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Network Working GroupL. Hornquist Astrand
Internet-DraftApple, Inc
Intended status: Standards TrackAugust 18, 2008
Expires: February 19, 2009 


Kerberos ticket extensions
draft-lha-krb-wg-ticket-extensions-01

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Abstract

The Kerberos protocol does not allow ticket extensions. This make it harder to deploy features like referrals and PKCROSS.

Since the Kerberos protocol did not specified extensibility for the Ticket structure and the current implementations are aware of the contents of tickets, the extension protocol cannot simply extend the Ticket ASN.1 structure. Instead, the extension data needs to be hidden inside the ticket.



Table of Contents

1.  Requirements Notation
2.  Protocol
3.  How to request a new assignment for a ticket extension
4.  Security Considerations
5.  Acknowledgements
6.  IANA Considerations
7.  Normative References
Appendix A.  Ticket-extensions ASN.1 Module
§  Author's Address
§  Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements




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1.  Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).



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2.  Protocol

The ticket and enc-part as defined by [RFC4120] (Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, “The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5),” July 2005.) is defined as follow:


Ticket          ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE {
        tkt-vno         [0] INTEGER (5),
        realm           [1] Realm,
        sname           [2] PrincipalName,
        enc-part        [3] EncryptedData -- EncTicketPart
}

EncryptedData   ::= SEQUENCE {
        etype   [0] Int32 -- EncryptionType --,
        kvno    [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
        cipher  [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
}


This document uses the special encryption type etype-TBETicket to signal that enc-part.cipher contains the DER-encoded TBETicket structure, instead of an encrypted EncTicketPart.


etype-TBETicket INTEGER ::= 4711 -- TBA XXX --

krb5int32  ::= INTEGER (-2147483648..2147483647)

TBETicket ::= SEQUENCE {
        etype           [0] krb5int32 -- EncryptionType --,
        cipher          [1] OCTET STRING
        extensions      [2] SEQUENCE OF TicketExtension OPTIONAL

}

TicketExtension ::= SEQUENCE {
        te-type [0] krb5int32,
        te-data [1] OCTET STRING
        te-csum [2] Checksum OPTIONAL
}

The content of cipher data and encryption type fields is moved inside TBETicket.

Negative ticket extension types (te-type) is private extensions and MUST only be used for experimentation or private use.

The te-type field specifies the type of the content in te-data. Unknown te-types MUST be ignored both by the client and the server.

The te-csum field is optional for the type, when in use by type type specifed in te-type, the key have to be specifed and the key usage number. The key is usually the session key of the ticket, but doesn't have to be, an extension could specify an new session key used for the ticket.

The KDC MUST NOT use extended ticket in an AS or TGS reply unless it is known that all instances of the service in question support it. In particular, a (local or cross-realm) TGT MUST NOT use extended tickets unless all of the KDCs to which it may be sent are known to support it.

The KDC MAY return extended tickets to servers supporting ticket extensions even if the extended ticket does not contain any extensions.



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3.  How to request a new assignment for a ticket extension

When anyone is writing a internet-draft for which a new assignment for te-type is needed/wanted under the ticket extension, then the proper way to do so is as follows:


      EXAMPLE-MODULE DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN

      krb5-ticket-extension-Name ::= INTEGER nnn
      -- IANA: please assign nnn
      -- RFC-Editor: replace nnn with IANA-assigned
      --             number and remove this note
      END

IANA: Don't do note above, its an example, remove this note RFC-Editor: Don't do note above, its an example, remove this note IANA will assign the number as part of the RFC publication process.

When reviewing the document, the reviewer should take sure to check that if te-csum is used, the siging key and key usage is specifed.



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4.  Security Considerations

This document describes how to extend Kerberos tickets to include additional data in the ticket. This does have a security implications since the extension data in the TBETicket is only optionally signed, not encrypted and is not replay protected. It is up to the consumers of this interface to make sure its used safely.

Some of the issues that the exensions need to protect themself from are: MITM downgrade to normal ticket, add or remove extentions, cut and paste extensions between requests, retransmission of requqests to a diffrent KDC.



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5.  Acknowledgements

Thanks to Leif Johansson, Kamada Ken'ichi, and Ken Raeburn for reviewing the document and provided suggestions for improvements.



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6.  IANA Considerations

There are currently no ticket extensions. Future ticket extensions will be published at:


      http://www.iana.org/assignments/NNNNNNNN
      -- IANA: please name registry, proposal: krb5-ticket-extensions

IANA is requested to maintain this registry for future assignments. New assignments can only be made via Specification Required as described in [RFC2434] (Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, “Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs,” October 1998.).

IANA will assign the number as part of the RFC publication process.



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7. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, “Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs,” BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, “The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5),” RFC 4120, July 2005 (TXT).


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Appendix A.  Ticket-extensions ASN.1 Module


KerberosV5-TicketExtensions {
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) ticket-extensions(TBA)
--- XXX who is the registerar for this number ?
} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

IMPORTS
        -- as defined in RFC 4120
        Int32, Checksum
                FROM KerberosV5Spec2 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
                     dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2)
                     modules(4) krb5spec2(2) }


etype-TBETicket INTEGER ::= 4711 -- XXX TBA --

TBETicket ::= SEQUENCE {
        etype           [0] Int32 -- EncryptionType --,
        cipher          [1] OCTET STRING
        extensions      [2] SEQUENCE OF TicketExtension OPTIONAL
}

TicketExtension ::= SEQUENCE {
        te-type [0] Int32,
        te-data [1] OCTET STRING
        te-csum [2] Checksum
}

END



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Author's Address

  Love Hornquist Astrand
  Apple, Inc
  Cupertino
  USA
Email:  lha@apple.com


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Full Copyright Statement

Intellectual Property