Terminology for Security Assessment
draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-03

Abstract

This memo documents terminology used in the documents produced by SACM (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring).

Status of This Memo

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Table of Contents

• 1. Introduction
• 2. Terms and Definitions
• 2.1. Pre-defined Terms
• 2.2. New Terms and Definitions
• 2.3. Requirements Language
• 3. IANA Considerations
• 4. Security Considerations
• 5. Acknowledgements
• 6. Change Log
• 6.1. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02-
• 6.2. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02-
• 6.3. ietf-sacm-terminology-02- to -03-
• 7. References
• 7.1. Normative References
• 7.2. Informative References
• Authors' Addresses

1. Introduction

Our goal with this document is to improve our agreement on the terminology used in documents produced by the IETF Working Group for Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring. Agreeing on terminology should help reach consensus on which problems we're trying to solve, and propose solutions and decide which ones to use.

This document is expected to be a temporary work product, and will probably be incorporated into the architecture or other document.

2. Terms and Definitions

This section describes terms that have been defined by other RFC's and defines new ones. The predefined terms will reference the RFC and where appropriate will be annotated with the specific context by which the term is used in SACM.

2.1. Pre-defined Terms

Assessment

• Defined in [RFC5209] as "the process of collecting posture for a set of capabilities on the endpoint (e.g., host-based firewall) such that the appropriate validators may evaluate the posture against compliance policy."
• Within this document the use of the term is expanded to support other uses of collected posture (e.g. reporting, network enforcement, vulnerability detection, license management). The phrase "set of capabilities on the endpoint" includes: hardware and software installed on the endpoint."

Asset

• Defined in [RFC4949] as "a system resource that is (a) required to be protected by an information system's security policy, (b) intended to be protected by a countermeasure, or (c) required for a system's mission.

Attribute

• Defined in [RFC5209] as "data element including any requisite meta-data describing an observed, expected, or the operational status of an endpoint feature (e.g., anti-virus software is currently in use)."

Endpoint

• Defined in [RFC5209] as "any computing device that can be connected to a network. Such devices normally are associated with a particular link layer address before joining the network and potentially an IP address once on the network. This includes: laptops, desktops, servers, cell phones, or any device that may have an IP address."
• To further clarify the [RFC5209] definition, an endpoint is any physical or virtual device that may have a network address. Note that, network infrastructure devices (e.g. switches, routers, firewalls), which fit the definition, are also considered to be endpoints within this document.
• Based on the previous definition of an asset, an endpoint is a type of asset.

Exposure

• An endpoint misconfiguration or software flaw that allows an attacker a means to compromise an endpoint or network. (derived from CVE exposure definition)
• From RFC4949: (I) A type of threat action whereby sensitive data is directly released to an unauthorized entity. (See: unauthorized disclosure.) Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes: - "Deliberate Exposure": Intentional release of sensitive data to an unauthorized entity. - "Scavenging": Searching through data residue in a system to gain unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. - "Human error": /exposure/ Human action or inaction that unintentionally results in an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. (Compare: corruption, incapacitation.) - "Hardware or software error": /exposure/ System failure that unintentionally results in an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. (Compare: corruption, incapacitation.)

Information Model

• An information model is an abstract representation of data, their properties, relationships between data and the operations that can be performed on the data. While there is some overlap with a data model, [RFC3444] distinguished an information model as being protocol and implementation neutral whereas a data model would provide such details.

Misconfiguration

• A misconfiguration is a configuration setting that violates organizational security policies, introduces a possible security weakness in a system, or permits or causes unintended behavior that may impact the security posture of a system. (from NIST IR 7670) The misalignment of a unit of endpoint configuration posture relative to organizational expectations that is subject to exploitation or misuse.

Posture

• Defined in [RFC5209] as "configuration and/or status of hardware or software on an endpoint as it pertains to an organization's security policy."
• This term is used within the scope of this document to represent the state information that is collected from an endpoint (e.g. software/hardware inventory, configuration settings).

Posture Attributes

• Defined in [RFC5209] as "attributes describing the configuration or status (posture) of a feature of the endpoint. For example, a Posture Attribute might describe the version of the operating system installed on the system."
• Within this document this term represents a specific assertion about endpoint state (e.g. configuration setting, installed software, hardware). The phrase "features of the endpoint" refers to installed software or software components.

Remediation

• A remediation is defined as a security-related set of actions that results in a change to a computer's state and may consist of changes motivated by the need to enforce organizational security policies, address discovered vulnerabilities, or correct misconfigurations. (from NIST IR 7670)

System Resource

• Defined in [RFC4949] as "data contained in an information system; or a service provided by a system; or a system capacity, such as processing power or communication bandwidth; or an item of system equipment (i.e., hardware, firmware, software, or documentation); or a facility that houses system operations and equipment.

Vulnerability

• A vulnerability is a state of configuration or defect in a system which allows an unintended and unauthorized party to violate the security or policies of the system.
• A weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that is subject to exploitation or misuse. This includes flaws in software and processes, and misconfiguration of hardware or software. (derived from NIST definitions)
• From RFC4949: (I) A flaw or weakness in a system's design, implementation, or operation and management that could be exploited to violate the system's security policy. (See: harden.) Tutorial: A system can have three types of vulnerabilities: (a) vulnerabilities in design or specification; (b) vulnerabilities in implementation; and (c) vulnerabilities in operation and management. Most systems have one or more vulnerabilities, but this does not mean that the systems are too flawed to use. Not every threat results in an attack, and not every attack succeeds. Success depends on the degree of vulnerability, the strength of attacks, and the effectiveness of any countermeasures in use. If the attacks needed to exploit a vulnerability are very difficult to carry out, then the vulnerability may be tolerable. If the perceived benefit to an attacker is small, then even an easily exploited vulnerability may be tolerable. However, if the attacks are well understood and easily made, and if the vulnerable system is employed by a wide range of users, then it is likely that there will be enough motivation for someone to launch an attack.

2.2. New Terms and Definitions

This section defines terms that are not explictly defined in the IETF.

Asset characterization

• Asset characterization is the process of defining attributes that describe properties of an identified asset.

Asset Management

• The process by which assets are provisioned, updated, maintained and deprecated.

Asset Targeting

• Asset targeting is the use of asset identification and categorization information to drive human-directed, automated decision making for data collection and analysis in support of endpoint posture assessment.

Building Block

• For SACM, a building block is a unit of functionality that may apply to more than one use case and can be supported by different components of an architectural model.

Collection Task

• The process by which posture attributes or values are collected.

Collection Guidance

• [NCW] This is well defined in the Use Cases draft under 2.1.1 "Guidance". Suggest to remove it from this draft.

Evaluation Task

• The process by which posture attributes are evaluated.

Evaluation Guidance

• [NCW] This is well defined in the Use Cases draft under 2.1.1 "Guidance". Suggest to remove it from this draft.

Endpoint Target

• The endpoint of interest.

Endpoint Discovery

• The process by which an endpoint can be identified.

Evaluation Result

• The resulting value from having evaluated a set of posture attributes.

Expected Endpoint State

• The required state of an endpoint that is to be compared against.

Processing Artifact

• [NCW] This is well defined in the Use Cases draft. Suggest to remove it from this draft.

Security Automation

• The process of which security alerts can be automated through the use of different tools to monitor, evaluate and analyze endpoint and network traffic for the purposes of detecting misconfigurations, misbehaviors or threats.

software flaw

• A weakness in software that is subject to exploitation or misuse. A software flaw can be used by an attacker to gain access to a system or network, and/or materially affect the confidentiality, integrity or availability of information hosted by an endpoint or exchanged over a network. Such a flaw may allow an attacker to execute commands as another user, access data that is contrary to specified access controls, pose as another entity, or to conduct a denial of service. (derived from CVE vulnerability definition)

Vulnerability Management

• The process of mitigating the ability to exploit a vulnerability, via defect removal or protective measures such that exploitation becomes impossible or highly unlikely. (from Chris Inacio)

2.3. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

4. Security Considerations

This memo documents terminology for security automation. While it is about security, it does not affect security.

5. Acknowledgements

6. Change Log

6.1. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02-

Added simple list of terms extracted from UC draft -05. It is expected that comments will be received on this list of terms as to whether they should be kept in this document. Those that are kept will be appropriately defined or cited.

6.2. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02-

Added Vulnerability, Vulnerability Management, xposure, Misconfiguration, and Software flaw.

6.3. ietf-sacm-terminology-02- to -03-

Removed Section 2.1. Cleaned up some editing nits; broke terms into 2 sections (predefined and newly defined terms). Added some of the relevant terms per the proposed list discussed in the IETF 89 meeting.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

7.2. Informative References

Authors' Addresses