]> Action State Group, Inc.

spec@actionstate.ai

Security transparency audit evidence interaction model Parties increasingly need to request verifiable evidence from a counterparty they do not trust — an audit trail, an interaction history, an account of actions taken — and to receive an answer they can check rather than believe. Evidence formats for the answer exist; the ask has no standard shape, and today one system's silence, another's error, and a third's stale cache are indistinguishable to a relying party. This document defines a transport-agnostic request/response interaction for verifiable evidence: a request that names its subject and a coverage anchor, and a set of possible outcomes that is exactly one of three things — the evidence artifact, a signed refusal carrying a machine-readable reason, or a recorded absence. The interaction makes asking, granting, and refusing each attributable and checkable, and requires that the same subject under the same coverage yield a byte-identical artifact for every requester. The interaction is symmetric: any party to a recorded exchange may ask the other, anchored on its own record of that exchange. A responder may additionally commit, in a signed statement, to keep a subject answerable until a stated time, so that a later absence is attributable rather than merely recorded. The document deliberately defines no evidence format, no identity or principal scheme, no trust policy, no availability guarantee, and no rule about who may ask.

Introduction A growing class of systems — autonomous agents, multi-party computation pipelines, registries of signed claims — accumulate evidence about their own actions: signed statements, receipts, transparency-log inclusion proofs. Formats for these artifacts exist and continue to mature; the SCITT architecture and COSE Receipts are representative examples, and this document depends on neither. What has no standard shape is the ask. Each ecosystem invents its own convention for "give me your evidence": a bespoke query endpoint here, an ad-hoc agent command there, a static file by private agreement somewhere else. The answers are not comparable. When a relying party asks two counterparties the same question, one counterparty's silence, another's transport error, and a third's stale cached answer all look alike — and none of the three leaves a record that the question was asked. This document standardizes the interaction, not the evidence. It defines a request — a small map naming a subject (what evidence is wanted) and a coverage anchor (the commitment the answer must verify against) — and constrains the outcome to exactly one of three states: the evidence artifact itself, a signed refusal with a machine-readable reason, or a recorded absence. Each outcome is something the requester can record and later cite. The evidence artifact remains opaque to this specification; it is identified by digest and verified against the anchor by format-specific means outside this document. A deployment that already has a format for the artifact — for example an Evidence Bundle () — carries it inside the artifact response envelope this document defines (); nothing here restates that format. Two further properties follow from deployments of this interaction shape, sketched in . First, the interaction is symmetric: the party that served a request may later ask the party that made it, and each side's strongest coverage anchor is its own sealed record of the exchange (). Second, the useful default answer to "show me your history" is not the records but a constant-size summary of the commitments over them — checkpoints, receipts, and consistency proofs — from which any individual record can later be verified (). A third property is optional: a responder may sign a commitment that a subject will remain answerable until a stated time (). Absence against an outstanding commitment is evidence against the responder; absence otherwise is evidence only of the requester's attempt.

Two Failure Modes The interaction is designed to close two specific failure modes this shape exists to prevent, sketched in : The flattering version. A responder that serves evidence through an unconstrained query interface can serve different evidence to different requesters — a fuller history to an auditor it expects, a curated one to a counterparty in a dispute. Nothing in the transport reveals the divergence. The caller-invariance requirement addresses this, conditional on the anchor-consistency requirement of : the artifact is a function of the subject and the coverage anchor, never of who is asking. The unaccountable refusal. A responder that declines by silence, by generic error, or by an unsigned message leaves the requester with nothing citable: "I asked and they refused" is an assertion, not a record. The signed refusal () constrains this: a refusal is a first-class, signed, machine-readable answer that the requester can record — and the three-state discipline () keeps genuine non-response distinguishable from refusal, so neither can be laundered into the other.

Non-Goals This document deliberately does not define:

• Any evidence format. The artifact is an opaque byte string identified by digest. Signed statements, receipts, log entries, bundles of proofs — all are carried, none are specified here.
• Any identity or principal scheme. Where a deployment binds a request or its response to a principal — the requester, the responder, or both — the reference's scheme (a key, a DID, an account identifier, a host-native name) is defined by the host or deployment, never by this document ().
• Requester identity, purpose, authorization, or disclosure policy carried in the artifact. These belong to the request/relationship layer — a deployment's own account, contract, or relationship model — and are referenced by this interaction, never embedded in the evidence artifact itself. What a principal field () names, and what relationship or contract a request cites, is deployment-defined and outside this document.
• Any trust decision. Receiving an artifact, a refusal, or nothing implies no judgment about the responder. What a requester does with each outcome is its own policy.
• Authorization or standing. Who may ask, and what any requester is entitled to receive, is the responder's policy and is out of scope. This document constrains only the form of the answer, whichever answer policy selects.
• Any availability guarantee. The interaction makes loss detectable and, where a responder has committed to retention (), attributable. It never makes evidence available.

Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Requester: the party asking for evidence. Responder: the party holding evidence and answering. Evidence artifact: the byte string a responder serves in the granting case. Opaque to this specification; identified by its digest. Evidence stream: the append-only body of evidence a responder holds and answers from — the ordered records over which its coverage anchors commit. A responder MAY hold several streams; a request is answered against exactly one. Anchored: verifying against a coverage anchor by the mechanism-specific means of the deployment's evidence format. Coverage anchor: a commitment — for example, a signed checkpoint over an append-only log, or a receipt from a transparency service — that the evidence artifact must verify against. The anchor is what turns an artifact from a story into something checkable: an artifact that verifies against an anchor the requester obtained or constrained independently is tamper-evident with respect to that anchor. Checkpoint / commitment: used generically for any signed, compact representation of a body of evidence at a point in its history, such that inclusion and consistency of evidence against it are checkable. describes one example of such a mechanism; this document depends on no particular one. Freshness: how recent a coverage anchor is, measured in a mechanism-specific unit (a log size, a timestamp). Exchange half: a party's own sealed record of one interaction with a counterparty — its request, or its response — citing the counterparty's record by digest. History card: the derivation history_card/1 (): the checkpoints over an evidence stream, their external receipts, and the consistency proofs between consecutive checkpoints. Constant size in the number of records; discloses no record content. Retention commitment: a signed statement by a responder that a named subject will remain answerable under this interaction until a stated time (). Route: a locator — a resolver, a URL, an endpoint identifier — for reaching a responder. Routes are hints. They are never subjects and never identity. Principal reference: an opaque value identifying a party — requester, responder, or a party named in a retention commitment — in a scheme this document does not define (). Distinct from a route: a route is where a party can be reached; a principal reference is who it is under whatever identity scheme the deployment recognizes. The three interaction outcomes: artifact (), signed refusal (), recorded absence (). Pending: the state of a request, before its waiting window closes, that has received neither an artifact response nor a signed refusal. Not one of the three interaction outcomes; resolves to recorded absence only once the window closes ().

The Request A request is a map — CBOR in bindings that use CBOR, JSON in bindings that use JSON, with the same field names — with the following fields:

Field	Presence	Description
subject	REQUIRED	what evidence is asked for ()
coverage	REQUIRED	the anchoring constraint the response must satisfy ()
derivation	OPTIONAL	identifier of a named computation over the subject ()
deadline	OPTIONAL	latest useful response time ()
nonce	RECOMMENDED	requester-supplied nonce or timestamp ()
route	OPTIONAL	where the requester believes the responder can be reached ()

A responder MUST ignore request fields it does not understand. A requester MUST NOT rely on any field not defined by this document being understood. A deployment MAY bind a request to a principal reference () by a mechanism outside this document — for example, the signature that authenticates the transport, or a field a deployment profile adds; this document defines no such field and takes no position on how the binding is made or checked. A request that is malformed — not a well-formed map, missing a REQUIRED field, or carrying a defined field whose value does not conform — is refused with reason request_malformed (), except where this document assigns a more specific reason (as for coverage, ). [[EDITOR: whether the request map is expressed in CDDL is open for -01. The field names in the table above are fixed; the semantics are as specified in this document.]]

Subject The subject names what is asked for, in one of six forms:

Form	Content	Meaning
full_history	(none)	the responder's entire evidence body for this evidence stream
checkpoints	(none)	the responder's checkpoints and their receipts for this stream; no records
record	digest	the single record identified by this digest
range	(a, b)	the records at positions a through b inclusive, under the coverage anchor's ordering
correlation	identifier	all records the responder holds that carry this correlation identifier
exchange	digest of the requester's own half	every record the responder holds that cites this exchange half ()

Subjects are digests, positions, and opaque identifiers — never display names. Names drift; digests do not. A requester that holds only a name has a resolution problem this document does not solve, and a responder MUST NOT attempt fuzzy or best-effort matching of a subject: a subject that does not resolve exactly is answered with a refusal carrying reason no_such_subject (). The range form presupposes a coverage-anchor mechanism that defines record positions; under a mechanism defining no positional ordering it cannot be satisfied and is refused with reason coverage_unsatisfiable. The checkpoints form asks for commitments only. It is the cheapest question a stranger can ask and the one a responder can always safely answer; the history_card/1 derivation () is its proof-carrying form. The exchange form names the requester's own sealed half of a prior interaction. A responder that recorded its side of that interaction holds a record citing that half by digest; the subject resolves to exactly those records. A responder holding no record citing the half answers no_such_subject — which, when the requester holds a signed reply from that responder citing the same half, is itself a contradiction the requester can cite ().

Coverage The coverage field carries exactly one of the following two members. A request carrying both, or neither, is malformed, and the responder MUST refuse it with reason coverage_unsatisfiable. expected_pin (digest): the requester already holds, obtained out of band, a specific coverage anchor — for example a published checkpoint — and requires the response to verify against exactly that anchor. This is the strongest form: the anchor's integrity does not depend on the responder at all, because the responder never chose it. A requester's own exchange half is a valid pin for an exchange subject: the responder's record cites it, and the requester sealed it before the responder's answer existed. min_freshness (size or time): the requester holds no specific anchor and instead requires that the response be covered by a commitment at least this fresh — at least this log size, or issued no earlier than this time. The responder selects a qualifying anchor and identifies it in the response. This form trades the pin's independence for availability: the requester can always form the request, but the anchor's independence now rests on whatever external witnessing or publication that anchor has, outside this protocol (). The two forms are mutually exclusive by design. A pinned request that also stated a freshness floor would invite the responder to substitute "fresher" coverage for the coverage the requester actually demanded; forbidding the combination keeps the requester's constraint unambiguous. A responder MAY perform work to satisfy min_freshness — for example, issue a new commitment covering evidence produced since its last one — and SHOULD do so when a deadline permits. A responder that cannot satisfy the coverage constraint MUST refuse with reason coverage_unsatisfiable rather than serve an artifact under weaker coverage. Serving under weaker-than-requested coverage is not a degraded success; it is a different answer to a different question, and this document forbids it.

Derivation The derivation field, when present, names a computation over the subject — by a registered token () for the derivations this document defines, or by the digest of a definition for any other — and asks for that computation's result, re-derivable by the requester, instead of the raw evidence. A count of records matching a predicate, a sum over a declared field, a projection of specific fields: each is a named computation whose definition declares exactly which fields of the underlying evidence it reads. Derivation is also the disclosure mechanism of this document: the declared field set of the named computation bounds what the responder reveals (). A responder that supports a derivation MUST evaluate it over exactly the subject as anchored by coverage — a derivation is a view of the anchored evidence, not an independent report — and the result MUST be accompanied by whatever the requester needs to check that binding (format-specific, out of scope here beyond the requirement that the binding be checkable). A responder that does not support the named derivation at all refuses with reason derivation_unsupported; a responder that supports the derivation in general but not for this subject refuses with reason no_such_subject, per .

Deadline The deadline field states the latest time at which a response is useful to the requester. It is advisory in the sense that no transport can enforce it, and normative in one respect: a responder that determines it cannot answer by the deadline SHOULD send a refusal with reason deadline_unmet before the deadline rather than let the exchange lapse into absence. A refusal is cheap and citable; an absence is neither party's record of anything except the requester's attempt.

Nonce The nonce field carries a requester-chosen nonce or timestamp; its use is RECOMMENDED. It makes each transmitted request instance distinct, so a refusal — identified by request digest, with a signed issuance time () — binds to this instance of asking, not replayable against a fresh one. Covered by the request digest, it MUST NOT influence the artifact ().

Route The route field carries the requester's belief about where the responder can be reached — a resolver name, a URL, a peer endpoint identifier. It is a hint for the transport binding and nothing more: it MUST NOT influence the artifact (), it is not a subject, and it is not identity. A responder reached through a route is authenticated by its signature on the response, never by the route (). The field exists so that the route actually attempted is part of the requester's record of asking, and so a failed route is part of any absence recorded ().

Principal Reference This document distinguishes a route (where a party can be reached, ) from a principal reference (who a party is). It defines the former and not the latter. Where a deployment needs to say "this request came from, or this response is addressed to, this particular party," it binds a principal reference into the exchange by whatever mechanism it already has — a signature key, a DID, an account identifier, or any other host-native scheme — and this document takes no position on that scheme, its resolution, or its trust. A retention commitment () similarly names an answerable party without this document defining what a name is. Two consequences for implementers. First, a requester or responder MAY be authenticated at the transport layer (by the signature over a response, for example, ) without either party ever appearing as a field in the request or response maps this document defines: authentication and subject resolution are independent, and a responder MUST NOT let knowledge of the requester's principal change the artifact served for a given (subject, coverage) pair (). Second, a deployment profile that adds a principal field to the request or response — to carry purpose, authorization context, or a relationship reference alongside the identity — does so as an extension this document neither requires nor constrains; such a field is request/relationship-layer material and MUST NOT appear inside the evidence artifact itself ().

Recording the Request The request itself is evidence: it is the requester's proof of having asked. Requesters SHOULD record each request they send — in their own evidence stream, signed, in the encoding actually transmitted — before or at transmission time. Where requests are recorded or their digests exchanged, deterministic encoding SHOULD be used: CBOR Core Deterministic Encoding () for CBOR, JCS for JSON, so that the recorded bytes and the transmitted bytes are the same bytes. A requester that retains neither the transmitted request bytes nor their digest cannot correlate a refusal — identified only by digest — with its own record of having asked. Request recording is a SHOULD, not a MUST: 's "I asked; they refused" property is empty without it, but this document does not require a requester to keep records it has no use for.

Interaction Outcomes An interaction produces exactly one of three outcomes: the artifact response, a signed refusal, or a recorded absence. Only the first two are messages a responder sends; the third is not a message at all — it is the requester's own record that no response arrived within its waiting window. Treating these as outcomes rather than as three things a responder chooses among matters: a responder can grant or refuse, full stop; it cannot "respond with absence," because absence is precisely the case in which nothing arrived to be a response. There is no fourth outcome, and no outcome is ever converted into another ().

The Artifact Response The artifact response is the signed response envelope for the granting outcome. The object it carries is opaque to this specification and MAY be an Evidence Bundle () or any other evidence artifact the deployment's evidence format defines; this document specifies the envelope and its binding to the request and the coverage anchor, never the carried object's internal shape. The envelope carries:

1. The artifact: the evidence bytes themselves, or a derivation result (), identified by digest.
2. The coverage anchor resolved: under expected_pin, confirmation of the pinned anchor; under min_freshness, the anchor the responder selected, which MUST satisfy the requested freshness.
3. Verification material: whatever proofs let the requester verify the artifact against the anchor offline — inclusion proofs, consistency proofs, countersignatures, receipts . An anchor MAY carry receipts from more than one transparency service; each receipt is verified on its own terms, and how many independent services a requester requires is requester policy, not a property of this interaction. The formats are evidence-mechanism-specific and out of scope; the requirement is that the artifact be verifiable against the anchor by the requester alone, with no further round trip to the responder and no appeal to the responder's honesty.

For the checkpoints subject and the history_card/1 derivation the artifact is the verification material: there is no separate record to verify, only commitments and the proofs between them. Implementations MUST NOT serve an empty artifact alongside proofs in these cases; the proofs are the artifact, and caller invariance () binds them. An artifact response MAY be accompanied by a retention commitment () covering the subject served. An artifact response that cannot be verified against the anchor is, to the requester, not evidence but an unverifiable story, and requesters SHOULD treat a verification failure as adverse — equivalent to discovering the exchange was not what it claimed — rather than as a retryable transport fault.

The Signed Refusal A refusal is an answer, not an error. It carries:

1. The request identified: the digest of the request being refused, computed over the request bytes as received.
2. A reason: exactly one machine-readable token from the registry established in . The initial tokens are not_authorized, no_such_subject, coverage_unsatisfiable, derivation_unsupported, policy_declined, deadline_unmet, request_malformed, and retention_expired. The last is distinct from no_such_subject by design: it states that the responder once committed to answer this subject () and the commitment has lapsed, so a lapsed promise cannot be presented as never having held the evidence.
3. An issuance time: the time the refusal was issued, which MUST be present and MUST be covered by the signature. It binds the refusal to a moment, so a recorded refusal cannot be presented as current policy nor replayed against a fresh request ().
4. A signature: the refusal is signed by the responder, in whatever signature format the deployment's evidence mechanism already uses, such that the requester can record the refusal and later demonstrate to a third party that this responder refused this request for this stated reason.

Human-readable detail MAY accompany the reason token; the token, not the prose, is the machine-readable answer. A responder MUST select the most specific applicable token, with one deliberate exception noted in : a responder MAY uniformly answer policy_declined wherever a more specific token would disclose information its policy protects, overriding the most-specific-token rule. That choice is policy, made by the responder, applied uniformly; it is not a license to select tokens per-requester in a way that leaks by differentiation (). A refusal refuses the request, once. It creates no standing obligation and no standing prohibition; the same request MAY be made again and MAY be answered differently as the responder's policy or evidence changes.

Pending Before the requester's waiting window closes, a request that has received neither an artifact response nor a signed refusal is pending: outstanding, not yet resolved, and not yet evidence of anything. Pending is not one of the three interaction outcomes — it is the state of a request between issuance and either an answer or the close of the window — and MUST NOT be recorded or cited as if it were an absence. A requester MAY track a request as pending, for its own bookkeeping or to display outstanding requests to an operator, without that tracking implying anything about the eventual outcome. Only once the waiting window closes with neither an artifact nor a refusal received does a request's state resolve to absence (). Until that boundary, delay, slow transport, and a responder about to answer are indistinguishable from one another, and none of them MUST be recorded as if the outcome were already known.

Recorded Absence Absence is the outcome in which no response — neither artifact nor refusal — arrives within the requester's waiting window (its deadline if it set one, or its local timeout otherwise); before that window closes, the request is pending, not absent (). Absence is not sent by anyone; it is recorded by the requester: the request digest, the transport attempted, and the window in which no answer came. Absence is an outcome about the exchange, not about the responder's intent. A network partition, a crashed responder, and a responder deliberately ignoring the request produce identical absences, and the requester's record SHOULD NOT embellish the absence with an inferred intent. An absence record SHOULD cite any retention commitment () the requester holds for the subject, and the route attempted. Absence inside an outstanding commitment is chargeable to the responder that signed it; absence without one is evidence of nothing but the attempt. The commitment changes whom the absence is evidence against; it does not change what the absence is, and the requester still MUST NOT infer intent.

The Three-State Discipline The three outcomes are mutually exclusive and are never synthesized into one another:

• Absence is NEVER synthesized into refusal. No party — not the requester, not a transport intermediary, not a recording system — may manufacture a refusal object from a timeout. A refusal exists only if the responder signed one. A requester's records MUST keep "they refused" (their signature, their reason) and "they did not answer" (my attempt, my window) as distinct, differently-evidenced facts.
• Refusal is never degraded into absence. A requester that receives a valid signed refusal SHOULD record it as such; discarding a refusal and recording an absence misstates the exchange.
• An unverifiable artifact is not a fourth outcome. An artifact response that fails verification against the anchor is recorded as what it is: a response received and failed. It is neither a grant nor an absence, and requesters SHOULD NOT record it as a successful grant.
• A commitment never converts an absence into a refusal. A retention commitment () makes an absence attributable; it does not make it a signed act of the responder, and no party may record it as one.
• Pending is never recorded as absence. A request still inside its waiting window is pending (), not absent; only the close of the window resolves it one way or the other.

The discipline exists because the three outcomes carry different evidentiary weight — a refusal is the responder's signed act, an absence is only the requester's attempt — and any synthesis between them forges the stronger from the weaker.

Mapping to a Requirement-Satisfaction Status This document defines no requirement-satisfaction vocabulary; a deployment composing this interaction with an evidence-contract or evidence-bundle layer typically derives one from the three outcomes above. The mapping shape — not a specific registry — is informative:

Outcome	Typically maps to (illustrative)
Artifact response, verified	requirement satisfied
Artifact response, verification fails	requirement status indeterminate — never treated as satisfied
Refusal: no_such_subject, coverage_unsatisfiable	evidence not found, or not yet committed
Refusal: not_authorized, policy_declined, derivation_unsupported	evidence withheld by policy, not absent
Refusal: retention_expired	a prior commitment lapsed; distinct from never having held the evidence
Pending	request outstanding; the window has not closed, nothing yet to map
Recorded absence	status unknown to the requester; not evidence of non-satisfaction

A deployment's own vocabulary MAY be coarser or finer than this table; the table exists to show that the three outcomes carry enough distinction to support one, not to define it.

Caller Invariance This is the normative core of the document. For a given responder, the same subject under the same coverage anchor MUST yield a byte-identical evidence artifact, regardless of the requester's identity, the transport binding used, or any other property of the request. Formally: the artifact MUST be a deterministic function of (subject, resolved coverage anchor, derivation if present), and MUST NOT be a function of the requester, its principal reference (), or the channel. Under expected_pin the resolved anchor is fixed by the requester, so two requesters pinning the same anchor and naming the same subject MUST receive identical bytes. Under min_freshness the responder selects the anchor; two requests resolved against the same selected anchor MUST receive identical bytes, and the anchor identification in the response () is what lets requesters compare notes across resolutions. Caller invariance is the anti-flattering-version property (). It is what makes the artifact evidence rather than a per-audience story: any two requesters — or one requester over two channels — can detect a responder serving divergent versions by comparing artifact digests for the same (subject, anchor) pair, without trusting each other's verification and without any authority adjudicating. A responder MAY refuse a requester outright (); what it MUST NOT do is grant different requesters different bytes for the same anchored subject. Access control is a policy; per-audience evidence is a forgery of the interaction. Anchor consistency. Caller invariance would be hollow if a responder could hand each requester its own anchor. All coverage anchors a responder serves for a given evidence stream MUST lie on one mutually consistent append-only history, and the responder MUST be able to produce, on request, a consistency proof between any two anchors it has served for that stream, in the proof format of the deployment's evidence mechanism. The limits of this requirement are discussed in . Two consequences for implementers:

• The artifact serialization MUST be deterministic. An artifact assembled with nondeterministic map ordering, timestamps of assembly, or per-request nonces violates invariance even with honest intent. Deterministic encodings (; for JSON) are the practical tool.
• Verification material ( item 3) is NOT required to be byte-identical across requesters — a consistency proof, for instance, may legitimately depend on which earlier anchor a particular requester holds. Invariance binds the artifact; the proofs bind the artifact to the anchor.

One subject form needs its own statement. An exchange subject is invariant per (exchange-half digest, anchor) like any other, but no two requesters can hold the same half, so cross-requester comparison is unavailable there. Invariance for exchange is instead checked by the responder's own recorded ask () against the artifact it served: the responder's record and the requester's record must name the same artifact digest. The subject does not weaken invariance; it changes who holds the second copy.

The Symmetric Ask Nothing in this document distinguishes the party that originally requested an action from the party that performed it. Once both have sealed their halves of an exchange — each citing the other's record by digest — either MAY ask the other for evidence about that exchange, using the exchange subject anchored on its own half. A provider asking its former requester is the same interaction with the roles swapped; no new message, no new state. The consequence is the one property no single-responder interaction can otherwise provide. A responder's log, however well witnessed, proves only the integrity of what the responder chose to write. A counterparty that sealed its own half of every exchange can prove an omission by arithmetic: it holds a signed reply citing a half the responder now claims not to have. Coverage is a property of the counterparty's record, not of the log, and the symmetric ask is how that record is exercised. Deployments MAY condition interaction on evidence — for example, a policy that serves only to peers whose history card () verifies against an independently obtained checkpoint. Such a policy is a requiring-party decision and is outside this document; the interaction only makes it expressible.

Recording the Exchange Each side SHOULD seal its half of the exchange into its own records: the requester its request, and whichever of the three outcomes followed; the responder the requests it received and the artifacts or refusals it served. Both sides' recording is a SHOULD: requester-side recording is what gives absence any meaning at all, and responder-side recording is the responder's own counter-record when a response it sent never arrived (). The consequence worth naming: once both the ask and the answer are recordable, "I asked; they refused" becomes citable material — a signed refusal in the requester's records, a recorded ask in the responder's — and each party can grade the other's conduct over time from its own records, with no authority anywhere in the loop. A requester's policy might treat a counterparty's pattern of policy_declined refusals differently from a pattern of absences; a responder's policy might treat a requester's recorded asks as standing to receive more. This document enables those policies and defines none of them ().

Derivation-Scoped Disclosure When derivation names a computation, the computation's declared field set defines the minimal disclosure needed to re-derive it: the responder reveals exactly the fields the named computation reads, and nothing more. The responder MUST NOT disclose fields outside the declared set as part of a derivation response, and MUST NOT evaluate a computation whose declared field set it is unwilling to disclose — the correct answer in that case is a refusal, not a silently truncated evaluation. Three disclosure tiers fall out naturally:

1. Digests-only — no derivation; subjects and artifacts identified and verified by digest, content never disclosed. Always safe to serve (subject to on low-entropy content).
2. Derivation-scoped — a named computation's declared fields, and only those. Minimal content disclosure, deliberate, and recorded: the derivation identifier in the recorded request states exactly what was revealed and why.
3. Full — the raw evidence bytes. The rare tier, appropriate where the requester's role requires the whole record.

The History Card This document registers one derivation, history_card/1, defined as follows. For the named evidence stream, the result is the ordered list of tuples (checkpoint, receipts for that checkpoint, consistency proof from the previous checkpoint), from the stream's first checkpoint to the one resolved by coverage. Its declared field set contains no record content: the card discloses commitments, external receipts over those commitments, and the proofs that each commitment extends the last. Its size is linear in the number of checkpoints and independent of the number of records. The history card is the default first question. It is the thing a stranger checks before deciding whether to ask for anything else; it is safe to serve to anyone under the digests-only tier; and it is sufficient to verify any individual record the responder later serves, by inclusion proof against a checkpoint the requester already holds. A card that fails to verify — a consistency proof that does not chain, a receipt that does not cover its checkpoint — is treated as an unverifiable artifact (). The derivation registry and definition format for other computations are expected to grow in a subsequent version. [[EDITOR: whether a second derivation, the result of a sampled recomputation of a subject by a third party, is registered in -00 or deferred to -01 — open.]]

Retention Commitments A responder MAY issue a retention commitment: a signed statement that a named subject will remain answerable under this interaction until a stated time. It carries:

1. the subject, in one of the forms of , and the evidence stream it belongs to;
2. until: the time after which the commitment lapses, covered by the signature;
3. optionally, a route at which the responder expects to be reachable, and optionally a principal reference () naming who is answerable, when that differs from the signer;
4. the responder's signature, in the signature format of the deployment's evidence mechanism.

A commitment is a promise about answerability under this interaction. It says nothing about whether the bytes exist anywhere else, and it does not make the subject available; it makes a later failure to answer attributable to the party that promised. A commitment MAY be carried alongside an artifact response (), published with the responder's checkpoints, or placed in a citing record's reference block as an optional member beside the digest of the thing cited. It MUST NOT appear in a request. A commitment that names a subject by anything other than a digest or a position under a checkpoint is malformed: the digest remains the identity, and the commitment is a route with a promise attached, never an address. Within until, an absence for the committed subject is recorded citing the commitment (). Within until, a refusal carrying not_authorized, coverage_unsatisfiable, request_malformed, or derivation_unsupported reflects a property of the request or of this responder's capabilities, not a failure to honor the commitment, and is not a breach. Any other refusal reason — no_such_subject, policy_declined, or deadline_unmet — within until is a broken commitment: the responder promised this subject would remain answerable and is refusing it on a ground the promise foreclosed; the refusal is signed, so the breach documents itself. After until, the correct refusal is retention_expired. The separation this section preserves is the one that a reference field promising only "resolvable" cannot express: that a name staying resolvable and the bytes staying unchanged are two different promises. The digest keeps the second. The commitment, when present, names who is answerable for the first, and for how long.

Transport Bindings The interaction is transport-agnostic; a binding maps the request map, the three outcomes, and the recording discipline onto a concrete transport. Bindings are intentionally thin. Two are defined here and one is reserved. Peer-to-peer stream binding. On a multiplexed peer transport that negotiates named subprotocols at connection time, this interaction is the subprotocol evidence-request/1. One request frame, one response frame; each frame is the deterministic CBOR encoding () of the maps in and . Absence is the stream closed or timed out without a response frame. The subprotocol identifier is what lets any two peers implementing it interoperate without prior arrangement; a peer that does not offer it has not refused — it has not answered, and the requester records that as absence, not as policy_declined. Message-oriented agent protocols bind the same way, with the request as a named message type and the three outcomes as three reply types. The identifier evidence-request/1 is a document constant of this specification; it does not require registration in a separate subprotocol registry. HTTP binding. Pinned, parameterless requests (a full_history or checkpoints subject under expected_pin) map onto GET of a static resource: the URL identifies the subject, the pin travels as a query parameter or is implied by the resource, and caller invariance is trivially auditable because the resource is the same bytes for every client. Parameterized requests (ranges, correlations, exchanges, derivations, min_freshness) map onto POST with the request map as the body. A responder SHOULD publish a manifest — its evidence stream identifiers, the subject forms and derivations it supports, and where retention commitments () can be fetched — so a requester can form a well-formed request without a prior round trip. A refusal is an HTTP response carrying the signed refusal object: a successful transport exchange carrying a refusal answer. Bindings MUST NOT conflate transport-level errors with refusals (). Registry query. A registry or query service exposing stored claims can expose this same interaction over its query path, so that a query answer arrives as an anchored artifact, a signed refusal, or a recordable absence rather than as a bare result set. This binding is reserved: its concrete mapping onto a specific query protocol is left to a future companion document rather than specified here.

Security Considerations The coverage anchor is the whole game. Every checkable property of this interaction flows through the anchor. A response that is not verifiable against an anchor the requester obtained or constrained independently of the responder is a story with a signature on it: internally consistent, attributable, and worth exactly the responder's word. Requesters SHOULD prefer expected_pin with independently obtained anchors wherever the deployment makes anchors available out of band — published checkpoints, transparency-service receipts , mutually recorded prior exchanges. min_freshness responses inherit only whatever independence the responder-selected anchor has from its own witnessing or publication. Split views: per-requester anchor forks defeat invariance. Caller invariance binds the artifact to (subject, anchor), not the anchor to a single history: a responder that maintains divergent histories and steers each requester to an anchor on "its" fork — a split-view (equivocation) attack — serves individually verifiable, per-anchor-invariant answers while defeating invariance in substance. The anchor-consistency rule of makes any fork a provable violation once two served anchors are compared; but detection ultimately requires that comparison — anchor gossip among requesters, or external witnessing of anchors — infrastructure outside this protocol. This protocol constrains the attack but cannot alone close it. Freshness of an anchor is not recency of evidence. An anchor's issuance freshness never implies recency or completeness of the evidence it covers: a just-issued anchor can commit to a history omitting everything the responder chose never to record. A time-based min_freshness satisfied by a responder-issued anchor is, absent external witnessing, responder self-attestation about its own clock and log. Requester-side anchor staleness is a discipline, not a guarantee. A requester pinning a cached anchor gets exactly what that anchor covers — including nothing the responder has done since. The protocol cannot make a stale pin fresh; it can only make the staleness visible (the anchor is identified in every response). Requesters for whom recency matters must maintain their anchor supply — refreshing pins from independent sources, or using min_freshness and accepting its weaker independence — and that maintenance is operational discipline outside this protocol. Integrity is not coverage. This protocol can establish that an artifact verifies against an anchor, and that it is the same artifact for every asker. It never proves that the responder's evidence is complete coverage of reality: a responder that simply never recorded an event, or that maintains a second evidence stream it is never asked about, produces perfectly verifiable, perfectly caller-invariant answers with the event absent. No request/response interaction with a single responder can close this; the complement is counterparty-held records — each party to an interaction recording its own half — so that omission by one holder is contradicted by the other's evidence (). Deployments SHOULD NOT represent a verified artifact response as proof that nothing else happened. A principal reference is not authenticated by this document. Where a deployment binds a request or a commitment to a principal reference (), verifying that binding is the deployment's own mechanism (typically a signature check outside the fields this document defines); this document neither strengthens nor weakens whatever guarantee that mechanism provides. Refusals and absences carry weight only when recorded. The accountability properties of exist only for parties that actually record. A requester that discards refusals has no citable record of them; the protocol makes the record possible, not automatic. Absence is unauthenticated; suppression is invisible. An absence records only the requester's own attempt: an on-path adversary that suppresses a response the responder actually sent produces exactly the same absence as a responder that never answered, so absence carries minimal evidentiary weight against the responder. Responder-side recording () is the counter-record for this case, and deployments SHOULD use integrity-protected transports so suppression requires active interference. Refusal partitioning is the residual per-audience channel. Caller invariance constrains the artifact, not who receives one: a responder can serve the friendly requester and refuse everyone else — each refusal well-formed, signed, and permitted — recreating a per-audience view through the pattern of refusals. Authorization remains responder policy (); the countermeasure is the recording discipline: signed refusals make a partitioning pattern demonstrable from the accumulated records of the refused. Signed refusals are commitments. A responder's refusal is a signed statement it may later be confronted with — including a no_such_subject refusal for a subject the responder later serves. Responders SHOULD treat reason-token selection with the same care as any other signed statement. A retention commitment is a promise, not availability. A responder that commits to retention () and then loses the bytes has breached. The interaction records the breach; it does not prevent it, and deployments SHOULD NOT present a retention commitment as a guarantee that the evidence will be there. The symmetric ask closes omission, not fabrication. A counterparty's half () proves that an exchange existed and what each side committed to; it does not prove that the content either side recorded is true. Corroboration of content — a second party recomputing the same work — is a different witness and is outside this document. Routes are attack surface. A route () is chosen by the requester and may be wrong, stale, or supplied by an adversary. A requester MUST NOT treat a route as the responder's identity, and MUST authenticate every response by the responder's signature. A response signed by the wrong key is not a response from the responder, whatever route it arrived by. Denial of service. Requests are cheap to send; artifact assembly, fresh-commitment issuance under min_freshness, and derivation evaluation are not. Responders MAY apply rate and cost policy freely — refusing with policy_declined is always available and always honest — but MUST NOT let load-shedding take the form of caller-variant artifacts, which would violate where refusal would not.

Privacy Considerations Digests-only is the default posture. The base interaction discloses digests, positions, and anchors — not content. Content disclosure happens only through derivation () or a full-tier artifact, is deliberate, and — where the exchange is recorded — leaves a record of exactly what was disclosed, to whom, under which request. Low-entropy content defeats digest opacity. A digest of a low-entropy value (an enumerable identifier, a small-range field) can be reversed by dictionary: an observer holding candidate values checks each against the digest. Subjects, correlation identifiers, and digests-only responses over low-entropy content SHOULD therefore be constructed with salting or equivalent hardening, per the conventions of the deployment's evidence format; this document does not define the salt discipline but requires deployments to have one wherever digests are relied on to conceal enumerable content. Leakage through reason tokens. The difference between no_such_subject and not_authorized reveals whether the subject exists; other token distinctions leak analogously. A responder MAY answer policy_declined uniformly wherever a more specific token would disclose information its policy protects (). The uniformity is the point: a per-requester choice of token leaks by differentiation exactly what the uniform token conceals. Coverage probing leaks log size. A size-based min_freshness is a threshold query on current log size — granted at or above the threshold, refused coverage_unsatisfiable below it — so a requester can binary-search it to learn the log's size and, over time, its growth rate, without ever seeing content. Responders for whom activity volume is sensitive can extend the uniform-policy_declined posture to coverage refusals. History cards leak cadence and volume. A card () discloses the number and spacing of checkpoints, and thereby an approximation of activity over time, without any record content. Responders for whom that is sensitive have the same option as for coverage probing: a uniform policy_declined for the derivation. Exchange subjects reveal a relationship. An exchange request names a half that only the two parties could hold, so any intermediary that sees the request learns that they interacted. Both parties already know; transport confidentiality is the only mitigation for everyone else. Correlation identifiers SHOULD be non-identifying. A correlation subject is visible to the responder and to any transport intermediary; identifiers that name persons or otherwise carry meaning outside the exchange leak that meaning to every party that sees the request. The request itself leaks interest. Asking about a subject reveals that the requester cares about it — to the responder, and to intermediaries on an unprotected transport. Requesters with sensitive interest patterns should weigh the ask itself as a disclosure; transport confidentiality protects against intermediaries but never against the responder. A principal reference, once bound, is itself disclosure. Any deployment mechanism that binds a request or response to a principal reference () discloses that reference to whoever observes the exchange. Whether that reference is itself sensitive — a persistent identifier versus a fresh one-time key — is a property of the host's identity scheme, outside this document's control.

IANA Considerations This document requests that IANA establish a registry titled "Evidence Request Refusal Reasons". The registration policy is Specification Required. Each entry consists of a reason token (lowercase ASCII, underscore-separated), a one-line description, and a reference. The initial contents are:

Token	Description	Reference
not_authorized	the responder's policy does not authorize this requester for this subject	This document
no_such_subject	the subject does not resolve to evidence the responder holds	This document
coverage_unsatisfiable	the responder cannot satisfy the coverage constraint as stated	This document
derivation_unsupported	the responder does not support the named derivation	This document
policy_declined	the responder declines without further characterization	This document
deadline_unmet	the responder cannot answer within the stated deadline	This document
request_malformed	the request is not well-formed as specified by the defining document	This document
retention_expired	the responder's retention commitment for this subject has lapsed	This document

This document further requests a registry titled "Evidence Request Derivations", registration policy Specification Required. Each entry consists of a derivation token (lowercase ASCII, underscore-separated, with a /N version suffix), a one-line description, the declared field set or a reference to it, and a reference. The initial contents are:

Token	Description	Declared fields	Reference
history_card/1	checkpoints, receipts, and consistency proofs for a stream	none (no record content)

This document makes no other requests of IANA.

References Normative References In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. Cryptographic operations like hashing and signing need the data to be expressed in an invariant format so that the operations are reliably repeatable. One way to address this is to create a canonical representation of the data. Canonicalization also permits data to be exchanged in its original form on the "wire" while cryptographic operations performed on the canonicalized counterpart of the data in the producer and consumer endpoints generate consistent results. This document describes the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS). This specification defines how to create a canonical representation of JSON data by building on the strict serialization methods for JSON primitives defined by ECMAScript, constraining JSON data to the Internet JSON (I-JSON) subset, and by using deterministic property sorting. The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack. This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format. Informative References CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Receipts prove properties of a Verifiable Data Structure (VDS) to a verifier. VDSs and associated Proof Types enable security properties, such as minimal disclosure, transparency, and non-equivocation. Transparency helps maintain trust over time and has been applied to certificates, end-to-end encrypted messaging systems, and supply chain security. This specification enables concise transparency-oriented systems by building on Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and COSE. The extensibility of the approach is demonstrated by providing CBOR encodings for Merkle inclusion and consistency proofs. Traceability in supply chains is a growing security concern. While Verifiable Data Structures (VDSs) have addressed specific issues, such as equivocation over digital certificates, they lack a universal architecture for all supply chains. This document defines such an architecture for single-issuer signed statement transparency. It ensures extensibility and interoperability between different transparency services as well as compliance with various auditing procedures and regulatory requirements. Work in Progress Work in Progress

Example Deployments The properties above are sketched, not proved, against four kinds of deployment. Each is described by capability only, at a length that omits implementation detail; none is a conformance requirement, and none names a specific product or organization. An enterprise system-of-record answers audit requests for a business unit's transaction history from a counterparty's compliance function. The same full_history request, pinned against the same published checkpoint, is served identically whether it arrives over the system's internal case-management API or a batch export a partner fetches nightly — the same bytes both paths, exercising caller invariance () across transports operated by different teams within one organization. Requests and their outcomes are recorded in the system's own audit log, giving the compliance function a citable record of what was asked and answered, independent of the case file itself. A peer-to-peer inference mesh runs a sidecar responder on every serving node, answering checkpoints, record, and exchange subjects over a subprotocol negotiated at connection time. Both halves of every served exchange are sealed — the requester's commitment before sending, the provider's reply citing it — and checkpoints go to a witness no serving node operates. This deployment shape exercises the symmetric ask () and the history card as the constant-size default (). A decentralized social protocol — clients publish signed events through nodes they do not operate and do not fully trust — uses this interaction for a client to ask a node for the interaction history tied to one of its own signing keys. subject names the key, coverage pins a checkpoint the client obtained from a different node, and the node answers with the same bytes regardless of which node served the request, refuses coverage_unsatisfiable if it has not yet observed enough events to satisfy the pin, or refuses no_such_subject if it holds nothing under that key at all. Because a client can run the same request against several nodes and compare artifact digests, caller invariance () turns "my node says X" into something checkable rather than trusted. A continuous-integration pipeline requests build-provenance evidence for one artifact from an upstream stage before promoting it: subject names the artifact by its build digest, coverage pins the upstream stage's checkpoint recorded when the artifact was produced, and deadline bounds how long the promotion step will wait before treating the request as absence rather than blocking indefinitely. A stage that cannot produce the provenance in time refuses deadline_unmet rather than let promotion discover only a timeout; whether a promotion step proceeds anyway on absence, rather than treating it as a blocked release, is a policy decision this document does not make for it. None of the four sketches above is a claim of conformance or of deployed practice; retention commitments () in particular remain a design proposal here, not a description of running code. The divergences a real deployment of any of these shapes would show — different refusal conventions, different freshness expressions, no common recording discipline — are precisely the gaps the normative sections above close.

Reference Blocks and This Interaction Evidence formats that cite other artifacts commonly carry a reference block of roughly the shape {relation, identifier, resolver, retention, digest}, in which the identifier is a name in the resolver's system and the digest is optional. Read against this interaction, the required and optional halves swap, and each member maps onto one thing defined here:

Reference member	Maps to	Status under this interaction
digest	record subject	REQUIRED; the identity of the cited thing
position under a checkpoint	range subject with expected_pin	OPTIONAL; a positional address, never a second identity
identifier + resolver	route	OPTIONAL; a hint for reaching a responder
retention	retention commitment ()	OPTIONAL; a signed promise by a named party, with an expiry

The inversion this produces is deliberate: a producer that cannot name a resolver may still cite, and a producer that cannot compute a digest may not. A reference that promises only that a name stays resolvable cannot say whether the bytes behind it are the ones present at issue time; a digest can, and a commitment beside it says who is answerable for serving them and until when. This appendix defines no reference-block format; it shows how one of the common shapes lands on the interaction so that the two can cite each other without either defining the other.

Acknowledgments The author thanks the participants in early discussions that helped shape this model. The evidence formats this interaction carries, and the transparency mechanisms its anchors lean on, are the work of the SCITT and COSE communities (, ); this document exists because those answers made the shape of the ask the remaining gap.