Session Security Envelope
draft-moskowitz-sse-02

Abstract

This memo specifies the details of the Session Security Envelope (SSE). SSE is a session protocol aiming to guarantee confidentiality, integrity and authentication completely independently by the underlying context, namely network and transport layers. A single session using the SEE protocol can include a single transport session or multiple transport sessions. This mean that SSE can survive the break-down in network and transport layers or to attacks carried against them. SSE is also applicable in networks lacking in classic inter-networking and transport protocols SSE relies on modern AEAD block cipher modes of operations, a class of block cipher modes which allows, at the same time, to authenticate the message while encrypting a part of it.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 7, 2016.
1. Introduction

This memo specifies the details of the Session Security Envelope (SSE). SSE is a session protocol aiming to guarantee confidentiality, integrity and authentication completely independently by the underlying context, namely network and transport layers. A single SSE session can span a single transport session or
multiple transport sessions. These transport sessions can use the same transport layer protocol (e.g. TCP) or use different transport protocols. SSE can survive the break-down in network and transport layers or to attacks carried against them. Moreover SSE will rely on modern AEAD block cipher modes of operations, a class of block cipher modes which allows, at the same time, to authenticate the message while encrypting a part of it.

2. Terms and Definitions

2.1. Requirements Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119, BCP 14 [RFC2119] and indicate requirement levels for compliant CoAP.

2.2. Notations

This section will contain notations

2.3. Definitions

AEAD Block Cypher: (definition needed)

SSE; Session Specific Envelope

3. SSL Security Boundary

The security boundary comes at layer above the IP transport layers (TCP, STCP, DTLS). This security allows the data to be secure prior to entering into a specific transport layer. A single SSE session can span 1 or N transport protocol connections. The multiple transport connections running under an SSE session may all use one protocol (e.g. TCP) or multiple protocols (e.g. TCP, STCP, DTLS). The higher layer security boundary provides a common security layer.

4. API

The initial API is part of a shim with socket call over a TCP socket.

\[ s = \text{int socket(int domain, int type, int protocol)} \]

where:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{domain: } & \text{AF_INET and AF_INET6 supported} \\
\text{type: } & \text{SOCK_SECURE}
\end{align*}
\]
protocol: Transport protocol (TCP (6), UDP (6), SCTP (132))

int setsockopt(int sockfd, int level, int optname, const void *optval, socklen_t optlen);

int getsockopt(int sockfd, int level, int optname, const void *optval, socket len);

where:
sockfd:      # socket file descriptor
optname:     # option name (see below)
optval;              # points to *sse_transport structure;
optlen;              # length of option

optval values:
ADD_SSE_Transport[1];   # add transport to SSE
DELETE_SSE_Transport[2]; # delete transport to SSE
Query_SSE_Transport [3];  # Query transport

optval        *sse_transport[MAX_SSE_TRANSPORTS]; - for add/deletes

struct *sse_add_transport
    int nt_sockfd;   # new transport socket
    int protocol;    # new protocol
;

struct

int getsockopt(int sockfd, int level, int optname, void *optval, socklen_t * optlen);

int setsockopt(int sockfd, int level, int optname, const void *optval, socklen_t optlen);

Figure 1 - Example SSE Socket API

Note: The prototype for this SECURE_SOCKET is on a FREEBSD OS.

5. Packet format

An SSE PDU is a Session Layer PDU (SPDU). In order to accommodate various use cases three formats are available for the PDU. The only difference between those formats is the size of length and sequence number fields. Following these fields is the encrypted payload and Integrity Check Value (ICV). Encrypted payload and ICV has a substructure depending on the choice of encryption algorithm and mode.
5.1. SSE compact format

SSE compact format aims to provide a Session Security Layer to applications leveraging on constrained network media with packet size limitations or high cost per bit transport.

In the SSE compact format:

- SPI is 32 bits.
- Length is 12 bits.
- Sequence Number is 20 bits.

12 bits of Length allows \(2^{12}\) 4096 bytes in the Encrypted Payload (does not include the ICV). 20 bits in the Sequence Number allows to send \(2^{20}\) 1048576 packets before renegotiating the key. (The ICV length is set by the KMP parameters, so the length is known and therefore is not included in the length calculation).

![Figure 2 - Compact format](image)

5.2. SSE Large Format

SSE large format aims provide a Session Security Layer to applications which have common sizes of transport packets.

In the SSE compact format:

- SPI is 32 bits.
- Length is 32 bits.
- Sequence Number is 32 bits.
32 bits of Length allows \((2^{32})\) or \(~4Gbytes\) in the Encrypted Payload (does not include the ICV). 32 bits in the Sequence Number allows to send \((2^{32})\) \(~40 billion\) packets packets before renegotiating the key.

The 32 bits of length allows an IPv6 jumbogram to be included as in the SSE Large Format Payload

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                             SPI                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                            Length                            |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                        Sequence Number                      |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|              Encrypted Payload and ICV (Variable)           |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 3 - Large Format

5.3. SSE Extreme Format

SSE large format aims provide a Session Security Layer to high performance networks.

In the SSE compact format:

SPI is 32 bits.

Length is 32 bits

Sequence Number is 64 bits

32 bits of Length allows \((2^{32})\) \(4294967296\) bytes \(4Gbytes\) in the Encrypted Payload (excluding the ICV). 32 bits in the Sequence Number allows to send \((2^{64})\) \(18446744073709551616\) (around \(18 \times 10^{18}\)) packets before renegotiating the key.
5.4. Header Fields

SPI is the Security Parameter Index, a 32 bit number received from the external KMP. It is the index into the Security Association and is typically unidirectional. That is each direction in has its own SPI. A KMP for a unicast communication would provide the two SPIs. Multicast is different. Depending on the requirements, there can be one SPI for all transmitters or one per transmitter.

Length is the length in bytes of the encrypted payload. This does not include the ICV. The length of the ICV depends on the block cipher settings.

Sequence Number is a, strictly increasing by 1, counter. When the field cannot be increased without wrapping a key renegotiation MUST be performed. Please note that this Sequence Number has not the same meaning and implications of a Transport Layer sequence number, hence increasing by 1 is a good idea.

Note: It is common practice to rekey some time BEFORE the number space is exhausted.

5.5. AEAD integration

SSE MUST use AEAD block cipher modes. AEAD block cypher modes will ensure confidentiality on the payload and integrity of both the payload and the headers (SPI, length and sequence number).
6. Packet processing and State Machine

SSE will spawn across several ports and protocols, hence each listened port and protocol can be a different SSE instance. See Architecture Draft.

6.1. Establishing a session

An application can establish a session via the SSE API, which in turn will interact with a KMP daemon. SSE instance will get all parameters related to the session from the KMP daemon.

Editorial note: Is this a local vulnerability?

6.2. Processing Outgoing Application Data

After having established an SSE session, an application can send application-level data using the normal socket calls. The SSE layer will encapsulate the packet, and send it on the appropriate transport session. The application doesn’t need to know SPI, sequence number or key. The local SSE knows these facts, and keeps it within the SSE data associated with a set of transport connections.

6.3. Processing Incoming Application Data

After having established an SSE session, the packets will be sent to the transport layer for de-encapsulation. After header removal, the socket processing will hand it to the SEE processing for security check. If the packet is deemed secure, the socket will remove the SSE envelope. The application see the byte stream as data from a transport connection.

The application doesn’t need to know SPI, sequence number or key, relying on a fake connection. (but its local SSE instance knows it, hence the application own memory where those are stored)

7. IANA Considerations

TBD.

8. Security Considerations

As SSE uses an AEAD block cipher, it is vulnerable to attack if a sequence number is reused for a given key. Thus implementations of SSE MUST provide for rekeying prior to Sequence Number rollover. An implementation should never assume that for a given context, the sequence number space will never be exhausted. Key Management Protocols like IKEv2 [RFC 4306] or HIP [RFC 7401] could be used to
provide for rekeying management. The KMP SHOULD not create a network layer fate-sharing limitation.

As any security protocol can be used for a resource exhaustion attack, implementations should consider methods to mitigate flooding attacks of messages with valid SPIs but invalid content. Even with the ICV check, resources are still consumed to validate the ICV.

SSE makes no attempt to recommend the ICV length. For constrained network implementations, other sources should guide the implementation as to ICV length selection. The ICV length selection SHOULD be the responsibility of the KMP.

As with any layered security protocol, SSE makes no claims of protecting lower or higher processes in the communication stack. Each layer’s risks and liabilities need be addressed at that level.

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References


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