Network Working Group R. Sparks, Ed.
Internet-Draft Estacado Systems
Expires: October 13, 2005 A. Hawrylyshen
Jasomi Networks
A. Johnston
MCI
J. Rosenberg
Cisco Systems
H. Schulzrinne
Columbia University
April 14, 2005
Session Initiation Protocol Torture Test Messages
draft-ietf-sipping-torture-tests-06
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
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This informational document gives examples of Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) test messages designed to exercise and "torture" a SIP
implementation.
Table of Contents
1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Document Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Representing Long Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Representing Non-printable Characters . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Representing Long Repeating Strings . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. SIP Test Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1 Parser tests (syntax) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1 Valid messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1.1 A short tortuous INVITE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1.2 Wide range of valid characters . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.1.3 Valid use of the % escaping mechanism . . . . . . 9
3.1.1.4 Escaped nulls in URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.1.5 Use of % when it is not an escape . . . . . . . . 11
3.1.1.6 Message with no LWS between display name and < . . 11
3.1.1.7 Long values in header fields . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1.1.8 Extra trailing octets in a UDP datagram . . . . . 14
3.1.1.9 Semicolon separated parameters in URI user part . 15
3.1.1.10 Varied and unknown transport types . . . . . . . 16
3.1.1.11 S/MIME signed message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1.1.12 Unusual reason phrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1.1.13 Empty reason phrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.2 Invalid messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.2.1 Extraneous header field separators . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.2.2 Content length larger than message . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.2.3 Negative Content-Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.2.4 Request scalar fields with overlarge values . . . 22
3.1.2.5 Response scalar fields with overlarge values . . . 23
3.1.2.6 Unterminated quoted string in display-name . . . . 23
3.1.2.7 <> enclosing Request-URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1.2.8 Malformed SIP Request-URI (embedded LWS) . . . . . 25
3.1.2.9 Multiple SP separating Request-Line elements . . . 26
3.1.2.10 SP characters at end of Request-Line . . . . . . 27
3.1.2.11 Escaped headers in SIP Request-URI . . . . . . . 28
3.1.2.12 Invalid timezone in Date header field . . . . . 28
3.1.2.13 Failure to enclose name-addr URI in <> . . . . . 29
3.1.2.14 Spaces within addr-spec . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1.2.15 Non-token characters in display-name . . . . . . 30
3.1.2.16 Unknown protocol version . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.1.2.17 Start line and CSeq method mismatch . . . . . . 31
3.1.2.18 Unknown Method with CSeq method mismatch . . . . 31
3.1.2.19 Overlarge response code . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2 Transaction layer semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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3.2.1 Missing transaction identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3 Application layer semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.1 Missing Required Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.2 Request-URI with unknown scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.3 Request-URI with known but atypical scheme . . . . . . 34
3.3.4 Unknown URI schemes in header fields . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3.5 Proxy-Require and Require . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3.6 Unknown Content-Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3.7 Unknown authorization scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3.8 Multiple values in single value required fields . . . 37
3.3.9 Multiple Content-Length values . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3.10 200 OK Response with broadcast Via header field
value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3.11 Max-Forwards of zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3.12 REGISTER with a contact header parameter . . . . . . 40
3.3.13 REGISTER with a url parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3.14 REGISTER with a url escaped header . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.15 Unacceptable Accept offering . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4 Backward compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.4.1 INVITE with RFC2543 syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A. Bit-exact archive of each test message . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.1 Encoded Reference Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 52
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1. Overview
This document is informational, and is NOT NORMATIVE on any aspect of
SIP.
This document contains test messages based on the current version
(2.0) of the Session Initiation Protocol as defined in [RFC3261].
Some messages exercise SIP's use of SDP as described in [RFC3264].
These messages were developed and refined at the SIPIt
interoperability test events.
The test messages are organized into several sections. Some stress
only a SIP parser and others stress both the parser and the
application above it. Some messages are valid, and some are not.
Each example clearly calls out what makes any invalid messages
incorrect.
This document does not attempt to catalog every way to make an
invalid message, nor does it attempt to be comprehensive in exploring
unusual, but valid, messages. Instead, it tries to focus on areas
that have caused interoperability problems or have particularly
unfavorable characteristics if they are handled improperly. This
document is a seed for a test plan, not a test plan in itself.
The messages are presented in the text using a set of markup
conventions to avoid ambiguity and meet Internet-Draft layout
requirements. To resolve any remaining ambiguity, a bit-accurate
version of each message is encapsulated in an appendix.
2. Document Conventions
This document contains many example SIP messages. Although SIP is a
text-based protocol, many of these examples cannot be unambiguously
rendered without additional markup due to the constraints placed on
the formatting of RFCs. This document defines and uses the markup
defined in this section to remove that ambiguity. This markup uses
the start and end tag conventions of XML, but does not define any XML
document type.
The appendix contains an encoded binary form of all the messages and
the algorithm needed to decode them into files.
2.1 Representing Long Lines
Several of these examples contain unfolded lines longer than 72
characters. These are captured between tags. The
single unfolded line is reconstructed by directly concatenating all
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lines appearing between the tags (discarding any line-feeds or
carriage returns). There will be no whitespace at the end of lines.
Any whitespace appearing at a fold-point will appear at the beginning
of a line.
The following represent the same string of bits:
Header-name: first value, reallylongsecondvalue, third value
Header-name: first value,
reallylongsecondvalue
, third value
Header-name: first value,
reallylong
second
value,
third value
Note that this is NOT SIP header line folding where different
strings of bits have equivalent meaning.
2.2 Representing Non-printable Characters
Several examples contain binary message bodies or header field values
containing non-ascii range UTF-8 encoded characters. These are
rendered here as a pair of hexadecimal digits per octet between
tags. This rendering applies even inside quoted-strings.
The following represent the same string of bits:
Header-name: value one
Header-name: value206F6Ee
The following is a Subject header field containing the euro symbol:
Subject: E282AC
2.3 Representing Long Repeating Strings
Several examples contain very large data values created with
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repeating bit strings. Those will be rendered here using value. As with this rendering
applies even inside quoted-strings.
For example, the value "abcabcabc" can be rendered as abc. A display name of "1000000 bottles of beer"
could be rendered as
To: "130 bottles of beer"
and a Max-Forwards header field with a value of one google will be
rendered here as
Max-Forwards: 10
3. SIP Test Messages
3.1 Parser tests (syntax)
3.1.1 Valid messages
3.1.1.1 A short tortuous INVITE
This short, relatively human-readable message contains:
o line folding all over
o escaped characters within quotes
o an empty subject
o LWS between colons, semicolons, header field values, and other
fields
o both comma separated and separate listing of header field values
o mix of short and long form for the same header field name
o unkown Request-URI parameter
o unknown header fields
o unknown header field with a value that would be syntactically
invalid if it were defined in terms of generic-param
o unusual header field ordering
o unusual header field name character case
o unknown parameters of a known header field
o uri parameter with no value
o header parameter with no value
o integer fields (Max-Forwards and CSeq) with leading zeros
All elements should treat this as a well-formed request.
The UnknownHeaderWithUnusualValue header field deserves special
attention. If this header field were defined in terms of comma
separated values with semicolon separated parameters (as many of the
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existing defined header fields), this would be invalid. However,
since the receiving element does not know the definition of the
syntax for this field, it must parse it as a header-value. Proxies
would forward this header field unchanged. Endpoints would ignore
the header field.
Message Details : wsinv
INVITE sip:vivekg@chair-dnrc.example.com;unknownparam SIP/2.0
TO :
sip:vivekg@chair-dnrc.example.com ; tag = 1918181833n
from : "J Rosenberg \\\""
;
tag = 98asjd8
MaX-fOrWaRdS: 0068
Call-ID: wsinv.ndaksdj@192.0.2.1
Content-Length : 151
cseq: 0009
INVITE
Via : SIP / 2.0
/UDP
192.0.2.2;branch=390skdjuw
s :
NewFangledHeader: newfangled value
continued newfangled value
UnknownHeaderWithUnusualValue: ;;,,;;,;
Content-Type: application/sdp
Route:
v: SIP / 2.0 / TCP spindle.example.com ;
branch = z9hG4bK9ikj8 ,
SIP / 2.0 / UDP 192.168.255.111 ; branch=
z9hG4bK30239
m:"Quoted string \"\"" ; newparam =
newvalue ;
secondparam ; q = 0.33
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.3
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.4
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
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3.1.1.2 Wide range of valid characters
This message exercises a wider range of characters in several key
syntactic elements than implementations usually see. Of particular
note:
o The Method contains non-alpha characters from token. Note that %
is not an escape character for this field. A method of IN%56ITE
is an unknown method. It is not the same as a method of INVITE
o The Request-URI contain unusual, but legal, characters
o A branch parameter contains all non-alphanum characters from token
o The To header field value's quoted-string contains quoted-pair
expansions, including a quoted NULL character
o The name part of name-addr in the From header field value contains
multiple tokens (instead of a quoted string) with all non-alphanum
characters from the token production rule. That value also has an
unknown header parameter whose name contains the non-alphanum
token characters and whose value is a non-ascii range UTF-8
encoded string. The tag parameter on this value contains the
non-alphanum token characters
o The Call-ID header field value contains the non-alphanum
characters from word. Notice that in this production:
* % is not an escape character. (It is only an escape character
in productions matching the rule "escaped")
* " does not start a quoted-string. None of ',` or " imply that
there will be a matching symbol later in the string
* The characters []{}()<> do not have any grouping semantics.
They are not required to appear in balanced pairs
o There is an unknown header field (matching extension-header) with
non-alphanum token characters in its name and a UTF8-NONASCII
value
If this unusual URI has been defined at a proxy, the proxy will
forward this request normally. Otherwise a proxy will generate a
404. Endpoints will generate a 501 listing the methods they
understand in an Allow header field.
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Message Details : intmeth
!interesting-Method0123456789_*+`.%indeed'~
sip:1_unusual.URI~(to-be!sure)&isn't+it$/crazy?,/;;*
:&it+has=1,weird!*pas$wo~d_too.(doesn't-it)
@example.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-.!%66*_+`'~
To: "BEL:\07 NUL:\00 DEL:\7F"
From: token1~` token2'+_ token3*%!.-
;fromParam''~+*_!.-%=
"D180D0B0D0B1D0BED182D0B0D18ED189D0B8D0B9"
;tag=_token~1'+`*%!-.
Call-ID: intmeth.word%ZK-!.*_+'@word`~)(><:\/"][?}{
CSeq: 139122385 !interesting-Method0123456789_*+`.%indeed'~
Max-Forwards: 255
extensionHeader-!.%*+_`'~:
EFBBBFE5A4A7E5819CE99BBB
Content-Length: 0
3.1.1.3 Valid use of the % escaping mechanism
This INVITE exercises the % HEX HEX escaping mechanism in several
places. The request is syntactically valid. Interesting features
include:
o The request-URI has sips:user@example.com embedded in its
userpart. What that might mean to example.net is beyond the scope
of this document.
o The From and To URIs have escaped characters in their userparts.
o The Contact URI has escaped characters in the URI parameters.
Note that the "name" uri-parameter has a value of "value%41" which
is NOT equivalent to "valueA". Per [RFC2396], unescaping URI
components is never performed recursively.
A parser must accept this as a well-formed message. The application
using the message must treat the % HEX HEX expansions as equivalent
to the character being encoded. The application must not try to
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interpret % as an escape character in those places where % HEX HEX
("escaped" in the grammar) is not a valid part of the construction.
In [RFC3261], "escaped" only occurs in the expansions of SIP-URI,
SIPS-URI, and Reason-Phrase.
Message Details : esc01
INVITE sip:sips%3Auser%40example.com@example.net SIP/2.0
To: sip:%75se%72@example.com
From: ;tag=938
Max-Forwards: 87
i: esc01.239409asdfakjkn23onasd0-3234
CSeq: 234234 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.net;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
C: application/sdp
Contact:
Content-Length: 151
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.1.1.4 Escaped nulls in URIs
This register request contains several URIs with nulls in the
userpart. The message is well formed - parsers must accept this
message. Implementations must take special care when unescaping the
AOR in this request to not prematurely shorten the username. This
request registers two distinct contact URIs.
Message Details : escnull
REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:null-%00-null@example.com
From: sip:null-%00-null@example.com;tag=839923423
Max-Forwards: 70
Call-ID: escnull.39203ndfvkjdasfkq3w4otrq0adsfdfnavd
CSeq: 14398234 REGISTER
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Contact:
Contact:
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L:0
3.1.1.5 Use of % when it is not an escape
Most of the places % can appear in a SIP message, it is not an escape
character. This can surprise the unwary implementor. The following
well-formed request has these properties:
o The request method is unknown. It is NOT equivalent to REGISTER
o The display-name portion of the To and From header fields is
"%Z%45". Note that this is not the same as %ZE
o This message has two Contact header field values, not three.
is a C%6Fntact header field value
A parser should accept this message as well formed. A proxy would
forward or reject the message depending on what the Request-URI meant
to it. An endpoint would reject this message with a 501.
Message Details : esc02
RE%47IST%45R sip:registrar.example.com SIP/2.0
To: "%Z%45"
From: "%Z%45" ;tag=f232jadfj23
Call-ID: esc02.asdfnqwo34rq23i34jrjasdcnl23nrlknsdf
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK209%fzsnel234
CSeq: 29344 RE%47IST%45R
Max-Forwards: 70
Contact:
C%6Fntact:
Contact:
l: 0
3.1.1.6 Message with no LWS between display name and <
This OPTIONS request is not valid per the grammar in RFC 3261 since
there is no LWS between the quoted string in the display name and <
in the From header field value. This has been identified as a
specification bug that will be removed when RFC 3261 is revised.
Elements should accept this request as well formed.
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Message Details : lwsdisp
OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:user@example.com
From: "caller";tag=323
Max-Forwards: 70
Call-ID: lwsdisp.1234abcd@funky.example.com
CSeq: 60 OPTIONS
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP funky.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
l: 0
3.1.1.7 Long values in header fields
This well-formed request contains header fields with many values and
values that are very long. Features include:
o The To header field has a long display name, and long uri
parameter names and values
o The From header field has long header parameter names and values,
in particular a very long tag
o The Call-ID is one long token
Message Details : longreq
INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
To: "I have a user name of
extreme proportion"
longvalue;
longparamname=shortvalue;
verylongParameterNameWithNoValue>
F: sip:
amazinglylongcallername@example.net
;tag=12982424
;unknownheaderparamname=
unknowheaderparamvalue
;unknownValuelessparamname
Call-ID: longreq.onereallylongcallid
CSeq: 3882340 INVITE
Unknown-Long-Name:
unknown-long-value;
unknown-long-parameter-name =
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unknown-long-parameter-value
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip33.example.com
v: SIP/2.0/TCP sip32.example.com
V: SIP/2.0/TCP sip31.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip30.example.com
ViA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip29.example.com
VIa: SIP/2.0/TCP sip28.example.com
VIA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip27.example.com
via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip26.example.com
viA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip25.example.com
vIa: SIP/2.0/TCP sip24.example.com
vIA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip23.example.com
V : SIP/2.0/TCP sip22.example.com
v : SIP/2.0/TCP sip21.example.com
V : SIP/2.0/TCP sip20.example.com
v : SIP/2.0/TCP sip19.example.com
Via : SIP/2.0/TCP sip18.example.com
Via : SIP/2.0/TCP sip17.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip16.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip15.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip14.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip13.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip12.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip11.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip10.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip9.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip8.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip7.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip6.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip5.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip4.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip3.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip2.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip1.example.com
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP
host.example.com;received=192.0.2.5;
branch=verylongbranchvalue
Max-Forwards: 70
Contact: amazinglylongcallername
@host5.example.net>
Content-Type: application/sdp
l: 151
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v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.1.1.8 Extra trailing octets in a UDP datagram
This message contains a single SIP REGISTER request, which ostensibly
arrived over UDP in a single datagram. The packet contains extra
octets after the body (which in this case has zero length). The
extra octets happen to look like a SIP INVITE request, but (per
section 18.3 of [RFC3261]) they are just spurious noise that must be
ignored.
A SIP element receiving this datagram would handle the REGISTER
request normally and ignore the extra bits that look like an INVITE
request. If the element is a proxy choosing to forward the REGISTER,
the INVITE octets would not appear in the forwarded request.
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Message Details : dblreq
REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:j.user@example.com
From: sip:j.user@example.com;tag=43251j3j324
Max-Forwards: 8
I: dblreq.0ha0isndaksdj99sdfafnl3lk233412
Contact: sip:j.user@host.example.com
CSeq: 8 REGISTER
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.125;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw23492
Content-Length: 0
INVITE sip:joe@example.com SIP/2.0
t: sip:joe@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=141334
Max-Forwards: 8
Call-ID: dblreq.0ha0isnda977644900765@192.0.2.15
CSeq: 8 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw380234
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: 151
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m =video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.1.1.9 Semicolon separated parameters in URI user part
This request has a semicolon-separated parameter contained in the
"user" part of the Request-URI (whose value contains an escaped @
symbol). Receiving elements will accept this as a well formed
message. The Request-URI will parse such that the user part is
"user;par=u@example.net".
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Message Details : semiuri
OPTIONS sip:user;par=u%40example.net@example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:j_user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.org;tag=33242
Max-Forwards: 3
Call-ID: semiuri.0ha0isndaksdj
CSeq: 8 OPTIONS
Accept: application/sdp, application/pkcs7-mime,
multipart/mixed, multipart/signed,
message/sip, message/sipfrag
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
l: 0
3.1.1.10 Varied and unknown transport types
This request contains Via header field values with all known
transport types and exercises the transport extension mechanism.
Parsers must accept this message as well formed. Elements receiving
this message would process it exactly as if the 2nd and subsequent
header field values specified UDP (or other transport).
Message Details : transports
OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:user@example.com
From: ;tag=323
Max-Forwards: 70
Call-ID: transports.kijh4akdnaqjkwendsasfdj
Accept: application/sdp
CSeq: 60 OPTIONS
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP t1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Via: SIP/2.0/SCTP t2.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKklasjdhf
Via: SIP/2.0/TLS t3.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK2980unddj
Via: SIP/2.0/UNKNOWN t4.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKasd0f3en
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP t5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK0a9idfnee
l: 0
3.1.1.11 S/MIME signed message
This is a signed MESSAGE request. The signature is binary encoded.
The body contains null (0x00) characters. Receivers must take care
to properly frame the received message.
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Parsers must accept this message as well formed, even if the
application above the parser does not support multipart/signed.
Message Details : smime01
MESSAGE sip:kumiko@example.com SIP/2.0
To:
From: ;tag=2929017b
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 127.0.0.1:5060
;branch=z9hG4bK-d87543-5032442a6f48352f-1--d87543-;rport
Call-ID: 74dd6bf53ebdf741@Y2ouY2lzY28uc2lwaXQubmV0
CSeq: 1 MESSAGE
Route:
Contact:
Max-Forwards: 70
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-Type: multipart/signed
;boundary=4d7f63e86a96c361;micalg=sha1
;protocol=application/pkcs7-signature
Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2005 17:30:54 GMT
User-Agent: SIPimp.org/0.2.5 (curses)
Content-Length: 1567
--4d7f63e86a96c361
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
This has a null in the body.
--4d7f63e86a96c361
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime;name=smime.p7s
Content-Disposition: attachment;handling=required
;filename=smime.p7s
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
308204E006092A864886F70D010702A08204D1308204CD020101310B3009
06052B0E03021A0500300B06092A864886F70D010701A08202D2308202CE
30820237A00302010202080195007102330113300D06092A864886F70D01
010505003070310B3009060355040613025553311330110603550408130A
43616C69666F726E69613111300F0603550407130853616E204A6F736531
0E300C060355040A1305736970697431293027060355040B132053697069
74205465737420436572746966696361746520417574686F72697479301E
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170D3035303431323137313933385A170D3038303431313137313933385A
3062310B3009060355040613025553311330110603550408130A43616C69
666F726E69613111300F0603550407130853616E204A6F7365310E300C06
0355040A13057369706974311B301906035504031412666C756666794065
78616D706C652E636F6D30819F300D06092A864886F70D01010105000381
8D0030818902818100978BB1A8AE41595A61730F9DDB218A7EC4F30F33C8
584E5B7B063FCFABBB8F95BF1C3F763D85A70F1CE95374CE801CA74D333F
EA7913548BD8CA4E683C0495F6127B365B067C8A04EEF31D1E4DD7A99492
2DF15F468622B49B3DD3AACEF5CE36DFAF51FDBE68AAFBDFB50274365450
DF147F544BB5F2BE3BCEFBE39291B764EB0203010001A37F307D30510603
551D11044A304886167369703A666C75666679406578616D706C652E636F
6D8615696D3A666C75666679406578616D706C652E636F6D861770726573
3A666C75666679406578616D706C652E636F6D30090603551D1304023000
301D0603551D0E041604146EA02972AF7BF578F284A873F7979DB3AD59EA
90300D06092A864886F70D01010505000381810010EB632291EB8560CCCB
C8FF9EB8481B8083A7AC2520AF79A4852CE997A0BF81272B8DBD5EB2CB72
97982BF66F20CB5758D85C9C90426571269D4523FA67C86BD72BF94A1C34
2054529F92B370D1C55A1A75F4BC17423B2BBB53CE289AEAD505925F3786
74A5BDAC658CFD48D8C600F21B9E7DDE5A1135E1FE273BA75392DFAE3182
01D6308201D2020101307C3070310B300906035504061302555331133011
0603550408130A43616C69666F726E69613111300F060355040713085361
6E204A6F7365310E300C060355040A130573697069743129302706035504
0B1320536970697420546573742043657274696669636174652041757468
6F7269747902080195007102330113300906052B0E03021A0500A081B130
1806092A864886F70D010903310B06092A864886F70D010701301C06092A
864886F70D010905310F170D3035303431323137333035335A302306092A
864886F70D010904311604140E5123C664D47E6B9BBE2630DD21D2496580
11B0305206092A864886F70D01090F31453043300A06082A864886F70D03
07300E06082A864886F70D030202020080300D06082A864886F70D030202
0140300706052B0E030207300D06082A864886F70D0302020128300D0609
2A864886F70D010101050004818018EEAA35F807FF7C7F96B747722367C9
5F72FCD74140721B36BF638375D5DBF13EF4F00A71DC7E3E866E1D51C14B
C91AC2FF8369FF56F2F16603701570A9273355A8D5875718204FABAF5DB7
480A718560B89F1E28F9186431BB2B2452D45DFC68C0EE42DD808C70355B
4BC18F7954DED86ED20AFD57275A6A1DFAAEE607C482
--4d7f63e86a96c361--
3.1.1.12 Unusual reason phrase
This 200 response contains a reason phrase other than "OK". The
reason phrase is intended for human consumption, and may contain any
string produced by
Reason-Phrase = *(reserved / unreserved / escaped
/ UTF8-NONASCII / UTF8-CONT / SP / HTAB)
This particular response contains unreserved and non-ASCII UTF-8
characters.This response is well formed. A parser must accept this
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message.
Message Details : unreason
SIP/2.0 200 = 2**3 * 5**2 D0BDD0BE20D181D182
D0BE20D0B4D0B5D0B2D18FD0BDD0BED181D182D0BE20D0B4
D0B5D0B2D18FD182D18C202D20D0BFD180D0BED181D182D0
BED0B5
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.198;branch=z9hG4bK1324923
Call-ID: unreason.1234ksdfak3j2erwedfsASdf
CSeq: 35 INVITE
From: sip:user@example.com;tag=11141343
To: sip:user@example.edu;tag=2229
Content-Length: 155
Content-Type: application/sdp
Contact:
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.198
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.198
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.1.1.13 Empty reason phrase
This well formed response contains no reason phrase. A parser must
accept this message. The space character after the reason code is
required. If it were not present, this message could be rejected as
invalid (a liberal receiver would accept it anyway).
Message Details : noreason
SIP/2.0 10020
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.105;branch=z9hG4bK2398ndaoe
Call-ID: noreason.asndj203insdf99223ndf
CSeq: 35 INVITE
From: ;tag=39ansfi3
To: ;tag=902jndnke3
Content-Length: 0
Contact:
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3.1.2 Invalid messages
This section contains several invalid messages reflecting errors seen
at interoperability events and exploring important edge conditions
that can be induced through malformed messages. This section does
not attempt to be a comprehensive list of all types of invalid
messages.
3.1.2.1 Extraneous header field separators
The Via header field of this request contains additional semicolons
and commas without parameters or values. The Contact header field
contains additional semicolons without parameters. This message is
syntactically invalid.
An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad
Request error.
Message Details : badinv01
INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:j.user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=134161461246
Max-Forwards: 7
Call-ID: badinv01.0ha0isndaksdjasdf3234nas
CSeq: 8 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;;,;,,
Contact: "Joe" ;;;;
Content-Length: 153
Content-Type: application/sdp
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.1.2.2 Content length larger than message
This is a request message with a Content Length that is larger than
the actual length of the body.
When sent over UDP (as this message ostensibly was), the receiving
element should respond with a 400 Bad Request error. If this message
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arrived over a stream-based transport such as TCP, there's not much
the receiving could do but wait for more data on the stream and close
the connection if none is forthcoming in a reasonable period of time.
Message Details : clerr
INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
Max-Forwards: 80
To: sip:j.user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=93942939o2
Contact:
Call-ID: clerr.0ha0isndaksdjweiafasdk3
CSeq: 8 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-39234-23523
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: 9999
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.155
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.155
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.1.2.3 Negative Content-Length
This request has a negative value for Content-Length.
An element receiving this message should respond with an error. This
request appeared over UDP, so the remainder of the datagram can
simply be discarded. If a request like this arrives over TCP, the
framing error is not recoverable and the connection should be closed.
The same behavior is appropriate for messages that arrive without a
numeric value in the Content-Length header field such as:
Content-Length: five
Implementors should take extra precautions if the technique they
choose for converting this ascii field into an integral form can
return a negative value. In particular, the result must not be used
as a counter or array index.
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Message Details : ncl
INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
Max-Forwards: 254
To: sip:j.user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=32394234
Call-ID: ncl.0ha0isndaksdj2193423r542w35
CSeq: 0 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.53;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Contact:
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: -999
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.53
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.53
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.1.2.4 Request scalar fields with overlarge values
This request contains several scalar header field values outside
their legal range.
o the CSeq sequence number is >2**32-1.
o the Max-Forwards value is >255.
o the Expires value is >2**32-1.
o the Contact expires parameter value is >2**32-1.
An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad
Request due to the CSeq error. If only the Max-Forwards field were
in error, the element could choose process the request as if the
field were absent. If only the expiry values were in error, the
element could treat them as if they contained the default values for
expiration (3600 in this case).
Other scalar request fields that may contain aberrant values include,
but are not limited to, the Contact q value, the Timestamp value,
and the Via ttl parameter.
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Message Details : scalar02
REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host129.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK342sdfoi3
To:
From: ;tag=239232jh3
CSeq: 36893488147419103232 REGISTER
Call-ID: scalar02.23o0pd9vanlq3wnrlnewofjas9ui32
Max-Forwards: 300
Expires: 10
Contact:
;expires=280297596632815
Content-Length: 0
3.1.2.5 Response scalar fields with overlarge values
This response contains several scalar header field values outside
their legal range.
o the CSeq sequence number is >2**32-1.
o The Retry-After field is unreasonably large (note that RFC 3261
does not define a legal range for this field).
o The Warning field has a warning-value with more than 3 digits
An element receiving this response will simply discard it.
Message Details : scalarlg
SIP/2.0 503 Service Unavailable
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host129.example.com
;branch=z9hG4bKzzxdiwo34sw
;received=192.0.2.129
To:
From: ;tag=2easdjfejw
CSeq: 9292394834772304023312 OPTIONS
Call-ID: scalarlg.noase0of0234hn2qofoaf0232aewf2394r
Retry-After: 949302838503028349304023988
Warning: 1812 overture "In Progress"
Content-Length: 0
3.1.2.6 Unterminated quoted string in display-name
This is a request with an unterminated quote in the display name of
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the To field. An element receiving this request should return an 400
Bad Request error.
An element could attempt to infer a terminating quote and accept the
message. Such an element needs to take care that it makes a
reasonable inference when it encounters
To: "Mr J. User
Message Details : quotbal
INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
To: "Mr. J. User
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=93334
Max-Forwards: 10
Call-ID: quotbal.aksdj
Contact:
CSeq: 8 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.59:5050;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: 153
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.1.2.7 <> enclosing Request-URI
This INVITE request is invalid because the Request-URI has been
enclosed within in "<>".
It is reasonable to always reject a request with this error with a
400 Bad Request. Elements attempting to be liberal with what they
accept may choose to ignore the brackets. If the element forwards
the request, it must not include the brackets in the messages it
sends.
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Message Details : ltgtruri
INVITE SIP/2.0
To: sip:user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=39291
Max-Forwards: 23
Call-ID: ltgtruri.1@192.0.2.5
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.5
Contact:
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: 160
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5
t=3149328700 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.1.2.8 Malformed SIP Request-URI (embedded LWS)
This INVITE has illegal LWS within the Request-URI.
An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad
Request.
An element could attempt to ignore the embedded LWS for those schemes
(like sip) where that would not introduce ambiguity.
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Message Details : lwsruri
INVITE sip:user@example.com; lr SIP/2.0
To: sip:user@example.com;tag=3xfe-9921883-z9f
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=231413434
Max-Forwards: 5
Call-ID: lwsruri.asdfasdoeoi2323-asdfwrn23-asd834rk423
CSeq: 2130706432 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw2395
Contact:
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: 160
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
t=3149328700 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.1.2.9 Multiple SP separating Request-Line elements
This INVITE has illegal multiple SP characters between elements of
the start line.
It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed. An element
that is liberal in what it accepts may ignore these extra SP
characters while processing the request. If the element forwards the
request, it must not include these extra SP characters in the
messages it sends.
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Message Details : lwsstart
INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
Max-Forwards: 8
To: sip:user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=8814
Call-ID: lwsstart.dfknq234oi243099adsdfnawe3@example.com
CSeq: 1893884 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw3923
Contact:
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: 151
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.1.2.10 SP characters at end of Request-Line
This OPTIONS request contains SP characters between the SIP-Version
field and the CRLF terminating the Request-Line.
It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed. An element
that is liberal in what it accepts may ignore these extra SP
characters while processing the request. If the element forwards the
request, it must not include these extra SP characters in the
messages it sends.
Message Details : trws
OPTIONS sip:remote-target@example.com SIP/2.02020
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host1.examle.com;branch=z9hG4bK299342093
To:
From: ;tag=329429089
Call-ID: trws.oicu34958239neffasdhr2345r
Accept: application/sdp
CSeq: 238923 OPTIONS
Max-Forwards: 70
Content-Length: 0
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3.1.2.11 Escaped headers in SIP Request-URI
This INVITE is malformed as the SIP Request-URI contains escaped
headers.
It is acceptable for an element to reject this request with a 400 Bad
Request. An element could choose to be liberal in what it accepts
and ignore the escaped headers. If the element is a proxy, the
escaped headers must not appear in the Request-URI of forwarded
request (and most certainly must not be translated into the actual
header of the forwarded request).
Message Details : escruri
INVITE sip:user@example.com?Route=%3Csip:example.com%3E SIP/2.0
To: sip:user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=341518
Max-Forwards: 7
Contact:
Call-ID: escruri.23940-asdfhj-aje3br-234q098w-fawerh2q-h4n5
CSeq: 149209342 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host-of-the-hour.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: 151
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.1.2.12 Invalid timezone in Date header field
This INVITE is invalid as it contains a non GMT time zone in the SIP
Date header field.
It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed (though an
element shouldn't do that unless the contents of the Date header
field were actually important to its processing). An element wishing
to be liberal in what it accepts could ignore this value altogether
if it wasn't going to use the Date header field anyhow. Otherwise,
it could attempt to interpret this date and adjust it to GMT.
RFC 3261 explicitly defines the only acceptable timezone designation
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as "GMT". "UT", while synonymous with GMT per [RFC2822], is not
valid. "UTC" and "UCT" are also invalid.
Message Details : baddate
INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=2234923
Max-Forwards: 70
Call-ID: baddate.239423mnsadf3j23lj42--sedfnm234
CSeq: 1392934 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Date: Fri, 01 Jan 2010 16:00:00 EST
Contact:
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: 151
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.1.2.13 Failure to enclose name-addr URI in <>
This REGISTER request is malformed. The SIP URI contained in the
Contact Header field has an escaped header, so the field must be in
name-addr form (which implies the URI must be enclosed in <>).
It is reasonable for an element receiving this request to respond
with a 400 Bad Request. An element choosing to be liberal in what it
accepts could infer the angle brackets since there is no ambiguity in
this example. In general, that won't be possible.
Message Details : regbadct
REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:user@example.com
From: sip:user@example.com;tag=998332
Max-Forwards: 70
Call-ID: regbadct.k345asrl3fdbv@10.0.0.1
CSeq: 1 REGISTER
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 135.180.130.133:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Contact: sip:user@example.com?Route=%3Csip:sip.example.com%3E
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l: 0
3.1.2.14 Spaces within addr-spec
This request is malformed since the addr-spec in the To header field
contains spaces. Parsers receiving this request must not break. It
is reasonable to reject this request with a 400 Bad Request response.
Elements attempting to be liberal may ignore the spaces.
Message Details : badaspec
OPTIONS sip:user@example.org SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host4.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdju43234
Max-Forwards: 70
From: "Bell, Alexander" ;tag=433423
To: "Watson, Thomas" < sip:t.watson@example.org >
Call-ID: badaspec.sdf0234n2nds0a099u23h3hnnw009cdkne3
Accept: application/sdp
CSeq: 3923239 OPTIONS
l: 0
3.1.2.15 Non-token characters in display-name
This OPTIONS request is malformed since the display names in the To
and From header fields contain non-token characters but are unquoted.
It is reasonable to always reject this kind of error with a 400 Bad
Request response.
An element may attempt to be liberal in what it receives and infer
the missing quotes. If this element were a proxy, it must not
propagate the error into the request it forwards. As a consequence,
if the fields are covered by a signature, there's not much point in
trying to be liberal - the message should be simply rejected.
Message Details : baddn
OPTIONS sip:t.watson@example.org SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP c.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Max-Forwards: 70
From: Bell, Alexander ;tag=43
To: Watson, Thomas
Call-ID: baddn.31415@c.example.com
Accept: application/sdp
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CSeq: 3923239 OPTIONS
l: 0
3.1.2.16 Unknown protocol version
To an element implementing [RFC3261], this request is malformed due
to its high version number.
The element should respond to the request with a 505 Version Not
Supported error.
Message Details : badvers
OPTIONS sip:t.watson@example.org SIP/7.0
Via: SIP/7.0/UDP c.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Max-Forwards: 70
From: A. Bell ;tag=qweoiqpe
To: T. Watson
Call-ID: badvers.31417@c.example.com
CSeq: 1 OPTIONS
l: 0
3.1.2.17 Start line and CSeq method mismatch
This request has mismatching values for the method in the start line
and the CSeq header field. Any element receiving this request will
respond with a 400 Bad Request.
Message Details : mismatch01
OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:j.user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=34525
Max-Forwards: 6
Call-ID: mismatch01.dj0234sxdfl3
CSeq: 8 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
l: 0
3.1.2.18 Unknown Method with CSeq method mismatch
This message has an unknown method in the start line, and a CSeq
method tag which does not match.
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Any element receiving this response should respond with a 501 Not
Implemented. A 400 Bad Request is also acceptable, but choosing a
501 (particularly at proxies) has better future-proof
characteristics.
Message Details : mismatch02
NEWMETHOD sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:j.user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=34525
Max-Forwards: 6
Call-ID: mismatch02.dj0234sxdfl3
CSeq: 8 INVITE
Contact:
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.net;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Content-Type: application/sdp
l: 139
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.1.2.19 Overlarge response code
This response has a response code larger than 699. An element
receiving this response should simply drop it.
Message Details : bigcode
SIP/2.0 4294967301 better not break the receiver
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.105;branch=z9hG4bK2398ndaoe
Call-ID: bigcode.asdof3uj203asdnf3429uasdhfas3ehjasdfas9i
CSeq: 353494 INVITE
From: ;tag=39ansfi3
To: ;tag=902jndnke3
Content-Length: 0
Contact:
3.2 Transaction layer semantics
This section contains tests that exercise an implementation's parser
and transaction layer logic.
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3.2.1 Missing transaction identifier
This request indicates support for RFC 3261-style transaction
identifiers by providing the z9hG4bK prefix to the branch parameter,
but it provides no identifier. A parser must not break when
receiving this message. An element receiving this request could
reject the request with a 400 Response (preferably statelessly, as
other requests from the source are likely to also have a malformed
branch parameter), or it could fall back to the RFC 2543 style
transaction identifier.
Message Details : badbranch
OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.org;tag=33242
Max-Forwards: 3
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1;branch=z9hG4bK
Accept: application/sdp
Call-ID: badbranch.sadonfo23i420jv0as0derf3j3n
CSeq: 8 OPTIONS
l: 0
3.3 Application layer semantics
This section contains tests that exercise an implementation's parser
and application layer logic.
3.3.1 Missing Required Header Fields
This request contains no Call-ID, From, or To header fields.
An element receiving this message must not break because of the
missing information. Ideally, it will respond with a 400 Bad Request
error.
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Message Details : insuf
INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
CSeq: 193942 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.95;branch=z9hG4bKkdj.insuf
Content-Type: application/sdp
l: 153
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.95
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.95
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.3.2 Request-URI with unknown scheme
This OPTIONS contains an unknown URI scheme in the Request-URI. A
parser must accept this as a well-formed SIP request.
An element receiving this request will reject it with a 416
Unsupported URI Scheme response.
Some early implementations attempt to look at the contents of the To
header field to determine how to route this kind of request. That is
an error. Despite the fact that the To header field and the Request
URI frequently look alike in simplistic first-hop messages, the To
header field contains no routing information.
Message Details : unkscm
OPTIONS nobodyKnowsThisScheme:totallyopaquecontent SIP/2.0
To: sip:user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=384
Max-Forwards: 3
Call-ID: unkscm.nasdfasser0q239nwsdfasdkl34
CSeq: 3923423 OPTIONS
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host9.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234
Content-Length: 0
3.3.3 Request-URI with known but atypical scheme
This OPTIONS contains an Request-URI with an IANA registered scheme
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that does not commonly appear Request-URIs of SIP requests. A parser
must accept this as a well-formed SIP request.
If an element will never accept this scheme as meaningful in a
request-URI, it is appropriate to treat it as unknown and return a
416 Unsupported URI Scheme response. If the element might accept
some URIs with this scheme, then a 404 Not Found is appropriate for
those URIs it doesn't accept.
Message Details : novelsc
OPTIONS soap.beep://192.0.2.103:3002 SIP/2.0
To: sip:user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=384
Max-Forwards: 3
Call-ID: novelsc.asdfasser0q239nwsdfasdkl34
CSeq: 3923423 OPTIONS
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host9.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234
Content-Length: 0
3.3.4 Unknown URI schemes in header fields
This message contains registered schemes in the To, From and Contact
header fields of a request. The message is syntactically valid.
Parsers must not fail when receiving this message.
Proxies should treat this message as they would any other request for
this URI. A registrar would reject this request with a 400 Bad
Request response since the To: header field is required to contain a
SIP or SIPS URI as an AOR.
Message Details : unksm2
REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
To: isbn:2983792873
From: ;tag=3234233
Call-ID: unksm2.daksdj@hyphenated-host.example.com
CSeq: 234902 REGISTER
Max-Forwards: 70
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.21:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Contact:
l: 0
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3.3.5 Proxy-Require and Require
This request tests proper implementation of SIP's Proxy-Require and
Require extension mechanisms.
Any element receiving this request will respond with a 420 Bad
Extension response containing an Unsupported header field listing
these features from either the Require or Proxy-Require header field
depending on the role in which the element is responding.
Message Details : bext01
OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:j_user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=242etr
Max-Forwards: 6
Call-ID: bext01.0ha0isndaksdj
Require: nothingSupportsThis, nothingSupportsThisEither
Proxy-Require: noProxiesSupportThis, norDoAnyProxiesSupportThis
CSeq: 8 OPTIONS
Via: SIP/2.0/TLS fold-and-staple.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Content-Length: 0
3.3.6 Unknown Content-Type
This INVITE request contains a body of unknown type. It is
syntactically valid. A parser must not fail when receiving it.
A proxy receiving this request would process it just like any other
INVITE. An endpoint receiving this request would reject it with a
415 Unsupported Media Type error.
Message Details : invut
INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
Contact:
To: sip:j.user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=8392034
Max-Forwards: 70
Call-ID: invut.0ha0isndaksdjadsfij34n23d
CSeq: 235448 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP somehost.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Content-Type: application/unknownformat
Content-Length: 40
3.3.7 Unknown authorization scheme
This REGISTER request contains an Authorization header field with an
unknown scheme. The request is well-formed. A parser must not fail
when receiving it.
A proxy will treat this request as any other REGISTER. If it
forwards the request, it will include this Authorization header field
unmodified in the forwarded messages.
A registrar that does not care about challenge-response
authentication will simply ignore the Authorization header field,
processing this registration as if the field were not present. A
registrar that does care about challenge-response authentication will
reject this request with a 401, issuing a new challenge with a scheme
it understands.
Endpoints choosing not to act as registrars will simply reject the
request. A 405 Method Not Allowed is appropriate.
Message Details : regaut01
REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:j.user@example.com
From: sip:j.user@example.com;tag=87321hj23128
Max-Forwards: 8
Call-ID: regaut01.0ha0isndaksdj
CSeq: 9338 REGISTER
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.0.2.253;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Authorization: NoOneKnowsThisScheme opaque-data=here
Content-Length:0
3.3.8 Multiple values in single value required fields
The message contains a request with multiple Call-ID, To, From,
Max-Forwards and CSeq values. An element receiving this request must
not break.
An element receiving this request would respond with a 400 Bad
Request error.
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Message Details : multi01
INVITE sip:user@company.com SIP/2.0
Contact:
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.25;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Max-Forwards: 70
CSeq: 5 INVITE
Call-ID: multi01.98asdh@192.0.2.1
CSeq: 59 INVITE
Call-ID: multi01.98asdh@192.0.2.2
From: sip:caller@example.com;tag=3413415
To: sip:user@example.com
To: sip:other@example.net
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=2923420123
Content-Type: application/sdp
l: 155
Contact:
Max-Forwards: 5
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.25
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.25
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.3.9 Multiple Content-Length values
Multiple conflicting Content-Length header field values appear in
this request.
From a framing perspective, this situation is equivalent to an
invalid Content-Length value (or no value at all).
An element receiving this message should respond with an error. This
request appeared over UDP, so the remainder of the datagram can
simply be discarded. If a request like this arrives over TCP, the
framing error is not recoverable and the connection should be closed.
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Message Details : mcl01
OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.net;branch=z9hG4bK293423
To: sip:user@example.com
From: sip:other@example.net;tag=3923942
Call-ID: mcl01.fhn2323orihawfdoa3o4r52o3irsdf
CSeq: 15932 OPTIONS
Content-Length: 13
Max-Forwards: 60
Content-Length: 5
Content-Type: text/plain
There's no way to know how many octets are supposed to be here.
3.3.10 200 OK Response with broadcast Via header field value
This message is a response with a 2nd Via header field value's
sent-by containing 255.255.255.255. The message is well formed -
parsers must not fail when receiving it.
Per [RFC3261] an endpoint receiving this message should simply
discard it.
If a proxy followed normal response processing rules blindly, it
would forward this response to the broadcast address. To protect
against this being used as an avenue of attack, proxies should drop
such responses.
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Message Details : bcast
SIP/2.0 200 OK
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.198;branch=z9hG4bK1324923
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 255.255.255.255;branch=z9hG4bK1saber23
Call-ID: bcast.0384840201234ksdfak3j2erwedfsASdf
CSeq: 35 INVITE
From: sip:user@example.com;tag=11141343
To: sip:user@example.edu;tag=2229
Content-Length: 155
Content-Type: application/sdp
Contact:
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.198
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.198
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.3.11 Max-Forwards of zero
This is a legal SIP request with the Max-Forwards header field value
set to zero.
A proxy should not forward the request and respond 483 (Too Many
Hops). An endpoint should process the request as if the Max-Forwards
field value were still positive.
Message Details : zeromf
OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:user@example.com
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=3ghsd41
Call-ID: zeromf.jfasdlfnm2o2l43r5u0asdfas
CSeq: 39234321 OPTIONS
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw2349i
Max-Forwards: 0
Content-Length: 0
3.3.12 REGISTER with a contact header parameter
This register request contains a contact where the 'unknownparam'
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parameter must be interpreted as being a contact-param and not a
url-param.
This REGISTER should succeed. The response must not include
"unknownparam" as a url-parameter for this binding. Likewise,
"unknownparam" must not appear as a url-parameter in any binding
during subsequent fetches.
Behavior is the same, of course, for any known contact-param
parameter names.
Message Details : cparam01
REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP saturn.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Max-Forwards: 70
From: sip:watson@example.com;tag=DkfVgjkrtMwaerKKpe
To: sip:watson@example.com
Call-ID: cparam01.70710@saturn.example.com
CSeq: 2 REGISTER
Contact: sip:+19725552222@gw1.example.net;unknownparam
l: 0
3.3.13 REGISTER with a url parameter
This register request contains a contact where the URI has an unknown
parameter.
The register should succeed and a subsequent retrieval of the
registration must include "unknownparam" as a url-parameter.
Behavior is the same, of course, for any known url-parameter names.
Message Details : cparam02
REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP saturn.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Max-Forwards: 70
From: sip:watson@example.com;tag=838293
To: sip:watson@example.com
Call-ID: cparam02.70710@saturn.example.com
CSeq: 3 REGISTER
Contact:
l: 0
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3.3.14 REGISTER with a url escaped header
This register request contains a contact where the URI has an escaped
header.
The register should succeed and a subsequent retrieval of the
registration must include the escaped Route header in the contact URI
for this binding.
Message Details : regescrt
REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:user@example.com
From: sip:user@example.com;tag=8
Max-Forwards: 70
Call-ID: regescrt.k345asrl3fdbv@192.0.2.1
CSeq: 14398234 REGISTER
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
M:
L:0
3.3.15 Unacceptable Accept offering
This request indicates the response must contain a body in an unknown
type. In particular, since the Accept header field does not contain
application/sdp, the response may not contain an SDP body. The
recipient of this request could respond with a 406 Not Acceptable
with a Warning/399 indicating that a response cannot be formulated in
the formats offered in the Accept header field. It is also
appropriate to respond with a 400 Bad Request since all SIP UAs
supporting INVITE are required to support application/sdp.
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Message Details : sdp01
INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
To: sip:j_user@example.com
Contact:
From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=234
Max-Forwards: 5
Call-ID: sdp01.ndaksdj9342dasdd
Accept: text/nobodyKnowsThis
CSeq: 8 INVITE
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
Content-Length: 151
Content-Type: application/sdp
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
3.4 Backward compatibility
3.4.1 INVITE with RFC2543 syntax
This is a legal message per RFC 2543 (and several bis versions) which
should be accepted by RFC 3261 elements which want to maintain
backwards compatibility.
o There is no branch parameter at all on the Via header field value
o There is no From tag
o There is no explicit Content-Length (The body is assumed to be all
octets in the datagram after the null-line)
o There is no Max-Forwards header field
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Message Details : inv2543
INVITE sip:UserB@example.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP iftgw.example.com
From:
Record-Route:
To: sip:+16505552222@ss1.example.net;user=phone
Call-ID: inv2543.1717@ift.client.example.com
CSeq: 56 INVITE
Content-Type: application/sdp
v=0
o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5
t=0 0
m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0
4. Security Considerations
This document presents NON NORMATIVE examples of SIP session
establishment. The security considerations in [RFC3261] apply.
Parsers must carefully consider edge conditions and malicious input
as part of their design. Attacks on many Internet systems use
crafted input to cause implementations to behave in undesirable ways.
Many of the messages in this draft are designed to stress a parser
implementation at points traditionally used for such attacks. This
document does not, however, attempt to be comprehensive. It should
be considered a seed to stimulate thinking and planning, not simply a
set of tests to be passed.
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
6. Acknowledgments
The final detailed review of this document was performed by: Diego
Besprosvan, Vijay Gurbani, Shashi Kumar, Derek MacDonald, Gautham
Narasimhan, Nils Ohlmeier, Bob Penfield, Reinaldo Penno, Marc
Petit-Huguenin, Richard Sugarman, and Venkatesh Venkataramanan.
Earlier versions of this document were reviewed by: Aseem Agarwal,
Rafi Assadi, Gonzalo Camarillo, Ben Campbell, Cullen Jennings, Vijay
Gurbani, Sunitha Kumar, Rohan Mahy, Jon Peterson, Marc
Petit-Huguenin, Vidhi Rastogi, Adam Roach, Bodgey Yin Shaohua and Tom
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Taylor.
Thanks to Cullen Jennings for contributing the S/MIME message.
Thanks to Neil Deason for contributing several messages and Kundan
Singh for performing parser validation of messages in earlier
versions.
The following individuals provided significant comments during the
early phases of the development of this document: Jean-Francois Mule,
Hemant Agrawal, Henry Sinnreich, David Devanatham, Joe Pizzimenti,
Matt Cannon, John Hearty, the whole MCI IPOP Design team, Scott
Orton, Greg Osterhout, Pat Sollee, Doug Weisenberg, Danny Mistry,
Steve McKinnon, and Denise Ingram, Denise Caballero, Tom Redman, Ilya
Slain, Pat Sollee, John Truetken, and others from MCI, 3Com, Cisco,
Lucent and Nortel.
7 Informative References
[RFC2396] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R. and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 2396,
August 1998.
[RFC2822] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822, April
2001.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M. and E. Schooler,
"SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.
[RFC3264] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264, June
2002.
Authors' Addresses
Robert J. Sparks (editor)
Estacado Systems
EMail: RjS@estacado.net
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Alan Hawrylyshen
Jasomi Networks
2033 Gateway Place
Suite 500
San Jose, CA 95110
EMail: alan@jasomi.com
Alan Johnston
MCI
100 South 4th Street
St. Louis, MO 63102
EMail: alan.johnston@mci.com
Jonathan Rosenberg
Cisco Systems
600 Lanidex Plaza
Parsippany, NJ 07052
Phone: +1 973 952 5000
EMail: jdrosen@cisco.com
URI: http://www.jdrosen.net
Henning Schulzrinne
Columbia University
Department of Computer Science
450 Computer Science Building
New York, NY 10027
US
Phone: +1 212 939 7042
EMail: hgs@cs.columbia.edu
URI: http://www.cs.columbia.edu
Appendix A. Bit-exact archive of each test message
The following text block is an encoded, gzip compressed TAR archive
of files that represent each of the example messages discussed in
Section 3.
To recover the compressed archive file intact, the text of this
document may be passed as input to the following Perl script (the
output should be redirected to a file or piped to "tar -xzvf -").
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#!/usr/bin/perl
use strict;
my $bdata = "";
use MIME::Base64;
while(<>) {
if (/-- BEGIN MESSAGE ARCHIVE --/ .. /-- END MESSAGE ARCHIVE --/) {
if ( m/^\s*[^\s]+\s*$/) {
$bdata = $bdata . $_;
}
}
}
print decode_base64($bdata);
Figure 58
Alternatively, the base-64 encoded block can be edited by hand to
remove document structure lines and fed as input to any base-64
decoding utility.
A.1 Encoded Reference Messages
-- BEGIN MESSAGE ARCHIVE --
H4sIAAAAAAACA+xd23LbSHqei1RSUZXeAVYt1zO2QDW6GyfK9Ehja2a0Poxj
yZ7M7qY8TaJBggQBCg2KllNxkr1IVW7yAsllqnK7uUtqq5JX8LxBbvYiV3mF
dAM8gABIQrZ48Bg9Q5MiGodu9vf1f+q/G8QirE+bVYuEn62oAF40jKN3XVNn
3kVREfxM4V+pSMGqyuspKlDBZxL4bA1lwEISSNJnQYf1SdBl8+otOz5qy+T9
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BcHYtJM5B6pqNfFKn8dIgwbixCk2o1EIkIENDCBQ+ITPJ3+bdFEH0mBILZsd
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-- END MESSAGE ARCHIVE --
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