| RATS Working Group | M. Richardson |
| Internet-Draft | Sandelman Software Works |
| Intended status: Informational | C. Wallace |
| Expires: April 8, 2020 | Red Hound Software |
| W. Pan | |
| Huawei Technologies | |
| October 06, 2019 |
Use cases for Remote Attestation common encodings
draft-richardson-rats-usecases-05
This document details mechanisms created for performing Remote Attestation that have been used in a number of industries. The document initially focuses on existing industry verticals, mapping terminology used in those specifications to the more abstract terminology used by the IETF RATS Working Group.
The document aspires to describe possible future use cases that would be enabled by common formats.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 8, 2020.
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
The recently chartered IETF RATS WG intends to create a system of attestations that can be shared across a multitude of different users.
This document exists as place to collect use cases for the common RATS technologies in support of the IETF RATS charter point 1. This document is not expected to be published as an RFC, but remain open as a working document. It could become an appendix to provide motivation for a protocol standards document.
End-user use cases that would either directly leverage RATS technology, or would serve to inform technology choices are welcome, however.
Critical to dealing with and contrasting different technologies is to collect terms which are compatible, to distinguish those terms which are similar but used in different ways.
This section will grow to include forward and external references to terms which have been seen. When terms need to be disambiguated they will be prefixed with their source, such as "TCG(claim)" or "FIDO(relying party)"
Platform attestations generally come in two categories. This document will attempt to indicate for a particular attestation technology falls into this.
A static attestation says something about the platform on which the code is running.
A session attestation says something about how a session key used in a connection such as TLS connection was created. It is usually the result of evaluating attestations that are attached to the certificates used to create such a session.
The term "statement" is used as the generic term for the semantic content which is being attested to.
[SP800-155] offers the following definition for root of trust.
"Roots of Trust are components (software, hardware, or hybrid) and computing engines that constitute a set of unconditionally trusted functions. Reliable and trustworthy BIOS integrity measurement and reporting depend upon software agents; each software agent relies upon Roots of Trust, and the level of trustworthiness in each agent depends on its Roots of Trust. BIOS integrity measurement requires the coordination of a Measurement Agent to harvest measurements, a Storage Agent to protect the measurements from modification until they can be reported, and a Reporting Agent to reliably report the measurements. Each of these agents has a corresponding Root of Trust (Root of Trust for Measurement, etc.) These Roots of Trust must act in concert and build on each other to enable reliable and trustworthy measurement, reporting, and verification of BIOS integrity measurements."
SP800-155 uses the terms RoT for Reporting, Storage and Measurement, but not RoT for Verification – it uses "Verification Agent". Though it is assumed the verifier is trustworthy.
However, [tcgglossary] (page 9) includes a RoT for Verification (RTV) as well.
The TCG Glossary also offers a general definition for Root of Trust "A component that performs one or more security-specific functions, such as measurement, storage, reporting, verification, and/or update. It is trusted always to behave in the expected manner, because its misbehavior cannot be detected (such as by measurement) under normal operation. "
[SP800-147B] defines RoT for Update (RoTU) and RoTU verification (RoTU-v).
The TCG definition seems more concise than the NIST, but gets to the same point.
For the purpose of this documenet, a hardware root of trust refers to security functionality that is trusted to behave in the expected manner, because its misbehavior cannot be detected under normal operation and resists soft exploits by encapsulating the functionality in hardware.
Each use case will consist of a table with a number of constant fields, as illustrated below. The claim names will be loosely synchronized with the EAT draft. The architecture draft (will) describe two classes of attestation flow: the passport type (Attestee sends evidence to Attester, receives signed statment, which is sent to relying party), or the background check type (Attestee sends measurements to Relying party, Relying Party checks with Attester).
This document is not a standards track document and does not make any normative protocol requirements using terminology described in [RFC2119].
The following specifications have been covered in this document:
This document will be expanded to include summaries from:
And any additional sources suggested.
This section lists a series of cases where an attestation is done.
This is a category of claims
This is a general description for which there are many specific use cases, including [I-D.fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation] section 1.2, "Software Inventory"
This may occur because the network is not connected, or even because it can not be connected until the equipment is validated.
This can be implemented by forcing a reboot unless attestation to an Attestation Server succeeds within the period interval, and having a reboot do remediation by bringing a device into compliance, including installation of patches as needed.
This is unlike the previous section on Device Attestation in that the attestation comes from a network operator, as to the device's need to continue operating, and is evaluated by trusted firmware (the relying party), which resets a watchdog timer.
An example use case is where a device manufacturer wants to protect its intellectual property in terms of the ML model it developed and that runs in the devices that its customers purchased, and it wants to prevent attackers, potentially including the customer themselves, from seeing the details of the model. This works by having some protected environment (e.g., a hardware TEE) in the device attest to some manufacturer's service, which if attestation succeeds, then the manufacturer service releases the model, or a key to decrypt the model, to the requester. If a hardware TEE is involved, then this use case overlaps with the TEEP use case.
The consortium seeks to have the following things attested: system configuration, group membership, and virtualization status.
This is a peer-to-peer protocol so each device in the consortium is a relying party. The attestation may be requested online by another entity within the consortium, but not by other parties. The attestation needs to be compact and interoperable and may be included in the blockchain itself at the completion of the consensus algorithm.
The attestation will need to start in a hardware RoT in order to validate if the system is running real hardware rather than running a virtual machine.
The tenant virtual machines will do verification as per 5.1
The network operator wants to know if the system as a whole is free of malware, but the network operator is not allowed to know who the tenants are.
This is contrasted to the Chassis + Line Cards case (To Be Defined: TBD).
Multiple Line Cards, but a small attestation system on the main card can combine things together. This is a kind of proxy.
Key storage attestations may be consumed by systems provisioning public key certificates for devices or human users. In these cases, attestations may be incorporated into certificate request protocols (e.g., EST {#rfc7030}, CMP {#rfc4210}, ACME {#rfc8555}, SCEP [I-D.gutmann-scep], etc.) and processed by registration authorities or certification authorities prior to determining contents for any issued certificate.
The simplest use case is the claim of some specific coordinates.
The second use case is the claim that some other devices are nearby. This may be absolute ("I am near device X, which claims to be at location A"), or just relative, ("I am near device X"). This use could use "I am here" or "I am near" claims from a 1:1 basis with device X, or use some other protocol. The nature of how the proximity was established would be part of this claim. In order to defeat a variety of mechanisms that might attempt to proxy ("wormhole") radio communications, highly precise clocks may be required, and there may also have to be attestations as to the precision of those clocks.
An additional example of being near would be for the case where two smartphones can establish that they are together by recording a common random movement, such as both devices being shaken together. Each device may validate the claim from the other (in a disconnected fashion), or a third party may validate the claim as the relying party.
This could be used to establish that a medical professional was in proximity of a patient with implanted devices who needs help.
A third way to establish location is for a third party to communicate directly with the relying party. The nature of how this trust is established (and whether it is done recursively) is outside of the scope here. What is critical is that the identity of "You" can be communicated through the third party in a way that the relying party can use, but other intermediaries can not view.
The device chain of custody from the original device manufacturer to the new owner may also be verified as part of device provenance attestation. The chain of custody history may be collected by a cloud service or similar capability that the supply chain and owner agree to use.
[I-D.fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation] section 1.2 refers to this as "Provable Device Identity", and section 2.3 details the parties.
The TCG RIV Reference Document addresses the problem of knowing if a networking device should be part of a network, if it belongs to the operator, and if it is running appropriate software. The work covers most of the use cases in Section 5.1.
This proposal is available as [I-D.fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation]. The goal is to be multi-vendor, scalable and extensible. The proposal intentionally limits itself to:
Service providers and enterprises deploy hundreds of routers, many of them in remote locations where they're difficult to access or secure. The point of remote attestation is to:
The use case described is to be able to monitor the authenticity of software versions and configurations running on each device. This allows owners and auditors to detect deviation from approved software and firmware versions and configurations, potentially identifying infected devices. [RFC5209]
Attestation may be performed by network management systems. Networking Equipment is often highly interconnected, so it's also possible that attestation could be performed by neighboring devices.
Specifically listed to be out of scope for the first generation includes: Linux processes, composite assemblies of hardware/software created by end-customers, and equipment that uses Sleep or Hibernate modes. There is an intention to cover some of these are topics in future versions of the documents.
The TCG-RIV Attestation leverages the TPM to make a series of measurements during the boot process, and to have the TPM sign those measurements. The resulting "PCR" hashes are then available to an external verifier.
A critical component of the RIV is compatibility with existing TPM practice for attestation proceedures, as spelled out in the TCG TAP Informational Model [tapinfomodel] and TPM architecture specifications [tpmarchspec].
The TCG uses the following terminology:
The TCG document builds upon a number of IETF technologies: SNMP (Attestation MIB), YANG, XML, JSON, CBOR, NETCONF, RESTCONF, CoAP, TLS and SSH. The TCG document leverages the 802.1AR IDevID and LDevID processes.
[keystore] describes a system used in smart phones that run the Android operation system. The system is primarily a software container to contain and control access to cryptographic keys, and therefore provides many of the same functions that a hardware Trusted Platform Module might provide.
The uses described in section Section 5.7 are the primary focus.
On hardware which is supported, the Android Keystore will make use of whatever trusted hardware is available, including use of a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or Secure Element (SE). The Keystore therefore abstracts the hardware, and guarantees to applications that the same APIs can be used on both more and less capable devices.
A great deal of focus from the Android Keystore seems to be on providing fine-grained authorization of what keys can be used by which applications.
XXX - clearly there must be additional (intended?) use cases that provide some kind of attestation.
Android 9 on Pixel 2 and 3 can provided protected confirmation messages. This uses hardware access from the TPM/TEE to display a message directly to the user, and receives confirmation directly from the user. A hash of the contents of the message can provided in an attestation that the device provides.
In addition, the Android Keystore provides attestation information about itself for use by FIDO.
QUOTE: Finally, the Verified Boot state is included in key attestation certificates (provided by Keymaster/Strongbox) in the deviceLocked and verifiedBootState fields, which can be verified by apps as well as passed onto backend services to remotely verify boot integrity
The FIDO Alliance [fido] has a number of specifications aimed primarily at eliminating the need for passwords for authentication to online services. The goal is to leverage asymmetric cryptographic operations in common browser and smart-phone platforms so that users can easily authentication.
The use cases of Section 5.7 are primary.
FIDO specifications extend to various hardware second factor authentication devices.
Terminology includes:
FIDO2 had a Key Attestation Format [fidoattestation], and a Signature Format [fidosignature], but these have been combined into the W3C document [fido_w3c] specification.
A FIDO use case involves the relying party receiving a device attestation about the biometric system that performs the identication of the human. It is the state of the biometric system that is being attested to, not the identity of the human!
FIDO does provides a transport in the form of the WebAuthn and FIDO CTAP protocols.
According to [fidotechnote] FIDO uses attestation to make claims about the kind of device which is be used to enroll. Keypairs are generated on a per-device model basis, with a certificate having a trust chain that leads back to a well-known root certificate. It is expected that as many as 100,000 devices in a production run would have the same public and private key pair. One assumes that this is stored in a tamper-proof TPM so it is relatively difficult to get this key out. The use of this key attests to the the device type, and the kind of protections for keys that the relying party may assume, not to the identity of the end user.
This section provides examples of some existing attestation formats.
Android Keystore attestations take the form of X.509 certificates. The examples below package the attestation certificate along with intermediate CA certificates required to validate the attestation as a certificates-only SignedData message [RFC5652]. The trust anchor is available here: [keystore_attestation].
The attestations below were generated using the generateKeyPair method from the DevicePolicyManager class using code similar to the following.
KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder builder = null;
if(hasStrongBox) {
builder = new KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(
m_alias,
KeyProperties.PURPOSE_SIGN | KeyProperties.PURPOSE_VERIFY | KeyProperties.PURPOSE_ENCRYPT | KeyProperties.PURPOSE_DECRYPT)
.setKeySize(2048)
.setDigests(KeyProperties.DIGEST_NONE, KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA256)
.setBlockModes(KeyProperties.BLOCK_MODE_CBC, KeyProperties.BLOCK_MODE_GCM)
.setEncryptionPaddings(KeyProperties.ENCRYPTION_PADDING_RSA_PKCS1, KeyProperties.ENCRYPTION_PADDING_RSA_OAEP)
.setSignaturePaddings(KeyProperties.SIGNATURE_PADDING_RSA_PSS, KeyProperties.SIGNATURE_PADDING_RSA_PKCS1)
.setUserAuthenticationRequired(false)
.setIsStrongBoxBacked(true)
.setUnlockedDeviceRequired(true);
}
else {
builder = new KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(
m_alias,
KeyProperties.PURPOSE_SIGN | KeyProperties.PURPOSE_VERIFY | KeyProperties.PURPOSE_ENCRYPT | KeyProperties.PURPOSE_DECRYPT)
.setKeySize(2048)
.setDigests(KeyProperties.DIGEST_NONE, KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA256, KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA384, KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA512)
.setBlockModes(KeyProperties.BLOCK_MODE_CBC, KeyProperties.BLOCK_MODE_CTR,KeyProperties.BLOCK_MODE_GCM)
.setEncryptionPaddings(KeyProperties.ENCRYPTION_PADDING_RSA_PKCS1, KeyProperties.ENCRYPTION_PADDING_RSA_OAEP)
.setSignaturePaddings(KeyProperties.SIGNATURE_PADDING_RSA_PSS, KeyProperties.SIGNATURE_PADDING_RSA_PKCS1)
.setUserAuthenticationRequired(false)
.setIsStrongBoxBacked(false)
.setUnlockedDeviceRequired(true);
}
builder.setAttestationChallenge(challenge_bytes);
KeyGenParameterSpec keySpec = builder.build();
AttestedKeyPair akp = dpm.generateKeyPair(componentName, algorithm, keySpec, idAttestationFlags);
Annotations included below are delimited by ASN.1 comments, i.e., –. Annotations should be consistent with structures described here: [keystore_attestation].
0 1172: SEQUENCE {
4 764: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 1: INTEGER 1
16 13: SEQUENCE {
18 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
29 0: NULL
: }
31 27: SEQUENCE {
33 25: SET {
35 23: SEQUENCE {
37 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
42 16: PrintableString 'c6047571d8f0d17c'
: }
: }
: }
60 32: SEQUENCE {
62 13: UTCTime 01/01/1970 00:00:00 GMT
77 15: GeneralizedTime 07/02/2106 06:28:15 GMT
: }
94 31: SEQUENCE {
96 29: SET {
98 27: SEQUENCE {
100 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
105 20: UTF8String 'Android Keystore Key'
: }
: }
: }
127 290: SEQUENCE {
131 13: SEQUENCE {
133 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
144 0: NULL
: }
146 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
151 266: SEQUENCE {
155 257: INTEGER
: 00 B5 3A 83 61 A2 85 CC D2 D6 25 7F 07 0B B4 A0
: F6 FE 05 01 C9 55 CB 0D 18 D2 C6 79 BA 82 12 67
: 75 8D 5B F3 24 D3 F8 EA 99 82 7D 1F 5E CD 77 D6
: 99 11 13 FF 18 C9 3D 4D 01 C5 8E E9 04 E7 17 E2
: 88 12 2B B9 A1 77 2F C2 4F 57 78 98 4E E3 DE 7A
: 1B 18 BE D3 ED C9 59 A0 24 50 E1 FA AC 81 B6 DA
: 80 B0 BD 48 AD 26 9C 4A 4E CE 54 17 58 C1 F4 F8
: 7F 3C 5D 8F C8 2C 2A 7B 18 95 B3 D4 E0 3A C8 9D
: [ Another 129 bytes skipped ]
416 3: INTEGER 65537
: }
: }
: }
421 347: [3] {
425 343: SEQUENCE {
429 14: SEQUENCE {
431 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
436 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
439 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
441 2: BIT STRING 4 unused bits
: '1100'B
: }
: }
445 323: SEQUENCE {
449 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 1 17'
461 307: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { -- Attestation Extension
465 303: SEQUENCE { -- KeyDescription
469 1: INTEGER 2 -- attestationVersion (KM3)
472 1: ENUMERATED 1 -- attestationSecurityLevel (TrustedEnv.)
475 1: INTEGER 3 -- keymasterVersion
478 1: ENUMERATED 1 -- keymasterSecurityLevel (TrustedEnv.)
481 9: OCTET STRING 'challenge' -- attestationChallenge
492 0: OCTET STRING -- reserved
: Error: Object has zero length.
494 44: SEQUENCE { -- softwareEnforced
496 8: [701] { -- creationDateTime
500 6: INTEGER 01 64 47 2A 4B 64
: }
508 28: [709] { -- attestationApplicationId
512 26: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
514 24: SEQUENCE { -- AttestationApplicationId
516 20: SET { -- package_infos
518 18: SEQUENCE { -- AttestationPackageInfo
520 13: OCTET STRING 'AndroidSystem' -- package_name
535 1: INTEGER 1 -- version
: }
: }
538 0: SET {} -- signature_digests
: }
: }
: }
: }
540 229: SEQUENCE { -- hardwareEnforced
543 14: [1] { -- purpose
545 12: SET {
547 1: INTEGER 0 -- KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT
550 1: INTEGER 1 -- KeyPurpose.DECRYPT
553 1: INTEGER 2 -- KeyPurpose.SIGN
556 1: INTEGER 3 -- KeyPurpose.VERIFY
: }
: }
559 3: [2] { -- algorithm
561 1: INTEGER 1 -- Algorithm.RSA
: }
564 4: [3] { -- keySize
566 2: INTEGER 2048
: }
570 11: [5] { -- digest
572 9: SET {
574 1: INTEGER 4 -- Digest.SHA256
577 1: INTEGER 5 -- Digest.SHA384
580 1: INTEGER 6 -- Digest.SHA512
: }
: }
583 14: [6] { -- padding
585 12: SET {
587 1: INTEGER 4 -- PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT
590 1: INTEGER 2 -- PaddingMode.RSA_OAEP
593 1: INTEGER 3 -- PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN
596 1: INTEGER 5 -- PaddingMode.RSA_PSS
: }
: }
599 5: [200] { -- rsaPublicExponent
603 3: INTEGER 65537
: }
608 2: [503] { -- noAuthRequired
612 0: NULL -- documentation indicates this is a Boolean
: }
614 3: [702] { -- origin
618 1: INTEGER 0 -- KeyOrigin.GENERATED
: }
621 2: [703] { -- rollbackResistant
625 0: NULL -- documentation indicates this is a Boolean
: }
627 42: [704] { -- rootOfTrust
631 40: SEQUENCE { -- verifiedBootKey
633 32: OCTET STRING
: 19 62 B0 53 85 79 FF CE 9A C9 F5 07 C4 6A FE 3B
: 92 05 5B AC 71 46 46 22 83 C8 5C 50 0B E7 8D 82
667 1: BOOLEAN TRUE -- deviceLocked
670 1: ENUMERATED 0 -- verifiedBootState (verified)
: }
: }
673 5: [705] { -- osVersion
677 3: INTEGER 90000 -- Android P
: }
682 5: [706] { -- osPatchLevel
686 3: INTEGER 201806 -- June 2018
: }
691 8: [710] { -- attestationIdBrand
695 6: OCTET STRING 'google'
: }
703 9: [711] { -- attestationIdDevice
707 7: OCTET STRING 'walleye'
: }
716 9: [712] { -- attestationIdProduct
720 7: OCTET STRING 'walleye'
: }
729 14: [713] { -- attestationIdSerial
733 12: OCTET STRING 'HT83K1A03849'
: }
747 8: [716] { -- attestationIdManufacturer
751 6: OCTET STRING 'Google'
: }
759 9: [717] { -- attestationIdModel
763 7: OCTET STRING 'Pixel 2'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
772 13: SEQUENCE {
774 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
785 0: NULL
: }
787 385: BIT STRING
: 05 41 B9 13 11 53 93 A2 02 62 1F 15 35 8E D9 7C
: A1 D5 2E ED 13 AC 24 26 B2 A1 2F EE B4 0C 4D 71
: DC 9F 55 EC A1 F6 64 62 F2 73 A8 7E FC 48 63 29
: 1E F5 0D 48 F3 73 43 0C 00 E0 D4 07 86 A6 A4 38
: 0E A8 47 0F 27 01 01 31 52 F6 62 8A 4B 80 BE 72
: FB 02 E7 56 84 CA CA 4D C3 6C 7C B2 BA C7 D7 9B
: C5 9D 90 65 4E F5 54 8F 25 CC 11 7F 8E 77 10 6A
: 6E 9F 80 89 48 8B 1D 51 AA 3B B7 C5 24 3C 28 B1
: [ Another 256 bytes skipped ]
: }
0 1304: SEQUENCE {
4 768: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 10: INTEGER 10 34 53 32 94 08 68 79 38 72
25 13: SEQUENCE {
27 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
38 0: NULL
: }
40 27: SEQUENCE {
42 25: SET {
44 23: SEQUENCE {
46 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
51 16: PrintableString '87f4514475ba0a2b'
: }
: }
: }
69 30: SEQUENCE {
71 13: UTCTime 26/05/2016 17:14:51 GMT
86 13: UTCTime 24/05/2026 17:14:51 GMT
: }
101 27: SEQUENCE {
103 25: SET {
105 23: SEQUENCE {
107 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
112 16: PrintableString 'c6047571d8f0d17c'
: }
: }
: }
130 418: SEQUENCE {
134 13: SEQUENCE {
136 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
147 0: NULL
: }
149 399: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
154 394: SEQUENCE {
158 385: INTEGER
: 00 B3 01 0D 78 BC 06 33 25 CA D6 A7 2C EF 49 05
: 4C C1 77 36 F2 E5 7B E8 4C 0A 87 8F 77 6A 09 45
: 9B AC E8 72 DA E2 0E 20 3D 68 30 A5 86 26 14 77
: AD 7E 93 F5 1D 38 A9 DB 5B FE B2 B8 1A 7B CD 22
: 3B 17 98 FC 1F 4F 77 2D 92 E9 DE 5F 6B 02 09 4E
: 99 86 53 98 1C 5E 23 B6 A4 61 53 A5 FB D1 37 09
: DB C0 0A 40 E9 28 E6 BE E2 8E 57 94 A9 F2 13 3A
: 11 40 D2 34 99 A6 B4 F3 99 F2 5D 4A 5D 6A 6C 4B
: [ Another 257 bytes skipped ]
547 3: INTEGER 65537
: }
: }
: }
552 221: [3] {
555 218: SEQUENCE {
558 29: SEQUENCE {
560 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
565 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
567 20: OCTET STRING
: 7B 7B F8 43 CA 1F 0F 96 27 0F 10 6F 7D 0C 23 14
: 72 8F 1D 80
: }
: }
589 31: SEQUENCE {
591 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
596 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
598 22: SEQUENCE {
600 20: [0]
: 0E 55 6F 46 F5 3B 77 67 E1 B9 73 DC 55 E6 AE EA
: B4 FD 27 DD
: }
: }
: }
622 12: SEQUENCE {
624 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
629 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
632 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
634 0: SEQUENCE {}
: }
: }
636 14: SEQUENCE {
638 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
643 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
646 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
648 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits
: '1'B (bit 0)
: }
: }
652 36: SEQUENCE {
654 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER nameConstraints (2 5 29 30)
659 29: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
661 27: SEQUENCE {
663 25: [0] {
665 23: SEQUENCE {
667 21: [2] 'invalid;email:invalid'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
690 84: SEQUENCE {
692 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
697 77: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
699 75: SEQUENCE {
701 73: SEQUENCE {
703 71: [0] {
705 69: [0] {
707 67: [6]
: 'https://android.googleapis.com/attestation/crl/1'
: '0345332940868793872'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
776 13: SEQUENCE {
778 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
789 0: NULL
: }
791 513: BIT STRING
: 69 13 A7 56 B3 9F E1 2B CE A2 09 89 E5 DC 03 B4
: B6 FF F6 1E 96 C7 62 C2 31 D1 B3 D6 1A 9E 36 CF
: C2 FC 0E 06 FA 0E CF B5 2D F8 19 D6 13 96 0B 56
: B0 EE 86 3B B1 B8 38 70 4E 57 EB D9 60 DC 58 74
: FE C8 EB A5 78 9F B7 19 5C F0 80 CF 29 16 6B 04
: 3A 5D 7C 2E 5F 11 12 36 BE 46 29 45 04 41 8F B5
: AB C6 31 5F 23 28 0C F2 7C 48 4A F6 43 AA 50 D0
: 53 96 1E AD 7C A3 89 96 BB 8B BF 2D 9A 0C 16 35
: [ Another 384 bytes skipped ]
: }
0 1393: SEQUENCE {
4 857: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 10: INTEGER 03 88 26 67 60 65 89 96 85 74
25 13: SEQUENCE {
27 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
38 0: NULL
: }
40 27: SEQUENCE {
42 25: SET {
44 23: SEQUENCE {
46 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
51 16: PrintableString 'f92009e853b6b045'
: }
: }
: }
69 30: SEQUENCE {
71 13: UTCTime 26/05/2016 17:01:32 GMT
86 13: UTCTime 24/05/2026 17:01:32 GMT
: }
101 27: SEQUENCE {
103 25: SET {
105 23: SEQUENCE {
107 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
112 16: PrintableString '87f4514475ba0a2b'
: }
: }
: }
130 546: SEQUENCE {
134 13: SEQUENCE {
136 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
147 0: NULL
: }
149 527: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
154 522: SEQUENCE {
158 513: INTEGER
: 00 D2 60 D6 45 85 E3 E2 23 79 5A DA 45 57 A7 D8
: 5B AF BD 9A 37 CB FA 97 C0 65 44 9D 3A C6 47 F6
: 0D 0B A2 74 12 CA F7 4B B9 5F FB B4 EC 5A 2B D0
: 16 01 DE BE E2 FE D2 76 0D 75 C4 B1 6A CB 3A 67
: 07 21 E0 D5 19 68 C8 1B 01 A2 24 02 FE AD 40 D6
: A7 98 16 0F A2 98 2E A7 AD 75 34 84 6F F8 CF 8A
: A1 0E 90 33 40 9E D0 86 26 57 71 CE FF CF 52 E1
: F0 F9 2B 7E 68 62 03 D8 FD FD 02 53 03 19 AC 28
: [ Another 385 bytes skipped ]
675 3: INTEGER 65537
: }
: }
: }
680 182: [3] {
683 179: SEQUENCE {
686 29: SEQUENCE {
688 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
693 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
695 20: OCTET STRING
: 0E 55 6F 46 F5 3B 77 67 E1 B9 73 DC 55 E6 AE EA
: B4 FD 27 DD
: }
: }
717 31: SEQUENCE {
719 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
724 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
726 22: SEQUENCE {
728 20: [0]
: 36 61 E1 00 7C 88 05 09 51 8B 44 6C 47 FF 1A 4C
: C9 EA 4F 12
: }
: }
: }
750 15: SEQUENCE {
752 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
757 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
760 5: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
762 3: SEQUENCE {
764 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
: }
: }
: }
767 14: SEQUENCE {
769 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
774 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
777 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
779 2: BIT STRING 1 unused bit
: '1100001'B
: }
: }
783 80: SEQUENCE {
785 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
790 73: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
792 71: SEQUENCE {
794 69: SEQUENCE {
796 67: [0] {
798 65: [0] {
800 63: [6]
: 'https://android.googleapis.com/attestation/crl/E'
: '8FA196314D2FA18'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
865 13: SEQUENCE {
867 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
878 0: NULL
: }
880 513: BIT STRING
: 0E 0D 71 4A 88 0A 58 53 B6 31 14 7D DA 22 31 C6
: 06 D6 EF 3B 22 4D D7 A5 C0 3F BF C6 B4 64 A3 FB
: 92 C2 CC 67 F4 6C 24 25 49 6E F6 CB 08 D6 A8 0D
: 94 06 7F 8C 8C 3C B1 77 CD C2 3F C7 5E A3 85 6D
: F7 A5 94 13 CD 5A 5C F3 9B 0A 0D E1 82 42 F4 C9
: 3F AD FC FB 7C AA 27 04 CC 1C 12 45 15 EB E6 70
: A0 6C DE 77 77 54 9B 1F 02 05 76 03 A4 FC 6C 07
: F4 CB BB 59 F5 CB ED 58 D8 30 9B 6E 3C F7 76 C1
: [ Another 384 bytes skipped ]
: }
0 1376: SEQUENCE {
4 840: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 9: INTEGER 00 E8 FA 19 63 14 D2 FA 18
24 13: SEQUENCE {
26 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
37 0: NULL
: }
39 27: SEQUENCE {
41 25: SET {
43 23: SEQUENCE {
45 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
50 16: PrintableString 'f92009e853b6b045'
: }
: }
: }
68 30: SEQUENCE {
70 13: UTCTime 26/05/2016 16:28:52 GMT
85 13: UTCTime 24/05/2026 16:28:52 GMT
: }
100 27: SEQUENCE {
102 25: SET {
104 23: SEQUENCE {
106 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
111 16: PrintableString 'f92009e853b6b045'
: }
: }
: }
129 546: SEQUENCE {
133 13: SEQUENCE {
135 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
146 0: NULL
: }
148 527: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
153 522: SEQUENCE {
157 513: INTEGER
: 00 AF B6 C7 82 2B B1 A7 01 EC 2B B4 2E 8B CC 54
: 16 63 AB EF 98 2F 32 C7 7F 75 31 03 0C 97 52 4B
: 1B 5F E8 09 FB C7 2A A9 45 1F 74 3C BD 9A 6F 13
: 35 74 4A A5 5E 77 F6 B6 AC 35 35 EE 17 C2 5E 63
: 95 17 DD 9C 92 E6 37 4A 53 CB FE 25 8F 8F FB B6
: FD 12 93 78 A2 2A 4C A9 9C 45 2D 47 A5 9F 32 01
: F4 41 97 CA 1C CD 7E 76 2F B2 F5 31 51 B6 FE B2
: FF FD 2B 6F E4 FE 5B C6 BD 9E C3 4B FE 08 23 9D
: [ Another 385 bytes skipped ]
674 3: INTEGER 65537
: }
: }
: }
679 166: [3] {
682 163: SEQUENCE {
685 29: SEQUENCE {
687 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
692 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
694 20: OCTET STRING
: 36 61 E1 00 7C 88 05 09 51 8B 44 6C 47 FF 1A 4C
: C9 EA 4F 12
: }
: }
716 31: SEQUENCE {
718 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
723 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
725 22: SEQUENCE {
727 20: [0]
: 36 61 E1 00 7C 88 05 09 51 8B 44 6C 47 FF 1A 4C
: C9 EA 4F 12
: }
: }
: }
749 15: SEQUENCE {
751 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
756 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
759 5: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
761 3: SEQUENCE {
763 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
: }
: }
: }
766 14: SEQUENCE {
768 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
773 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
776 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
778 2: BIT STRING 1 unused bit
: '1100001'B
: }
: }
782 64: SEQUENCE {
784 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
789 57: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
791 55: SEQUENCE {
793 53: SEQUENCE {
795 51: [0] {
797 49: [0] {
799 47: [6]
: 'https://android.googleapis.com/attestation/crl/'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
848 13: SEQUENCE {
850 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
861 0: NULL
: }
863 513: BIT STRING
: 20 C8 C3 8D 4B DC A9 57 1B 46 8C 89 2F FF 72 AA
: C6 F8 44 A1 1D 41 A8 F0 73 6C C3 7D 16 D6 42 6D
: 8E 7E 94 07 04 4C EA 39 E6 8B 07 C1 3D BF 15 03
: DD 5C 85 BD AF B2 C0 2D 5F 6C DB 4E FA 81 27 DF
: 8B 04 F1 82 77 0F C4 E7 74 5B 7F CE AA 87 12 9A
: 88 01 CE 8E 9B C0 CB 96 37 9B 4D 26 A8 2D 30 FD
: 9C 2F 8E ED 6D C1 BE 2F 84 B6 89 E4 D9 14 25 8B
: 14 4B BA E6 24 A1 C7 06 71 13 2E 2F 06 16 A8 84
: [ Another 384 bytes skipped ]
: }
The structures below are not annotated except where the difference is specific to the difference between the TEE structure shown above and artifacts emitted by StrongBox.
0 5143: SEQUENCE {
4 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER signedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 2)
15 5128: [0] {
19 5124: SEQUENCE {
23 1: INTEGER 1
26 0: SET {}
28 11: SEQUENCE {
30 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1)
: }
41 5100: [0] {
45 1114: SEQUENCE {
49 834: SEQUENCE {
53 3: [0] {
55 1: INTEGER 2
: }
58 1: INTEGER 1
61 13: SEQUENCE {
63 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
74 0: NULL
: }
76 47: SEQUENCE {
78 25: SET {
80 23: SEQUENCE {
82 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
87 16: PrintableString '90e8da3cadfc7820'
: }
: }
105 18: SET {
107 16: SEQUENCE {
109 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER title (2 5 4 12)
114 9: UTF8String 'StrongBox'
: }
: }
: }
125 30: SEQUENCE {
127 13: UTCTime 01/01/1970 00:00:00 GMT
142 13: UTCTime 23/05/2028 23:59:59 GMT
: }
157 31: SEQUENCE {
159 29: SET {
161 27: SEQUENCE {
163 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
168 20: UTF8String 'Android Keystore Key'
: }
: }
: }
190 290: SEQUENCE {
194 13: SEQUENCE {
196 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
207 0: NULL
: }
209 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
214 266: SEQUENCE {
218 257: INTEGER
: 00 DE 98 94 D5 E5 05 98 E8 FC 73 4D 26 FB 48 6A
: CA 06 A0 24 FA 05 D1 D2 32 10 46 F8 50 DD 3E 0D
: DF 4F 95 53 D2 CB 10 1F 00 B2 62 15 1E 21 7E 05
: C6 10 AC EE 7A D8 69 F1 1F 32 C3 17 CA D7 07 BE
: 3B 2B 83 0F B4 9C 3D C7 13 0B 9C 59 2F 1A 38 CE
: A5 1D 95 A7 3C EE 70 6A CF 41 FF 55 3F E0 9C 69
: E5 A0 C1 19 EF 40 E9 40 FC 74 D3 3B 96 D9 0E C1
: C3 9D 14 10 0C A6 95 19 49 88 F4 AB 74 FC 86 A6
: [ Another 129 bytes skipped ]
479 3: INTEGER 65537
: }
: }
: }
484 399: [3] {
488 395: SEQUENCE {
492 14: SEQUENCE {
494 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
499 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
502 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
504 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits
: '1'B (bit 0)
: }
: }
508 375: SEQUENCE {
512 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 1 17'
524 359: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
528 355: SEQUENCE {
532 1: INTEGER 3
535 1: ENUMERATED 2 -- attestationSecurityLevel (StrongBox)
538 1: INTEGER 4
541 1: ENUMERATED 2 -- attestationSecurityLevel (StrongBox)
544 9: OCTET STRING 'challenge'
555 0: OCTET STRING
: Error: Object has zero length.
557 53: SEQUENCE {
559 2: [509] {
563 0: NULL
: }
565 11: [701] {
569 9: INTEGER 00 FF FF FF FF FF E5 99 78
: }
580 28: [709] {
584 26: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
586 24: SEQUENCE {
588 20: SET {
590 18: SEQUENCE {
592 13: OCTET STRING 'AndroidSystem'
607 1: INTEGER 1
: }
: }
610 0: SET {}
: }
: }
: }
: }
612 271: SEQUENCE {
616 14: [1] {
618 12: SET {
620 1: INTEGER 0
623 1: INTEGER 1
626 1: INTEGER 2
629 1: INTEGER 3
: }
: }
632 3: [2] {
634 1: INTEGER 1
: }
637 4: [3] {
639 2: INTEGER 2048
: }
643 8: [4] {
645 6: SET {
647 1: INTEGER 2
650 1: INTEGER 32
: }
: }
653 8: [5] {
655 6: SET {
657 1: INTEGER 0
660 1: INTEGER 4
: }
: }
663 14: [6] {
665 12: SET {
667 1: INTEGER 2
670 1: INTEGER 3
673 1: INTEGER 4
676 1: INTEGER 5
: }
: }
679 2: [503] {
683 0: NULL
: }
685 3: [702] {
689 1: INTEGER 0
: }
692 76: [704] {
696 74: SEQUENCE {
698 32: OCTET STRING
: 61 FD A1 2B 32 ED 84 21 4A 9C F1 3D 1A FF B7 AA
: 80 BD 8A 26 8A 86 1E D4 BB 7A 15 17 0F 1A B0 0C
732 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
735 1: ENUMERATED 0
738 32: OCTET STRING
: 77 96 C5 3D 0E 09 46 2B BA BB FB 7B 8A 65 F6 8D
: EF 5C 46 88 BF 99 C4 1E 88 42 01 4D 1F 01 2D C5
: }
: }
772 3: [705] {
776 1: INTEGER 0
: }
779 5: [706] {
783 3: INTEGER 201903
: }
788 8: [710] {
792 6: OCTET STRING 'google'
: }
800 10: [711] {
804 8: OCTET STRING 'blueline'
: }
814 10: [712] {
818 8: OCTET STRING 'blueline'
: }
828 11: [713] {
832 9: OCTET STRING '8A2X0KLUU'
: }
843 8: [716] {
847 6: OCTET STRING 'Google'
: }
855 9: [717] {
859 7: OCTET STRING 'Pixel 3'
: }
868 6: [718] {
872 4: INTEGER 20180905
: }
878 5: [719] {
882 3: INTEGER 201903
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
887 13: SEQUENCE {
889 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
900 0: NULL
: }
902 257: BIT STRING
: 83 EA 59 8D BE 37 4A D5 C0 FC F8 FB AC 8B 72 1E
: A5 C2 3B 0C C0 04 1B C0 5A 18 A5 DF D4 67 1D B9
: 08 42 4B E2 2C AC 07 0F D8 0E 24 97 56 9E 14 F2
: D0 AC DD 1E FC DD 68 20 11 DF 88 B8 B6 22 AD 2B
: DB 9C 2E 5C 3F AF 0B 8F 02 68 AA 34 4B 5E C8 75
: B1 1A 09 D2 19 41 24 61 65 97 2C 0D A4 78 43 A7
: 9A 27 B2 4E 24 11 4F FF E2 D8 04 56 39 75 B2 34
: D8 18 C7 25 F3 3F C0 6A 37 AB 49 B6 96 51 61 72
: [ Another 128 bytes skipped ]
: }
1163 1181: SEQUENCE {
1167 645: SEQUENCE {
1171 3: [0] {
1173 1: INTEGER 2
: }
1176 10: INTEGER 17 10 24 68 40 71 02 97 78 50
1188 13: SEQUENCE {
1190 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
1201 0: NULL
: }
1203 47: SEQUENCE {
1205 25: SET {
1207 23: SEQUENCE {
1209 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
1214 16: PrintableString 'ccd18b9b608d658e'
: }
: }
1232 18: SET {
1234 16: SEQUENCE {
1236 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER title (2 5 4 12)
1241 9: UTF8String 'StrongBox'
: }
: }
: }
1252 30: SEQUENCE {
1254 13: UTCTime 25/05/2018 23:28:47 GMT
1269 13: UTCTime 22/05/2028 23:28:47 GMT
: }
1284 47: SEQUENCE {
1286 25: SET {
1288 23: SEQUENCE {
1290 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
1295 16: PrintableString '90e8da3cadfc7820'
: }
: }
1313 18: SET {
1315 16: SEQUENCE {
1317 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER title (2 5 4 12)
1322 9: UTF8String 'StrongBox'
: }
: }
: }
1333 290: SEQUENCE {
1337 13: SEQUENCE {
1339 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
1350 0: NULL
: }
1352 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
1357 266: SEQUENCE {
1361 257: INTEGER
: 00 A5 09 D4 09 D2 30 19 36 34 71 FD 7D 41 89 E6
: 2C A5 9D 10 1B 4F 40 6A B0 5F 56 34 16 E6 EB D7
: F3 E9 C5 DC 20 F3 86 D1 77 19 D7 15 1F E7 EC 62
: DC 0A BC 64 E9 18 52 B0 AA B8 FF 58 6A E0 0F B8
: 56 AF 77 D3 CE 3C DC 48 52 DD B2 86 0D 76 17 7C
: FD EE B4 E6 6E 0A 08 9E 06 CA 0F EC 4B B0 7C AF
: EA 82 27 A8 C9 A7 63 DA 89 F6 30 BA 3C 3A E5 C6
: EF 11 06 42 8A 2E FE 19 BE F2 C7 3B 34 16 B2 E2
: [ Another 129 bytes skipped ]
1622 3: INTEGER 65537
: }
: }
: }
1627 186: [3] {
1630 183: SEQUENCE {
1633 29: SEQUENCE {
1635 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
1640 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1642 20: OCTET STRING
: 77 A4 AD DF 1D 29 89 CA 92 E3 BA DE 27 3C 70 DF
: 36 03 7C 0C
: }
: }
1664 31: SEQUENCE {
1666 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
1671 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1673 22: SEQUENCE {
1675 20: [0]
: 1B 17 70 C6 97 DC 84 54 75 7C 3C 98 5C E6 1D 1D
: 08 59 5D 53
: }
: }
: }
1697 15: SEQUENCE {
1699 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
1704 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
1707 5: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1709 3: SEQUENCE {
1711 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
: }
: }
: }
1714 14: SEQUENCE {
1716 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
1721 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
1724 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1726 2: BIT STRING 2 unused bits
: '100000'B (bit 5)
: }
: }
1730 84: SEQUENCE {
1732 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
1737 77: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1739 75: SEQUENCE {
1741 73: SEQUENCE {
1743 71: [0] {
1745 69: [0] {
1747 67: [6]
: 'https://android.googleapis.com/attestation/crl/1'
: '7102468407102977850'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
1816 13: SEQUENCE {
1818 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
1829 0: NULL
: }
1831 513: BIT STRING
: 13 22 DA F2 92 93 CE C0 9F 70 40 C9 DA 85 6B 61
: 6F 8F BE E0 A4 04 55 C1 63 84 61 37 F5 4B 71 6D
: 62 AA 6F BF 6C E8 48 03 AD 28 85 21 9E 3C 1C 91
: 48 EE 65 28 65 70 D0 BD 5B CC DB CE B1 F5 B5 C3
: CA 7A A9 C8 8A 68 12 8A CA 6A 85 A6 BC DA 36 E9
: B9 94 35 82 5B CA BC B6 9F 83 03 7F 21 6C EE 82
: C1 3F BD C1 41 4B DD 1A 6F 6C AF 4A 52 FC 19 19
: 17 AC 29 0C 5E D7 57 90 D5 B1 2B 36 29 1F 45 33
: [ Another 384 bytes skipped ]
: }
2348 1376: SEQUENCE {
2352 840: SEQUENCE {
2356 3: [0] {
2358 1: INTEGER 2
: }
2361 9: INTEGER 00 E8 FA 19 63 14 D2 FA 18
2372 13: SEQUENCE {
2374 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
2385 0: NULL
: }
2387 27: SEQUENCE {
2389 25: SET {
2391 23: SEQUENCE {
2393 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
2398 16: PrintableString 'f92009e853b6b045'
: }
: }
: }
2416 30: SEQUENCE {
2418 13: UTCTime 26/05/2016 16:28:52 GMT
2433 13: UTCTime 24/05/2026 16:28:52 GMT
: }
2448 27: SEQUENCE {
2450 25: SET {
2452 23: SEQUENCE {
2454 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
2459 16: PrintableString 'f92009e853b6b045'
: }
: }
: }
2477 546: SEQUENCE {
2481 13: SEQUENCE {
2483 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
2494 0: NULL
: }
2496 527: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
2501 522: SEQUENCE {
2505 513: INTEGER
: 00 AF B6 C7 82 2B B1 A7 01 EC 2B B4 2E 8B CC 54
: 16 63 AB EF 98 2F 32 C7 7F 75 31 03 0C 97 52 4B
: 1B 5F E8 09 FB C7 2A A9 45 1F 74 3C BD 9A 6F 13
: 35 74 4A A5 5E 77 F6 B6 AC 35 35 EE 17 C2 5E 63
: 95 17 DD 9C 92 E6 37 4A 53 CB FE 25 8F 8F FB B6
: FD 12 93 78 A2 2A 4C A9 9C 45 2D 47 A5 9F 32 01
: F4 41 97 CA 1C CD 7E 76 2F B2 F5 31 51 B6 FE B2
: FF FD 2B 6F E4 FE 5B C6 BD 9E C3 4B FE 08 23 9D
: [ Another 385 bytes skipped ]
3022 3: INTEGER 65537
: }
: }
: }
3027 166: [3] {
3030 163: SEQUENCE {
3033 29: SEQUENCE {
3035 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
3040 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
3042 20: OCTET STRING
: 36 61 E1 00 7C 88 05 09 51 8B 44 6C 47 FF 1A 4C
: C9 EA 4F 12
: }
: }
3064 31: SEQUENCE {
3066 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
3071 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
3073 22: SEQUENCE {
3075 20: [0]
: 36 61 E1 00 7C 88 05 09 51 8B 44 6C 47 FF 1A 4C
: C9 EA 4F 12
: }
: }
: }
3097 15: SEQUENCE {
3099 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
3104 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
3107 5: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
3109 3: SEQUENCE {
3111 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
: }
: }
: }
3114 14: SEQUENCE {
3116 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
3121 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
3124 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
3126 2: BIT STRING 1 unused bit
: '1100001'B
: }
: }
3130 64: SEQUENCE {
3132 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
3137 57: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
3139 55: SEQUENCE {
3141 53: SEQUENCE {
3143 51: [0] {
3145 49: [0] {
3147 47: [6]
: 'https://android.googleapis.com/attestation/crl/'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
3196 13: SEQUENCE {
3198 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
3209 0: NULL
: }
3211 513: BIT STRING
: 20 C8 C3 8D 4B DC A9 57 1B 46 8C 89 2F FF 72 AA
: C6 F8 44 A1 1D 41 A8 F0 73 6C C3 7D 16 D6 42 6D
: 8E 7E 94 07 04 4C EA 39 E6 8B 07 C1 3D BF 15 03
: DD 5C 85 BD AF B2 C0 2D 5F 6C DB 4E FA 81 27 DF
: 8B 04 F1 82 77 0F C4 E7 74 5B 7F CE AA 87 12 9A
: 88 01 CE 8E 9B C0 CB 96 37 9B 4D 26 A8 2D 30 FD
: 9C 2F 8E ED 6D C1 BE 2F 84 B6 89 E4 D9 14 25 8B
: 14 4B BA E6 24 A1 C7 06 71 13 2E 2F 06 16 A8 84
: [ Another 384 bytes skipped ]
: }
3728 1413: SEQUENCE {
3732 877: SEQUENCE {
3736 3: [0] {
3738 1: INTEGER 2
: }
3741 10: INTEGER 03 88 26 67 60 65 89 96 85 99
3753 13: SEQUENCE {
3755 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
3766 0: NULL
: }
3768 27: SEQUENCE {
3770 25: SET {
3772 23: SEQUENCE {
3774 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
3779 16: PrintableString 'f92009e853b6b045'
: }
: }
: }
3797 30: SEQUENCE {
3799 13: UTCTime 20/06/2018 22:47:35 GMT
3814 13: UTCTime 17/06/2028 22:47:35 GMT
: }
3829 47: SEQUENCE {
3831 25: SET {
3833 23: SEQUENCE {
3835 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
3840 16: PrintableString 'ccd18b9b608d658e'
: }
: }
3858 18: SET {
3860 16: SEQUENCE {
3862 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER title (2 5 4 12)
3867 9: UTF8String 'StrongBox'
: }
: }
: }
3878 546: SEQUENCE {
3882 13: SEQUENCE {
3884 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
3895 0: NULL
: }
3897 527: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
3902 522: SEQUENCE {
3906 513: INTEGER
: 00 E8 22 0B F1 72 A6 01 63 D3 3C 44 9D DB 7A 87
: D6 3D 6F 6D 92 B7 C9 4A 70 96 5D 29 7A 8E 96 3E
: FE F3 10 53 B2 19 A5 BF 6E 54 AD D0 0A A2 8E 54
: E0 D4 B4 2E A6 E0 D4 30 F8 5A 47 CC 09 00 56 45
: BE DA 5A 84 59 90 18 CE 29 6C 8E 9E E6 90 98 BD
: D4 D8 F8 38 82 90 C9 79 DB 31 D3 7A A1 CA BA 6A
: 8B 9D 15 91 E2 6C 41 A3 2B 25 DA 4F E4 B3 14 E5
: 4B EC B7 89 06 44 18 67 C1 4C 03 35 18 D8 FD 7D
: [ Another 385 bytes skipped ]
4423 3: INTEGER 65537
: }
: }
: }
4428 182: [3] {
4431 179: SEQUENCE {
4434 29: SEQUENCE {
4436 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
4441 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
4443 20: OCTET STRING
: 1B 17 70 C6 97 DC 84 54 75 7C 3C 98 5C E6 1D 1D
: 08 59 5D 53
: }
: }
4465 31: SEQUENCE {
4467 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
4472 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
4474 22: SEQUENCE {
4476 20: [0]
: 36 61 E1 00 7C 88 05 09 51 8B 44 6C 47 FF 1A 4C
: C9 EA 4F 12
: }
: }
: }
4498 15: SEQUENCE {
4500 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
4505 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
4508 5: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
4510 3: SEQUENCE {
4512 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
: }
: }
: }
4515 14: SEQUENCE {
4517 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
4522 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
4525 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
4527 2: BIT STRING 2 unused bits
: '100000'B (bit 5)
: }
: }
4531 80: SEQUENCE {
4533 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
4538 73: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
4540 71: SEQUENCE {
4542 69: SEQUENCE {
4544 67: [0] {
4546 65: [0] {
4548 63: [6]
: 'https://android.googleapis.com/attestation/crl/8'
: 'F6734C9FA504789'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
4613 13: SEQUENCE {
4615 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
4626 0: NULL
: }
4628 513: BIT STRING
: 9B E2 2D 8C 43 AC 8F 11 35 11 77 BD F9 32 B3 01
: 8C E9 97 58 08 E5 C0 DD C4 CC A6 B1 4A A3 E5 D0
: 48 A6 18 1C 8E 5C FD 35 4A A5 12 C2 1A 82 64 3E
: B4 CC 0C 0B 1F 5E D5 11 C0 B7 49 5B A6 E7 74 37
: 0B 7D 99 27 84 B7 E0 34 58 28 01 CC 03 76 50 F8
: 1A B5 3B EF CA D2 FF 7D C9 37 FE D9 F7 30 3D 31
: 24 CA 83 FD 67 AC 38 E3 82 23 B0 70 80 48 84 D6
: A1 2E 18 BD 94 1F 9A 8E 82 CC 2F EB 97 AA 5B A3
: [ Another 384 bytes skipped ]
: }
: }
5145 0: SET {}
: }
: }
: }
The next two sections provide two views of a CSR generated via invocation of the Certificate Enrollment Manager API similar to the below:
CertificateRequestProperties request = new CertificateRequestProperties();
request.FriendlyName = "Self-Signed Device Certificate";
request.KeyAlgorithmName = KeyAlgorithmNames.Rsa;
request.KeyStorageProviderName = "Microsoft Smart Card Key Storage Provider";
request.UseExistingKey = true;
request.Exportable = ExportOption.NotExportable;
request.ContainerName = prj.GetContainerName();
request.Subject = subject_name;
request.KeyUsages = keyUsages;
request.SmartcardReaderName = smartCardReaderName;
string privacyCa =
"MIIDezCCAmOgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBUMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEY" +
"MBYGA1UEChMPVS5TLiBHb3Zlcm5tZW50MQ0wCwYDVQQLEwRESVNBMRwwGgYDVQQD" +
"ExNQdXJlYnJlZCBQcml2YWN5IENBMB4XDTE4MDQwMzE0NTQwMFoXDTI4MDQwMzE0" +
"NTQwMFowVDELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxGDAWBgNVBAoTD1UuUy4gR292ZXJubWVudDEN" +
"MAsGA1UECxMERElTQTEcMBoGA1UEAxMTUHVyZWJyZWQgUHJpdmFjeSBDQTCCASIw" +
"DQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMROV8sQ707OSvjRxoX5S6MaB0r4" +
"r5TnM97cx0RjtSVPu3O/WG9KRQdJtG9gARKKlxqgKOPJkTfTIxvUvWwKrtL9HjYs" +
"IC2V/otsX3JKgPepud2CTIy3I1ADU7UD0/0MGqALbn+grDTaZOSi5p6cA0eo/f0X" +
"O7UNh5r2YWOYAhZdhIy5F9BIOZEN/7pRyvKziupf3OVTQaMjMWoiDrCQC+D0xya4" +
"8qxU/VFy4c9BmIg7uNzkHDqdaogo1Gsj5t2y0lW37IbRo6HrZ5Dl18laIX7s7n9k" +
"Mp7GbK4rq/1FTMvI5bBpN/Pp4syi3f+oyQbSz+FPQwfBWGLukTUzPYcDVfUCAwEA" +
"AaNYMFYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFAFy9PrSM65GYyC0EVDPU91WJ0BXMAsGA1UdDwQEAwIC" +
"pDAoBgNVHSUEITAfBggrBgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEGCSsGAQQBgjcVJDANBgkq" +
"hkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAG777BuS/EXmuoHiVctA0n58u4SZb6i9Jvw1gI3qIryGM" +
"2oxDSKPr36c7R2tFmAqo4m9N97wh4xFebkkYHgZWPsp0hRFy79veE+wMCw+Z0B88" +
"ri4a2z/oTDmW9uf3r+BaZjRKpVoaYW9eztmz6DJA3wtvEdvUE2Nq4G1V5yXIdiSU" +
"pfVd4eyEPVNy0Yp9DZDBP9vVcd5x7VfG8rzQoaDcerwrsXJ9/WLDz76A6d2/syHN" +
"74CRuXYGhpBb7YL1jIhgVi6Rb4Dbq3dgDIkmTqUecEknuX73Oddr/phgqMOrVWUB" +
"1XrHJbPUuC+nuPbShhJ0vPRw13TX3deqjzTsj8XEcA==";
byte[] privacyCaBytes = Convert.FromBase64String(privacyCa);
IBuffer buffer = privacyCaBytes.AsBuffer();
request.AttestationCredentialCertificate = new Certificate(buffer); ;
csrToDiscard = await
CertificateEnrollmentManager.UserCertificateEnrollmentManager.\
CreateRequestAsync(request);
Attestation details are described here: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn366894.aspx.
The structure is essentially a Full PKI Request as described in RFC 5272.
* ContentInfo
* SignedData
* PKIData
* Empty controlSequence
* One TaggestRequest
* PKCS 10
* Basic request details along with encrypted attestation extension
* Empty cmsSequence
* Empty otherMsgSequence
* Certificates bag with two certs (one of which is revoked)
This section provides an annotation attestation statement as extracted from an encrypted attestation extension. The structure of the attestation statement is defined here: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408990.aspx.
600 1256: SEQUENCE {
604 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 311 21 24'
615 1241: SET {
619 1237: OCTET STRING
: 4B 41 53 54 01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 1C 00 00 00
: 00 00 00 00 B9 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 4B 41 44 53
: 02 00 00 00 18 00 00 00 A1 00 00 00 00 01 00 00
: 00 03 00 00 FF 54 43 47 80 17 00 22 00 0B 9A FD
: AB 8A 0B E9 0B BB 3F 7F E6 B6 77 91 EF A9 15 8A
: 03 B2 2B 8C BE 3F EC 56 B6 30 BF 82 73 9C 00 14
: 13 6E 2F 14 DD AF 30 72 A6 E3 89 4D BF 7A 54 26
: 36 2F 10 D6 00 00 00 00 51 4F CB E5 AD 8C 8C 60
: E6 C2 70 80 00 D4 2C 65 4C 6B 95 ED 95 00 22 00
: 0B 2B E6 2C AD 8D E8 9A 85 04 D7 F3 7B B7 4C F8
: 32 CD B4 F1 80 CA A6 35 B9 2C 39 87 B7 96 03 C3
: A3 00 22 00 0B 6C 88 60 B2 80 E3 BE 7D 34 F2 85
: DC 26 9D 1B 72 A8 0A 17 CF 31 08 F1 55 F2 9B 4E
: 82 C8 5B 49 7B 1A F1 4B 12 A1 C5 D1 A4 C5 A4 59
: C4 0A 97 E0 88 ED 1C D3 B6 38 4A 5D 6C 27 F5 69
: 7D 17 AD F6 C0 03 27 09 5D 93 B5 13 EA 50 B5 05
: 27 7B A0 51 4D 1B 17 52 87 7D B8 A6 05 4A 4F 39
: CA 36 5C A1 19 19 0B 73 B4 0E 7F D3 91 DA 91 EE
: 37 C6 CE 78 AF 15 21 5D EB 5E 5F 23 A7 08 E9 85
: D4 6B A0 95 6D D7 E0 3A D1 92 72 B7 D4 E5 35 6A
: 01 B0 7D 35 D0 99 BA A1 77 35 76 75 E3 90 A8 8B
: 86 27 B8 3D 47 75 2D 98 D0 23 4E 09 D8 26 6B 32
: 3C AB AC 50 A2 E8 FF 70 21 85 C5 5E B1 F5 9C B9
: 6E 21 27 C7 2A CD 84 61 02 47 6A A0 E1 9A 9F AF
: 02 43 08 D8 BF 9F 69 14 C4 8C 80 32 2D 5C A3 60
: 48 F5 5E 8E 65 6B 5E B5 0E A4 ED B9 8B F9 C3 D9
: A8 CE C0 64 71 F6 E3 81 F7 9D 79 E5 73 7B F3 A4
: 6E 65 8D 72 B4 0A 3E 5E 70 5F AB 2B 89 B9 5E 65
: 44 BF 44 7B FB 2E 29 39 64 36 85 63 46 62 AF 25
: A5 8B 19 30 AF 50 43 50 4D 38 00 00 00 02 00 00
: 00 03 00 00 00 38 01 00 00 E0 00 00 00 00 00 00
: 00 00 00 00 00 B0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 36 00
: 01 00 0B 00 06 00 72 00 20 9D FF CB F3 6C 38 3A
: E6 99 FB 98 68 DC 6D CB 89 D7 15 38 84 BE 28 03
: 92 2C 12 41 58 BF AD 22 AE 00 10 00 10 08 00 00
: 00 00 00 01 00 9B B1 27 B7 E3 5D 0C 10 74 52 1B
: 60 59 96 5E B6 08 D4 76 26 17 B5 92 49 39 34 CD
: A4 2D 4D C9 3E 50 05 2E D8 9E 22 37 E2 05 D2 7F
: 3B 3E 4D 9F E0 E0 31 52 74 A0 D5 18 BE F1 9F 79
: 48 D6 24 69 35 3C D4 1F 55 73 75 ED 83 D6 3A E3
: 63 77 A6 5B 92 97 86 13 7C 69 3B DE AA E5 0E 9A
: 39 CF 53 DF 4C 7A E0 3C A3 EC 29 DA 18 5F 86 E6
: 22 D9 2C A3 8E D8 E2 3E 80 9C 69 52 FA 1E 90 3F
: BA 09 04 D0 91 6A 27 2B 44 8C FF E8 DE FF BD B9
: CE DD 95 67 70 FD 94 E5 3A E6 E4 EA 01 A5 AC 4A
: 79 5C 88 4D 07 43 C7 C0 B8 95 3E 7C 72 90 CD 35
: 99 B3 32 8A C7 8C 90 63 E3 46 88 62 35 A4 5B 54
: F1 E8 61 0E CF 85 B4 41 6F 06 94 B6 BA 6F 4B CE
: F7 8A 18 6C 5E 9A 6B 65 C3 F5 58 ED 7D 6A 3A E6
: 24 B6 21 6F 8C EE 1C 21 60 9E 2F 86 22 D2 2B 8F
: E0 3B 12 AC 6B F5 FF 54 C6 E8 D4 3C 2E D3 B6 8E
: 7A 30 36 29 3D 00 DE 00 20 13 F5 31 2B 87 50 19
: D3 95 1F F2 B6 00 95 5B 0A E2 54 7A A0 CF 6A 2C
: F5 4F AD 77 C6 D5 4F 52 CB 00 10 3B 41 34 BF D4
: FC 8B BE 87 14 47 81 4E 5C 5C 23 73 44 AF D6 56
: 6F A6 6E BE E7 63 9C 43 53 C4 3C 26 33 B6 AD 75
: 36 AC 91 98 C1 FF E3 B2 AF E6 3F 14 C0 2E 65 D7
: C1 AD F6 22 D9 59 96 B6 70 8C 30 2F DE 76 1B EB
: 9D 56 C1 77 F8 1D 38 5C 7D 13 9C FD 1E 3E 00 1B
: 5A 74 C4 8E 49 2B 0B B5 C5 0E E3 A7 2C 92 E2 96
: 1E 9D C8 43 02 2F 8F F8 6E 66 4A FA D8 56 57 59
: 48 A4 D5 B7 7F 49 52 CA FA 11 E4 AF 27 E7 64 21
: 76 79 9B 8A A3 1A A6 FA A1 03 3E CC CD 41 26 3C
: 0D 3C DC 81 21 21 DE 92 4D 2A EF 66 DE D6 77 FE
: 41 0C 5D 44 1A D0 C4 D7 8B EA 6D DE 01 EE 97 DB
: 61 0F FD 62 59 00 00 00 06 00 20 8F CD 21 69 AB
: 92 69 4E 0C 63 3F 1A B7 72 84 2B 82 41 BB C2 02
: 88 98 1F C7 AC 1E DD C1 FD DB 0E 00 20 E5 29 F5
: D6 11 28 72 95 4E 8E D6 60 51 17 B7 57 E2 37 C6
: E1 95 13 A9 49 FE E1 F2 04 C4 58 02 3A 00 20 AF
: 2C A5 69 69 9C 43 6A 21 00 6F 1C B8 A2 75 6C 98
: BC 1C 76 5A 35 59 C5 FE 1C 3F 5E 72 28 A7 E7 00
: 20 C4 13 A8 47 B1 11 12 B1 CB DD D4 EC A4 DA AA
: 15 A1 85 2C 1C 3B BA 57 46 1D 25 76 05 F3 D5 AF
: 53 00 00 00 20 04 8E 9A 3A CE 08 58 3F 79 F3 44
: FF 78 5B BE A9 F0 7A C7 FA 33 25 B3 D4 9A 21 DD
: 51 94 C6 58 50
: }
The format is structured as follows:
typedef struct {
UINT32 Magic;
UINT32 Version;
UINT32 Platform;
UINT32 HeaderSize;
UINT32 cbIdBinding;
UINT32 cbKeyAttestation;
UINT32 cbAIKOpaque;
BYTE idBinding[cbIdBinding];
BYTE keyAttestation[cbKeyAttestation];
BYTE aikOpaque[cbAIKOpaque];
} KeyAttestationStatement;
4B 41 53 54 - Magic
01 00 00 00 - Version
02 00 00 00 - Platform
1C 00 00 00 - HeaderSize
00 00 00 00 - cbIdBinding
B9 04 00 00 - cbKeyAttestation
00 00 00 00 -- cbAIKOpaque
The remainder is the keyAttestation, which is structured as follows:
typedef struct {
UINT32 Magic;
UINT32 Platform;
UINT32 HeaderSize;
UINT32 cbKeyAttest;
UINT32 cbSignature;
UINT32 cbKeyBlob;
BYTE keyAttest[cbKeyAttest];
BYTE signature[cbSignature];
BYTE keyBlob[cbKeyBlob];
} keyAttestation;
4B 41 44 53 - Magic
02 00 00 00 - Platform
18 00 00 00 - HeaderSize
A1 00 00 00 -- cbKeyAttest (161)
00 01 00 00 -- cbSignature (256)
00 03 00 00 - cbKeyBlob
keyAttest (161 bytes) ~~~~~~~~~~~ FF 54 43 47 80 17 00 22 00 0B 9A FD AB 8A 0B E9 0B BB 3F 7F E6 B6 77 91 EF A9 15 8A 03 B2 2B 8C BE 3F EC 56 B6 30 BF 82 73 9C 00 14 13 6E 2F 14 DD AF 30 72 A6 E3 89 4D BF 7A 54 26 36 2F 10 D6 00 00 00 00 51 4F CB E5 AD 8C 8C 60 E6 C2 70 80 00 D4 2C 65 4C 6B 95 ED 95 00 22 00 0B 2B E6 2C AD 8D E8 9A 85 04 D7 F3 7B B7 4C F8 32 CD B4 F1 80 CA A6 35 B9 2C 39 87 B7 96 03 C3 A3 00 22 00 0B 6C 88 60 B2 80 E3 BE 7D 34 F2 85 DC 26 9D 1B 72 A8 0A 17 CF 31 08 F1 55 F2 9B 4E 82 C8 5B 49 7B ~~~~~~~~~~~
The keyAttest field is of type TPMS_ATTEST. The TPMS_ATTEST structure is defined in section 10.11.8 of https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-00.99.pdf. ~~~~~~~~~~~ FF 54 43 47 - magic 80 17 – type (TPM_ST_ATTEST_CERTIFY) 00 22 – name - TPM2B_NAME.size (34 bytes) 00 0B 9A FD AB 8A 0B E9 0B BB - TPM2B_NAME.name 3F 7F E6 B6 77 91 EF A9 15 8A 03 B2 2B 8C BE 3F EC 56 B6 30 BF 82 73 9C
00 14 – extraData – TPM2B_DATA.size (20 bytes) 13 6E 2F 14 DD AF 30 72 A6 E3 – TPM2B_DATA.buffer 89 4D BF 7A 54 26 36 2F 10 D6
00 00 00 00 51 4F CB E5 – clockInfo – TPMS_CLOCK_INFO.clock AD 8C 8C 60 – TPMS_CLOCK_INFO.resetCount E6 C2 70 80 – TPMS_CLOCK_INFO.restartCount 00 - – TPMS_CLOCK_INFO.safe
D4 2C 65 4C 6B 95 ED 95 - firmwareVersion
00 22 – attested – TPMS_CERTIFY_INFO.name.size 00 0B 2B E6 2C AD 8D E8 9A 85 - TPM2B_NAME.name 04 D7 F3 7B B7 4C F8 32 CD B4 F1 80 CA A6 35 B9 2C 39 87 B7 96 03 C3 A3
00 22 – TPMS_CERTIFY_INFO.qualifiedName.size 00 0B 6C 88 60 B2 80 E3 BE 7D - TPM2B_NAME.name 34 F2 85 DC 26 9D 1B 72 A8 0A 17 CF 31 08 F1 55 F2 9B 4E 82 C8 5B 49 7B ~~~~~~~~~~~
Signature (256 bytes) – generated using the AIK private key ~~~~~~~~~~~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~~~~~~~~~~~
The remainder is the keyBlob, which is defined here: https://github.com/Microsoft/TSS.MSR/blob/master/PCPTool.v11/inc/TpmAtt.h.
As with the Android Keystore attestations, Yubikey attestations take the form of an X.509 certificate. As above, the certificate is presented here packaged along with an intermediate CA certificate as a certificates-only SignedData message.
The attestations below were generated using code similar to that found in the yubico-piv-tool (https://github.com/Yubico/yubico-piv-tool). Details regarding attestations are here: https://developers.yubico.com/PIV/Introduction/PIV_attestation.html
0 1576: SEQUENCE {
4 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER signedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 2)
15 1561: [0] {
19 1557: SEQUENCE {
23 1: INTEGER 1
26 0: SET {}
28 11: SEQUENCE {
30 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1)
: }
41 1533: [0] {
45 742: SEQUENCE {
49 462: SEQUENCE {
53 3: [0] {
55 1: INTEGER 2
: }
58 9: INTEGER 00 A4 85 22 AA 34 AF AE 4F
69 13: SEQUENCE {
71 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
82 0: NULL
: }
84 43: SEQUENCE {
86 41: SET {
88 39: SEQUENCE {
90 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
95 32: UTF8String 'Yubico PIV Root CA Serial 263751'
: }
: }
: }
129 32: SEQUENCE {
131 13: UTCTime 14/03/2016 00:00:00 GMT
146 15: GeneralizedTime 17/04/2052 00:00:00 GMT
: }
163 33: SEQUENCE {
165 31: SET {
167 29: SEQUENCE {
169 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
174 22: UTF8String 'Yubico PIV Attestation'
: }
: }
: }
198 290: SEQUENCE {
202 13: SEQUENCE {
204 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
215 0: NULL
: }
217 271: BIT STRING
: 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 AB A9 0B 16 9B EF 31
: CC 3E AC 18 5A 2D 45 80 75 70 C7 58 B0 6C 3F 1B
: 59 0D 49 B9 89 E8 6F CE BB 27 6F D8 3C 60 3A 85
: 00 EF 5C BC 40 99 3D 41 EE EA C0 81 7F 76 48 E4
: A9 4C BC D5 6B E1 1F 0A 60 93 C6 FE AA D2 8D 8E
: E2 B7 CD 8B 2B F7 9B DD 5A AB 2F CF B9 0E 54 CE
: EC 8D F5 5E D7 7B 91 C3 A7 56 9C DC C1 06 86 76
: 36 44 53 FB 08 25 D8 06 B9 06 8C 81 FD 63 67 CA
: [ Another 142 bytes skipped ]
: }
492 21: [3] {
494 19: SEQUENCE {
496 17: SEQUENCE {
498 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 3'
510 3: OCTET STRING 04 03 03
: }
: }
: }
: }
515 13: SEQUENCE {
517 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
528 0: NULL
: }
530 257: BIT STRING
: 52 80 5A 6D C3 9E DF 47 A8 F1 B2 A5 9C A3 80 81
: 3B 1D 6A EB 6A 12 62 4B 11 FD 8D 30 F1 7B FC 71
: 10 C9 B2 08 FC D1 4E 35 7F 45 F2 10 A2 52 B9 D4
: B3 02 1A 01 56 07 6B FA 64 A7 08 F0 03 FB 27 A9
: 60 8D 0D D3 AC 5A 10 CF 20 96 4E 82 BC 9D E3 37
: DA C1 4C 50 E1 3D 16 B4 CA F4 1B FF 08 64 C9 74
: 4F 2A 3A 43 E0 DE 42 79 F2 13 AE 77 A1 E2 AE 6B
: DF 72 A5 B6 CE D7 4C 90 13 DF DE DB F2 8B 34 45
: [ Another 128 bytes skipped ]
: }
791 783: SEQUENCE {
795 503: SEQUENCE {
799 3: [0] {
801 1: INTEGER 2
: }
804 17: INTEGER
: 00 FE B9 AF 03 3B 0B A7 79 04 02 F5 67 AE DF 72
: ED
823 13: SEQUENCE {
825 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
836 0: NULL
: }
838 33: SEQUENCE {
840 31: SET {
842 29: SEQUENCE {
844 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
849 22: UTF8String 'Yubico PIV Attestation'
: }
: }
: }
873 32: SEQUENCE {
875 13: UTCTime 14/03/2016 00:00:00 GMT
890 15: GeneralizedTime 17/04/2052 00:00:00 GMT
: }
907 37: SEQUENCE {
909 35: SET {
911 33: SEQUENCE {
913 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
918 26: UTF8String 'YubiKey PIV Attestation 9e'
: }
: }
: }
946 290: SEQUENCE {
950 13: SEQUENCE {
952 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
963 0: NULL
: }
965 271: BIT STRING
: 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 93 C4 C0 35 95 7E 26
: 2A 7E A5 D0 29 C4 D7 E9 39 67 22 B1 09 45 46 4D
: DB A4 77 CB 0B A3 F1 D0 69 3C 24 8D A2 72 72 27
: E1 7F DE CB 67 A4 1D D2 E5 43 44 6F 21 39 F8 57
: 34 01 0E 7E C3 81 63 63 6A 6D D7 40 20 7B AF 35
: 61 9C 8D C1 D1 2B 25 48 EE 52 FC F3 72 6A 74 96
: 01 CB 1C 1A B2 AD F9 18 96 EB 59 EF E3 3A CA BC
: AA 9B 42 FE FF 60 6E 28 89 49 0D C1 B1 B0 25 AE
: [ Another 142 bytes skipped ]
: }
1240 60: [3] {
1242 58: SEQUENCE {
1244 17: SEQUENCE {
1246 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 3'
1258 3: OCTET STRING 04 03 03 -- firmware version
: }
1263 19: SEQUENCE {
1265 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 7'
1277 5: OCTET STRING 02 03 4F 9B B5 -- serial number
: }
1284 16: SEQUENCE {
1286 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 8'
1298 2: OCTET STRING 01 01 -- PIN and touch policy
: }
: }
: }
: }
1302 13: SEQUENCE {
1304 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
1315 0: NULL
: }
1317 257: BIT STRING
: 1F 2B B8 1C 95 A1 01 74 3F 87 27 F6 B3 A6 A9 9D
: 11 B9 ED 68 92 B9 05 2D 22 36 51 28 23 3D B0 2F
: 7A 17 D5 8C 0C F4 3A 68 FD 2A 34 0D 80 3C F7 8F
: B8 79 B0 76 E5 4D 61 94 C5 72 D6 9F 6E 26 76 5F
: 03 94 55 40 93 5C 04 EF CC 58 41 EB 7C 86 64 23
: 5F 23 5E 94 78 73 2E 77 8C 58 C5 45 87 22 CF BA
: 69 06 B8 C7 06 37 10 21 8C 74 AD 08 B9 85 F2 7B
: 99 02 4A 3E E8 96 09 D3 F4 C6 AB FA 49 68 E2 E0
: [ Another 128 bytes skipped ]
: }
: }
1578 0: SET {}
: }
: }
: }
0 1613: SEQUENCE {
4 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER signedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 2)
15 1598: [0] {
19 1594: SEQUENCE {
23 1: INTEGER 1
26 0: SET {}
28 11: SEQUENCE {
30 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1)
: }
41 1570: [0] {
45 762: SEQUENCE {
49 482: SEQUENCE {
53 3: [0] {
55 1: INTEGER 2
: }
58 9: INTEGER 00 86 77 17 E0 1D 19 2B 26
69 13: SEQUENCE {
71 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
82 0: NULL
: }
84 43: SEQUENCE {
86 41: SET {
88 39: SEQUENCE {
90 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
95 32: UTF8String 'Yubico PIV Root CA Serial 263751'
: }
: }
: }
129 32: SEQUENCE {
131 13: UTCTime 14/03/2016 00:00:00 GMT
146 15: GeneralizedTime 17/04/2052 00:00:00 GMT
: }
163 33: SEQUENCE {
165 31: SET {
167 29: SEQUENCE {
169 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
174 22: UTF8String 'Yubico PIV Attestation'
: }
: }
: }
198 290: SEQUENCE {
202 13: SEQUENCE {
204 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
215 0: NULL
: }
217 271: BIT STRING
: 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 C5 5B 8D E9 B9 3C 53
: 69 82 88 FE DA 70 FC 5C 88 78 41 25 A2 1D 7B 84
: 8E 93 36 AD 67 2B 4C AB 45 BE B2 E0 D5 9C 1B A1
: 68 D5 6B F8 63 5C 83 CB 83 38 62 B7 64 AE 83 37
: 37 8E C8 60 80 E6 01 F8 75 AA AE F6 6E A7 D5 76
: C5 C1 25 AD AA 9E 9D DC B5 7E E9 8E 2A B4 3F 99
: 0D F7 9F 20 A0 28 A0 9F B3 B1 22 5F AF 38 FB 73
: 46 F4 C7 93 30 DD FA D0 86 E0 C9 C6 72 99 AF FB
: [ Another 142 bytes skipped ]
: }
492 41: [3] {
494 39: SEQUENCE {
496 17: SEQUENCE {
498 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 3'
510 3: OCTET STRING 05 01 02
: }
515 18: SEQUENCE {
517 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
522 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
525 8: OCTET STRING 30 06 01 01 FF 02 01 00
: }
: }
: }
: }
535 13: SEQUENCE {
537 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
548 0: NULL
: }
550 257: BIT STRING
: 05 57 B7 BF 5A 41 74 F9 5F EC 2E D2 B8 78 26 E5
: EF 4F EA BF 5A 64 C9 CF 06 7F CA 8C 0A FC 1A 47
: 1C D6 AC ED C8 5B 54 72 00 9F B8 59 AB 73 25 B2
: D6 02 A3 59 83 31 69 EE C1 5F 3D F2 2B 1B 22 CA
: B6 FC F9 FB 21 32 9E 08 F3 08 54 6D C9 26 10 42
: 08 1D 3C B5 F0 5A B1 98 D4 68 DC 91 F1 D3 91 54
: 7A A0 34 8B F6 65 EB 13 9F 3A 1C BF 43 C5 D1 D0
: 33 23 C6 25 A0 4C E4 E9 AA 59 80 D8 02 1E B0 10
: [ Another 128 bytes skipped ]
: }
811 800: SEQUENCE {
815 520: SEQUENCE {
819 3: [0] {
821 1: INTEGER 2
: }
824 16: INTEGER
: 17 7D 2D F7 D6 6D 97 CC D6 CF 69 33 87 5B F1 5E
842 13: SEQUENCE {
844 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
855 0: NULL
: }
857 33: SEQUENCE {
859 31: SET {
861 29: SEQUENCE {
863 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
868 22: UTF8String 'Yubico PIV Attestation'
: }
: }
: }
892 32: SEQUENCE {
894 13: UTCTime 14/03/2016 00:00:00 GMT
909 15: GeneralizedTime 17/04/2052 00:00:00 GMT
: }
926 37: SEQUENCE {
928 35: SET {
930 33: SEQUENCE {
932 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
937 26: UTF8String 'YubiKey PIV Attestation 9e'
: }
: }
: }
965 290: SEQUENCE {
969 13: SEQUENCE {
971 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
982 0: NULL
: }
984 271: BIT STRING
: 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 A9 02 2D 7A 4C 0B B1
: 0C 02 F9 E5 9C E5 6F 20 D1 9D F9 CE B3 B3 4D 1B
: 61 B0 B4 E0 3F 44 19 72 88 8B 8D 9F 86 4A 5E C7
: 38 F0 AF C9 28 5C D8 A2 80 C9 43 93 2D FA 39 7F
: E9 39 2D 18 1B A7 A2 76 8F D4 6C D0 75 96 99 0D
: 06 37 9D 90 D5 71 00 6E FB 82 D1 5B 2A 7C 3B 62
: 9E AB 15 81 B9 AD 7F 3D 30 1C C2 4B 9D C4 D5 64
: 32 9A 54 D6 23 B1 65 92 A3 D7 57 E2 62 10 2B 93
: [ Another 142 bytes skipped ]
: }
1259 78: [3] {
1261 76: SEQUENCE {
1263 17: SEQUENCE {
1265 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 3'
1277 3: OCTET STRING 05 01 02 -- firmware version
: }
1282 20: SEQUENCE {
1284 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 7'
1296 6: OCTET STRING 02 04 00 93 6A A0 -- serial number
: }
1304 16: SEQUENCE {
1306 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 8'
1318 2: OCTET STRING 01 01 -- PIN and touch policy
: }
1322 15: SEQUENCE {
1324 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 4 1 41482 3 9'
1336 1: OCTET STRING 02 -- form factor
: }
: }
: }
: }
1339 13: SEQUENCE {
1341 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
1352 0: NULL
: }
1354 257: BIT STRING
: 9F EB 7A 4C F0 7C 67 11 ED C5 84 07 C8 19 41 B2
: 71 42 08 2B D6 CD A8 5F DC AE 79 75 6C F1 E5 4D
: 28 95 89 69 9D C0 2E A7 D4 48 51 B0 75 FF 63 FD
: B8 79 93 03 EA BB 8A 67 D8 E7 EC C9 1C 8E 3F AF
: 74 30 D4 7E 74 A4 26 50 9F D4 57 AE 23 C0 8A 63
: 4E F3 C7 CF 5A AF 91 11 A2 6B 3B 49 24 32 26 88
: D8 4F 6F BE BC F0 2D A9 A2 88 B4 5F 54 AF 42 72
: 08 74 64 57 76 5A 02 9A 9D 21 4B FD 7F 44 8F AF
: [ Another 128 bytes skipped ]
: }
: }
1615 0: SET {}
: }
: }
: }
TBD
TBD.
TBD.
Thomas Hardjono provided the text on blockchain system. Dave Thaler suggested many small variations. Frank Xialiang suggested the scalling scenarios that might preclude a 1:1 protocol between attesters and relying parties. Henk Birkholz provided many reviews. Kathleen Moriarty provided many useful edits. Ned Smith, Anders Rundgren and Steve Hanna provided many useful pointers to TCG terms and concepts. Thomas Fossati and Shawn Willden elucidated the Android Keystore goals and limitations.
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. |