payload returned by the native verifier, or a projection for which the adapter establishes integrity coverage of every projected field. A successful signature check is only one possible step of native verification. Schema, algorithm, issuer, audience, key status, validity, proof-of-possession, freshness, replay, and native policy checks remain those of the selected native profile. A verifier exception, unavailable required status source, unsupported critical field, or ambiguous result MUST become a bounded refusal, never an allow path. The output of this stage is VERIFIED for each accepted artifact. An artifact that has not reached VERIFIED MUST NOT participate in a selected action mapping or fill a selected AEC requirement slot.

Establish Exact-Action Correspondence The boundary MUST establish that the exact operation authorized by the selected native path is the operation that will enter the provider. When both are expressed in one native representation, the boundary MAY use the exact native identifier, digest, or protected operation fields defined by that protocol. When the boundary joins independently encoded representations, it MUST recompute the CAID of the observed action under the selected suite and definition source. It MUST compare every action-bound required artifact to that observed action using direct CAID equality or the Action-Mapping Profile defined by . Cross-format mapping MUST occur only after native verification and MUST use the exact source media type, schema version, target action type, definition source, and mapping-profile digest pinned by the relying party. Every target material field MUST be covered. Missing, lossy, unknown, unpinned, conflicting, or ambiguous mappings yield INDETERMINATE under CAID and MUST fail a required MATCH. AEB MUST NOT guess equivalence from names, natural-language descriptions, trace identifiers, or presenter assertions. CAID is conditional machinery for a cross-format join, not a second authorization protocol. MATCH is content correlation only. It does not validate a native artifact and does not authorize execution.

Evaluate Required Field-Origin Assertions A relying party MAY require a natively verified field-origin assertion for selected fields before admission. This document defines the processing contract for that input, not a field-origin wire format, origin taxonomy, scanner, or transformation language. The boundary MUST verify the assertion under the relying party's pinned native verifier, issuer and key, assertion profile and digest, action binding, field selectors, accepted origin classes, accepted transformation definitions, snapshot policy, freshness bound, and status inputs. The verifier output MUST bind each asserted field to the exact observed action or to a lossless, pinned mapping to that action. A profile identifier or origin label carried only by the presenter MUST NOT select its own verifier or trust root. A verified assertion establishes that the pinned issuer made the signed claim. It does not independently prove source truth, semantic correctness, absence of prompt injection, authorization, settlement, or the truth of a later physical effect. If policy requires an origin constraint for a material field, a missing assertion, unknown or disallowed origin, unpinned transformation, stale or unreliable required snapshot, action mismatch, or unavailable required status MUST withhold admission. The boundary MUST preserve the distinction between assertion verification and acceptance under local policy. A field-origin policy SHOULD be discriminating rather than a blanket prohibition on untrusted content. For example, it can refuse an untrusted message that selects a payee or destination while accepting the same origin class for a bounded non-authoritative memo field. The accepted and refused field classes are relying-party policy, not universal AEB semantics. EP-FIELD-ORIGIN-v0.1 and its finance-operations Gap 6 runner are an informative reference implementation profile . They do not become a mandatory AEB format and their same-team results are not independent implementation evidence.

Evaluate Additional Evidence Requirements When Required AEB does not require an AEC evaluation when one native authorization result, enforced by the effect-owning PEP, satisfies the relying party's complete requirement. When local policy requires multiple evidence legs, the boundary MUST submit only natively verified, action-matched evidence to an AEC verifier configured with the relying party's requirement. The requirement used for the decision MUST come from relying-party configuration, not from a presenter-controlled AEC member. Every required evidence role MUST be filled by an artifact whose native verifier and adapter are accepted for that role. A workload identity MUST NOT silently fill a policy-permit or human-authorization slot. A machine-policy decision MUST NOT silently fill a named-human slot. A generic operator signature MUST NOT be interpreted as evidence that a human operated a system or performed a named approval ceremony. When AEC is selected, only a successful evaluation under these inputs reaches SATISFIED. UNSATISFIED, malformed, unsupported, or ambiguous results MUST withhold invocation. AEB MUST NOT insert an AEC leg merely to re-decide or relabel one native PDP result. A qualification statement can fill an evaluation-evidence role only when its native verifier establishes the measured candidate, evaluation campaign, assignment, policy, freshness, and status. A qualification result MUST NOT fill an authorization role and MUST NOT by itself cause SATISFIED, AUTHORIZED, reservation, or invocation.

Pinned Boundary Requirement and Evaluation Record The consequence-owning relying party MUST pin every adapter revision, trust root, mapping profile, evidence requirement, and boundary constraint used for a decision. The presenter MUST NOT select or weaken those inputs. The following EP-AEB-REQUIREMENT-v1 object is an optional closed profile for a deployment that selects AEC and multiple evidence roles. It is not required for a single native authorization path: An implementation of this optional object MUST reject unknown terms. It MUST require exactly one one-time-consumption term. A distinct-human-quorum term counts only distinct natural-person subject identifiers exposed by eligible native verifiers for the named role. initiator-exclusion and executor-exclusion compare those verified subjects with the boundary-owned initiator and executor identifiers. Different encodings of one key or subject MUST NOT count as different humans. Execution-time evaluation MUST resolve current status through relying-party-configured status sources. Presenter-supplied current status is untrusted. Revoked, expired, stale, unavailable, ambiguous, or unauthenticated required status MUST withhold authorization. Historical re-performance MUST be labeled historical and MUST NOT be used as a current execution decision. The evaluator SHOULD emit a signed, re-derivable record binding the observed action and, when selected, its CAID; operation and consumption identifiers, initiator and executor, adapter and mapping revisions, complete requirement and configuration digests, native artifact digests, current-status snapshots, per-leg VERIFIED and MATCH results, AEC SATISFIED, boundary constraints, and the separate AUTHORIZED or REFUSED verdict, as applicable. A record that omits a conditional CAID or AEC stage MUST identify the native exact-operation binding and the reason the extra stage was not selected. The record is evidence of the evaluator's decision; it does not itself perform or authorize an effect.

Make the Local Authorization Decision The effect-owning PEP MUST establish AUTHORIZED before AEB custody or provider entry. It can do so by accepting and enforcing the selected native authorization result, or by making a separate local decision. AEB does not require a second PDP. If the native path is AuthZEN, the AuthZEN PDP decision and the PEP's enforcement of that decision remain authoritative under the selected AuthZEN and COAZ profile. The PEP MUST apply the exact operation, audience, tenant, organization, policy epoch, freshness, current credential and authority status, separation-of-duty rules, local risk controls, and bounded capability state required by that selected path. Additional local checks MAY narrow a native permit. They MUST NOT widen it, reinterpret a refusal as a permit, or claim that AEB issued the native decision. Credential revocation and per-action authorization evidence answer different questions. A current non-revocation or status result can establish that a credential remains acceptable under local policy; it does not prove that the credential holder authorized this action. A per-action authorization artifact does not prove that every credential in its trust path remains current. When policy requires both, the boundary MUST verify both without substituting one for the other. The boundary reaches AUTHORIZED only if the effect-owning PEP accepts the exact action at the decision time. When AEC is selected, SATISFIED alone MUST NOT trigger reservation or invocation.

Derive a Stable Replay Identity Before consuming or reserving authority, the boundary MUST derive a stable replay identity from the verified native authorization or from the executor-owned exact operation under a relying-party-pinned profile. The same native authority presented in a new wrapper, task, session, trace, challenge, or caller retry MUST yield the same replay identity. The replay identity MUST NOT be derived from a caller-selected retry identifier, an AEB wrapper digest, or other mutable context that can make the same authority spendable again. If the selected native profile cannot provide or support a stable derivation, the boundary MUST refuse provider entry.

Atomically Consume or Reserve Before Invocation After AUTHORIZED and stable replay derivation, and before provider entry, the boundary MUST perform the durable state transition required by the native evidence and local policy. This can include consuming a one-time authorization, challenge nonce, or operation key; reserving a bounded capability or budget; and fencing the operation to one owner across replicas. The transition MUST be atomic within the relying party's durable state domain. The operation record MUST bind the stable replay identity to the executor-owned observed action or operation identifier, never a presenter-selected decoy. Independently of that composite operation record, the store MUST enforce uniqueness or conflict detection for every stable native replay identity that the selected profile marks as one-time. Changing an operation identifier MUST NOT make the same one-time native authority reservable again. If the store is unavailable, non-atomic, stale, or reports an ambiguous result, the boundary MUST refuse before invocation. AEB does not claim atomicity between a local store and an unrelated remote provider. It requires the local consume or reserve transition to occur first so that any uncertainty after dispatch cannot make the same authority available for an uncontrolled second effect.

Enter the Provider with the Frozen Effect An authorized MCP tool call, API request, or other protocol operation is not automatically proof that an underlying provider effect was authorized or occurred. When the authorized operation is itself the protected provider mutation, the same frozen action can continue through this lifecycle. When an MCP server, API service, or intermediary makes a distinct downstream provider request, the boundary MUST bind that provider request to the authorized operation under the selected native profile or a pinned cross-format mapping. It MUST NOT infer that binding from a session, trace, tool name, or natural-language description. Before any call, message, or byte can reach an effecting component, the boundary MUST durably enter DISPATCH_PENDING for the frozen observed action that reached AUTHORIZED and CONSUMED or RESERVED. The record MUST bind the action digest, operation identifier, provider environment, audience, reservation or consumption record, and adapter. Failure or ambiguity while writing this record MUST withhold dispatch. The boundary MUST invoke only from that durable state. It MUST use a stable, action-bound, unique operation identifier or idempotency key where the provider supports one. After dispatch begins, it MUST durably record INVOKED or a terminal outcome before reporting success to the requester. The adapter MUST receive only the authority and evidence necessary for the downstream interface. It MUST NOT accept mutable intermediary or caller context that changes a material field after the boundary's authorization decision.

Classify the Effect Outcome After invocation begins, the boundary MUST classify the result as EXECUTED, FAILED, or INDETERMINATE. On restart, a DISPATCH_PENDING operation without an authoritative terminal record MUST be promoted to INDETERMINATE before any retry or release, because the process cannot establish that dispatch did not begin.

• EXECUTED requires an authoritative response or accepted native execution evidence matched to the exact action, operation identifier, provider environment, and audience.
• FAILED requires authoritative evidence that the invoked operation did not cause the protected effect. A local parse error, exception, timeout, connection loss, process crash, or missing response is not by itself such evidence.
• INDETERMINATE is REQUIRED whenever invocation may have reached the effecting system but the available authoritative evidence does not establish EXECUTED or FAILED.

For EXECUTED, the boundary MUST commit any reserved spend and preserve the terminal evidence. For FAILED, it MUST preserve the failure evidence and follow the native reservation policy. For INDETERMINATE, it MUST preserve or consume the reservation, refuse reuse of the authorization and operation identifier, and prohibit a blind replay.

Perform Authenticated Reconciliation An INDETERMINATE operation, including one recovered from a stranded DISPATCH_PENDING record, MUST remain closed until reconciliation authenticates the provider or system of record and matches the result to the original action, operation identifier, provider environment, audience, target resource, and every application-specific material field. Reconciliation MAY move INDETERMINATE to EXECUTED when authoritative evidence establishes that the exact effect occurred. It MAY move INDETERMINATE to FAILED when authoritative evidence establishes that it did not occur. Missing, stale, conflicting, unauthenticated, or action-mismatched observations MUST leave the operation INDETERMINATE. Reconciliation MUST NOT resurrect the original authorization or silently release its one-time replay unit. If policy permits a later attempt after an authoritative FAILED result, that attempt MUST use a new action instance and complete the lifecycle required by local policy. An implementation MUST NOT invoke again merely because a timeout elapsed or because the caller retried.

Declaration and Challenge Semantics A deployment MAY publish a static declaration describing protected actions, material fields, evidence requirements, challenge methods, and effect-boundary placement. Such a declaration is discovery metadata. It MUST NOT override the relying party's live, local enforcement configuration. An unsupported declaration version MUST be ignored as discovery input; it cannot weaken or replace live enforcement. An action that the live boundary configuration cannot classify or process under a supported version MUST fail closed. When required evidence is absent or unacceptable, a boundary MAY use its application protocol to return a dynamic challenge. A challenge MUST identify the boundary-computed action, the missing evidence roles, the policy context, an intended audience, a short expiry, and a single-use unpredictable nonce or equivalent replay unit. The nonce MUST NOT be consumed merely because untrusted bytes parse. It MUST be consumed atomically only after the selected native verifier establishes the integrity and challenge binding of an in-window presentation, and before that presentation can reach SATISFIED or authorize an effect. A presentation that is malformed, unauthenticated, expired, or not bound to the challenge MUST be refused without burning the nonce. A natively verified, challenge-bound presentation consumes the nonce whether or not the remaining evidence satisfies the requirement. Follow-up challenges MUST remain bound to the original boundary-computed action and MUST NOT derive that action from presenter input. A declaration or challenge authorizes nothing, reserves nothing, and promises no execution. A satisfied challenge still proceeds through native verification, exact-action correspondence, AUTHORIZED, stable replay identity, and atomic consumption or reservation. MATCH and SATISFIED also apply when the relying party selects CAID and AEC. This document intentionally defines no new manifest object, challenge object, well-known URI, HTTP status code, or media type.

Native Evidence and Transport Boundaries

WIMSE and HTTP Message Signatures WIMSE workload credentials and the WIMSE HTTP Message Signatures profile can provide end-to-end workload authentication and message integrity for the request components covered by the validated signature, including a body protected by a validated content digest. HTTP Message Signatures provide the underlying component-signing mechanism. AEB consumes those results; it does not redefine them. A validated WIMSE request can establish which workload possessed the protected key and that covered message components were not modified undetectably. It does not by itself establish CAID MATCH, AEC SATISFIED, named-human authorization, local AUTHORIZED, one-time consumption, or execution. The WIMSE AI Identity Management System (AIMS) profiles existing identity and authorization standards for agent workloads, including OAuth and Transaction Tokens. The individual draft-munoz-wimse-authorization-evidence submission describes an adjacent signed- evidence composition. AEB begins after the selected native identity and authorization path has produced the inputs enforced at the effect boundary. It does not replace their issuance, verification, mapping, or authorization semantics. PEDIGREE describes native identity and delegation-chain evidence. The AEB result records whether the relying party's stated delegation requirement was satisfied by the mapped evidence. It does not reinterpret, re-derive, or override the delegation protocol's native decision. In particular, a PEDIGREE completion block is post-effect evidence and MUST NOT fill a pre-action authorization role. Headers, routing metadata, forwarded identity, trace context, or other values that an intermediary can add, remove, or mutate outside the validated end-to-end integrity coverage MUST NOT be load-bearing authorization evidence. They MAY be used for routing or diagnostics. If such a value affects the protected consequence, the boundary MUST derive it independently or require it to be covered by accepted native integrity and the observed action's material binding.

AuthZEN and COAZ The AuthZEN Authorization API defines the PDP request and decision interface. COAZ defines how an incoming protocol operation is projected into the AuthZEN subject, action, resource, and context model. COAZ-MCP applies that mapping to MCP operations. Those specifications remain authoritative for operation-to-SARC mapping, PDP evaluation, and PEP enforcement. AEB does not replace COAZ mapping with CAID and does not require a second PDP. The effect-owning PEP can record AUTHORIZED when it accepts an AuthZEN permit for the exact operation under the selected COAZ profile. CAID is needed only if the boundary must compare that operation with an independently encoded provider action. AEC is needed only if local policy adds multiple evidence roles beyond the native decision.

Attested Per-Action Tokens and Permit Records OAuth access tokens, Rich Authorization Requests, Transaction Tokens, and related artifacts remain native OAuth inputs. OAuth authorization servers retain their OAuth roles; a Transaction Token Service retains Transaction Token issuance; and each accepting workload or resource retains its native authorization and enforcement decision. Their token, proof-of-possession, audience, and transaction semantics are not redefined by AEB. AEB applies only the downstream custody and provider-effect lifecycle selected by the effect-owning relying party. AP2 mandates likewise retain AP2's native verification, checkout, transaction-linkage, issuer, holder, and payment semantics. An AEB implementation can consume an AP2 result and control one covered provider entry without converting the mandate into an AEB token or claiming AP2 interoperability. Attested per-action tokens, including artifacts described by a deployment as OASNT-like, remain native evidence formats. AEB does not assign that descriptive label a token type, claim set, registry entry, or trust meaning. The selected native verifier determines what the token proves and exposes its integrity-protected action commitment, issuer, audience, validity, freshness, status, and bounded result to the AEB adapter. SCITT Permit records defined by likewise remain native pre-execution decision evidence. AEB does not reserialize a Permit or convert it into an AEB receipt. It verifies the selected Permit revision through its native adapter, maps its protected material action only through a pinned CAID profile, and assigns it only to evidence roles permitted by the relying party's AEC requirement. A native format's valid signature proves only the statement and signer semantics that format defines. It does not, without an additional accepted profile and evidence, prove that a natural person operated the workload, understood the action, held authority, or performed a particular approval ceremony.

Native Compilation Contract An AEB adapter compiles the result of a native verifier into the inputs needed by the AEB processing model. The native artifact, verifier, trust model, and result remain authoritative for their own semantics. Compilation MUST NOT convert a native result into an AEB credential or permit, and an AEB result MUST NOT overwrite a native result. The compilation target is the ordered AEB decision and lifecycle vocabulary: native verification, exact-action correspondence, authorization, stable replay identity, atomic reservation or consumption, provider entry, outcome classification, and authenticated reconciliation. CAID matching and AEC satisfaction are included only when the relying party selects the corresponding cross-format or multi-leg stage. A successful compile establishes only that the native result can be evaluated at those interfaces. It does not establish that the action is authorized, executed, safe, lawful, or true.

Pinned Inputs Before compilation, the relying party MUST pin:

• the native protocol, document revision, media type, schema version, and verifier revision;
• the adapter identifier, adapter revision, verifier implementation identifier, and implementation digest;
• the native trust anchors, issuer and audience policy, clock, freshness rules, and required status sources;
• when a cross-format join is selected, the exact source descriptor, target CAID action type, mapping profile identifier, mapping revision, and mapping digest;
• when AEC is selected, the accepted evidence role or roles;
• the native replay-unit derivation profile and replay scope; and
• every native field whose omission or change can affect the protected consequence, evidence role, freshness, replay unit, or local policy.

Presented data MAY select among already pinned native variants only where the native protocol defines that selection and the relying party enables it. Presented data MUST NOT add or change a trust root, verifier, mapping, evidence role, material-field rule, or replay scope. A verifier implementation identifier and digest are relying-party- selected configuration metadata. They do not prove that a measured runtime loaded or executed those bytes. A compile result MUST keep runtime measurement unestablished unless a separate accepted native attestation proves it.

Deterministic Operations An adapter exposes verifyNative, which verifies the artifact under the pinned native rules and returns the integrity-protected native result and exact operation binding. When the boundary performs a cross-format join, the adapter also exposes the logically separate mapAction operation, which maps only a VERIFIED native result to the relying party's expected action under the pinned mapping profile. Each selected operation MUST be deterministic for the supplied bytes and pins. It MUST NOT perform a network request, consult ambient credentials or trust stores, read mutable global state, or accept a caller-supplied verification verdict. Required current status and time MUST be explicit relying-party inputs. The boundary MUST supply detached, recursively immutable copies of the native artifact, expected action, trust inputs, status inputs, adapter configuration, and mapping profile. An adapter MUST NOT change a pinned input between native verification and action mapping.

Closed Compile Result For each native artifact, the compiler MUST return a closed result that contains:

• the native protocol, exact revision, artifact digest, and native verification result;
• the adapter identifier, revision, and configuration digest, plus the pinned verifier implementation identifier, revision, and digest;
• when selected, the mapping profile identifier, revision, and digest, plus mapper and resolver identifiers and the resolver implementation digest;
• the source schema or media type and target action type;
• the exact relying-party-supplied expected material action value, digest, and input provenance;
• the CAID and normalized-action digest when a cross-format join is selected, or the exact native operation binding otherwise;
• when AEC is selected, the accepted evidence role and subject, plus the status input and derived freshness result under pinned adapter rules;
• the stable native replay unit and replay scope;
• whether verifier runtime measurement is established;
• the semantic-loss report defined below; and
• every compiler state that remains unsupported or indeterminate.

The compile result is typed verifier output. It is not a bearer token, permit, receipt, or proof of execution. A deployment MAY serialize it for diagnostics or evidence transport, but that serialization MUST NOT become reusable authority. A native profile MAY expose actor, acting-for principal, target, declared purpose, audience, constraints, validity, or native nonclaims only when its native verifier and pinned mapping establish those values. The generic compiler MUST NOT infer them from a subject identifier, policy decision, action label, natural-language field, or trace metadata merely to fill a common shape. A caller-supplied local-policy decision MAY be reported as an explicit input, but it MUST NOT establish local authorization. Authorization, reservation or consumption, provider entry, outcome, and reconciliation remain unestablished until the component that owns each transition evaluates and records it.

Semantic-Loss Report The adapter MUST enumerate every field exposed by the native verifier that the selected mapping does not carry into the target action or accepted evidence role. Each omission MUST be classified as material, non-material, or unknown under relying-party-pinned rules, with a stable field path and declared basis. An omitted material or unknown field makes exact-action matching INDETERMINATE. That leg MUST NOT report equivalence, MATCH, SATISFIED, or AUTHORIZED. Renaming, moving, defaulting, unit-converting, rounding, truncating, or combining a material field is a transformation and requires a pinned deterministic rule. Natural-language similarity, an agent assertion, or a shared trace identifier is not such a rule. The compiler MAY retain a native mapper's raw relation, CAID, and normalized-action digest for diagnostics, but MUST label them as raw native output. They MUST NOT appear as the compiler-effective relation after material or unknown loss. The effective CAID and normalized- action digest are absent in that case. If two compiled legs produce one CAID but different normalized- action digests, the boundary MUST refuse the join. CAID remains a typed content identifier. It is not an authorization claim or a general declaration that two source formats have identical semantics.

Stable Native Replay Unit Every accepted authorization-bearing native result MUST expose a stable native replay unit derived from the verified native authority. The replay unit MUST NOT include an AEB wrapper digest, AEB operation identifier, consumption nonce, caller retry identifier, or other value whose change would make the same native authority spendable again. The evaluator MUST probe the adapter with a second deterministic wrapper reference. If the replay unit changes while the verified native authority does not, the result is INDETERMINATE. If two distinct verified native artifacts from one adapter collapse onto one replay unit without the native profile defining that equivalence, the result is INDETERMINATE. A replay-unit value does not prove that reservation or consumption occurred.

Path and Provider Ownership A deployment MUST state whether the AEB boundary controls the credential or other capability that reaches the effecting provider, which provider-entry paths it mediates, and every direct, administrator, break-glass, alternate-protocol, queued, or system-of- record path that bypasses it. An observe-only adapter or an adapter placed beside a write path MUST NOT be described as consequence admission or complete mediation. The compile result MAY record provider-attempt and reconciliation bindings only after the corresponding AEB transitions occur. A policy allow, access token, message signature, transparency receipt, action record, audit record, or native permit MUST NOT be relabeled as proof that provider entry, commitment, or an external effect occurred.

Compilation Conformance A native compilation profile MUST publish exact source locks, at least one positive vector containing the original native bytes, and a condition-removed control for every negative vector. Reports MUST keep native verification, mapping, AEC, local policy, reservation, provider outcome, and reconciliation results separate. The profile MUST include hostile vectors for material-field omission and substitution, mapping-pin change, stale or unavailable status, wrapper replay, alternate-path bypass, refusal-time consumption, concurrent admission, timeout after provider entry, blind retry, and reconciliation binding mismatch. It MUST state every native semantic that could not be compiled without invention. A profile that claims a direct native authorization path MUST show the exact native operation binding and stable replay identity without inserting a second PDP. A profile that joins a separately encoded provider action MUST exercise the selected CAID mapping, including a material-field substitution. A profile that adds multiple evidence roles MUST exercise the selected AEC requirement. Each report MUST say which conditional stages were used and why. A generic AEB compiler conformance claim requires at least two materially unrelated native profiles to reach the same AEB lifecycle without changing their native wire formats or result semantics. A same-team runner is reference evidence, not an independent implementation. Matching a finite vector set does not establish complete mediation, production deployment, or provider truth.

Conformance and Deployment Claims An implementation conforms to AEB only if every protected invocation follows the ordered processing model in and fails closed on every missing or ambiguous required transition. A deployment MUST state whether CAID or AEC is selected and MUST document:

• the protected action types and the effect paths actually mediated;
• the trusted configuration and durable-state boundaries;
• the native verifier revisions and relying-party pins;
• the method used to derive material action fields at the boundary;
• the consumption, reservation, and cross-replica fencing mechanism;
• the authoritative sources and matching rules used for reconciliation; and
• all direct, break-glass, administrator, alternate-protocol, and system-of-record paths that bypass the AEB implementation.

An implementation placed beside a write path is not complete mediation. A deployment MUST NOT claim complete mediation unless the protected system rejects all material alternate paths or subjects them to an equivalent boundary. Observe-only operation MAY be useful during deployment, but it MUST NOT be described as enforcement.

Security Considerations Cross-binding. An attacker can splice a valid permit, approval, credential, or receipt for action A into a request for action B. Native verification before mapping, executor-owned action construction, and exact correspondence between the authorized operation and provider entry are required defenses. A cross-format join also requires exact CAID matching. A multi-leg requirement also requires a relying-party-pinned AEC evaluation. Omitting a stage that the selected profile requires reopens the attack. Mutable context. Intermediary-added headers and agent annotations are convenient but are not trustworthy merely because they arrived on an authenticated hop. Every load-bearing field needs accepted end-to-end integrity coverage or independent derivation at the effect boundary. Time of check and time of use. The action passed to the executor must be the frozen action that was verified, matched, satisfied, authorized, and consumed or reserved. Mutable aliases, provider defaults, exchange rates, destinations, branch heads, and policy epochs can change a consequence after approval; profiles must bind or revalidate them as material fields. Replay and distributed state. Process-local caches are insufficient where replicas can invoke the same effect. Replay, consumption, reservation, and operation ownership state must be durable, atomic, and shared across every boundary instance that can reach the protected executor. Freshness and revocation. Expiration, nonce checks, credential status, authority status, and policy epoch are separate checks. A fresh message does not make a revoked credential valid, and a current credential does not make old per-action evidence fresh. Indeterminate effects. Retrying after a timeout can duplicate a payment, mutation, disclosure, or physical action. An invocation that might have reached the provider consumes the operation's retry right until authenticated reconciliation resolves the exact outcome. Caller assurances and unauthenticated webhooks do not resolve it. Signature overclaiming. A cryptographic signature can establish control of a key and integrity of covered content under a selected verification profile. It does not inherently identify a human, prove human operation, prove comprehension, establish legal authority, or prove execution. Boundary bypass. A correct AEB implementation does not protect direct database credentials, alternate APIs, shell access, administrator consoles, side channels, or actuator paths that bypass it. Deployment topology and credential placement are security properties, not implementation details.

Privacy Considerations Action objects and evidence can expose identities, destinations, resources, policy choices, commercial relationships, and sensitive operational timing. Deployments SHOULD minimize the evidence passed to the executor and retained in portable records, use opaque high-entropy references where appropriate, and avoid treating a plain digest of low-entropy personal data as anonymization. Reconciliation queries can disclose that an operation is disputed or uncertain. They SHOULD be authenticated, authorized, rate-limited, and limited to the exact operation. AEB does not require public disclosure of native evidence or local policy.

Relationship to EMILIA and Adjacent Work CAID owns typed material-action identity and exact, relying-party-pinned cross-format mapping. AEB invokes CAID after native verification only when independently encoded representations must be joined. It does not extend CAID with trust semantics. AEC owns heterogeneous evidence composition and the SATISFIED or UNSATISFIED result under a relying-party requirement. AEB invokes AEC only when local policy requires multiple evidence legs, then preserves the separate authorization and effect-lifecycle decisions. The earlier Action Evidence Graph series is replaced by AEC; an implementation following an older citation MUST NOT treat the superseded series as a second composition contract. AIMS, OAuth, AuthZEN, COAZ, and AP2 own their respective identity, delegation, authorization, protocol mapping, mandate, and native enforcement semantics. AEB is a post-permit consequence-admission lifecycle at a covered effect boundary. It does not create a parallel identity system, authorization server, PDP, mandate, or universal token. Authorization Receipts define one native action-bound organizational approval artifact and its receipt-specific consumption semantics. AEB does not make that format mandatory and does not generalize every native artifact into an EMILIA receipt. Static declarations and dynamic evidence challenges remain distinct protocol surfaces. A manifest can advertise discovery metadata, while an Authorization Evidence Challenge can carry the live, action-bound refusal and acquisition instructions. AEB owns the executor lifecycle in which those inputs are evaluated; it does not absorb or replace their wire formats. Qualification, revocation, remedy, and action-to-outcome continuity artifacts are optional native inputs or downstream records. They retain their own semantics. AEB composes them only through pinned verification, exact-action binding, local policy, durable custody, and authenticated reconciliation. A refusal MAY be represented by an action-bound signed refusal statement. The refusal artifact records what the boundary refused and why; it MUST NOT be interpreted as proof that every bypass path was mediated, that delivery to a requester occurred, or that a later action was refused.

IANA Considerations This document has no IANA actions. In particular, it creates no registry for native evidence types, lifecycle labels, verifier adapters, action mappings, or policy identifiers.

Changes since -05 This revision positions AEB explicitly after native identity and authorization systems. It makes CAID conditional on a cross-format join and AEC conditional on a multi-leg evidence requirement. It states that an effect-owning PEP can accept a native authorization result without a second PDP; AuthZEN and COAZ retain ownership of SARC mapping, PDP evaluation, and PEP enforcement. It distinguishes an authorized MCP or API request from a downstream provider effect and makes the post-permit sequence explicit: stable replay identity, durable consume or reserve, provider entry, terminal or indeterminate outcome, and authenticated reconciliation without blind retry. It updates the former KLRC reference to the WIMSE AIMS working-group document and adds informative AuthZEN, COAZ, COAZ-MCP, and AP2 references. The revision creates no credential, permit, receipt, registry, policy language, PDP, or universal token.

Implementation Status The Apache-2.0 reference implementation provides relying-party-pinned adapter and mapping registries, multi-leg CAID joins, the boundary terms defined above, current-status verification, signed configuration-bound evaluation records, durable ownership-fenced one-time consumption, execution reservation and reconciliation, and signed refusal statements. It also exposes a closed native-compiler report over the adapter contract, an AuthZEN-derived local PEP-observation profile, a source-pinned OAuth Transaction Authorization Challenge profile , a strict request-only profile over WPT-02 and Transaction Tokens -11 , and a WIMSE R10 compatibility matrix. All three paths pass locally. The AuthZEN-derived path verifies an EMILIA-signed local PEP observation, not an artifact defined or signed by AuthZEN. It therefore does not count toward the two-external-native-profile gate. OAuth transaction challenge and WPT plus Transaction Tokens are the two direct external-native candidates. Their mappings have not been reviewed by the native protocol owners, the published profiles still need an audited match against every required hostile vector and paired control, and their OAuth adjacency requires an explicit protocol-diversity judgment before the generic gate can close. The result is not an independent implementation or an adoption claim. The informative EP-FIELD-ORIGIN-v0.1 profile is evaluated before admission in the reference Gate. Its Gap 6 implementation profile has 14 deterministic cases, including disallowed field origins, unknown origin, profile substitution, an unpinned transformation, and the positive case in which untrusted content supplies only a bounded memo field. Conformance vectors and adversarial tests cover selected reference paths; the full conformance set above remains future conformance work and is not established by this revision. These same-team artifacts are not an independent implementation and do not prove that a deployment mediates every effect path.

References Normative References Internet Engineering Task Force EMILIA Protocol, Inc. EMILIA Protocol, Inc. Informative References EMILIA Protocol, Inc. EMILIA Protocol, Inc. EMILIA Protocol Google Agentic Commerce Glyphzero Labs Inc.

Acknowledgments External review sharpened the boundaries between workload and message integrity, per-action authorization evidence, credential status, human operation, and executor-owned effect control. Those distinctions are load-bearing in this document. Acknowledgment does not imply endorsement.