Network Working Group                                       S. Santesson
Internet-Draft                                              3xA Security
Intended status: Standards Track                              R. Housley
Expires: 24 April 2021                                    Vigil Security
                                                         21 October 2020


                       Signature Validation Token
                         draft-santesson-svt-00

Abstract

   Electronic signatures have a limited lifespan with respect to the
   time period that they can be validated and determined to be
   authentic.  The Signature Validation Token (SVT) defined in this
   specification provides evidence that asserts the validity of an
   electronic signature.  The SVT is provided by a trusted authority,
   which asserts that a particular signature was successfully validated
   according to defined procedures at a certain time.  Any future
   validation of that electronic signature can be satisfied by
   validating the SVT without any need to also validate the original
   electronic signature or the associated digital certificates.  SVT
   supports electronic signatures in CMS, XML, and PDF documents.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 April 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.






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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Signature Validation Token  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Signature Validation Token Function . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Signature Validation Token Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.1.  Data Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.2.  Signature Validation Token JWT Claims . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.3.  SigValidation Object Class  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.4.  Signature Claims Object Class . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.5.  SigReference Claims Object Class  . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.6.  SignedData Claims Object Class  . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.7.  PolicyValidation Claims Object Class  . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.8.  TimeValidation Claims Object Class  . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.2.9.  CertReference Claims Object Class . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.2.10. SVT JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   4.  Profiles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Signature Verification with a SVT . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix A.  Appendix: Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1.  Introduction

   Electronic signatures have a limited lifespan regarding when they can
   be validated and determined to be authentic.  Many factors make it
   more difficult to validate electronic signatures over time.  For
   example:

   *  Trusted information about the validity of the certificate
      containing the signer's public key is not available.

   *  Trusted information about the date and time when the signature was
      actually created is not available.





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   *  Algorithms used to create the electronic signature are no longer
      considered secure.

   *  Services necessary to validate the signature are no longer
      available.

   *  Supporting evidence such as CA certificates, OCSP responses, CRLs,
      or timestamps.

   The challenges to validation of an electronic signature increases
   over time, and eventually it is simply impossible to verify the
   signature with a sufficient level of assurance.

   Existing standards, such as the ETSI XAdES [XADES] profile for XML
   signatures [XMLDSIG11], ETSI PAdES [PADES] profile for PDF signatures
   [ISOPDF2], and ETSI CAdES [CADES] profile for CMS signatures
   [RFC5652] can be used to prolong the lifetime of a signature by
   storing data that supports validation of the electronic signature
   beyond the lifetime of the certificate containing the signer's public
   key, which is often referred to as the signing certificate.  The
   problem with this approach is that the amount of information that
   must be stored along with the electronic signature constantly grows
   over time.  The increasing amount of information and signed objects
   that need to be validated in order to verify the original electronic
   signature grows in complexity to the point where validation of the
   electronic signature may become infeasible.

   The Signature Validation Token (SVT) defined in this specification
   takes a fundamentally different approach to the problem by providing
   evidence by a trusted authority that asserts the validity of an
   electronic signature.  The SVT asserts that a particular electronic
   signature was successfully validated by a trusted authority according
   to defined procedures at a certain date and time.  Once the SVT is
   issued by a trusted authority, any future validation of that
   electronic signature is satisfied by validating the SVT, without any
   need to also validate the original electronic signature.















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   This approach drastically reduces the complexity of validation of
   older electronic signatures for the simple reason that validating the
   SVT eliminates the need to validate the many signed objects that
   would otherwise been needed to provide the same level of assurance.
   The SVT can be signed with private keys and algorithms that provide
   confidence for a considerable time period.  In fact, multiple SVTs
   can be used to offer greater assurance.  For example, one SVT could
   be produced with a large RSA private key, a second one with a strong
   elliptic curve, and a third one with a quantum safe digital signature
   algorithm to protect against advances in computing power and
   cryptanalytic capabilities.  Further, the trusted authority can add
   additional SVTs in the future using fresh private keys and signatures
   to extend the lifetime of the, if necessary.

2.  Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document use the following terms:

   *  Signed Data - The data covered by a particular electronic
      signature.  This is typically equivalent to the signed content of
      a document, and it represents the data that the signer intended to
      sign.  In some cases, such as in some XML signatures, the signed
      data can be the collection of several data fragments each
      referenced by the signature.  In the case of PDF, this is the data
      covered by the "ByteRange" parameter in the signature dictionary.

   *  Signed Bytes - These are the actual bytes of data that were hashed
      and signed by the digital signature algorithm.  In most cases,
      this is not the actual Signed Data, but a collection of signature
      metadata that includes references (hash) of the Signed Data as
      well as information about algorithms and other data bound to a
      signature.  In XML, this is the canonicalized SignedInfo element.
      In CMS and PDF signatures, this is the DER-encoded
      SignedAttributes structure.

   When these terms are used as defined in this section, they appear
   with a capitalized first letter.








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3.  Signature Validation Token

   The Signature Validation Token (SVT) is created by a trusted service
   to capture evidence of successful electronic signature verification,
   and then relying parties can depend on the checking that has already
   taken place by the trusted service.

3.1.  Signature Validation Token Function

   The function of the SVT is to capture evidence of electronic
   signature validity at one instance of secure signature validation
   process and to use that evidence to eliminate the need to perform any
   repeated cryptographic validation of the original electronic
   signature value, as well as reliance on any hash values bound to that
   signature.  The SVT achieves this by binding the following
   information to a specific electronic signature:

   *  A unique identification of the electronic signature.

   *  The data and metadata signed by the electronic signature.

   *  The signer's certificate that was validated as part of electronic
      signature verification.

   *  The certification path that was used to validate the signer's
      certificate.

   *  An assertion providing evidence of that the signature was
      verified, the date and time the verification was performed, the
      procedures used to verify the electronic signature, and the
      outcome of the verification.

   *  An assertion providing evidence of the date and time at which the
      signature is known to have existed, the procedures used to
      validate the date and time of existence, and the outcome of the
      validation.

   Using an SVT is equivalent to validating a signed document in a
   system once, and then using that document multiple times without
   subsequent revalidating the electronic signature for each usage.
   Such procedures are common in systems where the document is residing
   in a safe and trusted environment where it is protected against
   modification.  The SVT allows the safe and trusted environment to
   expand beyond a locally controlled environment, and the SVT allows a
   greater period between original electronic signature verification and
   subsequent usage.





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   Using the SVT, the electronic signature verification of a document
   can be take place once using a reliable trusted service, and then any
   relying party that is able to depend on the verification process
   already performed by the trusted service.  The SVT is therefore not
   only a valuable tool to extend the lifetime of a signed document, but
   also avoids the need for careful integration between electronic
   signature verification and document usage.

3.2.  Signature Validation Token Syntax

   The SVT is carried in a JSON Web Token (JWT) as defined in [RFC7519].

3.2.1.  Data Types

   The contents of claims in an SVT are specified using the following
   data types:

   *  String - JSON Data Type of string that contains an arbitrary case
      sensitive string value.

   *  Base64Binary - JSON Data Type of string that contains of Base64
      encoded byte array of binary data.

   *  StringOrURI - JSON Data Type of string that contains an arbitrary
      string or an URI as defined in [RFC7519], which REQUIRES a value
      containing the colon character (":") to be a URI.

   *  URI - JSON Data Type of string that contains an URI as defined in
      [RFC7519].

   *  Integer - JSON Data Type of number that contains a 32-bit signed
      integer value (from -2^31 to 2^31-1).

   *  Long - JSON Data Type of number that contains a 64-bit signed
      integer value (from -2^63 to 2^63-1).

   *  NumericDate - JSON Data Type of number that contains a data as
      defined in [RFC7519], which is the number of seconds from
      1970-01-01T00:00:00Z UTC until the specified UTC date/time,
      ignoring leap seconds.

   *  Boolean - JSON Data Type of boolean that contains explicit value
      of true or false.

   *  Object<Class> - A JSON object holding a claims object of a class
      defined in this specification (see Section 3.2.2).





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   *  Map<Type> - A JSON object with name-value pairs where the value is
      an object of the specified Type in the notation.  For example,
      Map<String> is a JSON object with name value pairs where all
      values are of type String.

   *  Array - A JSON array of a specific data type as defined in this
      section.  An array is expressed in this specification by square
      brackets.  For example, [String] indicates an array of String
      values, and [Object<DocHash>] indicates an array of DocHash
      objects.

   *  Null - A JSON null that represents an absent value.  A claim with
      a null value is equivalent with an absent claim.

3.2.2.  Signature Validation Token JWT Claims

   The SVT MUST contain only JWT claims in the following list:

   *  jti - A String data type that is a "JWT ID" registered claim
      according to [RFC7519].  It is RECOMMENDED that the identifier
      holds a hexadecimal string representation of a 128-bit unsigned
      integer.  A SVT MUST contain one "JWT ID" claim.

   *  iss - A StringOrURI data type that is an "Issuer" registered claim
      according to [RFC7519], which is an arbitrary unique identifier of
      the SVT issuer.  This value SHOULD have the value of an URI based
      on a domain owned by the issuer.  A SVT MUST contain one "Issuer"
      claim.

   *  iat - A NumericDate data type that is an "Issued At" registered
      claim according to [RFC7519], which expresses the date and time
      when this SVT was issued.  A SVT MUST contain one "Issued At"
      claim.

   *  aud - A [StringOrURI] data type or a StringOrURI data type that is
      an "Audience" registered claim according to [RFC7519].  The
      audience claim is an array of one or more identifiers, identifying
      intended recipients of the SVT.  Each identifier MAY identify a
      single entity, a group of entities or a common policy adopted by a
      group of entities.  If only one value is provided it MAY be
      provided as a single StringOrURI data type value instead of as an
      array of values.  Inclusion of the "Audience" claim in a SVT is
      OPTIONAL.

   *  exp - A NumericDate data type that is an "Expiration Time"
      registered claim according to [RFC7519], which expresses the date
      and time when services and responsibilities related to this SVT is
      no longer provided by the SVT issuer.  The precise meaning of the



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      expiration time claim is defined by local policies.  See
      implementation note below.  Inclusion of the "Expiration Time"
      claim in a SVT is OPTIONAL.

   *  sig_val_claims - A Object<SigValidation> data type that contains
      signature validation claims for this SVT extending the standard
      registered JTW claims above.  A SVT MUST contain one
      sig_val_claims claim.

   Note: An SVT asserts that a particular validation process was
   undertaken at a stated date and time.  This fact never changes and
   never expires.  However, some other aspects of the SVT such as
   liability for false claims or service provision related to a specific
   SVT may expire after a certain period of time, such as a service
   where an old SVT can be upgraded to a new SVT signed with fresh keys
   and algorithms.

3.2.3.  SigValidation Object Class

   The sig_val_claims JWT claim uses the SigValidation object class.  A
   SigValidation object holds all custom claims, and a SigValidation
   object contains the following parameters:

   *  ver - A String data type representing the version.  This parameter
      MUST be present, and the version in this specification indicated
      by the value "1.0".

   *  profile - A StringOrURI data type representing the name of a
      profile that defines conventions followed for specific claims and
      any extension points used by the SVT issuer.  Inclusion of this
      parameter is OPTIONAL.

   *  hash_algo - A URI data type that identifies the hash algorithm
      used to compute the hash values within the SVT.  The URI
      identifier MUST be one defined in [RFC6931] or in the IANA
      registry defined by this specification.  This parameter MUST be
      present.

   *  sig - A [Object<Signature>] data type that gives information about
      validated electronic signatures as an array of Signature objects.
      If the SVT contains signature validation evidence for more than
      one signature, then each signature is represented by a separate
      Signature object.  At least one Signature object MUST be present.








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   *  ext - A Map<String> data type that provides additional claims
      related to the SVT.  Extension claims are added at the discretion
      of the SVT issuer; however, extension claims MUST follow any
      conventions defined in a profile of this specification (see
      Section 4).  Inclusion of this parameter is OPTIONAL.

3.2.4.  Signature Claims Object Class

   The sig parameter in the SigValidation object class uses the
   Signature object class.  The Signature object contains claims related
   to signature validation evidence for one signature, and it contains
   the following parameters:

   *  sig_ref - A Object<SigReference> data type that contains reference
      information identifying the target signature.  This parameter MUST
      be present.

   *  sig_data - A [Object<SignedData>] data type that contains an array
      of references to Signed Data that was signed by the target
      electronic signature.  This parameter MUST be present.

   *  signer_cert_ref - A Object<CertReference> data type that
      references the signer's certificate and optionally reference to a
      supporting certification path that was used to verify the target
      electronic signature.  This parameter MUST be present.

   *  sig_val - A [Object<PolicyValidation>] data type that contains an
      array of results of signature verification according to defined
      procedures.  This parameter MUST be present.

   *  time_val - A [Object<TimeValidation>] data type that contains an
      array of time verification results that the target signature has
      existed at a specific date and time in the past.  Inclusion of
      this parameter is OPTIONAL.

   *  ext - A MAP<String> data type that provides additional claims
      related to the target signature.  Extension claims are added at
      the discretion of the SVT Issuer; however, extension claims MUST
      follow any conventions defined in a profile of this specification
      (see Section 4).  Inclusion of this parameter is OPTIONAL.











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3.2.5.  SigReference Claims Object Class

   The sig_ref parameter in the Signature object class uses the
   SigReference object class.  The SigReference object provides
   information used to match the Signature claims object to a specific
   target electronic signature and to verify the integrity of the target
   signature value and Signed Bytes, and it contains the following
   parameters:

   *  id - A String data type that contains an identifier assigned to
      the target signature.  Inclusion of this parameter is OPTIONAL.

   *  sig_hash - A Base64Binary data type that contains a hash value of
      the target electronic signature value.  This parameter MUST be
      present.

   *  sb_hash - A Base64Binary data type that contains a hash value of
      the Signed Bytes of the target electronic signature.  This
      parameter MUST be present.

3.2.6.  SignedData Claims Object Class

   The sig_data parameter in the Signature object class uses the
   SignedData object class.  The SignedData object provides information
   used to verify the target electronic signature references to Signed
   Data as well as to verify the integrity of all data that is signed by
   the target signature, and it contains the following parameters:

   *  ref - A String data type that contains a reference identifier for
      the data or data fragment covered by the target electronic
      signature.  This parameter MUST be present.

   *  hash - A Base64Binary data type that contains the hash value for
      the data covered by the target electronic signature.  This
      parameter MUST be present.

3.2.7.  PolicyValidation Claims Object Class

   The sig_val parameter in the Signature object class uses the
   PolicyValidation object class.  The PolicyValidation object provides
   information about the result of a validation process according to a
   spefific policy, and it contains the following parameters:

   *  pol - A StringOrURI data type that contains the identifier of the
      policy governing the electronic signature verification process.
      This parameter MUST be present.





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   *  res - A String data type that contains the result of the
      electronic signature verification process.  The value MUST be one
      of "PASSED", "FAILED" or "INDETERMINATE" as defined by
      [ETSI319102-1].  This parameter MUST be present.

   *  msg - A String data type that contains a message describing the
      result.  Inclusion of this parameter is OPTIONAL.

   *  ext - A MAP<String> data type that provides additional claims
      related to the target signature.  Extension claims are added at
      the discretion of the SVT Issuer; however, extension claims MUST
      follow any conventions defined in a profile of this specification
      (see Section 4).  Inclusion of this parameter is OPTIONAL.

3.2.8.  TimeValidation Claims Object Class

   The time_val parameter in the Signature object class uses the
   TimeValidation object class.  The TimeValidation claims object
   provides information about the result of validating time evidence
   asserting that the target signature existed at a particular date and
   time in the past, and it contains the following parameters:

   *  time - A NumericDate data type that contains the verified time.
      This parameter MUST be present.

   *  type - A StringOrURI data type that contains an identifier of the
      type of evidence of time.  This parameter MUST be present.

   *  iss - A StringOrURI data type that contains an identifier of the
      entity that issued the evidence of time.  This parameter MUST be
      present.

   *  id - A String data type that contains an unique identifier
      assigned to the evidence of time.  Inclusion of this parameter is
      OPTIONAL.

   *  val - A [Object<PolicyValidation>] data type that contains an
      array of results of the time evidence validation according to
      defined validation procedures.  Inclusion of this parameter is
      OPTIONAL.

   *  ext - A MAP<String> data type that provides additional claims
      related to the target signature.  Extension claims are added at
      the discretion of the SVT Issuer; however, extension claims MUST
      follow any conventions defined in a profile of this specification
      (see Section 4).  Inclusion of this parameter is OPTIONAL.





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3.2.9.  CertReference Claims Object Class

   The signer_cert_ref parameter in the Signature object class uses the
   CertReference object class.  The CertReference object references a
   single X.509 certificate or a X.509 certification path, either by
   providing the certificate data or by providing hash references for
   certificates that can be located in the target electronic signature,
   and it contains the following parameters:

   *  type - A StringOrURI data type that contains an identifier of the
      type of reference.  The type identifier MUST be one of the
      identifiers defined below, an identifier specified by the selected
      profile, or a URI identifier.  This parameter MUST be present.

   *  ref - A [String] data type that contains an array of string
      parameters according to conventions defined by the type
      identifier.  This parameter MUST be present.

   The following type identifiers are defined:

   *  "chain" - The ref contains an array of Base64 encoded X.509
      certificates [RFC5280].  The certificates MUST be provided in the
      order starting with the end entity certificate.  Any following
      certificate must be able to validate the signature on the previous
      certificate in the array.

   *  chain_hash - The ref contains an array of one or more Base64
      encoded hash values where each hash value is a hash over a X.509
      certificate [RFC5280] used to validate the signature.  The
      certificates MUST be provided in the order starting with the end
      entity certificate.  Any following certificate must be able to
      validate the signature on the previous certificate in the array.
      This option MUST NOT be used unless all hashed certificates are
      present in the target electronic signature.

   Note: All certificates referenced using the identifiers above are
   X.509 certificates.  Profiles of this specification MAY define
   alternative types of public key containers; however, a major function
   of these referenced certificates is not just to reference the public
   key, but also to provide the subject name of the signer.  It is
   therefore important for the full function of an SVT that the
   referenced public key container also provides the means to identify
   of the signer.

3.2.10.  SVT JOSE Header

   The SVT JWT MUST contain the following JOSE header parameters in
   accordance with Section 5 of [RFC7519]:



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   *  typ - This parameter MUST have the string value "JWT" (upper
      case).

   *  alg - This parameter identifies the algorithm used to sign the SVT
      JWT.  The algorithm identifier MUST be specified in [RFC7518] or
      the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry [
      add a ref ].  The specified signature hash algorithm MUST be
      identical to the hash algorithm specified in the hash_algo
      parameter of the SigValidation object within the sig_val_claims
      claim.

   The SVT header MUST contain a public key or a reference to a public
   key used to verify the signature on the SVT in accordance with
   [RFC7515].  Each profile, as discussed in Section 4, MUST define the
   requirements for how the key or key reference is included in the
   header.

4.  Profiles

   Each signed document and signature type will have to define the
   precise content and use of several claims in the SVT.

   Each profile MUST as a minimum define:

   *  How to reference the Signed Data content of the signed document.

   *  How to reference to the target electronic signature and the Signed
      Bytes of the signature.

   *  How to reference certificates supporting each electronic
      siganture.

   *  How to include public keys or references to public keys in the
      SVT.

   *  Whether each electronic signature is supported by a single SVT, or
      whether one SVT may support multiple electronic signatures of the
      same document.

   A profile MAY also define:

   *  Explicit information on how to perform signature validation based
      on an SVT.

   *  How to attach an SVT to an electronic signature or signed
      document.





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5.  Signature Verification with a SVT

   Signature verification based on an a SVT MUST follow these steps:

   1.  Locate all available SVTs available for the signed document that
       are relevant for the target electronic signature.

   2.  Select the most recent SVT that can be successfully validated and
       meets the requirement of the relying party.

   3.  Verify the integrity of the signature and the Signed Bytes of the
       target electronic signature using the sig_ref claim.

   4.  Verify that the Signed Data reference in the original electronic
       signature matches the reference values in the sig_data_ref claim.

   5.  Verify the integrity of referenced Signed Data using provided
       hash values in the sig_data_ref claim.

   6.  Obtain the verified certificates supporting the asserted
       electronic signature verification through the signer_cert_ref
       claim.

   7.  Verify that signature validation policy results satisfy the
       requirements of the relying party.

   8.  Verify that verified time results satisfy the context for the use
       of the signed document.

   After successfully performing these steps, signature validity is
   established as well as the trusted signer certificate binding the
   identity of the signer to the electronic signature.

6.  IANA Considerations

   { To be written }

7.  Security Considerations

   { To be written }

8.  Normative References

   [CADES]    ETSI, "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI);
              CAdES digital signatures; Part 1: Building blocks and
              CAdES baseline signatures", ETSI EN 319 122-1 v1.1.1,
              April 2016.




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   [ETSI319102-1]
              ETSI, "ETSI - Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures
              (ESI); Procedures for Creation and Validation of AdES
              Digital Signatures; Part 1: Creation and Validation",
              ETSI EN 319 102-1 v1.1.1, May 2016.

   [ISOPDF2]  ISO, "Document management -- Portable document format --
              Part 2: PDF 2.0", ISO 32000-2, July 2017.

   [PADES]    ETSI, "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI);
              PAdES digital signatures; Part 1: Building blocks and
              PAdES baseline signatures", ETSI EN 319 142-1 v1.1.1,
              April 2016.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC6931]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Additional XML Security Uniform
              Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 6931,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6931, April 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6931>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7518]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.






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   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [XADES]    ETSI, "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI);
              XAdES digital signatures; Part 1: Building blocks and
              XAdES baseline signatures", ETSI EN 319 132-1 v1.1.1,
              April 2016.

   [XMLDSIG11]
              Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Solo, D., Hirsch, F., Nystrom,
              M., Roessler, T., and K. Yiu, "XML Signature Syntax and
              Processing Version 1.1", W3C Proposed Recommendation, 11
              April 2013.

Appendix A.  Appendix: Examples

   The following example illustrates a basic SVT according to this
   specification issued for a signed PDF document.

   Note: Line breaks in the decoded example are inserted for
   readablilty.  Line breaks are not allowed in valid JSON data.

   Signature validation token JWT:



























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       eyJraWQiOiJPZW5JKzQzNEpoYnZmRG50ZlZcLzhyT3hHN0ZrdnlqYUtWSmFWcUlG
       QlhvaFZoQWU1Zks4YW5vdjFTNjg4cjdLYmFsK2Z2cGFIMWo4aWJnNTJRQnkxUFE9
       PSIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCIsImFsZyI6IlJTNTEyIn0.eyJhdWQiOiJodHRwOlwvXC9l
       eGFtcGxlLmNvbVwvYXVkaWVuY2UxIiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6XC9cL3N3ZWRlbmNv
       bm5lY3Quc2VcL3ZhbGlkYXRvciIsImlhdCI6MTU4MjczMDY0NSwianRpIjoiZTIy
       YzViZTZkZDZjYzZkYjgzNGJjY2QwNjZmNWUyZTMiLCJzaWdfdmFsX2NsYWltcyI6
       eyJzaWciOlt7ImV4dCI6bnVsbCwic2lnX3ZhbCI6W3sibXNnIjoiSW52YWxpZCBz
       aWduYXR1cmUiLCJleHQiOm51bGwsInJlcyI6IkZBSUxFRCIsInBvbCI6Imh0dHA6
       XC9cL2lkLnN3ZWRlbmNvbm5lY3Quc2VcL3N2dFwvc2lndmFsLXBvbGljeVwvY2hh
       aW5cLzAxIn1dLCJzaWdfcmVmIjp7InNpZ19oYXNoIjoiQmh1RTlCQ1lkcUxneW93
       bDJQYm1uSzlkSkFtaVZ0VDF1OVZnaUY5OWgyaFZQekU0WExXdmJDUGU0YUNKM0l6
       RmZvTDlrM3RXcjBXK3d5OUJlcWlyY1E9PSIsImlkIjpudWxsLCJzYl9oYXNoIjoi
       YnVlcTVIVE8xYnRwQ3JYUlg3VHpFS1VyTkpRaEdHOHFCaDR3eEVTcVJMM0J6bjRj
       bHZLMzdqWXUwS2pNTWtnSlFFTWZBMWIzaW1peTc5dDdoK1loOHc9PSJ9LCJzaWdu
       ZXJfY2VydF9yZWYiOnsicmVmIjpbIk5TdUZNXC92SitiZUJsUXRRVHptY1loNXg3
       TDhXQzlFMUtQSFJBMWlvTk9sS1ZHYmxhOVVSelljc2lzQXgyYmNzcU9oa3ZWVGMz
       bUs5RTZhZzA3aGZhdz09Il0sInR5cGUiOiJjaGFpbl9oYXNoIn0sInNpZ19kYXRh
       X3JlZiI6W3sicmVmIjoiMCAxMjI5MzUgMTI3OTM3IDI3NDMwIiwiaGFzaCI6Imt1
       VWI4NkZzTU5tSmwzdjRiUUswOUZrUWd2bzlReDAxbk5SeVFLVVppaEdFdW1kVnF0
       dUJLTlBxWkkxVHpDUWV3Nm44b0ZNak5oQjhDMFhNSmxrRE9RPT0ifV0sInRpbWVf
       dmFsIjpbXX1dLCJleHQiOnsibmFtZTIiOiJ2YWwyIiwibmFtZTEiOiJ2YWwxIn0s
       InZlciI6IjEuMCIsInByb2ZpbGUiOiJQREYiLCJoYXNoX2FsZ28iOiJodHRwOlwv
       XC93d3cudzMub3JnXC8yMDAxXC8wNFwveG1sZW5jI3NoYTUxMiJ9fQ.DhrCRxT_U
       8LeqK1BU9-5Bqui2cs5n21PrSqPnDtVa7mxUtqTnouOXjVfuWR0lfNAjEkc1y2QS
       X5x2dmMdCpNLWX127UHYiAm8NzeYuoWqdnxKiy61hZ1l0Jldnk52ngG_2UNDnrCG
       Bo9OgC90kG2bFQimZB3WgVtE7ad_HAwIXwd-vEHt6Sf2yWXlUTYqQ1Dxgq6pTKQn
       uf5ahsHVyeDihgNeix8-cGx1MEvvHNUpCcIXBx67BEcZ-SrqRoIZkVqEcW83KFMg
       qKWmWDgp4z_CKM5ix2dVzwp1GvYOM6M3QUKYgmiNA6dMWJvXeJZ-KKi5A-6gEqfg
       OsixuZechcDon_3nMzEeNBSJFXU7ohkvxIJN9LXNFAxzAT2UmASxrL9wvaQMmJHY
       Meet-vUsOPWcsq07eKO5bnsYwrs9igYeotgcT_Nl74Rmf9uMye_IgyzlS_NLL4xq
       9Aaf6LPXWZ0S_plugvfzv7HuzXNOY994voq8sOpO9xKYhqYnzbdDFKU

   Decoded JWT Header:

       {
         "kid" : "OenI+434JhbvfDntfV\/8rOxG7FkvyjaKVJaVqIFBXohVhAe5fK8an
                  ov1S688r7Kbal+fvpaH1j8ibg52QBy1PQ==",
         "typ" : "JWT",
         "alg" : "RS512"
       }

   Decoded JWT Claims:









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       {
         "aud" : "http://example.com/audience1",
         "iss" : "https://swedenconnect.se/validator",
         "iat" : 1582730645,
         "jti" : "e22c5be6dd6cc6db834bccd066f5e2e3",
         "sig_val_claims" : {
           "sig" : [ {
             "ext" : null,
             "sig_val" : [ {
               "msg" : "Invalid signature",
               "ext" : null,
               "res" : "FAILED",
               "pol" : "http://id.swedenconnect.se/svt/sigval-policy/
                        chain/01"
             } ],
             "sig_ref" : {
               "sig_hash" : "BhuE9BCYdqLgyowl2PbmnK9dJAmiVtT1u9VgiF99h2h
                             VPzE4XLWvbCPe4aCJ3IzFfoL9k3tWr0W+wy9BeqircQ
                             ==",
               "id" : null,
               "sb_hash" : "bueq5HTO1btpCrXRX7TzEKUrNJQhGG8qBh4wxESqRL3B
                            Bzn4clvK37jYu0KjMMkgJQEMfA1b3imiy79t7h+Yh8w=
                            ="
             },
             "signer_cert_ref" : {
               "ref" : [ "NSuFM/vJ+beBlQtQTzmcYh5x7L8WC9E1KPHRA1ioNOlKVG
                          bla9URzYcsisAx2bcsqOhkvVTc3mK9E6ag07hfaw==" ],
               "type" : "chain_hash"
             },
             "sig_data_ref" : [ {
               "ref" : "0 122935 127937 27430",
               "hash" : "kuUb86FsMNmJl3v4bQK09FkQgvo9Qx01nNRyQKUZihGEumd
                         VqtuBKNPqZI1TzCQew6n8oFMjNhB8C0XMJlkDOQ=="
             } ],
             "time_val" : [ ]
           } ],
           "ext" : {
             "name2" : "val2",
             "name1" : "val1"
           },
           "ver" : "1.0",
           "profile" : "PDF",
           "hash_algo" : "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha512"
         }
       }

Authors' Addresses




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   Stefan Santesson
   3xA Security AB
   Forskningsbyn Ideon
   SE-223 70 Lund
   Sweden

   Email: sts@aaa-sec.com


   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   516 Dranesville Road
   Herndon, VA,  20170
   United States of America

   Email: housley@vigilsec.com



































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