SAVNET D. Li Internet-Draft J. Wu Intended status: Informational L. Qin Expires: 22 April 2024 Tsinghua University L. Chen Zhongguancun Laboratory N. Geng M. Huang Huawei F. Gao Zhongguancun Laboratory 20 October 2023 Intra-domain Source Address Validation (SAVNET) Architecture draft-li-savnet-intra-domain-architecture-04 Abstract This document proposes the intra-domain SAVNET architecture, which achieves accurate source address validation (SAV) in an intra-domain network by an automatic way. Compared with uRPF-like SAV mechanisms that only depend on routers' local routing information, SAVNET routers generate SAV rules by using both local routing information and SAV-specific information exchanged among routers, resulting in more accurate SAV validation in asymmetric routing scenarios. Compared with ACL rules that require manual efforts to accommodate to network dynamics, SAVNET routers learn the SAV rules automatically in a distributed way. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 April 2024. Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. Source Entity and Validation Entity . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.1. Source Entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.2. Validation Entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. SAV-related Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.1. Local Routing Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.2. SAV-specific Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.3. SAV-specific Information Communication Mechanism . . 7 3.3. SAV Rule Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1. Use Case 1: Validating Outbound Packets from a Multi-homed Subnet at Edge Routers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.2. Use Case 2: Validating Inbound Packets from Other ASes at Border Routers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5. Meeting the Design Requirements of Intra-domain SAVNET . . . 12 5.1. Meeting the Accurate Validation Requirement . . . . . . . 12 5.2. Meeting the Automatic Update Requirement . . . . . . . . 12 5.3. Meeting the Incremental/Partial Deployment Requirement . 13 5.4. Meeting the Convergence Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.5. Meeting the Security Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. Manageability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 1. Introduction Source address validation (SAV) is important for mitigating source address spoofing and thus contributes to the Internet security. In the Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA) [RFC5210], SAV is divided into three checking levels, i.e., access-network SAV, intra- domain SAV, and inter-domain SAV. When an access network does not deploy SAV (such as SAVI [RFC7039][RFC7513], Cable Source Verify [cable-verify], and IP Source Guard [IPSG]), intra-domain SAV helps block spoofed packets from an access network as close to the source as possible [I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement]. The main purpose of the intra-domain SAV mechanism for an AS A, is to protect the outgoing packets of a subnet of AS A from forging their source addresses as other subnets' addresses or other AS's addresses, as well as protect the incoming packets to AS A from forging their source addresses as AS A's addresses. The main task of the intra- domain SAV mechanism is to generate the correct mapping relationship between a source address (prefix) and the valid incoming interface(s), called SAV rules. The core challenge of the intra- domain SAV mechanism is how to efficiently and accurately learn the mapping relationship. Although many existing intra-domain SAV mechanisms (such as ACL-based filtering [RFC2827], strict uRPF [RFC3704], and loose uRPF [RFC3704]) have been proposed, they suffer from either inaccurate mapping in asymmetric routing scenraios, or high operational overhead in dynamic networks. The key cause is that exsiting mechanisms generate the SAV rules by a router's local routing information or by manual inputs. In [I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement], five requirements for a new intra-domain SAVNET architecture are proposed. This document introduces the intra-domain SAVNET architecture to meet the five requirements. The key idea of intra-domain SAVNET architecture is to generate SAV rules in routers based on SAV- specific information exchanged among routers, instead of depending on local routing information like in existing mechanisms. It achieves accurate SAV validation, because the SAV-specific information exchanged among routers carry necessary information for asymmetric routing scenraio which cannot be learned by local routing information. It achieves automatic SAV rule update, because the SAV- specific information exchange is triggered when there is topology change or prefix change. In the incremental/partial deployment scenario where only part of intra-domain routers support the intra-domain SAVNET architecture, some SAV-specific information for building the complete SAV rules will be missing. In this case, local routing information can still be used to fill the gap. Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 1.1. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 2. Terminology Local Routing Information: The information in a router's local RIB or FIB that can be used to infer SAV rules. SAV-specific Information: The information specialized for SAV rule generation, which is exchanged among routers. SAV-related Information: The information used by a router to make SAV decisions. For intra-domain SAV, SAV-related information includes both local routing information and SAV-specific information. SAV-specific Information Communication Mechanism: The mechanism for exchanging SAV-specific information between routers. It can be a either a new protocol or an extension to an existing protocol. SAV Information Base: A table or data structure in a router which stores SAV-specific information and local routing information. SAV Rule: The rule in a router that describes the mapping relationship between a source address (prefix) and the valid incoming interface(s). It is used by a router to make SAV decisions and is inferred from the SAV information base. SAVNET Router: A router which runs SAVNET architecture. SAVNET Agent: The agent in a SAVNET router that is responsible for communicating SAV-specific information, processing SAV-related information, and generating SAV rules. Edge Router: An intra-domain router for a AS that is directly connected to a subnet of the AS. Border Router: An intra-domain router for a AS that is connected to other ASes. A router in an AS can be both an edge router and a border router, if it is connected to both the AS's subnets and other ASes. Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 Improper Block: The validation results that the packets with legitimate source addresses are blocked improperly due to inaccurate SAV rules. Improper Permit: The validation results that the packets with spoofed source addresses are permitted improperly due to inaccurate SAV rules. 3. Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture Overview 3.1. Source Entity and Validation Entity Figure 1 shows the overview of intra-domain SAVNET architecture. A SAVNET router can be an edge router, a border router, both an edge router and a border router, or other routers (i.e., neither an edge router nor a border router). Every SAVNET router has a SAVNET Agent that is responsible for actions related to SAV. In the architecture, a SAVNET router can act as Source Entity to send its SAV-specific information to other SAVNET routers, or/and act as Validation Entity to receive SAV-specific information from other SAVNET routers. 3.1.1. Source Entity When a SAVNET router acts as Source Entity, the information sender of its SAVNET Agent sends its SAV-specific information to other SAVNET routers that act as Validation Entity. For example, an edge router acting as Source Entity can obtain its SAV-specific information about the connected subnets and send out this information through communication channel. To this end, a SAV-specific information communication mechanism should be developed to build and maintain the communication channel between Source Entity and Validation Entity. 3.1.2. Validation Entity When a SAVNET router acts as Validation Entity, the information receiver of its SAVNET Agent receives SAV-specific information from other routers that act as Source Entity. Then, its SAVNET Agent processes the received SAV-specific information as well as its local routing information to generate SAV rules. For example, an edge router or a border router acting as Validation Entity can generate SAV rules and use SAV rules to perform SAV on inbound or outbound packets. Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 +---------------------+ +-------------------------------------+ | Source Entity | | Validation Entity | | (Router A) | | (Router B) | | | | | | +-----------------+ | | +-----------------+ +---------+ | | | SAVNET Agent | | Communication | | SAVNET Agent <-----+ RIB/FIB | | | | +-------------+ | | Channel | | +-------------+ | +---------+ | | | | Information +-----------------------> Information | | Local Routing | | | | Sender | | |(SAV-specific | | | Receiver | | Information | | | +-------------+ | | Information ) | | +-------------+ | | | +-----------------+ | | +-----------------+ | | | | | +---------------------+ +-------------------------------------+ Figure 1: The intra-domain SAVNET architecture In the following, Section 3.2 introduces both kinds of SAV-related information (i.e., local routing information and SAV-specific information), and how they can be obtained. Section 3.3 introduces the basic workflow of SAV rule generation. 3.2. SAV-related Information 3.2.1. Local Routing Information Local routing information is used for forwarding rule computation, which is stored in RIB/FIB. Although it is not specialized for SAV, it can also be used to infer SAV rules in existing uRPF-based SAV mechanisms, such as strict uRPF and loose uRPF. A SAVNET router acting as Validation Entity can directly obtain local routing information from the router's RIB/FIB. 3.2.2. SAV-specific Information SAV-specific information is specialized for SAV. A SAVNET router acting as Source Entity can obtain local SAV-specific information based on local routing information and local interface configurations. A SAVNET routing acting as Validation Entity can obtain SAV-specific information of other SAVNET routers that act as Source Entity through the communication channel. By learning the SAV-specific information from Source Entity, Validation Entity can generate more accurate SAV rules than solely using its local routing information. In this way, improper block problems can be avoided and improper permit problems can be reduced. For example, a router that is directly connected to subnets can act as Source Entity and inform the other routers of its locally known source prefixes of its subnets. Other routers acting as Validation Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 Entity can finally consolidate such SAV-specific information and local routing information to obtain the complete source prefixes of intra-domain subnets. 3.2.3. SAV-specific Information Communication Mechanism The SAV-specific communication mechanism is for building the communication channel and propagating SAV-specific information from Source Entity to Validation Entity. Since there is no off-the-shelf mechanism to achieve this function, a new SAV-specific communication mechanism is needed. It can be a new protocol or an extension to an existing protocol. This document does not present the details of the protocol design or protocol extensions. In the following, we describe the necessary features of SAV-specific communication mechanism. The SAV-specific communication mechanism SHOULD define the data structure or format of SAV-specific information, and the operations of communication (such as communication channel establishment and communication channel termination). In addition, the mechanism SHOULD require Source Entity to inform Validation Entity of the updates of SAV-specific information in a timely manner, so that Validation Entity can update SAV rules based on the latest information. In order to ensure the convergence and security of the communication, the session of the SAV-specific communication mechanism SHOULD meet the following requirements: * The session can be a long-time session or a temporary one, but it SHOULD provide sufficient assurance of transmission reliability and timeliness, so that Validation Entity can update its SAV rules in time. * Authentication can be conducted before session establishment. Authentication is optional but the ability of authentication SHOULD be available. 3.3. SAV Rule Generation Figure 2 shows the SAV rule generation process of the SAVNET router acting as Validation Entity. The SAV Information Manager of SAVNET Agent consolidates SAV-specific information from Information Receiver and local routing information from RIB/FIB into the SAV Information Base. Then, it sends the consolidated information to the SAV Rule Generator. The SAV Rule Generator will generate SAV rules (e.g., tuples like ) based on the consolidated information. It then stores SAV rules in SAV Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 Table [I-D.huang-savnet-sav-table]. SAV Information Manager also provides the support of diagnosis. Operators can look up the information in SAV Information Base for monitoring or troubleshooting purpose. +--------------------------------------------------------+ | SAVNET Agent | | | | SAV-specific information Local routing information | | from Information Receiver from RIB/FIB | | | | | | | | | | +---v-------------------v----+ | | | SAV Information Manager | | | | +------------------------+ | | | | | SAV Information Base | | | | | +------------------------+ | | | +----------------------------+ | | | | | | SAV-related information | | | | | +-------------v--------------+ | | | SAV Rule Generator | | | | +------------------------+ | | | | | SAV Rules | | | | | +------------------------+ | | | +----------------------------+ | +--------------------------------------------------------+ Figure 2: The workflow of SAV rule generation As mentioned in Section 3, Validation Entity can be either an edge router or a border router. According to the definition of intra- domain SAV proposed in [I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement], the edge router is responsible for validating packets received from the connected subnet and blocking those with source addresses of other subnets. While the border router is responsible for validating packets received from other ASes and blocking those with source addresses in internal source prefixes. Therefore, the working mechanism of SAVNET Agents of edge router and border router should be different, especially in the incremental/partial deployment scenario. For an edge router acting as Validation Entity, it should first combine the local routing information and the SAV-specific information to obtain the complete source prefixes of each connected subnet. Then, it binds the source prefixes of the subnet to its interface connected to the subnet, and conduct SAV at this interface. Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 Packets arriving at the interface will be considered invalid and should be blocked, if their source addresses do not belong to the subnet. In the incremental/partial deployment scenario where not all edge routers connected to the same subnets deploy SAV-specific information communication mechanism, an edge router acting as Validation Entity may not be able to identify complete source prefixes of the subnet. To avoid improper problems in this case, the Validation Entity is recommended to use less strict SAV rules. For example, it can choose to only block packets with non-global or non- routable source addresses by using its local routing information. For a border router acting as Validation Entity, it should combine the local routing information and the SAV-specific information to collect all internal source prefixes, i.e., the source prefixes of all internal subnets. Then, it binds the internal source prefixes to the interfaces connected to other ASes and conducts SAV at these interfaces. Packets arriving at these interfaces will be considered invalid and should be blocked, if their source addresses belong to internal source prefixes. In the incremental/partial deployment scenario where not all edge routers in the intra-domain network deploy SAV-specific information communication mechanism, a border router acting as Validation Entity may not be able to get complete internal source prefixes. In this scenario, the border router can still block inbound packets with source addresses belonging to the learned internal source prefixes. In addition, if the border router also implements inter-domain SAVNET architecture, its intra-domain SAVNET Agent SHOULD send the intra-domain SAV-specific information to its inter-domain SAVNET Agent, helping the inter-domain SAVNET Agent generate inter-domain SAV rules or inter-domain SAV-specific information. 4. Use Cases This section uses two use cases to illustrate that intra-domain SAVNET architecture can achieve more accurate and efficient SAV than existing intra-domain SAV mechanisms, both in the inbound and outbound directions. 4.1. Use Case 1: Validating Outbound Packets from a Multi-homed Subnet at Edge Routers Figure 3 shows an asymmetric routing in the multi-homed subnet scenario. This scenario has been proposed in [I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement]. Subnet 1 has prefix 10.0.0.0/15 and is attached to two edge routers, i.e., Router 1 and Router 2. Due to the inbound load balance strategy of Subnet 1, Router 1 only learns the route to sub prefix 10.1.0.0/16 from Subnet 1, while Router 2 only learns the route to the other sub Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 prefix 10.0.0.0/16 from Subnet 1. After that, Router 1 or Router 2 learns the route to the other sub prefix through the intra-domain routing protocol. The FIBs of Router 1 and Router 2 are shown in the figure. Assume Subnet 1 may send outbound packets with source addresses in sub prefix 10.0.0.0/16 to Router 1 for outbound load balance. +-------------------------------------------------------------+ | AS | | +----------+ | | | Router 3 | | | FIB on Router 1 +----------+ FIB on Router 2 | | Dest Next_hop /\ \ Dest Next_hop | | 10.1.0.0/16 Subnet 1 / \ 10.0.0.0/16 Subnet 1 | | 10.0.0.0/16 Router 3 / \/ 10.1.0.0/16 Router 3 | | +----------+ +----------+ | | | Router 1 | | Router 2 | | | +-----+#+--+ +-+#+------+ | | /\ / | | Outbound traffic with \ / Inbound traffic with | | source IP addresses \ / destination IP addresses | | of 10.0.0.0/16 \ \/ of 10.0.0.0/16 | | Subnet 1 | | (10.0.0.0/15 ) | | | +-------------------------------------------------------------+ Figure 3: A use case of outbound SAV In this case, as described in [I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement], strict uRPF at Router 1 will improperly block legitimate packets with source addresses in prefix 10.0.0.0/16 from Subnet 1 at interface '#', because it only accepts packets with source addresses in prefix 10.1.0.0/16 from Router 1's interface '#' according to its local routing information. If intra-domain SAVNET architecture is implemented in the network, Router 2 can inform Router 1 that prefix 10.0.0.0/16 also belongs to Subnet 1 by sending SAV-specific information to Router 1. Then, by combining both local routing information and received SAV-specific information, Router 1 learns that Subnet 1 owns both prefix 10.1.0.0/16 and prefix 10.0.0.0/16. Therefore, Router 1 will accept packets with source addresses in prefix 10.1.0.0/16 and prefix 10.0.0.0/16 at interface '#', so improper block can be avoided. Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 4.2. Use Case 2: Validating Inbound Packets from Other ASes at Border Routers Figure 4 shows the inbound SAV scenario which is proposed in [I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement]. Router 3 and Router 4 perform intra-domain SAV at interface '#' to block inbound packets with spoofed internal source addresses. + Packets with + Packets with | spoofed P1/P2 | spoofed P1/P2 +--------------|---------------------------|----------+ | AS \/ \/ | | +--+#+-----+ +---+#+----+ | | | Router 3 +-------------->| Router 4 | | | +----------+ +----------+ | | / \ | | | / \ | | | \/ \/ \/ | | +----------+ +----------+ +----------+ | | | Router 1 | | Router 2 | | Router 5 | | | +----------+ +----------+ +----------+ | | \ / | | | \ / | | | \ / \/ | | Subnet 1(P1) Subnet 2(P2) | +-----------------------------------------------------+ Figure 4: A use case of inbound SAV As described in [I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement], if Router 3 and Router 4 deploy ACL-based ingress filtering, the operator needs to manually generate and update ACL rules at Router 3 and Router 4 when internal source prefixes change. The operational overhead of manually maintaining and updating ACL rules will be extremely high, especially when there are multiple inbound validation points. Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 If intra-domain SAVNET architecture is implemented in the network, Router 1, Router 2, and Router 5 will inform Router 3 and Router 4 of the source prefixes of Subnet 1 and Subnet 2 by sending SAV-specific information. The SAV-specific information communication will be triggered if topology or prefix changes. For example, if Subnet 2 has a new source prefix P3, Router 5 will inform Router 3 and Router 4 of the new source prefix of Subnet 2 immediately. After receiving SAV-specific information from other routers, Router 3 and Router 4 can identify internal source prefixes and detect their changes. In this way, Router 3 and Router 4 can automatically generate and update SAV rules at interface '#' to block inbound packets with internal source addresses. 5. Meeting the Design Requirements of Intra-domain SAVNET Intra-domain SAVNET architecture is proposed to meet the five design requirements proposed in [I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement]. 5.1. Meeting the Accurate Validation Requirement In the asymmetric routing scenario shown in Figure 3, the edge router cannot identify the complete source prefixes of the connected subnet only using the router's local routing information. As a result, strict uRPF has improper block problems in the case of asymmetric routing, because it only uses local routing information to generate SAV rules. To meet the accurate validation requirement, intra-domain SAVNET architecture proposes SAV-specific information and requires routers to exchange SAV-specific information among each other. The SAVNET Router acting as Validation Entity can combine SAV-specific information with local routing information to generate accurate SAV rules. The use case in Section 4.1 has shown that intra-domain SAVNET architecture can achieve more accurate SAV validation compared with strict uRPF in asymmetric routing scenarios. 5.2. Meeting the Automatic Update Requirement In real intra-domain networks, the topology or prefixes of networks may change dynamically. The SAV mechanism MUST automatically update the SAV rules as the network changes. However, ACL-based SAV mechanism requires manual efforts to accommodate to network dynamics, resulting in high operational overhead. To meet the automatic update requirement, intra-domain SAVNET architecture allows SAVNET routers to exchange the changes of SAV- specific information among each other automatically. After receiving Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 updated SAV-specific information from Source Entity, routers acting as Validation Entity can generate and update its SAV rules accordingly. The use case in Section 4.2 has shown that intra-domain SAVNET architecture can achieve automatic update. 5.3. Meeting the Incremental/Partial Deployment Requirement Although an intra-domain network mostly has one administration, incremental/partial deployment may still exist due to phased deployment or the limitations coming from multi-vendor supplement. In phased deployment scenarios, SAV-specific information of non- deploying routers is not available, so SAVNET routers acting as Validation Entity may not obtain some needed SAV-specific information. As described in Section 3.3, the architecture can adapt to incremental/partial deployment. If complete SAV-specific information is unavailable, SAV rules can be generated by combining available SAV-specific information and local routing information. To mitigate the impact of phased deployment, it is also RECOMMENDED that edge routers connected to the same subnet can adopt intra-domain SAVNET together so that the complete source prefixes of the subnet can be obtained by other routers. For example, in Figure 3, Router 1 and Router 2 are recommended to be upgraded to SAVNET routers together so that the two routers can obtain complete source prefixes of Subnet 1 and generate accurate SAV rules. In addition, SAVNET routers acting as Validation Entity are RECOMMENDED to support flexible validation modes and perform SAV filtering incrementally to smooth the transition from partial to full deployment. * The Validation Entity is RECOMMENDED to support flexible validation modes such as interface-based prefix allowlist, interface-based prefix blocklist, and prefix-based interface allowlist [I-D.huang-savnet-sav-table]. The first two modes are interface-scale, and the last one is device-scale. Under incremental/partial deployment, the Validation Entity SHOULD take on the proper validation mode according to the deploying of Source Entity. For example, if Validation Entity is able to get the complete set of legitimate source prefixes arriving at a given interface, interface-based prefix allowlist can be enabled at the given interface, and improper block will not exist. * The Validation Entity is RECOMMENDED to performed SAV-invalid filtering incrementally. The router can first take conservative actions on the validated data packets. That is to say, the router will not directly discard packet with an invalid result in the Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 beginning of deployment. It can conduct sampling action for measurement analysis at first, and then conducts rate-limiting action or redirecting action for packets with invalid results. These conservative actions will not result in serious consequences if some legitimate packets are mistakenly considered invalid, while still providing protection for the network. Finally, filtering action is enabled only after confirming that there are no improper block problems. 5.4. Meeting the Convergence Requirement When the SAV-specific information or local routing information changes, the SAVNET Agent MUST be able to detect the changes in time and update SAV rules with the latest information. Otherwise, outdated SAV rules may cause legitimate packets to be blocked or spoofed packets to be accepted. To meet the convergence requirement, intra-domain SAVNET architecture requires routers to update SAV-specific information and SAV rules in a timely manner. Since SAV-specific information is originated from Source Entity, it requires Source Entity MUST send the updated SAV- specific information to Validation Entity in a timely manner. Consider that both routing information and SAV-specific information of a subnet are originated and advertised to other routers in the network by the edge router connected to the subnet. Thus, SAV- specific information SHOULD have a similar propagation speed as routing information. Even though, there will still be delays of message delivery (sometimes re-transmission delay due to packet loss) and information processing. Therefore, during the convergence process, the SAV rules for checking packets are possibly inaccurate, which may result in improper block or improper permit. Existing uRPF-based SAV mechanisms that solely use local routing information are also faced with similar convergence problems. Inaccurate validation may appear during the convergence of routing, which is inevitable in practice. To mitigate the impact of convergence problems and avoid improper block, future intra-domain SAV mechanisms MUST carefully consider the factors that may affect the convergence performance. 5.5. Meeting the Security Requirement Typically, routers in an intra-domain network can trust each other because they would not compromise intra-domain control-plane architectures and protocols. Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 However, in some unlikely cases, some routers may do harm to other routers within the same domain. Operators SHOULD be aware of potential threats involved in deploying the architecture. Some potential threats and solutions are as follows: * Entity impersonation. - Potential solution: Mutual authentication SHOULD be conducted before session establishment between two entities. - Gaps: Impersonation may still exist due to credential theft, implementation flaws, or entity being compromised. Some other security mechanisms can be taken to make such kind of impersonation difficult. Besides, the entities SHOULD be monitored so that misbehaved entities can be detected. * Message blocking. - Potential solution: Acknowledgement mechanisms MUST be provided in the session between a speaker and a receiver, so that message losses can be detected. - Gaps: Message blocking may be a result of DoS/DDoS attack, man- in-the-middle (MITM) attack, or congestion induced by traffic burst. Acknowledgement mechanisms can detect message losses but cannot avoid message losses. MITM attacks cannot be effectively detected by acknowledgement mechanisms. * Message alteration. - Potential solution: An authentication field can be carried by each message so as to ensure message integrity. - Gaps: More overhead of control plane and data plane will be induced. * Message replay. - Potential solution: Authentication value can be computed by adding a sequence number or timestamp as input. - Gaps: More overhead of control plane and data plane will be induced. To meet the security requirement, the above security threats SHOULD be considered when designing the new intra-domain SAV mechanism. Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 6. Manageability Considerations The architecture provides a general framework for communicating SAV- specific information between routers and generating SAV rules based on SAV-specific information and local routing information. Protocol- independent mechanisms SHOULD be provided for operating and managing SAV-related configurations. For example, a YANG data model for SAV configuration and operation is necessary for the ease of management. SAV may affect the normal forwarding of data packets. The diagnosis approach and necessary logging information SHOULD be provided. SAV Information Base SHOULD store some information that may not be useful for rule generation but is helpful for management. The SAV-specific information communication mechanism SHOULD have monitoring and troubleshooting functions, which are necessary for efficiently operating the architecture. 7. Privacy Considerations An intra-domain network is mostly operated by a single organization or company, and the advertised SAV-specific information is only used within the network. Therefore, the architecture does not import critical privacy issues in usual cases. 8. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA requirements. 9. Acknowledgements Many thanks to the valuable comments from: Igor Lubashev, Alvaro Retana, Aijun Wang, Joel Halpern, Jared Mauch, Kotikalapudi Sriram, Rüdiger Volk, Jeffrey Haas, Xiangqing Chang, Changwang Lin, etc. 10. References 10.1. Normative References [I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement] Li, D., Wu, J., Qin, L., Huang, M., and N. Geng, "Source Address Validation in Intra-domain Networks Gap Analysis, Problem Statement, and Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem- statement-02, 17 August 2023, . Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 [RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827, May 2000, . [RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, DOI 10.17487/RFC3704, March 2004, . [I-D.huang-savnet-sav-table] Huang, M., Cheng, W., Li, D., Geng, N., Liu, and L. Chen, "Source Address Validation Table Abstraction and Application", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- huang-savnet-sav-table-01, 6 March 2023, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . 10.2. Informative References [RFC5210] Wu, J., Bi, J., Li, X., Ren, G., Xu, K., and M. Williams, "A Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA) Testbed and Deployment Experience", RFC 5210, DOI 10.17487/RFC5210, June 2008, . [RFC7039] Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt, Ed., "Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Framework", RFC 7039, DOI 10.17487/RFC7039, October 2013, . [RFC7513] Bi, J., Wu, J., Yao, G., and F. Baker, "Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Solution for DHCP", RFC 7513, DOI 10.17487/RFC7513, May 2015, . [IPSG] "Configuring DHCP Features and IP Source Guard", January 2016, . Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 [cable-verify] "Cable Source-Verify and IP Address Security", January 2021, . Authors' Addresses Dan Li Tsinghua University Beijing China Email: tolidan@tsinghua.edu.cn Jianping Wu Tsinghua University Beijing China Email: jianping@cernet.edu.cn Lancheng Qin Tsinghua University Beijing China Email: qlc19@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn Li Chen Zhongguancun Laboratory Beijing China Email: lichen@zgclab.edu.cn Nan Geng Huawei Beijing China Email: gengnan@huawei.com Mingqing Huang Huawei Beijing China Email: huangmingqing@huawei.com Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Intra-domain SAVNET Architecture October 2023 Fang Gao Zhongguancun Laboratory Beijing China Email: gaofang@zgclab.edu.cn Li, et al. Expires 22 April 2024 [Page 19]