| SUIT | B. Moran |
| Internet-Draft | H. Tschofenig |
| Intended status: Standards Track | Arm Limited |
| Expires: September 10, 2020 | H. Birkholz |
| Fraunhofer SIT | |
| K. Zandberg | |
| Inria | |
| March 09, 2020 |
A Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based Serialization Format for the Software Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT) Manifest
draft-ietf-suit-manifest-04
This specification describes the format of a manifest. A manifest is a bundle of metadata about the firmware for an IoT device, where to find the firmware, the devices to which it applies, and cryptographic information protecting the manifest. Firmware updates and trusted boot both tend to use sequences of common operations, so the manifest encodes those sequences of operations, rather than declaring the metadata.
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A firmware update mechanism is an essential security feature for IoT devices to deal with vulnerabilities. While the transport of firmware images to the devices themselves is important there are already various techniques available, such as the Lightweight Machine-to-Machine (LwM2M) protocol offering device management of IoT devices. Equally important is the inclusion of meta-data about the conveyed firmware image (in the form of a manifest) and the use of end-to-end security protection to detect modifications and (optionally) to make reverse engineering more difficult. End-to-end security allows the author, who builds the firmware image, to be sure that no other party (including potential adversaries) can install firmware updates on IoT devices without adequate privileges. This authorization process is ensured by the use of dedicated symmetric or asymmetric keys installed on the IoT device: for use cases where only integrity protection is required it is sufficient to install a trust anchor on the IoT device. For confidentiality protected firmware images it is additionally required to install either one or multiple symmetric or asymmetric keys on the IoT device. Starting security protection at the author is a risk mitigation technique so firmware images and manifests can be stored on untrusted repositories; it also reduces the scope of a compromise of any repository or intermediate system to be no worse than a denial of service.
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the high-level firmware update architecture [I-D.ietf-suit-architecture].
Most Update and Trusted Execution operations are composed of the same small set of fundamental operations, such as copying a firmware image from one place to another, checking that a firmware image is correct, verifying that the specified firmware is the correct firmware for the device, or unpacking a firmware. By using these fundamental operations in different orders and changing the parameters they use, a great many use cases can be supported by the same encoding. The SUIT manifest uses this observation to heavily optimize update metadata for consumption by constrained devices.
While the SUIT manifest is informed by and optimized for firmware update use cases, there is nothing in the [I-D.ietf-suit-information-model] that restricts its use to only firmware use cases. Software update and delivery of arbitrary data can equally be managed by SUIT-based metadata.
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “NOT RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
The following terminology is used throughout this document.
This specification covers four aspects of firmware update: the background that has informed this specification, the behavior of a device consuming a manifest, the process of creating a manifest, and the structure of the manifest itself.
For information about firmware update in general and the background of the suit manifest, see Section 4. To implement an updatable device, see Section 5 and Section 7. To implement a tool that generates updates, see Section 6 and Section 7.
This section describes the logistical challenges, device constraints, use cases, and design principles that informed the structure of the manifest. For the security considerations of the manifest, see [I-D.ietf-suit-information-model].
Distributing firmware updates to diverse devices with diverse trust anchors in a coordinated system presents unique challenges. Devices have a broad set of constraints, requiring different metadata to make appropriate decisions. There may be many actors in production IoT systems, each of whom has some authority. Distributing firmware in such a multi-party environment presents additional challenges. Each party requires a different subset of data. Some data may not be accessible to all parties. Multiple signatures may be required from parties with different authorities. This topic is covered in more depth in [I-D.ietf-suit-architecture].
The various constraints on IoT devices create a broad set of use-case requirements. For example, devices with:
Supporting the requirements introduced by the constraints on IoT devices requires the flexibility to represent a diverse set of possible metadata, but also requires that the encoding is kept simple.
There are several fundamental assumptions that inform the model of the firmware update workflow:
There are several fundamental assumptions that inform the model of the secure boot workflow:
Based on these assumptions, the manifest is structured to work with a pull parser, where each section of the manifest is used in sequence. The expected workflow for a device installing an update can be broken down into 5 steps:
When installation is complete, similar information can be used for validating and running images in a further 3 steps:
If verification and running is implemented in a bootloader, then the bootloader MUST also verify the signature of the manifest and the applicability of the manifest in order to implement secure boot workflows. The bootloader MAY add its own authentication, e.g. a MAC, to the manifest in order to prevent further verifications.
When multiple manifests are used for an update, each manifest’s steps occur in a lockstep fashion; all manifests have dependency resolution performed before any manifest performs a payload fetch, etc.
The RECOMMENDED process is to verify the signature of the manifest prior to parsing/executing any section of the manifest. This guards the parser against arbitrary input by unauthenticated third parties, but it costs extra energy when a device receives an incompatible manifest.
If a device:
Then, the device MAY choose to parse and execute only the SUIT_Common section of the manifest prior to signature verification. The guidelines in Creating Manifests require that the common section contain the applicability checks, so this section is sufficient for applicability verification. The manifest parser MUST NOT execute any command with side-effects outside the parser (for example, Run, Copy, Swap, or Fetch commands) prior to authentication and any such command MUST result in an error.
The manifest described in this document is intended to meet several goals, as described below.
The SUIT manifest can be used for a variety of purposes throughout its lifecycle. The manifest allows:
Each of these uses happens at a different stage of the manifest lifecycle, so each has different requirements.
In order to provide flexible behavior to constrained devices, while still allowing more powerful devices to use their full capabilities, the SUIT manifest encodes the required behavior of a Recipient device. Behavior is encoded as a specialized byte code, contained in a CBOR list. This promotes a flat encoding, which simplifies the parser. The information encoded by this byte code closely matches the operations that a device will perform, which promotes ease of processing. The core operations used by most update and trusted execution operations are represented in the byte code. The byte code can be extended by registering new operations.
The specialized byte code approach gives benefits equivalent to those provided by a scripting language or conventional byte code, with two substantial differences. First, the language is extremely high level, consisting of only the operations that a device may perform during update and trusted execution of a firmware image. Second, the language specifies linear behavior, without reverse branches. Conditional processing is supported, and parallel and out-of-order processing may be performed by sufficiently capable devices.
By structuring the data in this way, the manifest processor becomes a very simple engine that uses a pull parser to interpret the manifest. This pull parser invokes a series of command handlers that evaluate a Condition or execute a Directive. Most data is structured in a highly regular pattern, which simplifies the parser.
The results of this allow a Recipient to implement a very small parser for constrained applications. If needed, such a parser also allows the Recipient to perform complex updates with reduced overhead. Conditional execution of commands allows a simple device to perform important decisions at validation-time.
Dependency handling is vastly simplified as well. Dependencies function like subroutines of the language. When a manifest has a dependency, it can invoke that dependency’s commands and modify their behavior by setting parameters. Because some parameters come with security implications, the dependencies also have a mechanism to reject modifications to parameters on a fine-grained level.
Developing a robust permissions system works in this model too. The Recipient can use a simple ACL that is a table of Identities and Component Identifier permissions to ensure that operations on components fail unless they are permitted by the ACL. This table can be further refined with individual parameters and commands.
Capability reporting is similarly simplified. A Recipient can report the Commands, Parameters, Algorithms, and Component Identifiers that it supports. This is sufficiently precise for a manifest author to create a manifest that the Recipient can accept.
The simplicity of design in the Recipient due to all of these benefits allows even a highly constrained platform to use advanced update capabilities.
This section describes the behavior of the manifest interpreter. This section focuses primarily on interpreting commands in the manifest. However, there are several other important behaviors of the interpreter: encoding version detection , rollback protection, and authenticity verification are chief among these (see Section 5.1).
Prior to executing any command sequence, the interpreter or its host application MUST inspect the manifest version field and fail when it encounters an unsupported encoding version. Next, the interpreter or its host application MUST extract the manifest sequence number and perform a rollback check using this sequence number. The exact logic of rollback protection may vary by application, but it has the following properties:
Here, valid means that a manifest has a supported encoding version AND it has not been excluded for other reasons. Reasons for excluding typically involve first executing the manifest and MAY include:
These failure reasons MAY be combined with retry mechanisms prior to marking a manifest as invalid.
Following these initial tests, the interpreter clears all parameter storage. This ensures that the interpreter begins without any leaked data.
Once a valid, authentic manifest has been selected, the interpreter MUST examine the component list and verify that its maximum number of components is not exceeded and that each listed component ID is supported.
For each listed component, the interpreter MUST provide storage for the supported parameters. If the interpreter does not have sufficient temporary storage to process the parameters for all components, it MAY process components serially for each command sequence. See Section 5.5 for more details.
The interpreter SHOULD check that the common section contains at least one vendor ID check and at least one class ID check.
If the manifest contains more than one component, each command sequence MUST begin with a Set Current Component command.
If a dependency is specified, then the interpreter MUST perform the following checks:
If the interpreter does not support dependencies and a manifest specifies a dependency, then the interpreter MUST reject the manifest.
The interpreter has a small set of design goals:
NOTE: when using A/B images, the manifest functions as two (or more) logical manifests, each of which applies to a system in a particular starting state. With that provision, design goal 3 holds.
The byte code that forms the bulk of the manifest is processed by an interpreter. This interpreter can be modeled as a simple abstract machine. This machine consists of several data storage locations that are modified by commands. Certain commands also affect the machine’s behavior.
Every command that modifies system state targets a specific component. Components are units of code or data that can be targeted by an update. They are identified by Component identifiers, arrays of binary-strings–effectively a binary path. Each component has a corresponding set of configuration, Parameters. Parameters are used as the inputs to commands.
Some parameters are REQUIRED to implement. These parameters allow a device to perform core functions.
Some parameters are RECOMMENDED to implement. These parameters are needed for most use-cases.
Other parameters are OPTIONAL to implement. These parameters allow a device to implement specific use-cases.
Commands define the behavior of a device. The commands are divided into two groups: those that modify state (directives) and those that perform tests (conditions). There are also several Control Flow operations.
Some commands are REQUIRED to implement. These commands allow a device to perform core functions
NOTE: on systems that support only a single component, Set Current Component has no effect.
Some commands are RECOMMENDED to implement. These commands are needed for most use-cases
Other commands are OPTIONAL to implement. These commands allow a device to implement specific use-cases.
The following table describes the behavior of each command. “params” represents the parameters for the current component or dependency.
| Code | Operation |
|---|---|
| cvid | binary-match(component, params[vendor-id]) |
| ccid | binary-match(component, params[class-id]) |
| cimg | binary-match(digest(component), params[digest]) |
| setc | component := components[arg] |
| ovrp | params[k] := v for k,v in arg |
| setd | dependency := dependencies[arg] |
| setp | params[k] := v if not k in params for k,v in arg |
| pdep | exec(dependency[common]); exec(dependency[current-segment]) |
| run | run(component) |
| getc | store(component, fetch(params[uri])) |
| ubf | assert(now() < arg) |
| cco | assert(offsetof(component) == arg) |
| cdid | binary-match(component, params[device-id]) |
| nimg | not binary-match(digest(component), params[digest]) |
| minb | assert(battery >= arg) |
| auth | assert(isAuthorized()) |
| cver | assert(version_check(component, arg)) |
| abrt | assert(0) |
| try | break if exec(seq) is not error for seq in arg |
| copy | store(component, params[src-component]) |
| swap | swap(component, params[src-component]) |
| wfe | until event(arg), wait |
| srun | exec(arg) |
| arun | run(component, arg) |
Because each manifest has a list of components and a list of components defined by its dependencies, it is possible for the manifest processor to handle one component at a time, traversing the manifest tree once for each listed component. In this mode, the interpreter ignores any commands executed while the component index is not the current component. This reduces the overall volatile storage required to process the update so that the only limit on number of components is the size of the manifest. However, this approach requires additional processing power.
Advanced devices may make use of the Strict Order parameter and enable parallel processing of some segments, or it may reorder some segments. To perform parallel processing, once the Strict Order parameter is set to False, the device may fork a process for each command until the Strict Order parameter is returned to True or the command sequence ends. Then, it joins all forked processes before continuing processing of commands. To perform out-of-order processing, a similar approach is used, except the device consumes all commands after the Strict Order parameter is set to False, then it sorts these commands into its preferred order, invokes them all, then continues processing.
Under each of these scenarios the parallel processing must halt:
To perform more useful parallel operations, sequences of commands may be collected in a suit-directive-run-sequence. Then, each of these sequences may be run in parallel. Each sequence defaults to Strict Order = True. To isolate each sequence from each other sequence, each sequence must declare a single target component. Set Component Index is not permitted inside this sequence.
As described in Section 5.2, each manifest must invoke each of its dependencies sections from the corresponding section of the dependent. Any changes made to parameters by the dependency persist in the dependent.
When a Process Dependency command is encountered, the interpreter loads the dependency identified by the Current Dependency Index. The interpreter first executes the common-sequence section of the identified dependency, then it executes the section of the dependency that corresponds to the currently executing section of the dependent.
The interpreter also performs the checks described in Section 5.2 to ensure that the dependent is processing the dependency correctly.
Manifests are created using tools for constructing COSE structures, calculating cryptographic values and compiling desired system state into a sequence of operations required to achieve that state. The process of constructing COSE structures is covered in [RFC8152] and the calculation of cryptographic values is beyond the scope of this document.
Compiling desired system state into a sequence of operations can be accomplished in many ways, however several templates are provided here to cover common use-cases. Many of these templates can be aggregated to produce more complex behavior.
NOTE: On systems that support only a single component, Set Current Component has no effect and can be omitted.
NOTE: Digest should always be set using Override Parameters, since this prevents a less-privileged dependent from replacing the digest.
When a manifest is constructed from a descriptive document, the descriptive document SHOULD be included in the severable text section. This section MAY be pruned from the manifest prior to distribution to a device. The inclusion of text source material enables several use-cases on unconstrained intermediate systems, where small manifest size, low parser complexity, and pull parsing are not required.
An unconstrained system that makes decisions based on the manifest can use the source material instead so that it does not need to execute the manifest.
An unconstrained system that presents data to a user can do so according to typical usage patterns without first executing the manifest, and can trust that information with the same level of confidence as the manifest itself.
A verifier can be constructed to emulate execution the manifest and compare the results of that execution to the source material, providing a check that the manifest performs its stated objectives and that the manifest does not exceed the capabilities of the target device.
The compatibility check ensures that devices only install compatible images.
Common: Set Current Component Check Vendor Identifier Check Class Identifier
All manifests MUST contain the compatibility check template, except as outlined below.
If a device class has a unique trust anchor, and every element in its trust chain is unique–different from every element in any other device class, then it MAY include the compatibility check.
If a manifest includes a dependency that performs a compatibility check, then the dependent manifest MAY include the compatibility check.
The compatibility check template contains a data dependency: Vendor Identifier and Class Identifier MUST be set prior to executing the template. One example of the full template is included below, however Parameters may be set within a Try-Each block as well. They may also be inherited from a dependent manifest.
For any other section that the dependency has, the dependent MUST invoke Process Dependency.
NOTE: Any changes made to parameters in a dependency persist in the dependent.
The manifest is enveloped in a CBOR map containing:
All elements in the outer map are wrapped in bstr.
+--------------------+
| Manifest Envelope |
+--------------------+
| Delegation CWTs |
| COSE Envelopes |
| Manifest --------------------> +-----------------------+
| Severable Elements | | Manifest (bstr) |
+--------------------+ +-----------------------+
| Structure Version |
| Sequence Number |
+-----------------------+ <------- Common Info |
| Common Info (bstr) | | Reference URI |
+-----------------------+ | Installation Commands ---+
| Dependencies | | Invocation Commands -----+
| Components IDs | | Protected Elements | |
| Component References | +-----------------------+ |
| Common Commands --------+ |
+-----------------------+ | |
+-> +-----------------------+ <---+
| Commands (bstr) |
+-----------------------+
| List of ( pairs of ( |
| * command ID code |
| * argument |
| )) |
+-----------------------+
The map indices in this encoding are reset to 1 for each map within the structure. This is to keep the indices as small as possible. The goal is to keep the index objects to single bytes (CBOR positive integers 1-23).
Wherever enumerations are used, they are started at 1. This allows detection of several common software errors that are caused by uninitialised variables. Positive numbers in enumerations are reserved for IANA registration. Negative numbers are used to identify application-specific implementations.
CDDL names are hyphenated and CDDL structures follow the convention adopted in COSE [RFC8152]: SUIT_Structure_Name.
Because the manifest can be used by different actors at different times, some parts of the manifest can be removed without affecting later stages of the lifecycle. This is called “Severing.” Severing of information is achieved by separating that information from the signed container so that removing it does not affect the signature. This means that ensuring authenticity of severable parts of the manifest is a requirement for the signed portion of the manifest. Severing some parts makes it possible to discard parts of the manifest that are no longer necessary. This is important because it allows the storage used by the manifest to be greatly reduced. For example, no text size limits are needed if text is removed from the manifest prior to delivery to a constrained device.
Elements are made severable by removing them from the manifest, encoding them in a bstr, and placing a SUIT_Digest of the bstr in the manifest so that they can still be authenticated. The SUIT_Digest typically consumes 4 bytes more than the size of the raw digest, therefore elements smaller than (Digest Bits)/8 + 4 SHOULD never be severable. Elements larger than (Digest Bits)/8 + 4 MAY be severable, while elements that are much larger than (Digest Bits)/8 + 4 SHOULD be severable.
Because of this, all command sequences in the manifest are encoded in a bstr so that there is a single code path needed for all command sequences
This object is a container for the other pieces of the manifest to provide a common mechanism to find each of the parts. All elements of the envelope are contained in bstr objects. Wherever the manifest references an object in the envelope, the bstr is included in the digest calculation.
The CDDL that describes the envelope is below
SUIT_Envelope = {
suit-delegation => bstr .cbor SUIT_Delegation
suit-authentication-wrapper
=> bstr .cbor SUIT_Authentication_Wrapper / nil,
$$SUIT_Manifest_Wrapped,
* $$SUIT_Severed_Fields,
}
SUIT_Delegation = [ + [ + CWT ] ]
SUIT_Authentication_Wrapper = [ + bstr .cbor SUIT_Authentication_Block ]
SUIT_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Mac_Tagged
SUIT_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Sign_Tagged
SUIT_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Mac0_Tagged
SUIT_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Sign1_Tagged
$$SUIT_Manifest_Wrapped //= (suit-manifest => bstr .cbor SUIT_Manifest)
$$SUIT_Manifest_Wrapped //= (
suit-manifest-encryption-info => bstr .cbor SUIT_Encryption_Wrapper,
suit-manifest-encrypted => bstr
)
SUIT_Encryption_Wrapper = COSE_Encrypt_Tagged / COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged
$$SUIT_Severed_Fields //= ( suit-dependency-resolution =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence)
$$SUIT_Severed_Fields //= (suit-payload-fetch =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence)
$$SUIT_Severed_Fields //= (suit-install =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence)
$$SUIT_Severed_Fields //= (suit-text =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Text_Map)
$$SUIT_Severed_Fields //= (suit-coswid =>
bstr .cbor concise-software-identity)
All elements of the envelope must be wrapped in a bstr to minimize the complexity of the code that evaluates the cryptographic integrity of the element and to ensure correct serialization for integrity and authenticity checks.
The suit-authentication-wrapper contains a list of 1 or more cryptographic authentication wrappers for the core part of the manifest. These are implemented as COSE_Mac_Tagged or COSE_Sign_Tagged blocks. Each of these blocks contains a SUIT_Digest of the manifest. This enables modular processing of the manifest. The COSE_Mac_Tagged and COSE_Sign_Tagged blocks are described in RFC 8152 [RFC8152] and are beyond the scope of this document. The suit-authentication-wrapper MUST come before any element in the SUIT_Envelope, except for the OPTIONAL suit-delegation, regardless of canonical encoding of CBOR. All validators MUST reject any SUIT_Envelope that begins with any element other than a suit-authentication-wrapper or suit-delegation.
A SUIT_Envelope that has not had authentication information added MUST still contain the suit-authentication-wrapper element, but the content MUST be nil.
The envelope MUST contain only one of
When the envelope contains SUIT_Encryption_Wrapper, the suit-authentication-wrapper MUST authenticate the plaintext of suit-manifest-encrypted. This ensures that the manifest can be stored decrypted and that a recipient MAY convert the suit-manifest-encrypted element to a suit-manifest element.
suit-manifest contains a SUIT_Manifest structure, which describes the payload(s) to be installed and any dependencies on other manifests.
suit-manifest-encryption-info contains a SUIT_Encryption_Wrapper, a COSE object that describes the information required to decrypt a ciphertext manifest.
suit-manifest-encrypted contains a ciphertext manifest.
Each of suit-dependency-resolution, suit-payload-fetch, and suit-payload-installation contain the severable contents of the identically named portions of the manifest, described in Section 7.3.
suit-text contains all the human-readable information that describes any and all parts of the manifest, its payload(s) and its resource(s).
suit-coswid contains a Concise Software Identifier. This may be discarded by the Recipient if not needed.
The manifest describes the critical metadata for the referenced payload(s). In addition, it contains:
The following CDDL fragment defines the manifest.
SUIT_Manifest = {
suit-manifest-version => 1,
suit-manifest-sequence-number => uint,
suit-common => bstr .cbor SUIT_Common,
? suit-reference-uri => #6.32(tstr),
* $$SUIT_Severable_Command_Sequences,
* $$SUIT_Command_Sequences,
* $$SUIT_Protected_Elements,
}
$$SUIT_Severable_Command_Sequences //= (suit-dependency-resolution =>
SUIT_Severable_Command_Segment)
$$SUIT_Severable_Command_Segments //= (suit-payload-fetch =>
SUIT_Severable_Command_Sequence)
$$SUIT_Severable_Command_Segments //= (suit-install =>
SUIT_Severable_Command_Sequence)
SUIT_Severable_Command_Sequence =
SUIT_Digest / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence
$$SUIT_Command_Sequences //= ( suit-validate =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence )
$$SUIT_Command_Sequences //= ( suit-load =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence )
$$SUIT_Command_Sequences //= ( suit-run =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence )
$$SUIT_Protected_Elements //= ( suit-text => SUIT_Digest )
$$SUIT_Protected_Elements //= ( suit-coswid => SUIT_Digest )
SUIT_Common = {
? suit-dependencies => bstr .cbor SUIT_Dependencies,
? suit-components => bstr .cbor SUIT_Components,
? suit-dependency-components
=> bstr .cbor SUIT_Component_References,
? suit-common-sequence => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
}
Several fields in the Manifest can be either a CBOR structure or a SUIT_Digest. In each of these cases, the SUIT_Digest provides for a severable field. Severable fields are RECOMMENDED to implement. In particular, text SHOULD be severable, since most useful text elements occupy more space than a SUIT_Digest, but are not needed by the Recipient. Because SUIT_Digest is a CBOR Array and each severable element is a CBOR bstr, it is straight-forward for a Recipient to determine whether an element is been severable. The key used for a severable element is the same in the SUIT_Manifest and in the SUIT_Envelope so that a Recipient can easily identify the correct data in the envelope.
The suit-manifest-version indicates the version of serialization used to encode the manifest. Version 1 is the version described in this document. suit-manifest-version is REQUIRED.
The suit-manifest-sequence-number is a monotonically increasing anti-rollback counter. It also helps devices to determine which in a set of manifests is the “root” manifest in a given update. Each manifest MUST have a sequence number higher than each of its dependencies. Each Recipient MUST reject any manifest that has a sequence number lower than its current sequence number. It MAY be convenient to use a UTC timestamp in seconds as the sequence number. suit-manifest-sequence-number is REQUIRED.
suit-common encodes all the information that is shared between each of the command sequences, including: suit-dependencies, suit-components, suit-dependency-components, and suit-common-sequence. suit-common is REQUIRED to implement.
suit-dependencies is a list of SUIT_Dependency blocks that specify manifests that must be present before the current manifest can be processed. suit-dependencies is OPTIONAL to implement.
In order to distinguish between components that are affected by the current manifest and components that are affected by a dependency, they are kept in separate lists. Components affected by the current manifest only list the component identifier. Components affected by a dependency include the component identifier and the index of the dependency that defines the component.
suit-components is a list of SUIT_Component blocks that specify the component identifiers that will be affected by the content of the current manifest. suit-components is OPTIONAL, but at least one manifest MUST contain a suit-components block.
suit-dependency-components is a list of SUIT_Component_Reference blocks that specify component identifiers that will be affected by the content of a dependency of the current manifest. suit-dependency-components is OPTIONAL.
suit-common-sequence is a SUIT_Command_Sequence to execute prior to executing any other command sequence. Typical actions in suit-common-sequence include setting expected device identity and image digests when they are conditional (see Section 10 for more information on conditional sequences). suit-common-sequence is RECOMMENDED.
suit-reference-uri is a text string that encodes a URI where a full version of this manifest can be found. This is convenient for allowing management systems to show the severed elements of a manifest when this URI is reported by a device after installation.
suit-dependency-resolution is a SUIT_Command_Sequence to execute in order to perform dependency resolution. Typical actions include configuring URIs of dependency manifests, fetching dependency manifests, and validating dependency manifests’ contents. suit-dependency-resolution is REQUIRED when suit-dependencies is present.
suit-payload-fetch is a SUIT_Command_Sequence to execute in order to obtain a payload. Some manifests may include these actions in the suit-install section instead if they operate in a streaming installation mode. This is particularly relevant for constrained devices without any temporary storage for staging the update. suit-payload-fetch is OPTIONAL.
suit-install is a SUIT_Command_Sequence to execute in order to install a payload. Typical actions include verifying a payload stored in temporary storage, copying a staged payload from temporary storage, and unpacking a payload. suit-install is OPTIONAL.
suit-validate is a SUIT_Command_Sequence to execute in order to validate that the result of applying the update is correct. Typical actions involve image validation and manifest validation. suit-validate is REQUIRED. If the manifest contains dependencies, one process-dependency invocation per dependency or one process-dependency invocation targeting all dependencies SHOULD be present in validate.
suit-load is a SUIT_Command_Sequence to execute in order to prepare a payload for execution. Typical actions include copying an image from permanent storage into RAM, optionally including actions such as decryption or decompression. suit-load is OPTIONAL.
suit-run is a SUIT_Command_Sequence to execute in order to run an image. suit-run typically contains a single instruction: either the “run” directive for the bootable manifest or the “process dependencies” directive for any dependents of the bootable manifest. suit-run is OPTIONAL. Only one manifest in an update may contain the “run” directive.
suit-text is a digest that uniquely identifies the content of the Text that is packaged in the SUIT_Envelope. text is OPTIONAL.
suit-coswid is a digest that uniquely identifies the content of the concise-software-identifier that is packaged in the SUIT_Envelope. coswid is OPTIONAL.
SUIT_Dependency specifies a manifest that describes a dependency of the current manifest.
The following CDDL describes the SUIT_Dependency structure.
SUIT_Dependency = {
suit-dependency-digest => SUIT_Digest,
? suit-dependency-prefix => SUIT_Component_Identifier,
}
The suit-dependency-digest specifies the dependency manifest uniquely by identifying a particular Manifest structure. The digest is calculated over the Manifest structure instead of the COSE Sig_structure or Mac_structure. This means that a digest may need to be calculated more than once, however this is necessary to ensure that removing a signature from a manifest does not break dependencies due to missing signature elements. This is also necessary to support the trusted intermediary use case, where an intermediary re-signs the Manifest, removing the original signature, potentially with a different algorithm, or trading COSE_Sign for COSE_Mac.
The suit-dependency-prefix element contains a SUIT_Component_Identifier. This specifies the scope at which the dependency operates. This allows the dependency to be forwarded on to a component that is capable of parsing its own manifests. It also allows one manifest to be deployed to multiple dependent devices without those devices needing consistent component hierarchy. This element is OPTIONAL.
The SUIT_Component_Reference describes an image that is defined by another manifest. This is useful for overriding the behavior of another manifest, for example by directing the recipient to look at a different URI for the image or by changing the expected format, such as when a gateway performs decryption on behalf of a constrained device. The following CDDL describes the SUIT_Component_Reference.
SUIT_Component_Reference = {
suit-component-identifier => SUIT_Component_Identifier,
suit-component-dependency-index => uint
}
Many conditions and directives require additional information. That information is contained within parameters that can be set in a consistent way. This allows reduction of manifest size and replacement of parameters from one manifest to the next.
The defined manifest parameters are described below.
| ID | CBOR Type | Scope | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | bstr | Component / Global | Vendor ID | A RFC4122 UUID representing the vendor of the device or component |
| 2 | bstr | Component / Global | Class ID | A RFC4122 UUID representing the class of the device or component |
| 3 | bstr | Component / Dependency | Image Digest | A SUIT_Digest |
| 4 | uint | Component / Global | Use Before | POSIX timestamp |
| 5 | uint | Component | Component Offset | Offset of the component |
| 12 | boolean | Global | Strict Order | Requires that the manifest is processed in a strictly linear fashion. Set to 0 to enable parallel handling of manifest directives. |
| 13 | boolean | Command Segment | Soft Failure | Condition failures only terminate the current command segment. |
| 14 | uint | Component / Dependency | Image Size | Integer size |
| 18 | bstr | Component / Dependency | Encryption Info | A COSE object defining the encryption mode of a resource |
| 19 | bstr | Component | Compression Info | The information required to decompress the image |
| 20 | bstr | Component | Unpack Info | The information required to unpack the image |
| 21 | tstr | Component / Dependency | URI | A URI from which to fetch a resource |
| 22 | uint | Component | Source Component | A Component Index |
| 23 | bstr / nil | Component | Run Arguments | An encoded set of arguments for Run |
| 24 | bstr | Component / Global | Device ID | A RFC4122 UUID representing the device or component |
| 25 | uint | Global | Minimum Battery | A minimum battery level in mWh |
| 26 | int | Component / Global | Priority | The priority of the update |
| nint | int / bstr / tstr | Custom | Custom Parameter | Application-defined parameter |
CBOR-encoded object parameters are still wrapped in a bstr. This is because it allows a parser that is aggregating parameters to reference the object with a single pointer and traverse it without understanding the contents. This is important for modularization and division of responsibility within a pull parser. The same consideration does not apply to Directives because those elements are invoked with their arguments immediately
The Strict Order Parameter allows a manifest to govern when directives can be executed out-of-order. This allows for systems that have a sensitivity to order of updates to choose the order in which they are executed. It also allows for more advanced systems to parallelize their handling of updates. Strict Order defaults to True. It MAY be set to False when the order of operations does not matter. When arriving at the end of a command sequence, ALL commands MUST have completed, regardless of the state of SUIT_Parameter_Strict_Order. If SUIT_Parameter_Strict_Order is returned to True, ALL preceding commands MUST complete before the next command is executed.
When executing a command sequence inside SUIT_Directive_Try_Each and a condition failure occurs, the manifest processor aborts the sequence. If Soft Failure is True, it returns Success. Otherwise, it returns the original condition failure. SUIT_Parameter_Soft_Failure is scoped to the enclosing SUIT_Command_Sequence. Its value is discarded when SUIT_Command_Sequence terminates.
Encryption Info defines the mechanism that Fetch or Copy should use to decrypt the data they transfer. SUIT_Parameter_Encryption_Info is encoded as a COSE_Encrypt_Tagged or a COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged, wrapped in a bstr.
Compression Info defines any information that is required for a device to perform decompression operations. Typically, this includes the algorithm identifier.
SUIT_Parameter_Compression_Info is defined by the following CDDL:
SUIT_Compression_Info = {
suit-compression-algorithm => SUIT_Compression_Algorithms
? suit-compression-parameters => bstr
}
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_gzip
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_bzip2
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_deflate
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_LZ4
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_lzma
SUIT_Unpack_Info defines the information required for a device to interpret a packed format, such as elf, hex, or binary diff. SUIT_Unpack_Info is defined by the following CDDL:
SUIT_Unpack_Info = {
suit-unpack-algorithm => SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms
? suit-unpack-parameters => bstr
}
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms //= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Delta
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms //= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Hex
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms //= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Elf
The following CDDL describes all SUIT_Parameters.
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-vendor-identifier => RFC4122_UUID)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-class-identifier => RFC4122_UUID)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-image-digest
=> bstr .cbor SUIT_Digest)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-image-size => uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-use-before => uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-component-offset => uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-encryption-info
=> bstr .cbor SUIT_Encryption_Info)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-compression-info
=> bstr .cbor SUIT_Compression_Info)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-unpack-info
=> bstr .cbor SUIT_Unpack_Info)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-uri => tstr)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-source-component => uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-run-args => bstr)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-device-identifier => RFC4122_UUID)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-minimum-battery => uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-update-priority => uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-version =>
SUIT_Parameter_Version_Match)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-wait-info =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Wait_Events)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-uri-list
=> bstr .cbor SUIT_Component_URI_List)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-custom => int/bool/tstr/bstr)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-strict-order => bool)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-soft-failure => bool)
RFC4122_UUID = bstr .size 16
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Value = [+int]
SUIT_Encryption_Info = COSE_Encrypt_Tagged/COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged
SUIT_Compression_Info = {
suit-compression-algorithm => SUIT_Compression_Algorithms,
? suit-compression-parameters => bstr
}
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_gzip
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_bzip2
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_lz4
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_lzma
SUIT_Unpack_Info = {
suit-unpack-algorithm => SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms,
? suit-unpack-parameters => bstr
}
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms /= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Delta
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms /= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Hex
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms /= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Elf
A SUIT_Command_Sequence defines a series of actions that the Recipient MUST take to accomplish a particular goal. These goals are defined in the manifest and include:
Each of these follows exactly the same structure to ensure that the parser is as simple as possible.
Lists of commands are constructed from two kinds of element:
The lists of commands are logically structured into sequences of zero or more conditions followed by zero or more directives. The logical structure is described by the following CDDL:
Command_Sequence = {
conditions => [ * Condition],
directives => [ * Directive]
}
This introduces significant complexity in the parser, however, so the structure is flattened to make parsing simpler:
SUIT_Command_Sequence = [ + (SUIT_Condition/SUIT_Directive) ]
Each condition is a command code identifier, followed by Nil. Each directive is composed of:
Argument blocks are defined for each type of directive.
Many conditions and directives apply to a given component, and these generally grouped together. Therefore, a special command to set the current component index is provided with a matching command to set the current dependency index. This index is a numeric index into the component ID tables defined at the beginning of the document. For the purpose of setting the index, the two component ID tables are considered to be concatenated together.
To facilitate optional conditions, a special directive is provided. It runs several new lists of conditions/directives, one after another, that are contained as an argument to the directive. By default, it assumes that a failure of a condition should not indicate a failure of the update/boot, but a parameter is provided to override this behavior.
Conditions are used to define mandatory properties of a system in order for an update to be applied. They can be pre-conditions or post-conditions of any directive or series of directives, depending on where they are placed in the list. Conditions never take arguments; conditions should test using parameters instead. Conditions include:
| Condition Code | Condition Name | Implementation |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Vendor Identifier | REQUIRED |
| 2 | Class Identifier | REQUIRED |
| 3 | Image Match | REQUIRED |
| 4 | Use Before | OPTIONAL |
| 5 | Component Offset | OPTIONAL |
| 24 | Device Identifier | OPTIONAL |
| 25 | Image Not Match | OPTIONAL |
| 26 | Minimum Battery | OPTIONAL |
| 27 | Update Authorized | OPTIONAL |
| 28 | Version | OPTIONAL |
| nint | Custom Condition | OPTIONAL |
Each condition MUST report a success code on completion. If a condition reports failure, then the current sequence of commands MUST terminate. If a condition requires additional information, this MUST be specified in one or more parameters before the condition is executed. If a Recipient attempts to process a condition that expects additional information and that information has not been set, it MUST report a failure. If a Recipient encounters an unknown Condition Code, it MUST report a failure.
Positive Condition numbers are reserved for IANA registration. Negative numbers are reserved for proprietary, application-specific directives.
There are three identifier-based conditions: suit-condition-vendor-identifier, suit-condition-class-identifier, and suit-condition-device-identifier. Each of these conditions match a RFC 4122 [RFC4122] UUID that MUST have already been set as a parameter. The installing device MUST match the specified UUID in order to consider the manifest valid. These identifiers MAY be scoped by component.
The Recipient uses the ID parameter that has already been set using the Set Parameters directive. If no ID has been set, this condition fails. suit-condition-class-identifier and suit-condition-vendor-identifier are REQUIRED to implement. suit-condition-device-identifier is OPTIONAL to implement.
Verify that the current component matches the digest parameter for the current component. The digest is verified against the digest specified in the Component’s parameters list. If no digest is specified, the condition fails. suit-condition-image-match is REQUIRED to implement.
Verify that the current component does not match the supplied digest. If no digest is specified, then the digest is compared against the digest specified in the Component’s parameters list. If no digest is specified, the condition fails. suit-condition-image-not-match is OPTIONAL to implement.
Verify that the current time is BEFORE the specified time. suit-condition-use-before is used to specify the last time at which an update should be installed. The recipient evaluates the current time against the suit-parameter-use-before parameter, which must have already been set as a parameter, encoded as a POSIX timestamp, that is seconds after 1970-01-01 00:00:00. Timestamp conditions MUST be evaluated in 64 bits, regardless of encoded CBOR size. suit-condition-use-before is OPTIONAL to implement.
suit-condition-minimum-battery provides a mechanism to test a device’s battery level before installing an update. This condition is for use in primary-cell applications, where the battery is only ever discharged. For batteries that are charged, suit-directive-wait is more appropriate, since it defines a “wait” until the battery level is sufficient to install the update. suit-condition-minimum-battery is specified in mWh. suit-condition-minimum-battery is OPTIONAL to implement.
Request Authorization from the application and fail if not authorized. This can allow a user to decline an update. Argument is an integer priority level. Priorities are application defined. suit-condition-update-authorized is OPTIONAL to implement.
suit-condition-version allows comparing versions of firmware. Verifying image digests is preferred to version checks because digests are more precise. The image can be compared as:
Versions are encoded as a CBOR list of integers. Comparisons are done on each integer in sequence. Comparison stops after all integers in the list defined by the manifest have been consumed OR after a non-equal match has occurred. For example, if the manifest defines a comparison, “Equal [1]”, then this will match all version sequences starting with 1. If a manifest defines both “Greater or Equal [1,0]” and “Lesser [1,10]”, then it will match versions 1.0.x up to, but not including 1.10.
The following CDDL describes SUIT_Condition_Version_Argument
SUIT_Condition_Version_Argument = [
suit-condition-version-comparison-type:
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types,
suit-condition-version-comparison-value:
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Value
]
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /=
suit-condition-version-comparison-greater
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /=
suit-condition-version-comparison-greater-equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /=
suit-condition-version-comparison-equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /=
suit-condition-version-comparison-lesser-equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /=
suit-condition-version-comparison-lesser
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Value = [+int]
While the exact encoding of versions is application-defined, semantic versions map conveniently. For example,
suit-condition-version is OPTIONAL to implement.
SUIT_Condition_Custom describes any proprietary, application specific condition. This is encoded as a negative integer, chosen by the firmware developer. If additional information must be provided to the condition, it should be encoded in a custom parameter (a nint) as described in Section 7.6. SUIT_Condition_Custom is OPTIONAL to implement.
Many conditions use identifiers to determine whether a manifest matches a given Recipient or not. These identifiers are defined to be RFC 4122 [RFC4122] UUIDs. These UUIDs are explicitly NOT human-readable. They are for machine-based matching only.
A device may match any number of UUIDs for vendor or class identifier. This may be relevant to physical or software modules. For example, a device that has an OS and one or more applications might list one Vendor ID for the OS and one or more additional Vendor IDs for the applications. This device might also have a Class ID that must be matched for the OS and one or more Class IDs for the applications.
A more complete example: A device has the following physical components: 1. A host MCU 2. A WiFi module
This same device has three software modules: 1. An operating system 2. A WiFi module interface driver 3. An application
Suppose that the WiFi module’s firmware has a proprietary update mechanism and doesn’t support manifest processing. This device can report four class IDs:
This allows the OS, WiFi module, and application to be updated independently. To combat possible incompatibilities, the OS class ID can be changed each time the OS has a change to its API.
This approach allows a vendor to target, for example, all devices with a particular WiFi module with an update, which is a very powerful mechanism, particularly when used for security updates.
UUIDs MUST be created according to RFC 4122 [RFC4122]. UUIDs SHOULD use versions 3, 4, or 5, as described in RFC4122. Versions 1 and 2 do not provide a tangible benefit over version 4 for this application.
The RECOMMENDED method to create a vendor ID is: Vendor ID = UUID5(DNS_PREFIX, vendor domain name)
The RECOMMENDED method to create a class ID is: Class ID = UUID5(Vendor ID, Class-Specific-Information)
Class-specific information is composed of a variety of data, for example:
The following CDDL describes SUIT_Condition:
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-vendor-identifier, nil) SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-class-identifier, nil) SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-device-identifier, nil) SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-image-match, nil) SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-image-not-match, nil) SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-use-before, nil) SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-minimum-battery, nil) SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-update-authorized, nil) SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-version, nil) SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-component-offset, nil)
Directives are used to define the behavior of the recipient. Directives include:
| Directive Code | Directive Name | Implementation |
|---|---|---|
| 12 | Set Component Index | REQUIRED if more than one component |
| 13 | Set Dependency Index | REQUIRED if dependencies used |
| 14 | Abort | OPTIONAL |
| 15 | Try Each | OPTIONAL |
| 16 | Reserved | N/A |
| 17 | Reserved | N/A |
| 18 | Process Dependency | OPTIONAL |
| 19 | Set Parameters | OPTIONAL |
| 20 | Override Parameters | REQUIRED |
| 21 | Fetch | REQUIRED for Updater |
| 22 | Copy | OPTIONAL |
| 23 | Run | REQUIRED for Bootloader |
| 29 | Wait | OPTIONAL |
| 30 | Run Sequence | OPTIONAL |
| 32 | Swap | OPTIONAL |
When a Recipient executes a Directive, it MUST report a success code. If the Directive reports failure, then the current Command Sequence MUST terminate.
Set Component Index defines the component to which successive directives and conditions will apply. The supplied argument MUST be either a boolean or an unsigned integer index into the concatenation of suit-components and suit-dependency-components. If the following directives apply to ALL components, then the boolean value “True” is used instead of an index. True does not apply to dependency components. If the following directives apply to NO components, then the boolean value “False” is used. When suit-directive-set-dependency-index is used, suit-directive-set-component-index = False is implied. When suit-directive-set-component-index is used, suit-directive-set-dependency-index = False is implied.
The following CDDL describes the argument to suit-directive-set-component-index.
SUIT_Directive_Set_Component_Index_Argument = uint/bool
Set Dependency Index defines the manifest to which successive directives and conditions will apply. The supplied argument MUST be either a boolean or an unsigned integer index into the dependencies. If the following directives apply to ALL dependencies, then the boolean value “True” is used instead of an index. If the following directives apply to NO dependencies, then the boolean value “False” is used. When suit-directive-set-component-index is used, suit-directive-set-dependency-index = False is implied. When suit-directive-set-dependency-index is used, suit-directive-set-component-index = False is implied.
Typical operations that require suit-directive-set-dependency-index include setting a source URI, invoking “Fetch,” or invoking “Process Dependency” for an individual dependency.
The following CDDL describes the argument to suit-directive-set-dependency-index.
SUIT_Directive_Set_Manifest_Index_Argument = uint/bool
Unconditionally fail. This operation is typically used in conjunction with suit-directive-try-each.
To enable conditional commands, and to allow several strictly ordered sequences to be executed out-of-order, suit-directive-run-sequence allows the manifest processor to execute its argument as a SUIT_Command_Sequence. The argument must be wrapped in a bstr.
When a sequence is executed, any failure of a condition causes immediate termination of the sequence.
The following CDDL describes the SUIT_Run_Sequence argument.
SUIT_Directive_Run_Sequence_Argument = bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence
When suit-directive-run-sequence completes, it forwards the last status code that occurred in the sequence. If the Soft Failure parameter is true, then suit-directive-run-sequence only fails when a directive in the argument sequence fails.
SUIT_Parameter_Soft_Failure defaults to False when suit-directive-run-sequence begins. Its value is discarded when suit-directive-run-sequence terminates.
This command runs several SUIT_Command_Sequence, one after another, in a strict order. Use this command to implement a “try/catch-try/catch” sequence. Manifest processors MAY implement this command.
SUIT_Parameter_Soft_Failure is initialized to True at the beginning of each sequence. If one sequence aborts due to a condition failure, the next is started. If no sequence completes without condition failure, then suit-directive-try-each returns an error. If a particular application calls for all sequences to fail and still continue, then an empty sequence (nil) can be added to the Try Each Argument.
The following CDDL describes the SUIT_Try_Each argument.
SUIT_Directive_Try_Each_Argument = [
+ bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
nil / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence
]
Execute the commands in the common section of the current dependency, followed by the commands in the equivalent section of the current dependency. For example, if the current section is “fetch payload,” this will execute “common” in the current dependency, then “fetch payload” in the current dependency. Once this is complete, the command following suit-directive-process-dependency will be processed.
If the current dependency is False, this directive has no effect. If the current dependency is True, then this directive applies to all dependencies. If the current section is “common,” this directive MUST have no effect.
When SUIT_Process_Dependency completes, it forwards the last status code that occurred in the dependency.
The argument to suit-directive-process-dependency is defined in the following CDDL.
SUIT_Directive_Process_Dependency_Argument = nil
suit-directive-set-parameters allows the manifest to configure behavior of future directives by changing parameters that are read by those directives. When dependencies are used, suit-directive-set-parameters also allows a manifest to modify the behavior of its dependencies.
Available parameters are defined in Section 7.6.
If a parameter is already set, suit-directive-set-parameters will skip setting the parameter to its argument. This provides the core of the override mechanism, allowing dependent manifests to change the behavior of a manifest.
The argument to suit-directive-set-parameters is defined in the following CDDL.
SUIT_Directive_Set_Parameters_Argument = {+ SUIT_Parameters}
N.B.: A directive code is reserved for an optimization: a way to set a parameter to the contents of another parameter, optionally with another component ID.
suit-directive-override-parameters replaces any listed parameters that are already set with the values that are provided in its argument. This allows a manifest to prevent replacement of critical parameters.
Available parameters are defined in Section 7.6.
The argument to suit-directive-override-parameters is defined in the following CDDL.
SUIT_Directive_Override_Parameters_Argument = {+ SUIT_Parameters}
suit-directive-fetch instructs the manifest processor to obtain one or more manifests or payloads, as specified by the manifest index and component index, respectively.
suit-directive-fetch can target one or more manifests and one or more payloads. suit-directive-fetch retrieves each component and each manifest listed in component-index and manifest-index, respectively. If component-index or manifest-index is True, instead of an integer, then all current manifest components/manifests are fetched. The current manifest’s dependent-components are not automatically fetched. In order to pre-fetch these, they MUST be specified in a component-index integer.
suit-directive-fetch typically takes no arguments unless one is needed to modify fetch behavior. If an argument is needed, it must be wrapped in a bstr.
suit-directive-fetch reads the URI or URI List parameter to find the source of the fetch it performs.
The behavior of suit-directive-fetch can be modified by setting one or more of SUIT_Parameter_Encryption_Info, SUIT_Parameter_Compression_Info, SUIT_Parameter_Unpack_Info. These three parameters each activate and configure a processing step that can be applied to the data that is transferred during suit-directive-fetch.
The argument to suit-directive-fetch is defined in the following CDDL.
SUIT_Directive_Fetch_Argument = nil/bstr
suit-directive-copy instructs the manifest processor to obtain one or more payloads, as specified by the component index. suit-directive-copy retrieves each component listed in component-index, respectively. If component-index is True, instead of an integer, then all current manifest components are copied. The current manifest’s dependent-components are not automatically copied. In order to copy these, they MUST be specified in a component-index integer.
The behavior of suit-directive-copy can be modified by setting one or more of SUIT_Parameter_Encryption_Info, SUIT_Parameter_Compression_Info, SUIT_Parameter_Unpack_Info. These three parameters each activate and configure a processing step that can be applied to the data that is transferred during suit-directive-copy.
N.B. Fetch and Copy are very similar. Merging them into one command may be appropriate.
suit-directive-copy reads its source from SUIT_Parameter_Source_Component.
The argument to suit-directive-copy is defined in the following CDDL.
SUIT_Directive_Copy_Argument = nil
suit-directive-swap instructs the manifest processor to move the source to the destination and the destination to the source simultaneously. Swap has nearly identical semantics to suit-directive-copy except that suit-directive-swap replaces the source with the current contents of the destination in an application-defined way. If SUIT_Parameter_Compression_Info or SUIT_Parameter_Encryption_Info are present, they must be handled in a symmetric way, so that the source is decompressed into the destination and the destination is compressed into the source. The source is decrypted into the destination and the destination is encrypted into the source. suit-directive-swap is OPTIONAL to implement.
suit-directive-run directs the manifest processor to transfer execution to the current Component Index. When this is invoked, the manifest processor MAY be unloaded and execution continues in the Component Index. Arguments provided to Run are forwarded to the executable code located in Component Index, in an application-specific way. For example, this could form the Linux Kernel Command Line if booting a Linux device.
If the executable code at Component Index is constructed in such a way that it does not unload the manifest processor, then the manifest processor may resume execution after the executable completes. This allows the manifest processor to invoke suitable helpers and to verify them with image conditions.
The argument to suit-directive-run is defined in the following CDDL.
SUIT_Directive_Run_Argument = nil/bstr
suit-directive-wait directs the manifest processor to pause until a specified event occurs. Some possible events include:
The following CDDL defines the encoding of these events.
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-authorization => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-power => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-network => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-other-device-version
=> SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Other_Device_Version)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-time => uint); Timestamp
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-time-of-day
=> uint); Time of Day (seconds since 00:00:00)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-day-of-week
=> uint); Days since Sunday
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Authorization = int ; priority
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Power = int ; Power Level
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Network = int ; Network State
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Other_Device_Version = [
other-device: bstr,
other-device-version: [+int]
]
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Time = uint ; Timestamp
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Time_Of_Day = uint ; Time of Day
; (seconds since 00:00:00)
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Day_Of_Week = uint ; Days since Sunday
The following CDDL describes SUIT_Directive:
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-set-component-index, uint/bool)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-set-dependency-index, uint/bool)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-run-sequence,
bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-try-each,
SUIT_Directive_Try_Each_Argument)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-process-dependency, nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-set-parameters,
{+ SUIT_Parameters})
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-override-parameters,
{+ SUIT_Parameters})
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-fetch, nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-copy, nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-run, nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-wait,
{ + SUIT_Wait_Events })
SUIT_Directive_Try_Each_Argument = [
+ bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
nil / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence
]
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-authorization => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-power => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-network => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-other-device-version
=> SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Other_Device_Version)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-time => uint); Timestamp
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-time-of-day
=> uint); Time of Day (seconds since 00:00:00)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-day-of-week
=> uint); Days since Sunday
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Authorization = int ; priority
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Power = int ; Power Level
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Network = int ; Network State
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Other_Device_Version = [
other-device: bstr,
other-device-version: [+int]
]
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Time = uint ; Timestamp
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Time_Of_Day = uint ; Time of Day
; (seconds since 00:00:00)
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Day_Of_Week = uint ; Days since Sunday
The SUIT_Text_Map contains all text descriptions needed for this manifest. The text section is typically severable, allowing manifests to be distributed without the text, since end-nodes do not require text. The meaning of each field is described below.
Each section MAY be present. If present, each section MUST be as described. Negative integer IDs are reserved for application-specific text values.
| ID | Name | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | manifest-description | Free text description of the manifest |
| 2 | update-description | Free text description of the update |
| 3 | vendor-name | Free text vendor name |
| 4 | model-name | Free text model name |
| 5 | vendor-domain | The domain used to create the vendor-id |
| 6 | model-info | The information used to create the class-id |
| 7 | component-description | Free text description of each component in the manifest |
| 8 | json-source | The JSON-formatted document that was used to create the manifest |
| 9 | yaml-source | The yaml-formatted document that was used to create the manifest |
| 10 | version-dependencies | List of component versions required by the manifest |
To manage permissions in the manifest, there are three models that can be used.
First, the simplest model requires that all manifests are authenticated by a single trusted key. This mode has the advantage that only a root manifest needs to be authenticated, since all of its dependencies have digests included in the root manifest.
This simplest model can be extended by adding key delegation without much increase in complexity.
A second model requires an ACL to be presented to the device, authenticated by a trusted party or stored on the device. This ACL grants access rights for specific component IDs or component ID prefixes to the listed identities or identity groups. Any identity may verify an image digest, but fetching into or fetching from a component ID requires approval from the ACL.
A third model allows a device to provide even more fine-grained controls: The ACL lists the component ID or component ID prefix that an identity may use, and also lists the commands that the identity may use in combination with that component ID.
RFC 8152 [RFC8152] provides containers for signature, MAC, and encryption, but no basic digest container. The container needed for a digest requires a type identifier and a container for the raw digest data. Some forms of digest may require additional parameters. These can be added following the digest. This structure is described by the following CDDL.
The algorithms listed are sufficient for verifying integrity of Firmware Updates as of this writing, however this may change over time.
SUIT_Digest = [ suit-digest-algorithm-id : $suit-digest-algorithm-ids, suit-digest-bytes : bytes, ? suit-digest-parameters : any ] digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha224 digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha256 digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha384 digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha512 digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-224 digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-256 digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-384 digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-512 algorithm-id-sha224 = 1 algorithm-id-sha256 = 2 algorithm-id-sha384 = 3 algorithm-id-sha512 = 4 algorithm-id-sha3-224 = 5 algorithm-id-sha3-256 = 6 algorithm-id-sha3-384 = 7 algorithm-id-sha3-512 = 8
For some use cases, it is important to provide a sequence that can fail without terminating an update. For example, a dual-image XIP MCU may require an update that can be placed at one of two offsets. This has two implications, first, the digest of each offset will be different. Second, the image fetched for each offset will have a different URI. Conditional sequences allow this to be resolved in a simple way.
The following JSON representation of a manifest demonstrates how this would be represented. It assumes that the bootloader and manifest processor take care of A/B switching and that the manifest is not aware of this distinction.
{
"structure-version" : 1,
"sequence-number" : 7,
"common" :{
"components" : [
[b'0']
],
"common-sequence" : [
{
"directive-set-var" : {
"size": 32567
},
},
{
"try-each" : [
[
{"condition-component-offset" : "<offset A>"},
{
"directive-set-var": {
"digest" : "<SHA256 A>"
}
}
],
[
{"condition-component-offset" : "<offset B>"},
{
"directive-set-var": {
"digest" : "<SHA256 B>"
}
}
],
[{ "abort" : null }]
]
}
]
}
"fetch" : [
{
"try-each" : [
[
{"condition-component-offset" : "<offset A>"},
{
"directive-set-var": {
"uri" : "<URI A>"
}
}
],
[
{"condition-component-offset" : "<offset B>"},
{
"directive-set-var": {
"uri" : "<URI B>"
}
}
],
[{ "directive-abort" : null }]
]
},
"fetch" : null
]
}
In order to create a valid SUIT Manifest document the structure of the corresponding CBOR message MUST adhere to the following CDDL data definition.
SUIT_Envelope = {
suit-delegation => bstr .cbor SUIT_Delegation
suit-authentication-wrapper
=> bstr .cbor SUIT_Authentication_Wrapper / nil,
$$SUIT_Manifest_Wrapped,
* $$SUIT_Severed_Fields,
}
SUIT_Delegation = [ + [ + CWT ] ]
CWT = SUIT_Authentication_Block
SUIT_Authentication_Wrapper = [ + bstr .cbor SUIT_Authentication_Block ]
SUIT_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Mac_Tagged
SUIT_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Sign_Tagged
SUIT_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Mac0_Tagged
SUIT_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Sign1_Tagged
$$SUIT_Manifest_Wrapped //= (suit-manifest => bstr .cbor SUIT_Manifest)
$$SUIT_Manifest_Wrapped //= (
suit-manifest-encryption-info => bstr .cbor SUIT_Encryption_Wrapper,
suit-manifest-encrypted => bstr
)
SUIT_Encryption_Wrapper = COSE_Encrypt_Tagged / COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged
$$SUIT_Severed_Fields //= ( suit-dependency-resolution =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence)
$$SUIT_Severed_Fields //= (suit-payload-fetch =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence)
$$SUIT_Severed_Fields //= (suit-install =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence)
$$SUIT_Severed_Fields //= (suit-text =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Text_Map)
$$SUIT_Severed_Fields //= (suit-coswid =>
bstr .cbor concise-software-identity)
COSE_Mac_Tagged = any
COSE_Sign_Tagged = any
COSE_Mac0_Tagged = any
COSE_Sign1_Tagged = any
COSE_Encrypt_Tagged = any
COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged = any
SUIT_Digest = [
suit-digest-algorithm-id : suit-digest-algorithm-ids,
suit-digest-bytes : bstr,
? suit-digest-parameters : any
]
; Named Information Hash Algorithm Identifiers
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha224
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha256
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha384
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha512
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-224
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-256
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-384
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-512
algorithm-id-sha224 = 1
algorithm-id-sha256 = 2
algorithm-id-sha384 = 3
algorithm-id-sha512 = 4
algorithm-id-sha3-224 = 5
algorithm-id-sha3-256 = 6
algorithm-id-sha3-384 = 7
algorithm-id-sha3-512 = 8
SUIT_Manifest = {
suit-manifest-version => 1,
suit-manifest-sequence-number => uint,
suit-common => bstr .cbor SUIT_Common,
? suit-reference-uri => #6.32(tstr),
* $$SUIT_Severable_Command_Sequences,
* $$SUIT_Command_Sequences,
* $$SUIT_Protected_Elements,
}
$$SUIT_Severable_Command_Sequences //= (suit-dependency-resolution =>
SUIT_Severable_Command_Sequence)
$$SUIT_Severable_Command_Sequences //= (suit-payload-fetch =>
SUIT_Severable_Command_Sequence)
$$SUIT_Severable_Command_Sequences //= (suit-install =>
SUIT_Severable_Command_Sequence)
SUIT_Severable_Command_Sequence =
SUIT_Digest / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence
$$SUIT_Command_Sequences //= ( suit-validate =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence )
$$SUIT_Command_Sequences //= ( suit-load =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence )
$$SUIT_Command_Sequences //= ( suit-run =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence )
$$SUIT_Protected_Elements //= ( suit-text => SUIT_Digest )
$$SUIT_Protected_Elements //= ( suit-coswid => SUIT_Digest )
SUIT_Common = {
? suit-dependencies => bstr .cbor SUIT_Dependencies,
? suit-components => bstr .cbor SUIT_Components,
? suit-dependency-components
=> bstr .cbor SUIT_Component_References,
? suit-common-sequence => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
}
SUIT_Dependencies = [ + SUIT_Dependency ]
SUIT_Components = [ + SUIT_Component_Identifier ]
SUIT_Component_References = [ + SUIT_Component_Reference ]
concise-software-identity = any
SUIT_Dependency = {
suit-dependency-digest => SUIT_Digest,
suit-dependency-prefix => SUIT_Component_Identifier,
}
SUIT_Component_Identifier = [* bstr]
SUIT_Component_Reference = {
suit-component-identifier => SUIT_Component_Identifier,
suit-component-dependency-index => uint
}
SUIT_Command_Sequence = [ + (
SUIT_Condition // SUIT_Directive // SUIT_Command_Custom
) ]
SUIT_Command_Custom = (suit-command-custom, bstr/tstr/int/nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-vendor-identifier, nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-class-identifier, nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-device-identifier, nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-image-match, nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-image-not-match, nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-use-before, nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-minimum-battery, nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-update-authorized, nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-version, nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-component-offset, nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-set-component-index, uint/bool)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-set-dependency-index, uint/bool)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-run-sequence,
bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-try-each,
SUIT_Directive_Try_Each_Argument)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-process-dependency, nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-set-parameters,
{+ SUIT_Parameters})
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-override-parameters,
{+ SUIT_Parameters})
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-fetch, nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-copy, nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-swap, nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-run, nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-wait, nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-abort, nil)
SUIT_Directive_Try_Each_Argument = [
+ bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
nil / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence
]
SUIT_Wait_Event = { + SUIT_Wait_Events }
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-authorization => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-power => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-network => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-other-device-version
=> SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Other_Device_Version)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-time => uint); Timestamp
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-time-of-day
=> uint); Time of Day (seconds since 00:00:00)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-day-of-week
=> uint); Days since Sunday
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Other_Device_Version = [
other-device: bstr,
other-device-version: [+int]
]
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-vendor-identifier => RFC4122_UUID)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-class-identifier => RFC4122_UUID)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-image-digest
=> bstr .cbor SUIT_Digest)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-image-size => uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-use-before => uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-component-offset => uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-encryption-info
=> bstr .cbor SUIT_Encryption_Info)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-compression-info
=> bstr .cbor SUIT_Compression_Info)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-unpack-info
=> bstr .cbor SUIT_Unpack_Info)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-uri => tstr)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-source-component => uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-run-args => bstr)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-device-identifier => RFC4122_UUID)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-minimum-battery => uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-update-priority => uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-version =>
SUIT_Parameter_Version_Match)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-wait-info =>
bstr .cbor SUIT_Wait_Event)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-custom => int/bool/tstr/bstr)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-strict-order => bool)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-soft-failure => bool)
RFC4122_UUID = bstr .size 16
SUIT_Parameter_Version_Match = [
suit-condition-version-comparison-type:
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types,
suit-condition-version-comparison-value:
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Value
]
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /=
suit-condition-version-comparison-greater
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /=
suit-condition-version-comparison-greater-equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /=
suit-condition-version-comparison-equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /=
suit-condition-version-comparison-lesser-equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /=
suit-condition-version-comparison-lesser
suit-condition-version-comparison-greater = 1
suit-condition-version-comparison-greater-equal = 2
suit-condition-version-comparison-equal = 3
suit-condition-version-comparison-lesser-equal = 4
suit-condition-version-comparison-lesser = 5
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Value = [+int]
SUIT_Encryption_Info = COSE_Encrypt_Tagged/COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged
SUIT_Compression_Info = {
suit-compression-algorithm => SUIT_Compression_Algorithms,
? suit-compression-parameters => bstr
}
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_gzip
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_bzip2
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_deflate
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_lz4
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_lzma
SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_gzip = 1
SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_bzip2 = 2
SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_deflate = 3
SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_lz4 = 4
SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_lzma = 7
SUIT_Unpack_Info = {
suit-unpack-algorithm => SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms,
? suit-unpack-parameters => bstr
}
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms /= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Delta
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms /= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Hex
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms /= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Elf
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Delta = 1
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Hex = 2
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Elf = 3
SUIT_Text_Map = {SUIT_Text_Keys => tstr}
SUIT_Text_Keys /= suit-text-manifest-description
SUIT_Text_Keys /= suit-text-update-description
SUIT_Text_Keys /= suit-text-vendor-name
SUIT_Text_Keys /= suit-text-model-name
SUIT_Text_Keys /= suit-text-vendor-domain
SUIT_Text_Keys /= suit-text-model-info
SUIT_Text_Keys /= suit-text-component-description
SUIT_Text_Keys /= suit-text-manifest-json-source
SUIT_Text_Keys /= suit-text-manifest-yaml-source
SUIT_Text_Keys /= suit-text-version-dependencies
suit-delegation = 1
suit-authentication-wrapper = 2
suit-manifest = 3
suit-manifest-encryption-info = 4
suit-manifest-encrypted = 5
suit-manifest-version = 1
suit-manifest-sequence-number = 2
suit-common = 3
suit-reference-uri = 4
suit-dependency-resolution = 7
suit-payload-fetch = 8
suit-install = 9
suit-validate = 10
suit-load = 11
suit-run = 12
suit-text = 13
suit-coswid = 14
suit-dependencies = 1
suit-components = 2
suit-dependency-components = 3
suit-common-sequence = 4
suit-dependency-digest = 1
suit-dependency-prefix = 2
suit-component-identifier = 1
suit-component-dependency-index = 2
suit-command-custom = nint
suit-condition-vendor-identifier = 1
suit-condition-class-identifier = 2
suit-condition-image-match = 3
suit-condition-use-before = 4
suit-condition-component-offset = 5
suit-condition-device-identifier = 24
suit-condition-image-not-match = 25
suit-condition-minimum-battery = 26
suit-condition-update-authorized = 27
suit-condition-version = 28
suit-directive-set-component-index = 12
suit-directive-set-dependency-index = 13
suit-directive-abort = 14
suit-directive-try-each = 15
;suit-directive-do-each = 16 ; TBD
;suit-directive-map-filter = 17 ; TBD
suit-directive-process-dependency = 18
suit-directive-set-parameters = 19
suit-directive-override-parameters = 20
suit-directive-fetch = 21
suit-directive-copy = 22
suit-directive-run = 23
suit-directive-wait = 29
suit-directive-run-sequence = 30
suit-directive-swap = 32
suit-wait-event-authorization = 1
suit-wait-event-power = 2
suit-wait-event-network = 3
suit-wait-event-other-device-version = 4
suit-wait-event-time = 5
suit-wait-event-time-of-day = 6
suit-wait-event-day-of-week = 7
suit-parameter-vendor-identifier = 1
suit-parameter-class-identifier = 2
suit-parameter-image-digest = 3
suit-parameter-use-before = 4
suit-parameter-component-offset = 5
suit-parameter-strict-order = 12
suit-parameter-soft-failure = 13
suit-parameter-image-size = 14
suit-parameter-encryption-info = 18
suit-parameter-compression-info = 19
suit-parameter-unpack-info = 20
suit-parameter-uri = 21
suit-parameter-source-component = 22
suit-parameter-run-args = 23
suit-parameter-device-identifier = 24
suit-parameter-minimum-battery = 26
suit-parameter-update-priority = 27
suit-parameter-version = 28
suit-parameter-wait-info = 29
suit-parameter-custom = nint
suit-compression-algorithm = 1
suit-compression-parameters = 2
suit-unpack-algorithm = 1
suit-unpack-parameters = 2
suit-text-manifest-description = 1
suit-text-update-description = 2
suit-text-vendor-name = 3
suit-text-model-name = 4
suit-text-vendor-domain = 5
suit-text-model-info = 6
suit-text-component-description = 7
suit-text-manifest-json-source = 8
suit-text-manifest-yaml-source = 9
suit-text-version-dependencies = 10
The following examples demonstrate a small subset of the functionality of the manifest. However, despite this, even a simple manifest processor can execute most of these manifests.
The examples are signed using the following ECDSA secp256r1 key:
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgApZYjZCUGLM50VBC CjYStX+09jGmnyJPrpDLTz/hiXOhRANCAASEloEarguqq9JhVxie7NomvqqL8Rtv P+bitWWchdvArTsfKktsCYExwKNtrNHXi9OB3N+wnAUtszmR23M4tKiW -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
The corresponding public key can be used to verify these examples:
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEhJaBGq4LqqvSYVcYnuzaJr6qi/Eb bz/m4rVlnIXbwK07HypLbAmBMcCjbazR14vTgdzfsJwFLbM5kdtzOLSolg== -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
Each example uses SHA256 as the digest function.
Secure boot and compatibility check.
{
/ authentication-wrapper / 2:h'81d28443a10126a058248202582064d8094
da3ef71c5971b7b84e7f4be1f56452c32fdde7bc1c70889112f1d5d9958407d637397e
12abdd41bc026a8e8a22f0f902a5b972e7786d570a37ac43c370b64a6946b0311f059c
a01d40f74d88d6fd7193baa36f5cf20aa57c46a0411a6b704' / [
18([
/ protected / h'a10126' / {
/ alg / 1:-7 / ES256 /,
} /,
/ unprotected / {
},
/ payload / h'8202582064d8094da3ef71c5971b7b84e7f4be1f
56452c32fdde7bc1c70889112f1d5d99' / [
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'64d8094da3ef71c5971b7b84e7f4be1f56452c32fdde7bc1c70889112f1d5d99'
] /,
/ signature / h'7d637397e12abdd41bc026a8e8a22f0f902a5b
972e7786d570a37ac43c370b64a6946b0311f059ca01d40f74d88d6fd7193baa36f5cf
20aa57c46a0411a6b704'
])
] /,
/ manifest / 3:h'a50101020103585ea20244818141000458548614a40150fa6
b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab4503820
2582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100
e1987d001f602f60a438203f60c438217f6' / {
/ manifest-version / 1:1,
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:1,
/ common / 3:h'a20244818141000458548614a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfb
e9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450382025820001122334
45566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f
6' / {
/ components / 2:h'81814100' / [
[h'00']
] /,
/ common-sequence / 4:h'8614a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663
e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab4503820258200011223344556677
8899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f6' / [
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{
/ vendor-id /
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /,
/ class-id / 2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45'
/ 1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /,
/ image-digest / 3:[
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
],
/ image-size / 14:34768,
} ,
/ condition-vendor-identifier / 1,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-class-identifier / 2,F6 / nil /
] /,
} /,
/ validate / 10:h'8203f6' / [
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
/ run / 12:h'8217f6' / [
/ directive-run / 23,F6 / nil /
] /,
} /,
}
Total size of manifest without COSE authentication object: 116
Manifest:
a1035870a50101020103585ea20244818141000458548614a40150fa6b4a 53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab 45038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdef fedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f60a438203f60c438217f6
Total size of manifest with COSE authentication object: 231
Manifest with COSE authentication object:
a202587081d28443a10126a058248202582064d8094da3ef71c5971b7b84 e7f4be1f56452c32fdde7bc1c70889112f1d5d9958407d637397e12abdd4 1bc026a8e8a22f0f902a5b972e7786d570a37ac43c370b64a6946b0311f0 59ca01d40f74d88d6fd7193baa36f5cf20aa57c46a0411a6b704035870a5 0101020103585ea20244818141000458548614a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdf be9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab4503820258 2000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876 5432100e1987d001f602f60a438203f60c438217f6
Simultaneous download and installation of payload.
{
/ authentication-wrapper / 2:h'81d28443a10126a0582482025820666b83f
f51628190387170489535aa9441656d8a24401de6458595c42cb0165d58405cb310acb
34f7ebb42acfffce430dbda94faa412900ce8e76650445e2c37e4cc132d8bb5f30ecf5
f8130270bbf8d159f6d36e1cdf97b64229910fdb447538af1' / [
18([
/ protected / h'a10126' / {
/ alg / 1:-7 / ES256 /,
} /,
/ unprotected / {
},
/ payload / h'82025820666b83ff51628190387170489535aa94
41656d8a24401de6458595c42cb0165d' / [
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'666b83ff51628190387170489535aa9441656d8a24401de6458595c42cb0165d'
] /,
/ signature / h'5cb310acb34f7ebb42acfffce430dbda94faa4
12900ce8e76650445e2c37e4cc132d8bb5f30ecf5f8130270bbf8d159f6d36e1cdf97b
64229910fdb447538af1'
])
] /,
/ manifest / 3:h'a50101020203585ea20244818141000458548614a40150fa6
b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab4503820
2582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100
e1987d001f602f60958258613a115781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2
f66696c652e62696e15f603f60a438203f6' / {
/ manifest-version / 1:1,
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:2,
/ common / 3:h'a20244818141000458548614a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfb
e9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450382025820001122334
45566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f
6' / {
/ components / 2:h'81814100' / [
[h'00']
] /,
/ common-sequence / 4:h'8614a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663
e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab4503820258200011223344556677
8899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f6' / [
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{
/ vendor-id /
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /,
/ class-id / 2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45'
/ 1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /,
/ image-digest / 3:[
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
],
/ image-size / 14:34768,
} ,
/ condition-vendor-identifier / 1,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-class-identifier / 2,F6 / nil /
] /,
} /,
/ install / 9:h'8613a115781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f
6d2f66696c652e62696e15f603f6' / [
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:'http://example.com/file.bin',
} ,
/ directive-fetch / 21,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
/ validate / 10:h'8203f6' / [
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
} /,
}
Total size of manifest without COSE authentication object: 151
Manifest:
a1035893a50101020203585ea20244818141000458548614a40150fa6b4a 53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab 45038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdef fedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f60958258613a115781b687474703a 2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f603f60a438203 f6
Total size of manifest with COSE authentication object: 266
Manifest with COSE authentication object:
a202587081d28443a10126a0582482025820666b83ff5162819038717048 9535aa9441656d8a24401de6458595c42cb0165d58405cb310acb34f7ebb 42acfffce430dbda94faa412900ce8e76650445e2c37e4cc132d8bb5f30e cf5f8130270bbf8d159f6d36e1cdf97b64229910fdb447538af1035893a5 0101020203585ea20244818141000458548614a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdf be9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab4503820258 2000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876 5432100e1987d001f602f60958258613a115781b687474703a2f2f657861 6d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f603f60a438203f6
Compatibility test, simultaneous download and installation, and secure boot.
{
/ authentication-wrapper / 2:h'81d28443a10126a058248202582038df852
c98928fae9694fce5b6b51addd631bfde473eceb20c8b929ae6ec2d6c584050bba3dd9
b0ad6da91265cff1ec69c3a9e2e42ffd97e780e37c78ac7889140620439874108ec527
1f3325988f2774f17339fcd61a5c08a3d15fb7fcdeef9294e' / [
18([
/ protected / h'a10126' / {
/ alg / 1:-7 / ES256 /,
} /,
/ unprotected / {
},
/ payload / h'8202582038df852c98928fae9694fce5b6b51add
d631bfde473eceb20c8b929ae6ec2d6c' / [
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'38df852c98928fae9694fce5b6b51addd631bfde473eceb20c8b929ae6ec2d6c'
] /,
/ signature / h'50bba3dd9b0ad6da91265cff1ec69c3a9e2e42
ffd97e780e37c78ac7889140620439874108ec5271f3325988f2774f17339fcd61a5c0
8a3d15fb7fcdeef9294e'
])
] /,
/ manifest / 3:h'a60101020303585ea20244818141000458548614a40150fa6
b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab4503820
2582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100
e1987d001f602f60958258613a115781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2
f66696c652e62696e15f603f60a438203f60c438217f6' / {
/ manifest-version / 1:1,
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:3,
/ common / 3:h'a20244818141000458548614a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfb
e9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450382025820001122334
45566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f
6' / {
/ components / 2:h'81814100' / [
[h'00']
] /,
/ common-sequence / 4:h'8614a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663
e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab4503820258200011223344556677
8899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f6' / [
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{
/ vendor-id /
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /,
/ class-id / 2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45'
/ 1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /,
/ image-digest / 3:[
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
],
/ image-size / 14:34768,
} ,
/ condition-vendor-identifier / 1,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-class-identifier / 2,F6 / nil /
] /,
} /,
/ install / 9:h'8613a115781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f
6d2f66696c652e62696e15f603f6' / [
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:'http://example.com/file.bin',
} ,
/ directive-fetch / 21,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
/ validate / 10:h'8203f6' / [
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
/ run / 12:h'8217f6' / [
/ directive-run / 23,F6 / nil /
] /,
} /,
}
Total size of manifest without COSE authentication object: 156
Manifest:
a1035898a60101020303585ea20244818141000458548614a40150fa6b4a 53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab 45038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdef fedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f60958258613a115781b687474703a 2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f603f60a438203 f60c438217f6
Total size of manifest with COSE authentication object: 271
Manifest with COSE authentication object:
a202587081d28443a10126a058248202582038df852c98928fae9694fce5 b6b51addd631bfde473eceb20c8b929ae6ec2d6c584050bba3dd9b0ad6da 91265cff1ec69c3a9e2e42ffd97e780e37c78ac7889140620439874108ec 5271f3325988f2774f17339fcd61a5c08a3d15fb7fcdeef9294e035898a6 0101020303585ea20244818141000458548614a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdf be9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab4503820258 2000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876 5432100e1987d001f602f60958258613a115781b687474703a2f2f657861 6d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f603f60a438203f60c438217 f6
Compatibility test, simultaneous download and installation, load from external storage, and secure boot.
{
/ authentication-wrapper / 2:h'81d28443a10126a05824820258208ae1d4d
1846e82975dd5d7555ef0c3836e7e653a8bb1214466457781c0d2f2aa58401ef2d0ca6
aabf259feb880a1a4deb4e345cda314b2facf9983766da3744af825b3f98c74afdfa85
aed406b10315e0cc6c44ee19321681c69f911bc90bf8d22c0' / [
18([
/ protected / h'a10126' / {
/ alg / 1:-7 / ES256 /,
} /,
/ unprotected / {
},
/ payload / h'820258208ae1d4d1846e82975dd5d7555ef0c383
6e7e653a8bb1214466457781c0d2f2aa' / [
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'8ae1d4d1846e82975dd5d7555ef0c3836e7e653a8bb1214466457781c0d2f2aa'
] /,
/ signature / h'1ef2d0ca6aabf259feb880a1a4deb4e345cda3
14b2facf9983766da3744af825b3f98c74afdfa85aed406b10315e0cc6c44ee1932168
1c69f911bc90bf8d22c0'
])
] /,
/ manifest / 3:h'a701010204035863a2024782814100814101045856880c001
4a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f
2ab45038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9
8765432100e1987d001f602f6095827880c0013a115781b687474703a2f2f6578616d7
06c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f603f60a45840c0003f60b4b880c0113a1160
016f603f60c45840c0117f6' / {
/ manifest-version / 1:1,
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:4,
/ common / 3:h'a2024782814100814101045856880c0014a40150fa6b4a5
3d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45038202582
000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e198
7d001f602f6' / {
/ components / 2:h'82814100814101' / [
[h'00'] ,
[h'01']
] /,
/ common-sequence / 4:h'880c0014a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9d
e663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450382025820001122334455
66778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f6'
/ [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0 ,
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{
/ vendor-id /
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /,
/ class-id / 2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45'
/ 1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /,
/ image-digest / 3:[
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
],
/ image-size / 14:34768,
} ,
/ condition-vendor-identifier / 1,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-class-identifier / 2,F6 / nil /
] /,
} /,
/ install / 9:h'880c0013a115781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e
636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f603f6' / [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0 ,
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:'http://example.com/file.bin',
} ,
/ directive-fetch / 21,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
/ validate / 10:h'840c0003f6' / [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0 ,
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
/ load / 11:h'880c0113a1160016f603f6' / [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,1 ,
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ source-component / 22:0 / [h'00'] /,
} ,
/ directive-copy / 22,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
/ run / 12:h'840c0117f6' / [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,1 ,
/ directive-run / 23,F6 / nil /
] /,
} /,
}
Total size of manifest without COSE authentication object: 180
Manifest:
a10358b0a701010204035863a2024782814100814101045856880c0014a4 0150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf42 9b2d51f2ab45038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff012345 6789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f6095827880c0013a115 781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15 f603f60a45840c0003f60b4b880c0113a1160016f603f60c45840c0117f6
Total size of manifest with COSE authentication object: 295
Manifest with COSE authentication object:
a202587081d28443a10126a05824820258208ae1d4d1846e82975dd5d755 5ef0c3836e7e653a8bb1214466457781c0d2f2aa58401ef2d0ca6aabf259 feb880a1a4deb4e345cda314b2facf9983766da3744af825b3f98c74afdf a85aed406b10315e0cc6c44ee19321681c69f911bc90bf8d22c00358b0a7 01010204035863a2024782814100814101045856880c0014a40150fa6b4a 53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab 45038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdef fedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f6095827880c0013a115781b687474 703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f603f60a45 840c0003f60b4b880c0113a1160016f603f60c45840c0117f6
Compatibility test, simultaneous download and installation, load and decompress from external storage, and secure boot.
{
/ authentication-wrapper / 2:h'81d28443a10126a0582482025820310798d
3d8276a740505d1f017972e281d6d26c9967a658879ae6d07e6a238a958404d48f0059
918c261bc1636b467b2b455801c4d211758a42e82a8f8fc245f21857d7c0e78f1b6d6a
8ab1f0c9e147043066c0af53c1563070d4934faeec21bac55' / [
18([
/ protected / h'a10126' / {
/ alg / 1:-7 / ES256 /,
} /,
/ unprotected / {
},
/ payload / h'82025820310798d3d8276a740505d1f017972e28
1d6d26c9967a658879ae6d07e6a238a9' / [
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'310798d3d8276a740505d1f017972e281d6d26c9967a658879ae6d07e6a238a9'
] /,
/ signature / h'4d48f0059918c261bc1636b467b2b455801c4d
211758a42e82a8f8fc245f21857d7c0e78f1b6d6a8ab1f0c9e147043066c0af53c1563
070d4934faeec21bac55'
])
] /,
/ manifest / 3:h'a701010205035863a2024782814100814101045856880c001
4a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f
2ab45038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9
8765432100e1987d001f602f6095827880c0013a115781b687474703a2f2f6578616d7
06c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f603f60a45840c0003f60b4d880c0113a2130
1160016f603f60c45840c0117f6' / {
/ manifest-version / 1:1,
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:5,
/ common / 3:h'a2024782814100814101045856880c0014a40150fa6b4a5
3d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45038202582
000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e198
7d001f602f6' / {
/ components / 2:h'82814100814101' / [
[h'00'] ,
[h'01']
] /,
/ common-sequence / 4:h'880c0014a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9d
e663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450382025820001122334455
66778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f6'
/ [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0 ,
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{
/ vendor-id /
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /,
/ class-id / 2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45'
/ 1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /,
/ image-digest / 3:[
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
],
/ image-size / 14:34768,
} ,
/ condition-vendor-identifier / 1,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-class-identifier / 2,F6 / nil /
] /,
} /,
/ install / 9:h'880c0013a115781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e
636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f603f6' / [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0 ,
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:'http://example.com/file.bin',
} ,
/ directive-fetch / 21,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
/ validate / 10:h'840c0003f6' / [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0 ,
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
/ load / 11:h'880c0113a21301160016f603f6' / [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,1 ,
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ source-component / 22:0 / [h'00'] /,
/ compression-info / 19:1 / gzip /,
} ,
/ directive-copy / 22,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
/ run / 12:h'840c0117f6' / [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,1 ,
/ directive-run / 23,F6 / nil /
] /,
} /,
}
Total size of manifest without COSE authentication object: 182
Manifest:
a10358b2a701010205035863a2024782814100814101045856880c0014a4 0150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf42 9b2d51f2ab45038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff012345 6789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f6095827880c0013a115 781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15 f603f60a45840c0003f60b4d880c0113a21301160016f603f60c45840c01 17f6
Total size of manifest with COSE authentication object: 297
Manifest with COSE authentication object:
a202587081d28443a10126a0582482025820310798d3d8276a740505d1f0 17972e281d6d26c9967a658879ae6d07e6a238a958404d48f0059918c261 bc1636b467b2b455801c4d211758a42e82a8f8fc245f21857d7c0e78f1b6 d6a8ab1f0c9e147043066c0af53c1563070d4934faeec21bac550358b2a7 01010205035863a2024782814100814101045856880c0014a40150fa6b4a 53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab 45038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdef fedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f6095827880c0013a115781b687474 703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f603f60a45 840c0003f60b4d880c0113a21301160016f603f60c45840c0117f6
Compatibility test, download, installation, and secure boot.
{
/ authentication-wrapper / 2:h'81d28443a10126a05824820258209a45659
58c6e09c92fc69feeb09081c875f113082245ba2025801fa46dc2280e58404604e6413
30d610fd0a0545b9b816f09c0767edf66fc57f40393cd4423e0807b36226e843e0f57b
f860a3cf542655048648dea81e62e39f19e7ac96652d3de90' / [
18([
/ protected / h'a10126' / {
/ alg / 1:-7 / ES256 /,
} /,
/ unprotected / {
},
/ payload / h'820258209a4565958c6e09c92fc69feeb09081c8
75f113082245ba2025801fa46dc2280e' / [
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'9a4565958c6e09c92fc69feeb09081c875f113082245ba2025801fa46dc2280e'
] /,
/ signature / h'4604e641330d610fd0a0545b9b816f09c0767e
df66fc57f40393cd4423e0807b36226e843e0f57bf860a3cf542655048648dea81e62e
39f19e7ac96652d3de90'
])
] /,
/ manifest / 3:h'a701010205035863a2024782814101814100045856880c011
4a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f
2ab45038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9
8765432100e1987d001f602f6085823840c0013a115781b687474703a2f2f6578616d7
06c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e094b880c0113a1160016f603f60a45840c0103f
60c45840c0117f6' / {
/ manifest-version / 1:1,
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:5,
/ common / 3:h'a2024782814101814100045856880c0114a40150fa6b4a5
3d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45038202582
000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e198
7d001f602f6' / {
/ components / 2:h'82814101814100' / [
[h'01'] ,
[h'00']
] /,
/ common-sequence / 4:h'880c0114a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9d
e663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450382025820001122334455
66778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f6'
/ [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,1 ,
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{
/ vendor-id /
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /,
/ class-id / 2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45'
/ 1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /,
/ image-digest / 3:[
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
],
/ image-size / 14:34768,
} ,
/ condition-vendor-identifier / 1,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-class-identifier / 2,F6 / nil /
] /,
} /,
/ payload-fetch / 8:h'840c0013a115781b687474703a2f2f6578616d70
6c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e' / [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0 ,
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:'http://example.com/file.bin',
}
] /,
/ install / 9:h'880c0113a1160016f603f6' / [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,1 ,
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ source-component / 22:0 / [h'01'] /,
} ,
/ directive-copy / 22,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
/ validate / 10:h'840c0103f6' / [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,1 ,
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
/ run / 12:h'840c0117f6' / [
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,1 ,
/ directive-run / 23,F6 / nil /
] /,
} /,
}
Total size of manifest without COSE authentication object: 176
Manifest:
a10358aca701010205035863a2024782814101814100045856880c0114a4 0150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf42 9b2d51f2ab45038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff012345 6789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f6085823840c0013a115 781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e09 4b880c0113a1160016f603f60a45840c0103f60c45840c0117f6
Total size of manifest with COSE authentication object: 291
Manifest with COSE authentication object:
a202587081d28443a10126a05824820258209a4565958c6e09c92fc69fee b09081c875f113082245ba2025801fa46dc2280e58404604e641330d610f d0a0545b9b816f09c0767edf66fc57f40393cd4423e0807b36226e843e0f 57bf860a3cf542655048648dea81e62e39f19e7ac96652d3de900358aca7 01010205035863a2024782814101814100045856880c0114a40150fa6b4a 53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab 45038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdef fedcba98765432100e1987d001f602f6085823840c0013a115781b687474 703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e094b880c0113 a1160016f603f60a45840c0103f60c45840c0117f6
Compatibility test, 2 images, simultaneous download and installation, and secure boot.
{
/ authentication-wrapper / 2:h'81d28443a10126a05824820258201d15a17
13d3a4510ca392454adff987abb5425348e449618122ffa817012cc315840197a4a3a4
188fe1dd8baa468ae9a35ac8e5ef462017530116eadd90892c96c6ab00825fcb45edb7
57547733c14d3b637ea8a085ce7bfc782a0b2cd80d31b1294' / [
18([
/ protected / h'a10126' / {
/ alg / 1:-7 / ES256 /,
} /,
/ unprotected / {
},
/ payload / h'820258201d15a1713d3a4510ca392454adff987a
bb5425348e449618122ffa817012cc31' / [
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'1d15a1713d3a4510ca392454adff987abb5425348e449618122ffa817012cc31'
] /,
/ signature / h'197a4a3a4188fe1dd8baa468ae9a35ac8e5ef4
62017530116eadd90892c96c6ab00825fcb45edb757547733c14d3b637ea8a085ce7bf
c782a0b2cd80d31b1294'
])
] /,
/ manifest / 3:h'a501010203035899a202448181410004588f8814a20150fa6
b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450f825
82e8405f614a2038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcde
ffedcba98765432100e1987d058308405f614a203820258200123456789abcdeffedcb
a987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0e1a00012c2201f602f60958538
60f8258248405f613a115781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c6
5312e62696e58248405f613a115781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f6
6696c65322e62696e15f603f60a438203f6' / {
/ manifest-version / 1:1,
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:3,
/ common / 3:h'a202448181410004588f8814a20150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfb
e9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450f82582e8405f614a20
38202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543
2100e1987d058308405f614a203820258200123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210001
12233445566778899aabbccddeeff0e1a00012c2201f602f6' / {
/ components / 2:h'81814100' / [
[h'00']
] /,
/ common-sequence / 4:h'8814a20150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663
e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450f82582e8405f614a203820258
2000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e19
87d058308405f614a203820258200123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100011223344
5566778899aabbccddeeff0e1a00012c2201f602f6' / [
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{
/ vendor-id /
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /,
/ class-id / 2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45'
/ 1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /,
} ,
/ directive-try-each / 15,[
h'8405f614a2038202582000112233445566778899aabbccdd
eeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d0' / [
/ condition-component-offset / 5,F6 / nil / ,
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{
/ image-digest / 3:[
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
],
/ image-size / 14:34768,
}
] / ,
h'8405f614a203820258200123456789abcdeffedcba987654
321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0e1a00012c22' / [
/ condition-component-offset / 5,F6 / nil / ,
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{
/ image-digest / 3:[
/ algorithm-id / 2 / sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'0123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
],
/ image-size / 14:76834,
}
] /
] ,
/ condition-vendor-identifier / 1,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-class-identifier / 2,F6 / nil /
] /,
} /,
/ install / 9:h'860f8258248405f613a115781c687474703a2f2f657861
6d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65312e62696e58248405f613a115781c687474703a2f2f
6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65322e62696e15f603f6' / [
/ directive-try-each / 15,[
h'8405f613a115781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d
2f66696c65312e62696e' / [
/ condition-component-offset / 5,F6 / nil / ,
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:'http://example.com/file1.bin',
}
] / ,
h'8405f613a115781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d
2f66696c65322e62696e' / [
/ condition-component-offset / 5,F6 / nil / ,
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:'http://example.com/file2.bin',
}
] /
] ,
/ directive-fetch / 21,F6 / nil / ,
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
/ validate / 10:h'8203f6' / [
/ condition-image-match / 3,F6 / nil /
] /,
} /,
}
Total size of manifest without COSE authentication object: 256
Manifest:
a10358fca501010203035899a202448181410004588f8814a20150fa6b4a 53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab 450f82582e8405f614a2038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddee ff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d058308405f614a20382 0258200123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aa bbccddeeff0e1a00012c2201f602f6095853860f8258248405f613a11578 1c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65312e62696e58 248405f613a115781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f6669 6c65322e62696e15f603f60a438203f6
Total size of manifest with COSE authentication object: 371
Manifest with COSE authentication object:
a202587081d28443a10126a05824820258201d15a1713d3a4510ca392454 adff987abb5425348e449618122ffa817012cc315840197a4a3a4188fe1d d8baa468ae9a35ac8e5ef462017530116eadd90892c96c6ab00825fcb45e db757547733c14d3b637ea8a085ce7bfc782a0b2cd80d31b12940358fca5 01010203035899a202448181410004588f8814a20150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdf be9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450f82582e 8405f614a2038202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01234567 89abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d058308405f614a203820258200123 456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff 0e1a00012c2201f602f6095853860f8258248405f613a115781c68747470 3a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65312e62696e58248405f613 a115781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65322e62 696e15f603f60a438203f6
IANA is requested to setup a registry group for SUIT elements.
Within this group, IANA is requested to setup registries for SUIT keys:
For each registry, values 0-23 are Standards Action, 24-255 are IETF Review, 256-65535 are Expert Review, and 65536 or greater are First Come First Served.
Negative values -23 to 0 are Experimental Use, -24 and lower are Private Use.
This document is about a manifest format describing and protecting firmware images and as such it is part of a larger solution for offering a standardized way of delivering firmware updates to IoT devices. A more detailed discussion about security can be found in the architecture document [I-D.ietf-suit-architecture] and in [I-D.ietf-suit-information-model].
The discussion list for this document is located at the e-mail address suit@ietf.org. Information on the group and information on how to subscribe to the list is at https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/suit
Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/suit/current/index.html
We would like to thank the following persons for their support in designing this mechanism:
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC4122] | Leach, P., Mealling, M. and R. Salz, "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005. |
| [RFC8152] | Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017. |
| [RFC8174] | Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017. |
| [I-D.ietf-suit-architecture] | Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Brown, D. and M. Meriac, "A Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-suit-architecture-08, November 2019. |
| [I-D.ietf-suit-information-model] | Moran, B., Tschofenig, H. and H. Birkholz, "An Information Model for Firmware Updates in IoT Devices", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-suit-information-model-05, January 2020. |