RATS Working Group H. Birkholz
Internet-Draft M. Eckel
Intended status: Standards Track Fraunhofer SIT
Expires: 27 August 2022 S. Bhandari
ThoughtSpot
E. Voit
B. Sulzen
Cisco
L. Xia
Huawei
T. Laffey
HPE
G. Fedorkow
Juniper
23 February 2022
A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote Attestation
Procedures using TPMs
draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-14
Abstract
This document defines YANG RPCs and a small number of configuration
nodes required to retrieve attestation evidence about integrity
measurements from a device, following the operational context defined
in TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification.
Complementary measurement logs are also provided by the YANG RPCs,
originating from one or more roots of trust for measurement (RTMs).
The module defined requires at least one TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0 as well
as a corresponding TPM Software Stack (TSS), or equivalent hardware
implementations that include the protected capabilities as provided
by TPMs as well as a corresponding software stack, included in the
device components of the composite device the YANG server is running
on.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 August 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures . . . 3
2.1. YANG Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1.1. 'ietf-tpm-remote-attestation' . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. 'ietf-tcg-algs' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1. Introduction
This document is based on the general terminology defined in the
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] and uses the operational context defined
in [I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest] as well as the
interaction model and information elements defined in
[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]. The currently
supported hardware security modules (HSMs) are the Trusted Platform
Modules (TPMs) [TPM1.2] and [TPM2.0] as specified by the Trusted
Computing Group (TCG). One or more TPMs embedded in the components
of a Composite Device are required in order to use the YANG module
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defined in this document. A TPM is used as a root of trust for
reporting (RTR) in order to retrieve attestation Evidence from a
composite device (_TPM Quote_ primitive operation). Additionally, it
is used as a root of trust for storage (RTS) in order to retain
shielded secrets and store system measurements using a folding hash
function (_TPM PCR Extend_ primitive operation).
Specific terms imported from [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] and used in
this document include: Attester, Composite Device, Evidence.
Specific terms imported from [TPM2.0-Key] and used in this document
include: Endorsement Key (EK), Initial Attestation Key (IAK), Local
Attestation Key (LAK).
1.1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures
One or more TPMs MUST be embedded in a Composite Device that provides
attestation evidence via the YANG module defined in this document.
The ietf-basic-remote-attestation YANG module enables a composite
device to take on the role of an Attester, in accordance with the
Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) architecture
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture], and the corresponding challenge-
response interaction model defined in the
[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models] document. A fresh nonce
with an appropriate amount of entropy [NIST-915121] MUST be supplied
by the YANG client in order to enable a proof-of-freshness with
respect to the attestation Evidence provided by the Attester running
the YANG datastore. Further, this nonce is used to prevent replay
attacks. The method for communicating the relationship of each
individual TPM to specific measured component within the Composite
Device is out of the scope of this document.
2.1. YANG Modules
In this section the several YANG modules are defined.
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2.1.1. 'ietf-tpm-remote-attestation'
This YANG module imports modules from [RFC6991], [RFC8348],
[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore], and ietf-tcg-algs.yang Section 2.1.2.3.
Additionally references are made to [RFC8032], [RFC8017], [RFC6933],
[TPM1.2-Commands], [TPM2.0-Arch], [TPM2.0-Structures], [TPM2.0-Key],
[TPM1.2-Structures], [bios-log], [ima-log], [BIOS-Log-Event-Type] and
[netequip-boot-log].
2.1.1.1. Features
This module supports the following features:
* 'TPMs': Indicates that multiple TPMs on the device can support
remote attestation. This feature is applicable in cases where
multiple line cards are present, each with its own TPM.
* 'bios': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of BIOS/
UEFI event logs. [bios-log]
* 'ima': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of event
logs from the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA).
[ima-log]
* 'netequip_boot': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval
of netequip boot event logs. [netequip-boot-log]
2.1.1.2. Identities
This module supports the following types of attestation event logs:
'bios', 'ima', and 'netequip_boot'.
2.1.1.3. Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs)
In the following, RPCs for both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 attestation
procedures are defined.
2.1.1.3.1. 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation'
This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (_TPM Quote_
operation) from a TPM 1.2 compliant cryptoprocessor. Where the
feature 'TPMs' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not
provided, all TPM 1.2 compliant cryptoprocessors will respond. A
YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows:
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+---x tpm12-challenge-response-attestation {taa:TPM12}?
+---w input
| +---w tpm12-attestation-challenge
| +---w pcr-index* pcr
| +---w nonce-value binary
| +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref {tpm:TPMs}?
+--ro output
+--ro tpm12-attestation-response* []
+--ro certificate-name certificate-name-ref
+--ro up-time? uint32
+--ro TPM_QUOTE2? binary
2.1.1.3.2. 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation'
This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (_TPM Quote_
operation) from a TPM 2.0 compliant cryptoprocessor. Where the
feature 'TPMs' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not
provided, all TPM 2.0 compliant cryptoprocessors will respond. A
YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows:
+---x tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {taa:TPM20}?
+---w input
| +---w tpm20-attestation-challenge
| +---w nonce-value binary
| +---w tpm20-pcr-selection* []
| | +---w TPM20-hash-algo? identityref
| | +---w pcr-index* tpm:pcr
| +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref {tpm:TPMs}?
+--ro output
+--ro tpm20-attestation-response* []
+--ro certificate-name certificate-name-ref
+--ro TPMS_QUOTE_INFO binary
+--ro quote-signature? binary
+--ro up-time? uint32
+--ro unsigned-pcr-values* []
+--ro TPM20-hash-algo? identityref
+--ro pcr-values* [pcr-index]
+--ro pcr-index pcr
+--ro pcr-value? binary
An example of an RPC challenge requesting PCRs 0-7 from a SHA-256
bank could look like the following:
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xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation">
(identifier of a TPM signature key with which the Verifier is
supposed to sign the attestation data)
0xe041307208d9f78f5b1bbecd19e2d152ad49de2fc5a7d8dbf769f6b8ffdeab9
TPM_ALG_SHA256
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
A successful response could be formatted as follows:
(instance of Certificate name in the Keystore)
(raw attestation data, i.e. the TPM quote; this includes
a composite digest of requested PCRs, the nonce,
and TPM 2.0 time information.)
(signature over attestation-data using the TPM key
identified by sig-key-id)
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2.1.1.4. 'log-retrieval'
This RPC allows a Verifier to acquire the evidence which was extended
into specific TPM PCRs. A YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as
follows:
+---x log-retrieval
+---w input
| +---w log-selector* []
| | +---w name* string
| | +---w (index-type)?
| | | +--:(last-entry)
| | | | +---w last-entry-value? binary
| | | +--:(index)
| | | | +---w last-index-number? uint64
| | | +--:(timestamp)
| | | +---w timestamp? yang:date-and-time
| | +---w log-entry-quantity? uint16
| +---w log-type identityref
+--ro output
+--ro system-event-logs
+--ro node-data* []
+--ro name? string
+--ro up-time? uint32
+--ro log-result
+--ro (attested_event_log_type)
+--:(bios) {bios}?
| +--ro bios-event-logs
| +--ro bios-event-entry* [event-number]
| +--ro event-number uint32
| +--ro event-type? uint32
| +--ro pcr-index? pcr
| +--ro digest-list* []
| | +--ro hash-algo? identityref
| | +--ro digest* binary
| +--ro event-size? uint32
| +--ro event-data* uint8
+--:(ima) {ima}?
| +--ro ima-event-logs
| +--ro ima-event-entry* [event-number]
| +--ro event-number uint64
| +--ro ima-template? string
| +--ro filename-hint? string
| +--ro filedata-hash? binary
| +--ro filedata-hash-algorithm? string
| +--ro template-hash-algorithm? string
| +--ro template-hash? binary
| +--ro pcr-index? pcr
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| +--ro signature? binary
+--:(netequip_boot) {netequip_boot}?
+--ro boot-event-logs
+--ro boot-event-entry* [event-number]
+--ro event-number uint64
+--ro ima-template? string
+--ro filename-hint? string
+--ro filedata-hash? binary
+--ro filedata-hash-algorithm? string
+--ro template-hash-algorithm? string
+--ro template-hash? binary
+--ro pcr-index? pcr
+--ro signature? binary
2.1.1.5. Data Nodes
This section provides a high level description of the data nodes
containing the configuration and operational objects with the YANG
model. For more details, please see the YANG model itself in
Figure 1.
Container 'rats-support-structures': This houses the set of
information relating to a device's TPM(s).
Container 'tpms': Provides configuration and operational details for
each supported TPM, including the tpm-firmware-version, PCRs which
may be quoted, certificates which are associated with that TPM,
and the current operational status. Of note are the certificates
which are associated with that TPM. As a certificate is
associated with a particular TPM attestation key, knowledge of the
certificate allows a specific TPM to be identified.
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+--rw tpms
+--rw tpm* [name]
+--rw name string
+--ro hardware-based? boolean
+--ro physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}?
+--ro path? string
+--ro compute-node compute-node-ref {tpm:tpms}?
+--ro manufacturer? string
+--rw firmware-version identityref
+--rw tpm12-hash-algo? identityref
+--rw tpm12-pcrs* pcr
+--rw tpm20-pcr-bank* [tpm20-hash-algo]
| +--rw tpm20-hash-algo identityref
| +--rw pcr-index* tpm:pcr
+--ro status enumeration
+--rw certificates
+--rw certificate* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw keystore-ref? leafref
+--rw type? enumeration
container 'attester-supported-algos' - Identifies which TCG hash
algorithms are available for use on the Attesting platform. This
allows an operator to limit algorithms available for use by RPCs to
just a desired set from the universe of all allowed hash algorithms
by the TCG.
+--rw attester-supported-algos
+--rw tpm12-asymmetric-signing* identityref
+--rw tpm12-hash* identityref
+--rw tpm20-asymmetric-signing* identityref
+--rw tpm20-hash* identityref
container 'compute-nodes' - When there is more than one TPM
supported, this container maintains the set of information related to
the compute node associated with a specific TPM. This allows each
specific TPM to identify to which 'compute-node' it belongs.
+--rw compute-nodes {tpm:TPMs}?
+--ro compute-node* [node-id]
+--ro node-id string
+--ro node-physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}?
+--ro node-name? string
+--ro node-location? string
2.1.1.6. YANG Module
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file "ietf-tpm-remote-attestation@2022-02-16.yang"
module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation {
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation";
prefix tpm;
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types.";
}
import ietf-hardware {
prefix hw;
reference
"RFC 8348: A YANG Data Model for Hardware Management.";
}
import ietf-keystore {
prefix ks;
reference
"draft-ietf-netconf-keystore:
A YANG Data Model for a Keystore.";
}
import ietf-tcg-algs {
prefix taa;
reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based
Remote Attestation Procedures using TPMs.";
}
organization
"IETF RATS (Remote ATtestation procedureS) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web :
WG List :
Author : Eric Voit
Author : Henk Birkholz
Author : Michael Eckel
Author : Shwetha Bhandari
Author : Bill Sulzen
Author : Liang Xia (Frank)
Author : Tom Laffey
Author : Guy Fedorkow ";
description
"A YANG module to enable a TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 based
remote attestation procedure using a challenge-response
interaction model and the TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 Quote
primitive operations.
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified
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as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2022-02-16 {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote
Attestation Procedures using TPMs";
}
/*****************/
/* Features */
/*****************/
feature tpms {
description
"The device supports the remote attestation of multiple
TPM based cryptoprocessors.";
}
feature bios {
description
"The device supports the bios logs.";
reference
"bios-log:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf
Section 9.4.5.2";
}
feature ima {
description
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"The device supports Integrity Measurement Architecture logs.
Many variants of IMA logs exist in the deployment. Each encodes
the log entry contents as the specific measurements which get
hashed into a PCRs as Evidence. See the reference below for
one example of such an encoding.";
reference
"ima-log:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p30_13feb2021.pdf Section 4.3";
}
feature netequip_boot {
description
"The device supports the netequip_boot logs.";
reference
"netequip-boot-log:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy";
}
/*****************/
/* Typedefs */
/*****************/
typedef pcr {
type uint8 {
range "0..31";
}
description
"Valid index number for a PCR. At this point 0-31 is viable.";
}
typedef compute-node-ref {
type leafref {
path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:compute-nodes"
+ "/tpm:compute-node/tpm:node-name";
}
description
"This type is used to reference a hardware node. It is quite
possible this leafref will eventually point to another YANG
module's node.";
}
typedef certificate-name-ref {
type leafref {
path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm"
+ "/tpm:certificates/tpm:certificate/tpm:name";
}
description
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"A type which allows identification of a TPM based certificate.";
}
/******************/
/* Identities */
/******************/
identity attested_event_log_type {
description
"Base identity allowing categorization of the reasons why an
attested measurement has been taken on an Attester.";
}
identity ima {
base attested_event_log_type;
description
"An event type recorded in IMA.";
}
identity bios {
base attested_event_log_type;
description
"An event type associated with BIOS/UEFI.";
}
identity netequip_boot {
base attested_event_log_type;
description
"An event type associated with Network Equipment Boot.";
}
/*****************/
/* Groupings */
/*****************/
grouping tpm20-hash-algo {
description
"The cryptographic algorithm used to hash the TPM2 PCRs. This
must be from the list of platform supported options.";
leaf tpm20-hash-algo {
type identityref {
base taa:hash;
}
must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:attester-supported-algos'
+ '/tpm:tpm20-hash' {
error-message "This platform does not support tpm20-hash-algo";
}
default "taa:TPM_ALG_SHA256";
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description
"The hash scheme that is used to hash a TPM1.2 PCR. This
must be one of those supported by a platform.";
}
}
grouping tpm12-hash-algo {
description
"The cryptographic algorithm used to hash the TPM1.2 PCRs.";
leaf tpm12-hash-algo {
type identityref {
base taa:hash;
}
must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:attester-supported-algos'
+ '/tpm:tpm12-hash' {
error-message "This platform does not support tpm12-hash-algo";
}
default "taa:TPM_ALG_SHA1";
description
"The hash scheme that is used to hash a TPM1.2 PCR. This
MUST be one of those supported by a platform. This assumes
that an algorithm other than SHA1 can be supported on some
TPM1.2 cryptoprocessor variant.";
}
}
grouping nonce {
description
"A random number intended to be used once to show freshness
and to allow the detection of replay attacks.";
leaf nonce-value {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"A cryptographically generated random number which should
not be predictable prior to its issuance from a random
number generation function. The random number MUST be
derived from an entropy source external to the Attester.
Note that a nonce sent into a TPM will typically be 160 or 256
binary digits long. (This is 20 or 32 bytes.) So if fewer
binary are sent, this nonce object will be padded
with leading zeros any in Quotes returned from the TPM.
Additionally if more bytes are sent, the nonce will be trimmed
to the most significant binary digits.";
}
}
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grouping tpm12-pcr-selection {
description
"A Verifier can request one or more PCR values using its
individually created Attestation Key Certificate (AC).
The corresponding selection filter is represented in this
grouping.
Requesting a PCR value that is not in scope of the AC used,
detailed exposure via error msg should be avoided.";
leaf-list pcr-index {
type pcr;
description
"The numbers/indexes of the PCRs. At the moment this is limited
to 32. In addition, any selection of PCRs MUST verify that
the set of PCRs requested are a subset the set of PCRs
exposed by in the leaf-list /tpm:rats-support-structures
/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm[name=current()]/tpm:tpm12-pcrs";
}
}
grouping tpm20-pcr-selection {
description
"A Verifier can acquire one or more PCR values, which are hashed
together in a TPM2B_DIGEST coming from the TPM2. The selection
list of desired PCRs and the Hash Algorithm is represented in
this grouping.";
list tpm20-pcr-selection {
unique "tpm20-hash-algo";
description
"Specifies the list of PCRs and Hash Algorithms that can be
returned within a TPM2B_DIGEST.";
reference
"TPM2.0-Structures:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.9.7";
uses tpm20-hash-algo;
leaf-list pcr-index {
type pcr;
must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms'
+ '/tpm:tpm[name = current()] and '
+ '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm'
+ '/tpm:tpm20-pcr-bank[pcr-index = current()]' {
error-message "Acquiring this PCR index is not supported";
}
description
"The numbers of the PCRs that which are being tracked
with a hash based on the tpm20-hash-algo. In addition,
any selection of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs
requested are a subset the set of PCR indexes exposed
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within /tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms
/tpm:tpm[name=current()]/tpm:tpm20-pcr-bank
/tpm:pcr-index";
}
}
}
grouping certificate-name-ref {
description
"Identifies a certificate in a keystore.";
leaf certificate-name {
type certificate-name-ref;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies a certificate in a keystore.";
}
}
grouping tpm-name {
description
"A unique TPM on a device.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"Unique system generated name for a TPM on a device.";
}
}
grouping tpm-name-selector {
description
"One or more TPM on a device.";
leaf-list name {
type string;
config false;
description
"Name of one or more unique TPMs on a device. If this object
exists, a selection should pull only the objects related to
these TPM(s). If it does not exist, all qualifying TPMs that
are 'hardware-based' equals true on the device are selected.";
}
}
grouping node-uptime {
description
"Uptime in seconds of the node.";
leaf up-time {
type uint32;
description
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"Uptime in seconds of this node reporting its data";
}
}
grouping tpm12-attestation {
description
"Contains an instance of TPM1.2 style signed cryptoprocessor
measurements. It is supplemented by unsigned Attester
information.";
uses node-uptime;
leaf TPM_QUOTE2 {
type binary;
description
"Result of a TPM1.2 Quote2 operation. This includes PCRs,
signatures, locality, the provided nonce and other data which
can be further parsed to appraise the Attester.";
reference
"TPM1.2-Commands:
TPM1.2 commands rev116 July 2007, Section 16.5
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads
/TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf";
}
}
grouping tpm20-attestation {
description
"Contains an instance of TPM2 style signed cryptoprocessor
measurements. It is supplemented by unsigned Attester
information.";
leaf TPMS_QUOTE_INFO {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"A hash of the latest PCR values (and the hash algorithm used)
which have been returned from a Verifier for the selected PCRs
and Hash Algorithms.";
reference
"TPM2.0-Structures:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.12.1";
}
leaf quote-signature {
type binary;
description
"Quote signature returned by TPM Quote. The signature was
generated using the key associated with the
certificate 'name'.";
reference
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"TPM2.0-Structures:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 11.2.1";
}
uses node-uptime;
list unsigned-pcr-values {
description
"PCR values in each PCR bank. This might appear redundant with
the TPM2B_DIGEST, but that digest is calculated across multiple
PCRs. Having to verify across multiple PCRs does not
necessarily make it easy for a Verifier to appraise just the
minimum set of PCR information which has changed since the last
received TPM2B_DIGEST. Put another way, why should a Verifier
reconstruct the proper value of all PCR Quotes when only a
single PCR has changed?
To help this happen, if the Attester does know specific PCR
values, the Attester can provide these individual values via
'unsigned-pcr-values'. By comparing this information to the
what has previously been validated, it is possible for a
Verifier to confirm the Attester's signature while eliminating
significant processing. There should never be a result where
an unsigned PCR value is actually that that within a quote.
If there is a difference, a signed result which has been
verified from retrieved logs is considered definitive.";
uses tpm20-hash-algo;
list pcr-values {
key "pcr-index";
description
"List of one PCR bank.";
leaf pcr-index {
type pcr;
description
"PCR index number.";
}
leaf pcr-value {
type binary;
description
"PCR value.";
reference
"TPM2.0-Structures:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.9.7";
}
}
}
}
grouping log-identifier {
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description
"Identifier for type of log to be retrieved.";
leaf log-type {
type identityref {
base attested_event_log_type;
}
mandatory true;
description
"The corresponding measurement log type identity.";
}
}
grouping boot-event-log {
description
"Defines a specific instance of an event log entry
and corresponding to the information used to
extend the PCR";
leaf event-number {
type uint32;
description
"Unique event number of this event";
}
leaf event-type {
type uint32;
description
"BIOS Log Event Type:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf Section 10.4.1";
}
leaf pcr-index {
type pcr;
description
"Defines the PCR index that this event extended";
}
list digest-list {
description
"Hash of event data";
leaf hash-algo {
type identityref {
base taa:hash;
}
description
"The hash scheme that is used to compress the event data in
each of the leaf-list digest items.";
}
leaf-list digest {
type binary;
description
"The hash of the event data using the algorithm of the
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'hash-algo' against 'event data'.";
}
}
leaf event-size {
type uint32;
description
"Size of the event data";
}
leaf-list event-data {
type uint8;
description
"The event data size determined by event-size";
}
}
grouping bios-event-log {
description
"Measurement log created by the BIOS/UEFI.";
list bios-event-entry {
key event-number;
description
"Ordered list of TCG described event log
that extended the PCRs in the order they
were logged";
uses boot-event-log;
}
}
grouping ima-event {
description
"Defines an hash log extend event for IMA measurements";
reference
"ima-log:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p30_13feb2021.pdf Section 4.3";
leaf event-number {
type uint64;
description
"Unique number for this event for sequencing";
}
leaf ima-template {
type string;
description
"Name of the template used for event logs
for e.g. ima, ima-ng, ima-sig";
}
leaf filename-hint {
type string;
description
"File that was measured";
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}
leaf filedata-hash {
type binary;
description
"Hash of filedata";
}
leaf filedata-hash-algorithm {
type string;
description
"Algorithm used for filedata-hash";
}
leaf template-hash-algorithm {
type string;
description
"Algorithm used for template-hash";
}
leaf template-hash {
type binary;
description
"hash(filedata-hash, filename-hint)";
}
leaf pcr-index {
type pcr;
description
"Defines the PCR index that this event extended";
}
leaf signature {
type binary;
description
"The file signature";
}
}
grouping ima-event-log {
description
"Measurement log created by IMA.";
list ima-event-entry {
key event-number;
description
"Ordered list of ima event logs by event-number";
uses ima-event;
}
}
grouping network-equipment-boot-event-log {
description
"Measurement log created by Network Equipment Boot. The Network
Equipment Boot format is identical to the IMA format. In
contrast to the IMA log, the Network Equipment Boot log
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includes every measurable event from an Attester, including
the boot stages of BIOS, Bootloader, etc. In essence, the scope
of events represented in this format combines the scope of BIOS
events and IMA events.";
list boot-event-entry {
key event-number;
description
"Ordered list of Network Equipment Boot event logs
by event-number, using the IMA event format.";
uses ima-event;
}
}
grouping event-logs {
description
"A selector for the log and its type.";
choice attested_event_log_type {
mandatory true;
description
"Event log type determines the event logs content.";
case bios {
if-feature "bios";
description
"BIOS/UEFI event logs";
container bios-event-logs {
description
"BIOS/UEFI event logs";
uses bios-event-log;
}
}
case ima {
if-feature "ima";
description
"IMA event logs.";
container ima-event-logs {
description
"IMA event logs.";
uses ima-event-log;
}
}
case netequip_boot {
if-feature "netequip_boot";
description
"Network Equipment Boot event logs";
container boot-event-logs {
description
"Network equipment boot event logs.";
uses network-equipment-boot-event-log;
}
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}
}
}
/**********************/
/* RPC operations */
/**********************/
rpc tpm12-challenge-response-attestation {
if-feature "taa:tpm12";
description
"This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 1.2 commands made to the
attesting device.";
input {
container tpm12-attestation-challenge {
description
"This container includes every information element defined
in the reference challenge-response interaction model for
remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on
TPM 1.2 structure definitions";
uses tpm12-pcr-selection;
uses nonce;
leaf-list certificate-name {
if-feature "tpm:tpms";
type certificate-name-ref;
must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']"
+ "/tpm:certificates/"
+ "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" {
error-message "Not an available TPM1.2 AIK certificate.";
}
description
"When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the
TPMs associated with these certificate(s).";
}
}
}
output {
list tpm12-attestation-response {
unique "certificate-name";
description
"The binary output of TPM 1.2 TPM_Quote/TPM_Quote2, including
the PCR selection and other associated attestation evidence
metadata";
uses certificate-name-ref {
description
"Certificate associated with this tpm12-attestation.";
}
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uses tpm12-attestation;
}
}
}
rpc tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {
if-feature "taa:tpm20";
description
"This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 2.0 commands of the
managed device. ComponentIndex from the hardware manager YANG
module to refer to dedicated TPM in composite devices,
e.g. smart NICs, is still a TODO.";
input {
container tpm20-attestation-challenge {
description
"This container includes every information element defined
in the reference challenge-response interaction model for
remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on
TPM 2.0 structure definitions";
uses nonce;
uses tpm20-pcr-selection;
leaf-list certificate-name {
if-feature "tpm:tpms";
type certificate-name-ref;
must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']"
+ "/tpm:certificates/"
+ "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" {
error-message "Not an available TPM2.0 AIK certificate.";
}
description
"When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the
TPMs associated with the certificates.";
}
}
}
output {
list tpm20-attestation-response {
unique "certificate-name";
description
"The binary output of TPM2b_Quote in one TPM chip of the
node which identified by node-id. An TPMS_ATTEST structure
including a length, encapsulated in a signature";
uses certificate-name-ref {
description
"Certificate associated with this tpm20-attestation.";
}
uses tpm20-attestation;
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}
}
}
rpc log-retrieval {
description
"Logs Entries are either identified via indices or via providing
the last line received. The number of lines returned can be
limited. The type of log is a choice that can be augmented.";
input {
list log-selector {
description
"Selection of log entries to be reported.";
uses tpm-name-selector;
choice index-type {
description
"Last log entry received, log index number, or timestamp.";
case last-entry {
description
"The last entry of the log already retrieved.";
leaf last-entry-value {
type binary;
description
"Content of an log event which matches 1:1 with a
unique event record contained within the log. Log
entries subsequent to this will be passed to the
requester. Note: if log entry values are not unique,
this MUST return an error.";
}
}
case index {
description
"Numeric index of the last log entry retrieved, or
zero.";
leaf last-index-number {
type uint64;
description
"The last numeric index number of a log entry.
Zero means to start at the beginning of the log.
Entries subsequent to this will be passed to the
requester.";
}
}
case timestamp {
leaf timestamp {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"Timestamp from which to start the extraction. The
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next log entry subsequent to this timestamp is to
be sent.";
}
description
"Timestamp from which to start the extraction.";
}
}
leaf log-entry-quantity {
type uint16;
description
"The number of log entries to be returned. If omitted, it
means all of them.";
}
}
uses log-identifier;
}
output {
container system-event-logs {
description
"The requested data of the measurement event logs";
list node-data {
unique "name";
description
"Event logs of a node in a distributed system
identified by the node name";
uses tpm-name;
uses node-uptime;
container log-result {
description
"The requested entries of the corresponding log.";
uses event-logs;
}
}
}
}
}
/**************************************/
/* Config & Oper accessible nodes */
/**************************************/
container rats-support-structures {
description
"The datastore definition enabling verifiers or relying
parties to discover the information necessary to use the
remote attestation RPCs appropriately.";
container compute-nodes {
if-feature "tpm:tpms";
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description
"Holds the set device subsystems/components in this composite
device that support TPM operations.";
list compute-node {
key "node-id";
config false;
min-elements 2;
description
"A component within this composite device which
supports TPM operations.";
leaf node-id {
type string;
description
"ID of the compute node, such as Board Serial Number.";
}
leaf node-physical-index {
if-feature "hw:entity-mib";
type int32 {
range "1..2147483647";
}
config false;
description
"The entPhysicalIndex for the compute node.";
reference
"RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex";
}
leaf node-name {
type string;
description
"Name of the compute node.";
}
leaf node-location {
type string;
description
"Location of the compute node, such as slot number.";
}
}
}
container tpms {
description
"Holds the set of TPMs within an Attester.";
list tpm {
key "name";
unique "path";
description
"A list of TPMs in this composite device that RATS
can be conducted with.";
uses tpm-name;
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leaf hardware-based {
type boolean;
config false;
description
"Answers the question: is this TPM is a hardware based
TPM?";
}
leaf physical-index {
if-feature "hw:entity-mib";
type int32 {
range "1..2147483647";
}
config false;
description
"The entPhysicalIndex for the TPM.";
reference
"RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex";
}
leaf path {
type string;
config false;
description
"Path to a unique TPM on a device. This can change across
reboots.";
}
leaf compute-node {
if-feature "tpm:tpms";
type compute-node-ref;
config false;
mandatory true;
description
"Indicates the compute node measured by this TPM.";
}
leaf manufacturer {
type string;
config false;
description
"TPM manufacturer name.";
}
leaf firmware-version {
type identityref {
base taa:cryptoprocessor;
}
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the cryptoprocessor API set supported. This
is automatically configured by the device and should not
be changed.";
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}
uses tpm12-hash-algo {
when "firmware-version = 'taa:tpm12'";
refine "tpm12-hash-algo" {
description
"The hash algorithm overwrites the default used for PCRs
on this TPM1.2 compliant cryptoprocessor.";
}
}
leaf-list tpm12-pcrs {
when "../firmware-version = 'taa:tpm12'";
type pcr;
description
"The PCRs which may be extracted from this TPM1.2
compliant cryptoprocessor.";
}
list tpm20-pcr-bank {
when "../firmware-version = 'taa:tpm20'";
key "tpm20-hash-algo";
description
"Specifies the list of PCRs that may be extracted for
a specific Hash Algorithm on this TPM2 compliant
cryptoprocessor. A bank is a set of PCRs which are
extended using a particular hash algorithm.";
reference
"TPM2.0-Structures:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.9.7";
leaf tpm20-hash-algo {
type identityref {
base taa:hash;
}
must '/tpm:rats-support-structures'
+ '/tpm:attester-supported-algos'
+ '/tpm:tpm20-hash' {
error-message
"This platform does not support tpm20-hash-algo";
}
description
"The hash scheme actively being used to hash a
one or more TPM2.0 PCRs.";
}
leaf-list pcr-index {
type tpm:pcr;
description
"Defines what TPM2 PCRs are available to be extracted.";
}
}
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leaf status {
type enumeration {
enum operational {
value 0;
description
"The TPM currently is currently running normally and
is ready to accept and process TPM quotes.";
reference
"TPM2.0-Arch:
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-1-Architecture-01.07-2014-03-13.pdf
Section 12";
}
enum non-operational {
value 1;
description
"TPM is in a state such as startup or shutdown which
precludes the processing of TPM quotes.";
}
}
config false;
mandatory true;
description
"TPM chip self-test status.";
}
container certificates {
description
"The TPM's certificates, including EK certificates
and AK certificates.";
list certificate {
key "name";
description
"Three types of certificates can be accessed via
this statement, including Initial Attestation
Key Certificate, Local Attestation Key Certificate or
Endorsement Key Certificate.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name uniquely identifying a certificate
associated within key within a TPM.";
}
leaf keystore-ref {
type leafref {
path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key"
+ "/ks:certificates/ks:certificate/ks:name";
}
description
"A reference to a specific certificate of an
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asymmetric key in the Keystore.";
}
leaf type {
type enumeration {
enum endorsement-certificate {
value 0;
description
"Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate type.";
reference
"TPM2.0-Key:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TCG_IWG_DevID_v1r2_02dec2020.pdf
Section 3.11";
}
enum initial-attestation-certificate {
value 1;
description
"Initial Attestation key (IAK) Certificate type.";
reference
"TPM2.0-Key:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TCG_IWG_DevID_v1r2_02dec2020.pdf
Section 3.2";
}
enum local-attestation-certificate {
value 2;
description
"Local Attestation Key (LAK) Certificate type.";
reference
"TPM2.0-Key:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TCG_IWG_DevID_v1r2_02dec2020.pdf
Section 3.2";
}
}
description
"Function supported by this certificate from within the
TPM.";
}
}
}
}
}
container attester-supported-algos {
description
"Identifies which TPM algorithms are available for use on an
attesting platform.";
leaf-list tpm12-asymmetric-signing {
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when "../../tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']";
type identityref {
base taa:asymmetric;
}
description
"Platform Supported TPM12 asymmetric algorithms.";
}
leaf-list tpm12-hash {
when "../../tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']";
type identityref {
base taa:hash;
}
description
"Platform supported TPM12 hash algorithms.";
}
leaf-list tpm20-asymmetric-signing {
when "../../tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']";
type identityref {
base taa:asymmetric;
}
description
"Platform Supported TPM20 asymmetric algorithms.";
}
leaf-list tpm20-hash {
when "../../tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']";
type identityref {
base taa:hash;
}
description
"Platform supported TPM20 hash algorithms.";
}
}
}
}
Figure 1
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2.1.2. 'ietf-tcg-algs'
This document has encoded the TCG Algorithm definitions of
[TCG-Algos], revision 1.32. By including this full table as a
separate YANG file within this document, it is possible for other
YANG models to leverage the contents of this model. Specific
references to [RFC7748], [ISO-IEC-9797-1], [ISO-IEC-9797-2],
[ISO-IEC-10116], [ISO-IEC-10118-3], [ISO-IEC-14888-3],
[ISO-IEC-15946-1], [ISO-IEC-18033-3], [IEEE-Std-1363-2000],
[IEEE-Std-1363a-2004], [NIST-PUB-FIPS-202], [NIST-SP800-38C],
[NIST-SP800-38D], [NIST-SP800-38F], [NIST-SP800-56A],
[NIST-SP800-108], [bios-log], [ima-log], and [netequip-boot-log]
exist within the YANG Model.
2.1.2.1. Features
There are two types of features supported: 'TPM12' and 'TPM20'.
Support for either of these features indicates that a cryptoprocessor
supporting the corresponding type of TCG TPM API is present on an
Attester. Most commonly, only one type of cryptoprocessor will be
available on an Attester.
2.1.2.2. Identities
There are three types of identities in this model:
1. Cryptographic functions supported by a TPM algorithm; these
include: 'asymmetric', 'symmetric', 'hash', 'signing',
'anonymous_signing', 'encryption_mode', 'method', and
'object_type'. The definitions of each of these are in Table 2
of [TCG-Algos].
2. API specifications for TPMs: 'tpm12' and 'tpm20'
3. Specific algorithm types: Each algorithm type defines what
cryptographic functions may be supported, and on which type of
API specification. It is not required that an implementation of
a specific TPM will support all algorithm types. The contents of
each specific algorithm mirrors what is in Table 3 of
[TCG-Algos].
2.1.2.3. YANG Module
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file "ietf-tcg-algs@2022-02-16.yang"
module ietf-tcg-algs {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs";
prefix taa;
organization
"IETF RATS Working Group";
contact
"WG Web:
WG List:
Author: Eric Voit ";
description
"This module defines a identities for asymmetric algorithms.
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2022-02-16 {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote
Attestation Procedures using TPMs";
}
/*****************/
/* Features */
/*****************/
feature tpm12 {
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description
"This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 1.2 API
as per Section 4.8 of TPM1.2-Structures:
TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-
Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf";
}
feature tpm20 {
description
"This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 2.0 API
as per Section 11.4 of Trusted Platform Module Library
Part 1: Architecture. See TPM2.0-Arch:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-1-Architecture-01.07-2014-03-13.pdf";
}
/*****************/
/* Identities */
/*****************/
identity asymmetric {
description
"A TCG recognized asymmetric algorithm with a public and
private key.";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2,
http://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tcg-algorithm-registry/
TCG-_Algorithm_Registry_r1p32_pub";
}
identity symmetric {
description
"A TCG recognized symmetric algorithm with only a private key.";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2";
}
identity hash {
description
"A TCG recognized hash algorithm that compresses input data to
a digest value or indicates a method that uses a hash.";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2";
}
identity signing {
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description
"A TCG recognized signing algorithm";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2";
}
identity anonymous_signing {
description
"A TCG recognized anonymous signing algorithm.";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2";
}
identity encryption_mode {
description
"A TCG recognized encryption mode.";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2";
}
identity method {
description
"A TCG recognized method such as a mask generation function.";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2";
}
identity object_type {
description
"A TCG recognized object type.";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2";
}
identity cryptoprocessor {
description
"Base identity identifying a crytoprocessor.";
}
identity tpm12 {
if-feature "tpm12";
base cryptoprocessor;
description
"Supportable by a TPM1.2.";
reference
"TPM1.2-Structures:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf
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TPM_ALGORITHM_ID values, page 18";
}
identity tpm20 {
if-feature "tpm20";
base cryptoprocessor;
description
"Supportable by a TPM2.";
reference
"TPM2.0-Structures:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf
The TCG Algorithm Registry. Table 9";
}
identity TPM_ALG_RSA {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base tpm12;
base tpm20;
base asymmetric;
base object_type;
description
"RSA algorithm";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0001";
}
identity TPM_ALG_TDES {
if-feature "tpm12";
base tpm12;
base symmetric;
description
"Block cipher with various key sizes (Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm, commonly called Triple Data Encryption Standard)
Note: was banned in TPM1.2 v94";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0003";
}
identity TPM_ALG_SHA1 {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base hash;
base tpm12;
base tpm20;
description
"SHA1 algorithm - Deprecated due to insufficient cryptographic
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protection. However it is still useful for hash algorithms
where protection is not required.";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x0004";
}
identity TPM_ALG_HMAC {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base tpm12;
base tpm20;
base hash;
base signing;
description
"Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3,
ISO/IEC 9797-2 and RFC2014. ALG_ID: 0x0005";
}
identity TPM_ALG_AES {
if-feature "tpm12";
base tpm12;
base symmetric;
description
"The AES algorithm with various key sizes";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3,
ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0006";
}
identity TPM_ALG_MGF1 {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base hash;
base method;
description
"hash-based mask-generation function";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3,
IEEE Std 1363-2000 and IEEE Std 1363a-2004.
ALG_ID: 0x0007";
}
identity TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base hash;
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base object_type;
description
"An encryption or signing algorithm using a keyed hash. These
may use XOR for encryption or an HMAC for signing and may
also refer to a data object that is neither signing nor
encrypting.";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3,
ALG_ID: 0x0008";
}
identity TPM_ALG_XOR {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base tpm12;
base tpm20;
base hash;
base symmetric;
description
"The XOR encryption algorithm.";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x000A";
}
identity TPM_ALG_SHA256 {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base hash;
description
"The SHA 256 algorithm";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000B";
}
identity TPM_ALG_SHA384 {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base hash;
description
"The SHA 384 algorithm";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000C";
}
identity TPM_ALG_SHA512 {
if-feature "tpm20";
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base tpm20;
base hash;
description
"The SHA 512 algorithm";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000D";
}
identity TPM_ALG_NULL {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
description
"NULL algorithm";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x0010";
}
identity TPM_ALG_SM3_256 {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base hash;
description
"The SM3 hash algorithm.";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018. ALG_ID: 0x0012";
}
identity TPM_ALG_SM4 {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base symmetric;
description
"SM4 symmetric block cipher";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x0013";
}
identity TPM_ALG_RSASSA {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base asymmetric;
base signing;
description
"Signature algorithm defined in section 8.2 (RSASSAPKCS1-v1_5)";
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reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0014";
}
identity TPM_ALG_RSAES {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base asymmetric;
base encryption_mode;
description
"Signature algorithm defined in section 7.2 (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5)";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0015";
}
identity TPM_ALG_RSAPSS {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base asymmetric;
base signing;
description
"Padding algorithm defined in section 8.1 (RSASSA PSS)";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0016";
}
identity TPM_ALG_OAEP {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base asymmetric;
base encryption_mode;
description
"Padding algorithm defined in section 7.1 (RSASSA OAEP)";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0017";
}
identity TPM_ALG_ECDSA {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base asymmetric;
base signing;
description
"Signature algorithm using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)";
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reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 14888-3. ALG_ID: 0x0018";
}
identity TPM_ALG_ECDH {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base asymmetric;
base method;
description
"Secret sharing using ECC";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST SP800-56A and RFC 7748. ALG_ID: 0x0019";
}
identity TPM_ALG_ECDAA {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base asymmetric;
base signing;
base anonymous_signing;
description
"Elliptic-curve based anonymous signing scheme";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
TCG TPM 2.0 library specification. ALG_ID: 0x001A";
}
identity TPM_ALG_SM2 {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base asymmetric;
base signing;
base encryption_mode;
base method;
description
"SM2 - depending on context, either an elliptic-curve based,
signature algorithm, an encryption scheme, or a key exchange
protocol";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x001B";
}
identity TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR {
if-feature "tpm20";
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base tpm20;
base asymmetric;
base signing;
description
"Elliptic-curve based Schnorr signature";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x001C";
}
identity TPM_ALG_ECMQV {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base asymmetric;
base method;
description
"Two-phase elliptic-curve key";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST SP800-56A. ALG_ID: 0x001D";
}
identity TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base hash;
base method;
description
"Concatenation key derivation function";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST SP800-56A (approved alternative1) section 5.8.1.
ALG_ID: 0x0020";
}
identity TPM_ALG_KDF2 {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base hash;
base method;
description
"Key derivation function";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
IEEE 1363a-2004 KDF2 section 13.2. ALG_ID: 0x0021";
}
identity TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_108 {
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base TPM_ALG_KDF2;
description
"A key derivation method";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST SP800-108 - Section 5.1 KDF. ALG_ID: 0x0022";
}
identity TPM_ALG_ECC {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base asymmetric;
base object_type;
description
"Prime field ECC";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 15946-1. ALG_ID: 0x0023";
}
identity TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
description
"Object type for a symmetric block cipher";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
TCG TPM 2.0 library specification. ALG_ID: 0x0025";
}
identity TPM_ALG_CAMELLIA {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base symmetric;
description
"The Camellia algorithm";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0026";
}
identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base hash;
description
"ISO/IEC 10118-3 - the SHA 256 algorithm";
reference
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"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST PUB FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0027";
}
identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_384 {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base hash;
description
"The SHA 384 algorithm";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST PUB FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0028";
}
identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_512 {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base hash;
description
"The SHA 512 algorithm";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST PUB FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0029";
}
identity TPM_ALG_CMAC {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base symmetric;
base signing;
description
"block Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 Algorithm 5. ALG_ID: 0x003F";
}
identity TPM_ALG_CTR {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base symmetric;
base encryption_mode;
description
"Counter mode";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0040";
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}
identity TPM_ALG_OFB {
base tpm20;
base symmetric;
base encryption_mode;
description
"Output Feedback mode";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0041";
}
identity TPM_ALG_CBC {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base symmetric;
base encryption_mode;
description
"Cipher Block Chaining mode";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0042";
}
identity TPM_ALG_CFB {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base symmetric;
base encryption_mode;
description
"Cipher Feedback mode";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0043";
}
identity TPM_ALG_ECB {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base symmetric;
base encryption_mode;
description
"Electronic Codebook mode";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0044";
}
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identity TPM_ALG_CCM {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base symmetric;
base signing;
base encryption_mode;
description
"Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication
Code (CCM)";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST SP800-38C. ALG_ID: 0x0050";
}
identity TPM_ALG_GCM {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base symmetric;
base signing;
base encryption_mode;
description
"Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST SP800-38D. ALG_ID: 0x0051";
}
identity TPM_ALG_KW {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base symmetric;
base signing;
base encryption_mode;
description
"AES Key Wrap (KW)";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0052";
}
identity TPM_ALG_KWP {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base symmetric;
base signing;
base encryption_mode;
description
"AES Key Wrap with Padding (KWP)";
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reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0053";
}
identity TPM_ALG_EAX {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base symmetric;
base signing;
base encryption_mode;
description
"Authenticated-Encryption Mode";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0054";
}
identity TPM_ALG_EDDSA {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base asymmetric;
base signing;
description
"Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (PureEdDSA)";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
RFC 8032. ALG_ID: 0x0060";
}
}
Note that not all cryptographic functions are required for use by
ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang. However the full definition of
Table 3 of [TCG-Algos] will allow use by additional YANG
specifications.
3. IANA Considerations
This document registers the following namespace URIs in the
[xml-registry] as per [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
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URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document registers the following YANG modules in the registry
[yang-parameters] as per Section 14 of [RFC6020]:
Name: ietf-tpm-remote-attestation
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-
attestation
Prefix: tpm
Reference: draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra (RFC form)
Name: ietf-tcg-algs
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs
Prefix: taa
Reference: draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra (RFC form)
4. Security Considerations
The YANG module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang specified in this
document defines a schema for data that is designed to be accessed
via network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or
RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport
layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure
Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the
mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [RFC8446].
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., _config true_, which is the
default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., _edit-config_)
to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes
as well as their sensitivity/vulnerability:
Container '/rats-support-structures/attester-supported-algos': 'tpm1
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2-asymmetric-signing', 'tpm12-hash', 'tpm20-asymmetric-signing',
and 'tpm20-hash'. All could be populated with algorithms that are
not supported by the underlying physical TPM installed by the
equipment vendor.
Container: '/rats-support-structures/tpms': 'name': Although shown
as 'rw', it is system generated. Therefore it should not be
possible for an operator to add or remove a TPM from the
configuration.
'tpm20-pcr-bank': It is possible to configure PCRs for extraction
which are not being extended by system software. This could
unnecessarily use TPM resources.
'certificates': It is possible to provision a certificate which
does not correspond to an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) within
the TPM 1.2, or an Attestation Key (AK) within the TPM 2.0
respectively.
RPC 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation': It must be verified that
the certificate is for an active AIK, i.e., the certificate
provided is able to support Attestation on the targeted TPM 1.2.
RPC 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation': It must be verified that
the certificate is for an active AK, i.e., the quote signature
associated with RPC response has been generated by an entity
legitimately able to perform Attestation on the targeted TPM 2.0.
RPC 'log-retrieval': Requesting a large volume of logs from the
attester could require significant system resources and create a
denial of service.
Information collected through the RPCs above could reveal that
specific versions of software and configurations of endpoints that
could identify vulnerabilities on those systems. Therefore RPCs
should be protected by NACM [RFC8341] with a default setting of deny-
all to limit the extraction of attestation data by only authorized
Verifiers.
For the YANG module ietf-tcg-algs.yang, please use care when
selecting specific algorithms. The introductory section of
[TCG-Algos] highlights that some algorithms should be considered
legacy, and recommends implementers and adopters diligently evaluate
available information such as governmental, industrial, and academic
research before selecting an algorithm for use.
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5. Change Log
Changes from version 08 to version 09:
* AD Review comments
Changes from version 08 to version 09:
* Minor formatting tweaks for shepherd. IANA registered.
Changes from version 05 to version 06:
* More YANG Dr comments covered
Changes from version 04 to version 05:
* YANG Dr comments covered
Changes from version 03 to version 04:
* TPM1.2 Quote1 eliminated
* YANG model simplifications so redundant info isn't exposed
Changes from version 02 to version 03:
* moved to tcg-algs
* cleaned up model to eliminate sources of errors
* removed key establishment RPC
* added lots of XPATH which must all be scrubbed still
* Descriptive text added on model contents.
Changes from version 01 to version 02:
* Extracted Crypto-types into a separate YANG file
* Mades the algorithms explicit, not strings
* Hash Algo as key the selected TPM2 PCRs
* PCR numbers are their own type
* Eliminated nested keys for node-id plus tpm-name
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* Eliminated TPM-Name of "ALL"
* Added TPM-Path
Changes from version 00 to version 01:
* Addressed author's comments
* Extended complementary details about attestation-certificates
* Relabeled chunk-size to log-entry-quantity
* Relabeled location with compute-node or tpm-name where appropriate
* Added a valid entity-mib physical-index to compute-node and tpm-
name to map it back to hardware inventory
* Relabeled name to tpm_name
* Removed event-string in last-entry
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[bios-log] "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification,
Section 9.4.5.2", n.d.,
.
[BIOS-Log-Event-Type]
"TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification",
n.d., .
[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]
Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-23,
14 December 2021, .
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture-
15, 8 February 2022, .
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[I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest]
Fedorkow, G., Voit, E., and J. Fitzgerald-McKay, "TPM-
based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-
network-device-attest-12, 23 February 2022,
.
[IEEE-Std-1363-2000]
"IEEE 1363-2000 - IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-
Key Cryptography", n.d.,
.
[IEEE-Std-1363a-2004]
"1363a-2004 - IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key
Cryptography - Amendment 1: Additional Techniques", n.d.,
.
[ima-log] "Canonical Event Log Format, Section 4.3", n.d.,
.
[ISO-IEC-10116]
"ISO/IEC 10116:2017 - Information technology", n.d.,
.
[ISO-IEC-10118-3]
"Dedicated hash-functions - ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018", n.d.,
.
[ISO-IEC-14888-3]
"ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 - Digital signatures with appendix",
n.d., .
[ISO-IEC-15946-1]
"ISO/IEC 15946-1:2016 - Information technology", n.d.,
.
[ISO-IEC-18033-3]
"ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 - Encryption algorithms", n.d.,
.
[ISO-IEC-9797-1]
"Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - ISO/IEC
9797-1:2011", n.d.,
.
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[ISO-IEC-9797-2]
"Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - ISO/IEC
9797-2:2011", n.d.,
.
[netequip-boot-log]
"IMA Policy Kernel Documentation", n.d.,
.
[NIST-PUB-FIPS-202]
"SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-
Output Functions", n.d.,
.
[NIST-SP800-108]
"Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom
Functions", n.d.,
.
[NIST-SP800-38C]
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the
CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality", n.d.,
.
[NIST-SP800-38D]
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", n.d.,
.
[NIST-SP800-38F]
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Methods for Key Wrapping", n.d.,
.
[NIST-SP800-56A]
"Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes
Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", n.d.,
.
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[RFC2014] Weinrib, A. and J. Postel, "IRTF Research Group Guidelines
and Procedures", BCP 8, RFC 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC2014,
October 1996, .
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
.
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
.
[RFC6933] Bierman, A., Romascanu, D., Quittek, J., and M.
Chandramouli, "Entity MIB (Version 4)", RFC 6933,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6933, May 2013,
.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
.
[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, .
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
.
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[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, .
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
.
[RFC8348] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Dong, J., and D. Romascanu, "A
YANG Data Model for Hardware Management", RFC 8348,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8348, March 2018,
.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
.
[TCG-Algos]
"TCG Algorithm Registry", n.d.,
.
[TPM1.2] TCG, ., "TPM 1.2 Main Specification", 2 October 2003,
.
[TPM1.2-Commands]
"TPM Main Part 3 Commands", n.d.,
.
[TPM1.2-Structures]
"TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures", n.d.,
.
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[TPM2.0] TCG, ., "TPM 2.0 Library Specification", 15 March 2013,
.
[TPM2.0-Arch]
"Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 1: Architecture",
n.d., .
[TPM2.0-Key]
TCG, ., "TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation,
Rev10", 14 April 2021, .
[TPM2.0-Structures]
"Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 2: Structures",
n.d., .
[xml-registry]
"IETF XML Registry", n.d.,
.
[yang-parameters]
"YANG Parameters", n.d.,
.
6.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]
Birkholz, H., Eckel, M., Pan, W., and E. Voit, "Reference
Interaction Models for Remote Attestation Procedures",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-
reference-interaction-models-05, 26 January 2022,
.
[NIST-915121]
"True Randomness Can't be Left to Chance: Why entropy is
important for information security", n.d.,
.
Authors' Addresses
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Henk Birkholz
Fraunhofer SIT
Rheinstrasse 75
64295 Darmstadt
Germany
Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de
Michael Eckel
Fraunhofer SIT
Rheinstrasse 75
64295 Darmstadt
Germany
Email: michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de
Shwetha Bhandari
ThoughtSpot
Email: shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com
Eric Voit
Cisco Systems
Email: evoit@cisco.com
Bill Sulzen
Cisco Systems
Email: bsulzen@cisco.com
Liang Xia (Frank)
Huawei Technologies
101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
Nanjing
Jiangsu, 210012
China
Email: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com
Tom Laffey
Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Email: tom.laffey@hpe.com
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Guy C. Fedorkow
Juniper Networks
10 Technology Park Drive
Westford
Email: gfedorkow@juniper.net
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