Internet-Draft SD-JWT June 2024
Fett, et al. Expires 15 December 2024 [Page]
Workgroup:
Web Authorization Protocol
Internet-Draft:
draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-09
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Authors:
D. Fett
Authlete
K. Yasuda
Keio University
B. Campbell
Ping Identity

Selective Disclosure for JWTs (SD-JWT)

Abstract

This specification defines a mechanism for selective disclosure of individual elements of a JSON object used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure. It encompasses various applications, including but not limited to the selective disclosure of JSON Web Token (JWT) claims.

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization Protocol Working Group mailing list (oauth@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 15 December 2024.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This document specifies conventions for creating JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] structures with JSON [RFC8259] objects as the payload while supporting selective disclosure of individual elements of that JSON. Because JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] is a very prevalent application of JWS with a JSON payload, the selective disclosure of JWT claims receives primary treatment herein. However, that does not preclude the mechanism's applicability to other or more general applications of JWS with JSON payloads.

The JSON-based representation of claims in a signed JWT is secured against modification using JWS digital signatures. A consumer of a signed JWT that has checked the signature can safely assume that the contents of the token have not been modified. However, anyone receiving an unencrypted JWT can read all the claims. Likewise, anyone with the decryption key receiving encrypted JWT can also read all the claims.

One of the common use cases of a signed JWT is representing a user's identity. As long as the signed JWT is one-time use, it typically only contains those claims the user has consented to disclose to a specific Verifier. However, there is an increasing number of use cases where a signed JWT is created once and then used a number of times by the user (the "Holder" of the JWT). In such use cases, the signed JWT needs to contain the superset of all claims the user of the signed JWT might want to disclose to Verifiers at some point. The ability to selectively disclose a subset of these claims depending on the Verifier becomes crucial to ensure minimum disclosure and prevent Verifiers from obtaining claims irrelevant for the transaction at hand. SD-JWTs defined in this document enable such selective disclosure of JWT claims.

One example of a multi-use JWT is a verifiable credential, an Issuer-signed credential that contains the claims about a subject, and whose authenticity can be cryptographically verified.

Similar to the JWT specification on which it builds, this document is a product of the Web Authorization Protocol (oauth) working group. However, while both JWT and SD-JWT have potential OAuth 2.0 applications, their utility and application is certainly not constrained to OAuth 2.0. JWT was developed as a general-purpose token format and has seen widespread usage in a variety of applications. SD-JWT is a selective disclosure mechanism for JWT and is similarly intended to be general-purpose specification.

While JWTs with claims describing natural persons are a common use case, the mechanisms defined in this document can be used for other use cases as well.

In an SD-JWT, claims can be hidden, but cryptographically protected against undetected modification. "Claims" here refers to both object properties (name-value pairs) as well as array elements. When issuing the SD-JWT to the Holder, the Issuer includes the cleartext counterparts of all hidden claims, the so-called Disclosures, outside the signed part of the SD-JWT.

The Holder decides which claims to disclose to a particular Verifier and includes the respective Disclosures in the SD-JWT to that Verifier. The Verifier has to verify that all disclosed claim values were part of the original Issuer-signed JWT. The Verifier will not, however, learn any claim values not disclosed in the Disclosures.

This document also defines a format for SD-JWTs with Key Binding (SD-JWT+KB). By optionally sending an SD-JWT+KB to a Verifier, the Holder can prove to the Verifier that they hold the private key associated to the SD-JWT (i.e., using the cnf claim [RFC7800]). The strength of the binding is conditional upon the trust in the protection of the private key of the key pair an SD-JWT is bound to.

SD-JWT can be used with any JSON-based representation of claims, including JSON-LD.

This specification aims to be easy to implement and to leverage established and widely used data formats and cryptographic algorithms wherever possible.

1.1. Feature Summary

This specification defines two primary data formats:

  1. SD-JWT is a composite structure enabling selective disclosure of its contents. The definition in this document comprises the following:

    • A format for enabling selective disclosure in nested JSON data structures, supporting selectively disclosable object properties (name-value pairs) and array elements
    • A format for encoding the selectively disclosable data items
    • A format extending the JWS Compact Serialization, allowing for the combined transport of the Issuer-signed JSON data structure and the disclosable data items
    • An alternate format extending the JWS JSON Serialization, also allowing for transport of the Issuer-signed JSON data structure and disclosure data

  2. SD-JWT+KB is a composite structure enabling cryptographic key binding when presented to the Verifier. The definition in this document comprises the following:

    • A facility for associating an SD-JWT to a key pair
    • A format for a Key Binding JWT (KB-JWT) that proves possession of the private key of the associated key pair
    • A format extending the SD-JWT format for the combined transport of the SD-JWT and the KB-JWT

1.2. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

base64url denotes the URL-safe base64 encoding without padding defined in Section 2 of [RFC7515].

2. Terms and Definitions

Selective disclosure:
Process of a Holder disclosing to a Verifier a subset of claims contained in a claim set issued by an Issuer.
Selectively Disclosable JWT (SD-JWT):
A composite structure, consisting of an Issuer-signed JWT (JWS, [RFC7515]) and zero or more Disclosures, which supports selective disclosure as defined in this document. It can contain both regular claims and digests of selectively-disclosable claims.
Disclosure:
A JSON array containing a combination of a salt, a cleartext claim name (present when the claim is a name-value pair and absent when the claim is an array element), and a cleartext claim value, which is base64url-encoded and used to calculate a digest for the respective claim. The term Disclosure refers to the whole base64url-encoded string.
Key Binding:
Ability of the Holder to prove legitimate possession of an SD-JWT by proving control over a private key during the presentation. When utilizing Key Binding, an SD-JWT contains the public key corresponding to the private key controlled by the Holder (or a reference to this public key).
Key Binding JWT (KB-JWT):
A JWT for proving Key Binding as defined in Section 5.3. A Key Binding JWT is said to "be tied to" a particular SD-JWT when its payload includes a hash of the SD-JWT in its sd_hash claim.
Selectively Disclosable JWT with Key Binding (SD-JWT+KB):
A composite structure, comprising an SD-JWT and a Key Binding JWT tied to that SD-JWT.
Issuer:
An entity that creates SD-JWTs.
Holder:
An entity that received SD-JWTs from the Issuer and has control over them.
Verifier:
An entity that requests, checks, and extracts the claims from an SD-JWT with its respective Disclosures.

3. Flow Diagram 

           +------------+
           |            |
           |   Issuer   |
           |            |
           +------------+
                 |
            Issues SD-JWT
      including all Disclosures
                 |
                 v
           +------------+
           |            |
           |   Holder   |
           |            |
           +------------+
                 |
         Presents SD-JWT+KB
    including selected Disclosures
                 |
                 v
           +-------------+
           |             |+
           |  Verifiers  ||+
           |             |||
           +-------------+||
            +-------------+|
             +-------------+
Figure 1: SD-JWT Issuance and Presentation Flow

4. Concepts

This section describes SD-JWTs with their respective Disclosures and Key Binding at a conceptual level, abstracting from the data formats described in Section 5.

4.1. SD-JWT and Disclosures

An SD-JWT, at its core, is a digitally signed JSON document containing digests over the selectively disclosable claims with the Disclosures outside the document. Disclosures can be omitted without breaking the signature, and modifying them can be detected. Selectively disclosable claims can be individual object properties (name-value pairs) or array elements.

Each digest value ensures the integrity of, and maps to, the respective Disclosure. Digest values are calculated using a hash function over the Disclosures, each of which contains a cryptographically secure random salt, the claim name (only when the claim is an object property), and the claim value. The Disclosures are sent to the Holder as part of the SD-JWT in the format defined in Section 5. When presenting an SD-JWT to a Verifier, the Holder only includes the Disclosures for the claims that it wants to reveal to that Verifier.

An SD-JWT MAY also contain clear-text claims that are always disclosed to the Verifier.

4.2. Disclosing to a Verifier

To disclose to a Verifier a subset of the SD-JWT claim values, a Holder sends only the Disclosures of those selectively released claims to the Verifier as part of the SD-JWT.

4.3. Optional Key Binding

Key Binding is an optional feature. When Key Binding is required by the use-case, the SD-JWT MUST contain information about the key material controlled by the Holder.

Note: How the public key is included in SD-JWT is out of scope of this document. It can be passed by value or by reference.

When a Verifier requires Key Binding, the Holder presents an SD-JWT+KB, consisting of an SD-JWT as well as a Key Binding JWT tied to that SD-JWT. The Key Binding JWT encodes a signature by the Holder's private key over

  • a hash of the SD-JWT,
  • a nonce to ensure the freshness of the signature, and
  • an audience value to indicate the intended audience for the document.

Details of the format of Key Binding JWTs are described in Section 5.3.

4.4. Verification

At a high level, the Verifier

  • receives either an SD-JWT or an SD-JWT+KB from the Holder,
  • verifies the signature on the SD-JWT (or the the SD-JWT inside the SD-JWT+KB) using the Issuer's public key,
  • verifies the signature on the KB-JWT using the public key included (or referenced) in the SD-JWT, if the Verifier's policy requires Key Binding, and
  • calculates the digests over the Holder-Selected Disclosures and verifies that each digest is contained in the SD-JWT.

The detailed algorithm is described in Section 8.3.

5. SD-JWT and SD-JWT+KB Data Formats

An SD-JWT is composed of

An SD-JWT+KB is composed of

The Issuer-signed JWT, Disclosures, and Key Binding JWT are explained in Section 5.1, Section 5.2, and Section 5.3 respectively.

The serialized format for the SD-JWT is the concatenation of each part delineated with a single tilde ('~') character as follows:

<Issuer-signed JWT>~<Disclosure 1>~<Disclosure 2>~...~<Disclosure N>~

The order of the concatenated parts MUST be the Issuer-signed JWT, a tilde character, zero or more Disclosures each followed by a tilde character, and lastly the optional Key Binding JWT. In the case that there is no Key Binding JWT, the last element MUST be an empty string and the last separating tilde character MUST NOT be omitted.

The serialized format for an SD-JWT+KB extends the SD-JWT format by concatenating a Key Binding JWT.

<Issuer-signed JWT>~<Disclosure 1>~<Disclosure 2>~...~<Disclosure N>~<KB-JWT>

The two formats can be distinguished by the final ~ character that is present on an SD-JWT. A Verifier that expects an SD-JWT MUST verify that the final tilde-separated component is empty. A Verifier that expects an SD-JWT+KB MUST verify that its final tilde-separated component is a valid KB-JWT.

The Disclosures are linked to the Issuer-signed JWT through the digest values included therein.

When issuing to a Holder, the Issuer includes all the relevant Disclosures in the SD-JWT.

When presenting to a Verifier, the Holder sends only the selected set of the Disclosures in the SD-JWT.

The Holder MAY send any subset of the Disclosures to the Verifier, i.e., none, some, or all Disclosures. For data that the Holder does not want to reveal to the Verifier, the Holder MUST NOT send Disclosures or reveal the salt values in any other way. A Holder MUST NOT send a Disclosure that was not included in the issued SD-JWT or send a Disclosure more than once.

To further illustrate the SD-JWT format, the following examples show a few different SD-JWT permutations, both with and without various constituent parts.

An SD-JWT without Disclosures and without a KB-JWT:

<Issuer-signed JWT>~

An SD-JWT with Disclosures and without a KB-JWT:

<Issuer-signed JWT>~<Disclosure 1>~<Disclosure N>~

An SD-JWT+KB without Disclosures:

<Issuer-signed JWT>~<KB-JWT>

An SD-JWT+KB with Disclosures:

<Issuer-signed JWT>~<Disclosure 1>~<Disclosure N>~<KB-JWT>

As an alternative illustration of the SD-JWT format, for those who celebrate, ABNF [RFC5234] for the SD-JWT, SD-JWT+KB, and various constituent parts is provided here:

ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; A-Z / a-z
DIGIT = %x30-39 ; 0-9
BASE64URL = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_")
JWT = BASE64URL "." BASE64URL "." BASE64URL
DISCLOSURE = BASE64URL
SD-JWT = JWT "~" *[DISCLOSURE "~"]
KB-JWT = JWT
SD-JWT-KB = SD-JWT KB-JWT

5.1. Issuer-signed JWT

An SD-JWT has a JWT component that MUST be signed using the Issuer's private key. It MUST NOT use the none algorithm.

The payload of an SD-JWT is a JSON object according to the following rules:

  1. The payload MAY contain the _sd_alg key described in Section 5.1.1.
  2. The payload MAY contain one or more digests of Disclosures to enable selective disclosure of the respective claims, created and formatted as described in Section 5.2.
  3. The payload MAY contain one or more decoy digests to obscure the actual number of claims in the SD-JWT, created and formatted as described in Section 5.2.5.
  4. The payload MAY contain one or more non-selectively disclosable claims.
  5. The payload MAY contain the Holder's public key(s) or reference(s) thereto, as explained in Section 5.1.2.
  6. The payload MAY contain further claims such as iss, iat, etc. as defined or required by the application using SD-JWTs.
  7. The payload MUST NOT contain the reserved claims _sd or ... except for the purpose of transporting digests as described below.

The same digest value MUST NOT appear more than once in the SD-JWT.

Applications of SD-JWT SHOULD be explicitly typed using the typ header parameter. See Section 10.11 for more details.

It is the Issuer who decides which claims are selectively disclosable and which are not. End-User claims MAY be included as plaintext as well, e.g., if hiding the particular claims from the Verifier is not required in the intended use case. See Section 10.7 for considerations on making validity-controlling claims such as exp selectively disclosable.

Claims that are not selectively disclosable are included in the SD-JWT in plaintext just as they would be in any other JSON structure.

5.1.1. Hash Function Claim

The claim _sd_alg indicates the hash algorithm used by the Issuer to generate the digests as described in Section 5.2. When used, this claim MUST appear at the top level of the SD-JWT payload. It MUST NOT be used in any object nested within the payload. If the _sd_alg claim is not present at the top level, a default value of sha-256 MUST be used.

The hash algorithm identifier MUST be a hash algorithm value from the "Hash Name String" column in the IANA "Named Information Hash Algorithm" registry [IANA.Hash.Algorithms] or a value defined in another specification and/or profile of this specification.

To promote interoperability, implementations MUST support the sha-256 hash algorithm.

See Section 10 for requirements regarding entropy of the salt, minimum length of the salt, and choice of a hash algorithm.

5.1.2. Key Binding

If the Issuer wants to enable Key Binding, it includes a public key associated with the Holder, or a reference thereto, using the cnf claim as defined in [RFC7800]. The jwk confirmation method, as defined in Section 3.2 of [RFC7800], is suggested for doing so, however, other confirmation methods can be used.

Note that, as was stated in [RFC7800], if an application needs to represent multiple proof-of-possession keys in the same SD-JWT, one way to achieve this is to use other claim names, in addition to cnf, to hold the additional proof-of-possession key information.

It is out of the scope of this document to describe how the Holder key pair is established. For example, the Holder MAY create a key pair and provide a public key to the Issuer, the Issuer MAY create the key pair for the Holder, or Holder and Issuer MAY use pre-established key material.

Note: The examples throughout this document use the cnf claim with the jwk member to include the raw public key by value in SD-JWT.

5.2. Disclosures

Disclosures are created differently depending on whether a claim is an object property (name-value pair) or an array element.

  • For a claim that is an object property, the Issuer creates a Disclosure as described in Section 5.2.1.
  • For a claim that is an array element, the Issuer creates a Disclosure as described in Section 5.2.2.

5.2.1. Disclosures for Object Properties

For each claim that is an object property and that is to be made selectively disclosable, the Issuer MUST create a Disclosure as follows:

  • Create an array of three elements in this order:

    1. A salt value. MUST be a string. See Section 10.3 for security considerations. It is RECOMMENDED to base64url-encode minimum 128 bits of cryptographically secure random data, producing a string. The salt value MUST be unique for each claim that is to be selectively disclosed. The Issuer MUST NOT reveal the salt value to any party other than the Holder.
    2. The claim name, or key, as it would be used in a regular JWT payload. It MUST be a string and MUST NOT be _sd, ..., or a claim name existing in the object as a non-selectively disclosable claim.
    3. The claim value, as it would be used in a regular JWT payload. The value MAY be of any type that is allowed in JSON, including numbers, strings, booleans, arrays, and objects.
  • JSON-encode the array, producing an UTF-8 string.
  • base64url-encode the byte representation of the UTF-8 string, producing a US-ASCII [RFC0020] string. This string is the Disclosure.

The order is decided based on the readability considerations: salts would have a constant length within the SD-JWT, claim names would be around the same length all the time, and claim values would vary in size, potentially being large objects.

The following example illustrates the steps described above.

The array is created as follows:

["_26bc4LT-ac6q2KI6cBW5es", "family_name", "Möbius"]

The resulting Disclosure would be: WyJfMjZiYzRMVC1hYzZxMktJNmNCVzVlcyIsICJmYW1pbHlfbmFtZSIsICJNw7ZiaXVzIl0

Note that variations in whitespace, encoding of Unicode characters, ordering of object properties, etc., are allowed in the JSON representation and no canonicalization needs be performed before base64url-encoding. For example, the following strings are all valid and encode the same claim value "Möbius":

  • A different way to encode the unicode umlaut:
    WyJfMjZiYzRMVC1hYzZxMktJNmNCVzVlcyIsICJmYW1pbHlfbmFtZSIsICJNX
    HUwMGY2Yml1cyJd
  • No white space:
    WyJfMjZiYzRMVC1hYzZxMktJNmNCVzVlcyIsImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwiTcO2Y
    ml1cyJd
  • Newline characters between elements:
    WwoiXzI2YmM0TFQtYWM2cTJLSTZjQlc1ZXMiLAoiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUiLAoiT
    cO2Yml1cyIKXQ

See Appendix B for some further considerations on the Disclosure format approach.

5.2.2. Disclosures for Array Elements

For each claim that is an array element and that is to be made selectively disclosable, the Issuer MUST create a Disclosure as follows:

  • The array MUST contain two elements in this order:

    1. The salt value as described in Section 5.2.1.
    2. The array element that is to be hidden. This value MAY be of any type that is allowed in JSON, including numbers, strings, booleans, arrays, and objects.

The Disclosure string is created by JSON-encoding this array and base64url-encoding the byte representation of the resulting string as described in Section 5.2.1. The same considerations regarding variations in the result of the JSON encoding apply.

For example, a Disclosure for the second element of the nationalities array in the following claim set:

{
  "nationalities": ["DE", "FR"]
}

could be created by first creating the following array:

["lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA", "FR"]

The resulting Disclosure would be: WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgIkZSIl0

5.2.3. Hashing Disclosures

For embedding references to the Disclosures in the SD-JWT, each Disclosure is hashed using the hash algorithm specified in the _sd_alg claim described in Section 5.1.1. The resulting digest is then included in the SD-JWT payload instead of the original claim value, as described next.

The digest MUST be taken over the US-ASCII bytes of the base64url-encoded value that is the Disclosure. This follows the convention in JWS [RFC7515] and JWE [RFC7516]. The bytes of the digest MUST then be base64url-encoded.

It is important to note that:

  • The input to the hash function MUST be the base64url-encoded Disclosure, not the bytes encoded by the base64url string.
  • The bytes of the output of the hash function MUST be base64url-encoded, and are not the bytes making up the (often used) hex representation of the bytes of the digest.

For example, the SHA-256 digest of the Disclosure WyI2cU1RdlJMNWhhaiIsICJmYW1pbHlfbmFtZSIsICJNw7ZiaXVzIl0 would be uutlBuYeMDyjLLTpf6Jxi7yNkEF35jdyWMn9U7b_RYY.

The SHA-256 digest of the Disclosure WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgIkZSIl0 would be w0I8EKcdCtUPkGCNUrfwVp2xEgNjtoIDlOxc9-PlOhs.

5.2.4. Embedding Disclosure Digests in SD-JWTs

For selectively disclosable claims, the digests of the Disclosures are embedded into the Issuer-signed JWT instead of the claims themselves. The precise way of embedding depends on whether a claim is an object property (name-value pair) or an array element.

  • For a claim that is an object property, the Issuer embeds a Disclosure digest as described in Section 5.2.4.1.
  • For a claim that is an array element, the Issuer creates a Disclosure digest as described in Section 5.2.4.2.
5.2.4.1. Object Properties

Digests of Disclosures for object properties are added to an array under the new key _sd in the object. The _sd key MUST refer to an array of strings, each string being a digest of a Disclosure or a decoy digest as described in Section 5.2.5.

The array MAY be empty in case the Issuer decided not to selectively disclose any of the claims at that level. However, it is RECOMMENDED to omit the _sd key in this case to save space.

The Issuer MUST hide the original order of the claims in the array. To ensure this, it is RECOMMENDED to shuffle the array of hashes, e.g., by sorting it alphanumerically or randomly, after potentially adding decoy digests as described in Section 5.2.5. The precise method does not matter as long as it does not depend on the original order of elements.

For example, using the digest of the object property Disclosure created above, the Issuer could create the following SD-JWT payload to make family_name selectively disclosable:

{
  "given_name": "Alice",
  "_sd": ["uutlBuYeMDyjLLTpf6Jxi7yNkEF35jdyWMn9U7b_RYY"]
}
5.2.4.2. Array Elements

Digests of Disclosures for array elements are added to the array in the same position as the original claim value in the array. For each digest, an object of the form {"...": "<digest>"} is added to the array. The key MUST always be the string ... (three dots). The value MUST be the digest of the Disclosure created as described in Section 5.2.3. There MUST NOT be any other keys in the object.

For example, using the digest of the array element Disclosure created above, the Issuer could create the following SD-JWT payload to make the second element of the nationalities array selectively disclosable:

{
  "nationalities":
    ["DE", {"...": "w0I8EKcdCtUPkGCNUrfwVp2xEgNjtoIDlOxc9-PlOhs"}]
}

As described in Section 8.3, Verifiers ignore all selectively disclosable array elements for which they did not receive a Disclosure. In the example above, the verification process would output an array with only one element unless a matching Disclosure for the second element is received.

5.2.5. Decoy Digests

An Issuer MAY add additional digests to the SD-JWT payload that are not associated with any claim. The purpose of such "decoy" digests is to make it more difficult for an attacker to see the original number of claims contained in the SD-JWT. Decoy digests MAY be added both to the _sd array for objects as well as in arrays.

It is RECOMMENDED to create the decoy digests by hashing over a cryptographically secure random number. The bytes of the digest MUST then be base64url-encoded as above. The same digest function as for the Disclosures MUST be used.

For decoy digests, no Disclosure is sent to the Holder, i.e., the Holder will see digests that do not correspond to any Disclosure. See Section 11.3 for additional privacy considerations.

To ensure readability and replicability, the examples in this specification do not contain decoy digests unless explicitly stated. For an example with decoy digests, see Appendix A.1.

5.3. Key Binding JWT

This section defines the Key Binding JWT, which encodes a signature over an SD-JWT by the Holder's private key.

The Key Binding JWT MUST be a JWT according to [RFC7519] and its payload MUST contain the following elements:

  • in the JOSE header,

    • typ: REQUIRED. MUST be kb+jwt, which explicitly types the Key Binding JWT as recommended in Section 3.11 of [RFC8725].
    • alg: REQUIRED. A digital signature algorithm identifier such as per IANA "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry. MUST NOT be none.

  • in the JWT payload,

    • iat: REQUIRED. The value of this claim MUST be the time at which the Key Binding JWT was issued using the syntax defined in [RFC7519].
    • aud: REQUIRED. The intended receiver of the Key Binding JWT. How the value is represented is up to the protocol used and out of scope of this specification.
    • nonce: REQUIRED. Ensures the freshness of the signature. The value type of this claim MUST be a string. How this value is obtained is up to the protocol used and out of scope of this specification.
    • sd_hash: REQUIRED. The base64url-encoded hash value over the Issuer-signed JWT and the selected Disclosures as defined below.

5.3.1. Binding to an SD-JWT

The hash value in the sd_hash claim binds the KB-JWT to the specific SD-JWT. The sd_hash value MUST be taken over the US-ASCII bytes of the encoded SD-JWT, i.e., the Issuer-signed JWT, a tilde character, and zero or more Disclosures selected for presentation to the Verifier, each followed by a tilde character:

<Issuer-signed JWT>~<Disclosure 1>~<Disclosure 2>~...~<Disclosure N>~

The bytes of the digest MUST then be base64url-encoded.

The same hash algorithm as for the Disclosures MUST be used (defined by the _sd_alg element in the Issuer-signed JWT or the default value, as defined in Section 5.1.1).

5.3.2. Validating the Key Binding JWT

The Verifier MUST ensure that the key with which it validates the signature on the Key Binding JWT is the key specified in the SD-JWT as the Holder's public key. For example, if the SD-JWT contains a cnf value with a jwk member, the Verifier could parse the provided JWK and use it to verify the Key Binding JWT.

Whether to require Key Binding is up to the Verifier's policy, based on the set of trust requirements such as trust frameworks it belongs to. See Section 10.5 for security considerations.

6. Example SD-JWT

In this example, a simple SD-JWT is demonstrated. This example is split into issuance and presentation.

Note: Throughout the examples in this document, line breaks had to be added to JSON strings and base64-encoded strings to adhere to the 72-character limit for lines in RFCs and for readability. JSON does not allow line breaks within strings.

6.1. Issuance

The Issuer is using the following input claim set:

{
  "sub": "user_42",
  "given_name": "John",
  "family_name": "Doe",
  "email": "johndoe@example.com",
  "phone_number": "+1-202-555-0101",
  "phone_number_verified": true,
  "address": {
    "street_address": "123 Main St",
    "locality": "Anytown",
    "region": "Anystate",
    "country": "US"
  },
  "birthdate": "1940-01-01",
  "updated_at": 1570000000,
  "nationalities": [
    "US",
    "DE"
  ]
}

The Issuer in this case made the following decisions:

  • The nationalities array is always visible, but its contents are selectively disclosable.
  • The sub element and essential verification data (iss, iat, cnf, etc.) are always visible.
  • All other End-User claims are selectively disclosable.
  • For address, the Issuer is using a flat structure, i.e., all of the claims in the address claim can only be disclosed in full. Other options are discussed in Section 7.

The following payload is used for the SD-JWT:

{
  "_sd": [
    "CrQe7S5kqBAHt-nMYXgc6bdt2SH5aTY1sU_M-PgkjPI",
    "JzYjH4svliH0R3PyEMfeZu6Jt69u5qehZo7F7EPYlSE",
    "PorFbpKuVu6xymJagvkFsFXAbRoc2JGlAUA2BA4o7cI",
    "TGf4oLbgwd5JQaHyKVQZU9UdGE0w5rtDsrZzfUaomLo",
    "XQ_3kPKt1XyX7KANkqVR6yZ2Va5NrPIvPYbyMvRKBMM",
    "XzFrzwscM6Gn6CJDc6vVK8BkMnfG8vOSKfpPIZdAfdE",
    "gbOsI4Edq2x2Kw-w5wPEzakob9hV1cRD0ATN3oQL9JM",
    "jsu9yVulwQQlhFlM_3JlzMaSFzglhQG0DpfayQwLUK4"
  ],
  "iss": "https://issuer.example.com",
  "iat": 1683000000,
  "exp": 1883000000,
  "sub": "user_42",
  "nationalities": [
    {
      "...": "pFndjkZ_VCzmyTa6UjlZo3dh-ko8aIKQc9DlGzhaVYo"
    },
    {
      "...": "7Cf6JkPudry3lcbwHgeZ8khAv1U1OSlerP0VkBJrWZ0"
    }
  ],
  "_sd_alg": "sha-256",
  "cnf": {
    "jwk": {
      "kty": "EC",
      "crv": "P-256",
      "x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
      "y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
    }
  }
}

The following Disclosures are created by the Issuer:

Claim given_name:

  • SHA-256 Hash: jsu9yVulwQQlhFlM_3JlzMaSFzglhQG0DpfayQwLUK4
  • Disclosure:
    WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiSm9o
    biJd
  • Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "given_name", "John"]

Claim family_name:

  • SHA-256 Hash: TGf4oLbgwd5JQaHyKVQZU9UdGE0w5rtDsrZzfUaomLo
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkRv
    ZSJd
  • Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "family_name", "Doe"]

Claim email:

  • SHA-256 Hash: JzYjH4svliH0R3PyEMfeZu6Jt69u5qehZo7F7EPYlSE
  • Disclosure:
    WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImVtYWlsIiwgImpvaG5kb2VA
    ZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXQ
  • Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "email", "johndoe@example.com"]

Claim phone_number:

  • SHA-256 Hash: PorFbpKuVu6xymJagvkFsFXAbRoc2JGlAUA2BA4o7cI
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInBob25lX251bWJlciIsICIr
    MS0yMDItNTU1LTAxMDEiXQ
  • Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "phone_number",
    "+1-202-555-0101"]

Claim phone_number_verified:

  • SHA-256 Hash: XQ_3kPKt1XyX7KANkqVR6yZ2Va5NrPIvPYbyMvRKBMM
  • Disclosure:
    WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgInBob25lX251bWJlcl92ZXJp
    ZmllZCIsIHRydWVd
  • Contents: ["Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA", "phone_number_verified", true]

Claim address:

  • SHA-256 Hash: XzFrzwscM6Gn6CJDc6vVK8BkMnfG8vOSKfpPIZdAfdE
  • Disclosure:
    WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVl
    dF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRv
    d24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiVVMifV0
  • Contents: ["AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA", "address", {"street_address":
    "123 Main St", "locality": "Anytown", "region": "Anystate",
    "country": "US"}]

Claim birthdate:

  • SHA-256 Hash: gbOsI4Edq2x2Kw-w5wPEzakob9hV1cRD0ATN3oQL9JM
  • Disclosure:
    WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTQw
    LTAxLTAxIl0
  • Contents: ["Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ", "birthdate", "1940-01-01"]

Claim updated_at:

  • SHA-256 Hash: CrQe7S5kqBAHt-nMYXgc6bdt2SH5aTY1sU_M-PgkjPI
  • Disclosure:
    WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgInVwZGF0ZWRfYXQiLCAxNTcw
    MDAwMDAwXQ
  • Contents: ["G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA", "updated_at", 1570000000]

Array Entry:

  • SHA-256 Hash: pFndjkZ_VCzmyTa6UjlZo3dh-ko8aIKQc9DlGzhaVYo
  • Disclosure:
    WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgIlVTIl0
  • Contents: ["lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA", "US"]

Array Entry:

  • SHA-256 Hash: 7Cf6JkPudry3lcbwHgeZ8khAv1U1OSlerP0VkBJrWZ0
  • Disclosure:
    WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0JJZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwgIkRFIl0
  • Contents: ["nPuoQnkRFq3BIeAm7AnXFA", "DE"]

The payload is then signed by the Issuer to create a JWT like the following:

eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImV4YW1wbGUrc2Qtand0In0.eyJfc2QiOiBb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.XaB1KmNGBE-uKjT8M3VSu65QVWdNMjuhJI1sIEM4TIEs6Ae2f0DfWP80
TAg79QIhbz04IIrrXyrEbzkeZLoVHQ

The issued SD-JWT might look as follows:

eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImV4YW1wbGUrc2Qtand0In0.eyJfc2QiOiBb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.XaB1KmNGBE-uKjT8M3VSu65QVWdNMjuhJI1sIEM4TIEs6Ae2f0DfWP80
TAg79QIhbz04IIrrXyrEbzkeZLoVHQ~WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgI
mdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiSm9obiJd~WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZh
bWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkRvZSJd~WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImVtYWl
sIiwgImpvaG5kb2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXQ~WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhR
IiwgInBob25lX251bWJlciIsICIrMS0yMDItNTU1LTAxMDEiXQ~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4Z
TQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgInBob25lX251bWJlcl92ZXJpZmllZCIsIHRydWVd~WyJBSngt
MDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIjog
IjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRvd24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFu
eXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiVVMifV0~WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZR
IiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTQwLTAxLTAxIl0~WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5
YWpBIiwgInVwZGF0ZWRfYXQiLCAxNTcwMDAwMDAwXQ~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92T
U5JdkNBIiwgIlVTIl0~WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0JJZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwgIkRFIl0~

6.2. Presentation

The following non-normative example shows an SD-JWT+KB as it would be sent from the Holder to the Verifier. Note that it consists of six tilde-separated parts, with the Issuer-signed JWT as shown above in the beginning, four Disclosures (for the claims given_name, family_name, address, and nationalities) in the middle, and the Key Binding JWT as the last element.

eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImV4YW1wbGUrc2Qtand0In0.eyJfc2QiOiBb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.XaB1KmNGBE-uKjT8M3VSu65QVWdNMjuhJI1sIEM4TIEs6Ae2f0DfWP80
TAg79QIhbz04IIrrXyrEbzkeZLoVHQ~WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgI
mZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkRvZSJd~WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImFk
ZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5
IjogIkFueXRvd24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiVVMi
fV0~WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiSm9obiJd
~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgIlVTIl0~eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCA
idHlwIjogImtiK2p3dCJ9.eyJub25jZSI6ICIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwgImF1ZCI6ICJodH
RwczovL3ZlcmlmaWVyLmV4YW1wbGUub3JnIiwgImlhdCI6IDE3MTgyOTg3NjYsICJzZF
9oYXNoIjogImEyWTh0bUhrUm9MQXFrWTlKMjR0aXhucWJNLVVxcFg2MUpJRm5BVDIxX2
sifQ.sqzbrv_SfCuI7yk3w7Hot82zFZiaWB-EH2GqsSi2-ZukcgP7z8DQGhPkSV97-WZ
r5hGm-nR0MmSDTXgmoFeViQ

The following Key Binding JWT payload was created and signed for this presentation by the Holder:

{
  "nonce": "1234567890",
  "aud": "https://verifier.example.org",
  "iat": 1718298766,
  "sd_hash": "a2Y8tmHkRoLAqkY9J24tixnqbM-UqpX61JIFnAT21_k"
}

If the Verifier did not require Key Binding, then the Holder could have presented the SD-JWT with selected Disclosures directly, instead of encapsulating it in an SD-JWT+KB.

7. Considerations on Nested Data in SD-JWTs

Being JSON, an object in an SD-JWT payload MAY contain name-value pairs where the value is another object or objects MAY be elements in arrays. In SD-JWT, the Issuer decides for each claim individually, on each level of the JSON, whether the claim should be selectively disclosable or not. This choice can be made on each level independent from whether keys higher in the hierarchy are selectively disclosable.

From this it follows that the _sd key containing digests MAY appear multiple times in an SD-JWT, and likewise, there MAY be multiple arrays within the hierarchy with each having selectively disclosable elements. Digests of selectively disclosable claims MAY even appear within other Disclosures.

The following examples illustrate some of the options an Issuer has. It is up to the Issuer to decide which structure to use, depending on, for example, the expected use cases for the SD-JWT, requirements for privacy, size considerations, or ecosystem requirements. For more examples with nested structures, see Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2.

The following input claim set is used as an example throughout this section:

{
  "sub": "6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c",
  "address": {
    "street_address": "Schulstr. 12",
    "locality": "Schulpforta",
    "region": "Sachsen-Anhalt",
    "country": "DE"
  }
}

Important: The following examples of the structures are non-normative and are not intended to represent all possible options. They are also not meant to define or restrict how address can be represented in an SD-JWT.

7.1. Example: Flat SD-JWT

The Issuer can decide to treat the address claim as a block that can either be disclosed completely or not at all. The following example shows that in this case, the entire address claim is treated as an object in the Disclosure.

{
  "_sd": [
    "fOBUSQvo46yQO-wRwXBcGqvnbKIueISEL961_Sjd4do"
  ],
  "iss": "https://issuer.example.com",
  "iat": 1683000000,
  "exp": 1883000000,
  "sub": "6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c",
  "_sd_alg": "sha-256"
}

The Issuer would create the following Disclosure:

Claim address:

  • SHA-256 Hash: fOBUSQvo46yQO-wRwXBcGqvnbKIueISEL961_Sjd4do
  • Disclosure:
    WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVl
    dF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIlNjaHVsc3RyLiAxMiIsICJsb2NhbGl0eSI6ICJTY2h1
    bHBmb3J0YSIsICJyZWdpb24iOiAiU2FjaHNlbi1BbmhhbHQiLCAiY291bnRy
    eSI6ICJERSJ9XQ
  • Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "address", {"street_address":
    "Schulstr. 12", "locality": "Schulpforta", "region":
    "Sachsen-Anhalt", "country": "DE"}]

7.2. Example: Structured SD-JWT

The Issuer may instead decide to make the address claim contents selectively disclosable individually:

{
  "iss": "https://issuer.example.com",
  "iat": 1683000000,
  "exp": 1883000000,
  "sub": "6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c",
  "address": {
    "_sd": [
      "6vh9bq-zS4GKM_7GpggVbYzzu6oOGXrmNVGPHP75Ud0",
      "9gjVuXtdFROCgRrtNcGUXmF65rdezi_6Er_j76kmYyM",
      "KURDPh4ZC19-3tiz-Df39V8eidy1oV3a3H1Da2N0g88",
      "WN9r9dCBJ8HTCsS2jKASxTjEyW5m5x65_Z_2ro2jfXM"
    ]
  },
  "_sd_alg": "sha-256"
}

In this case, the Issuer would use the following data in the Disclosures for the address sub-claims:

Claim street_address:

  • SHA-256 Hash: 9gjVuXtdFROCgRrtNcGUXmF65rdezi_6Er_j76kmYyM
  • Disclosure:
    WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgInN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIiwg
    IlNjaHVsc3RyLiAxMiJd
  • Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "street_address", "Schulstr. 12"]

Claim locality:

  • SHA-256 Hash: 6vh9bq-zS4GKM_7GpggVbYzzu6oOGXrmNVGPHP75Ud0
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlNjaHVs
    cGZvcnRhIl0
  • Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "locality", "Schulpforta"]

Claim region:

  • SHA-256 Hash: KURDPh4ZC19-3tiz-Df39V8eidy1oV3a3H1Da2N0g88
  • Disclosure:
    WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgInJlZ2lvbiIsICJTYWNoc2Vu
    LUFuaGFsdCJd
  • Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "region", "Sachsen-Anhalt"]

Claim country:

  • SHA-256 Hash: WN9r9dCBJ8HTCsS2jKASxTjEyW5m5x65_Z_2ro2jfXM
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiREUiXQ
  • Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "country", "DE"]

The Issuer may also make one sub-claim of address non-selectively disclosable and hide only the other sub-claims:

{
  "iss": "https://issuer.example.com",
  "iat": 1683000000,
  "exp": 1883000000,
  "sub": "6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c",
  "address": {
    "_sd": [
      "6vh9bq-zS4GKM_7GpggVbYzzu6oOGXrmNVGPHP75Ud0",
      "9gjVuXtdFROCgRrtNcGUXmF65rdezi_6Er_j76kmYyM",
      "KURDPh4ZC19-3tiz-Df39V8eidy1oV3a3H1Da2N0g88"
    ],
    "country": "DE"
  },
  "_sd_alg": "sha-256"
}

In this case there would be no Disclosure for country since it is provided in the clear.

7.3. Example: SD-JWT with Recursive Disclosures

The Issuer may also decide to make the address claim contents selectively disclosable recursively, i.e., the address claim is made selectively disclosable as well as its sub-claims:

{
  "_sd": [
    "HvrKX6fPV0v9K_yCVFBiLFHsMaxcD_114Em6VT8x1lg"
  ],
  "iss": "https://issuer.example.com",
  "iat": 1683000000,
  "exp": 1883000000,
  "sub": "6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c",
  "_sd_alg": "sha-256"
}

The Issuer creates Disclosures first for the sub-claims and then includes their digests in the Disclosure for the address claim:

Claim street_address:

  • SHA-256 Hash: 9gjVuXtdFROCgRrtNcGUXmF65rdezi_6Er_j76kmYyM
  • Disclosure:
    WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgInN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIiwg
    IlNjaHVsc3RyLiAxMiJd
  • Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "street_address", "Schulstr. 12"]

Claim locality:

  • SHA-256 Hash: 6vh9bq-zS4GKM_7GpggVbYzzu6oOGXrmNVGPHP75Ud0
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlNjaHVs
    cGZvcnRhIl0
  • Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "locality", "Schulpforta"]

Claim region:

  • SHA-256 Hash: KURDPh4ZC19-3tiz-Df39V8eidy1oV3a3H1Da2N0g88
  • Disclosure:
    WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgInJlZ2lvbiIsICJTYWNoc2Vu
    LUFuaGFsdCJd
  • Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "region", "Sachsen-Anhalt"]

Claim country:

  • SHA-256 Hash: WN9r9dCBJ8HTCsS2jKASxTjEyW5m5x65_Z_2ro2jfXM
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiREUiXQ
  • Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "country", "DE"]

Claim address:

  • SHA-256 Hash: HvrKX6fPV0v9K_yCVFBiLFHsMaxcD_114Em6VT8x1lg
  • Disclosure:
    WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7Il9zZCI6
    IFsiNnZoOWJxLXpTNEdLTV83R3BnZ1ZiWXp6dTZvT0dYcm1OVkdQSFA3NVVk
    MCIsICI5Z2pWdVh0ZEZST0NnUnJ0TmNHVVhtRjY1cmRlemlfNkVyX2o3Nmtt
    WXlNIiwgIktVUkRQaDRaQzE5LTN0aXotRGYzOVY4ZWlkeTFvVjNhM0gxRGEy
    TjBnODgiLCAiV045cjlkQ0JKOEhUQ3NTMmpLQVN4VGpFeVc1bTV4NjVfWl8y
    cm8yamZYTSJdfV0
  • Contents: ["Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA", "address", {"_sd":
    ["6vh9bq-zS4GKM_7GpggVbYzzu6oOGXrmNVGPHP75Ud0",
    "9gjVuXtdFROCgRrtNcGUXmF65rdezi_6Er_j76kmYyM",
    "KURDPh4ZC19-3tiz-Df39V8eidy1oV3a3H1Da2N0g88",
    "WN9r9dCBJ8HTCsS2jKASxTjEyW5m5x65_Z_2ro2jfXM"]}]

8. Verification and Processing

8.1. Verification of the SD-JWT

Upon receiving an SD-JWT, either directly or as a component of an SD-JWT+KB, a Holder or a Verifier needs to ensure that:

  • the Issuer-signed JWT is valid, i.e., it is signed by the Issuer and the signature is valid, and
  • all Disclosures are valid and correspond to a respective digest value in the Issuer-signed JWT (directly in the payload or recursively included in the contents of other Disclosures).

The Holder or the Verifier MUST perform the following (or equivalent) steps when receiving an SD-JWT:

  1. Separate the SD-JWT into the Issuer-signed JWT and the Disclosures (if any).

  2. Validate the Issuer-signed JWT:

    1. Ensure that a signing algorithm was used that was deemed secure for the application. Refer to [RFC8725], Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for details. The none algorithm MUST NOT be accepted.
    2. Validate the signature over the Issuer-signed JWT per Section 5.2 of [RFC7515].
    3. Validate the Issuer and that the signing key belongs to this Issuer.
    4. Check that the _sd_alg claim value is understood and the hash algorithm is deemed secure (see Section 5.1.1).

  3. Process the Disclosures and embedded digests in the Issuer-signed JWT as follows:

    1. For each Disclosure provided:

      1. Calculate the digest over the base64url-encoded string as described in Section 5.2.3.

    2. (*) Identify all embedded digests in the Issuer-signed JWT as follows:

      1. Find all objects having an _sd key that refers to an array of strings.
      2. Find all array elements that are objects with one key, that key being ... and referring to a string.

    3. (**) For each embedded digest found in the previous step:

      1. Compare the value with the digests calculated previously and find the matching Disclosure. If no such Disclosure can be found, the digest MUST be ignored.

      2. If the digest was found in an object's _sd key:

        1. If the contents of the respective Disclosure is not a JSON-encoded array of three elements (salt, claim name, claim value), the SD-JWT MUST be rejected.
        2. If the claim name is _sd or ..., the SD-JWT MUST be rejected.
        3. If the claim name already exists at the level of the _sd key, the SD-JWT MUST be rejected.
        4. Insert, at the level of the _sd key, a new claim using the claim name and claim value from the Disclosure.
        5. Recursively process the value using the steps described in (*) and (**).

      3. If the digest was found in an array element:

        1. If the contents of the respective Disclosure is not a JSON-encoded array of two elements (salt, value), the SD-JWT MUST be rejected.
        2. Replace the array element with the value from the Disclosure.
        3. Recursively process the value using the steps described in (*) and (**).
    4. Remove all array elements for which the digest was not found in the previous step.
    5. Remove all _sd keys and their contents from the Issuer-signed JWT payload. If this results in an object with no properties, it should be represented as an empty object {}.
    6. Remove the claim _sd_alg from the SD-JWT payload.
  4. If any digest value is encountered more than once in the Issuer-signed JWT payload (directly or recursively via other Disclosures), the SD-JWT MUST be rejected.
  5. If any Disclosure was not referenced by digest value in the Issuer-signed JWT (directly or recursively via other Disclosures), the SD-JWT MUST be rejected.
  6. Check that the SD-JWT is valid using claims such as nbf, iat, and exp in the processed payload. If a required validity-controlling claim is missing (see Section 10.7), the SD-JWT MUST be rejected.

If any step fails, the SD-JWT is not valid and processing MUST be aborted.

It is up to the Holder how to maintain the mapping between the Disclosures and the plaintext claim values to be able to display them to the End-User when needed.

8.2. Processing by the Holder

The Issuer MUST provide the Holder an SD-JWT, not an SD-JWT+KB. If the Holder receives an SD-JWT+KB, it SHOULD be rejected.

For presentation to a Verifier, the Holder MUST perform the following (or equivalent) steps:

  1. Decide which Disclosures to release to the Verifier, obtaining proper End-User consent if necessary.
  2. Assemble the SD-JWT, including the Issuer-signed JWT and the selected Disclosures (see Section 5 for the format).

  3. If Key Binding is not required:

    1. Send the SD-JWT to the Verifier.

  4. If Key Binding is required:

    1. Create a Key Binding JWT tied to the SD-JWT.
    2. Assemble the SD-JWT+KB by concatenating the SD-JWT and the Key Binding JWT.
    3. Send the SD-JWT+KB to the Verifier.

8.3. Verification by the Verifier

Upon receiving a presentation from a Holder, in the form of either an SD-JWT or an SD-JWT+KB, in addition to the checks outlined in Section 8.1, Verifiers need to ensure that

  • if Key Binding is required, then the Holder has provided an SD-JWT+KB, and
  • the Key Binding JWT is signed by the Holder and valid.

To this end, Verifiers MUST follow the following steps (or equivalent):

  1. Determine if Key Binding is to be checked according to the Verifier's policy for the use case at hand. This decision MUST NOT be based on whether a Key Binding JWT is provided by the Holder or not. Refer to Section 10.5 for details.
  2. If Key Binding is required and the Holder has provided an SD-JWT (without Key Binding), the Verifier MUST reject the presentation.
  3. If the Holder has provided an SD-JWT+KB, parse it into an SD-JWT and a Key Binding JWT.
  4. Process the SD-JWT as defined in Section 8.1.

  5. If Key Binding is required:

    1. Determine the public key for the Holder from the SD-JWT (see Section 5.1.2).
    2. Ensure that a signing algorithm was used that was deemed secure for the application. Refer to [RFC8725], Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for details. The none algorithm MUST NOT be accepted.
    3. Validate the signature over the Key Binding JWT per Section 5.2 of [RFC7515].
    4. Check that the typ of the Key Binding JWT is kb+jwt (see Section 5.3).
    5. Check that the creation time of the Key Binding JWT, as determined by the iat claim, is within an acceptable window.
    6. Determine that the Key Binding JWT is bound to the current transaction and was created for this Verifier (replay protection) by validating nonce and aud claims.
    7. Calculate the digest over the Issuer-signed JWT and Disclosures as defined in Section 5.3.1 and verify that it matches the value of the sd_hash claim in the Key Binding JWT.
    8. Check that the Key Binding JWT is a valid JWT in all other respects, per [RFC7519] and [RFC8725].

If any step fails, the presentation is not valid and processing MUST be aborted.

Otherwise, the processed SD-JWT payload can be passed to the application to be used for the intended purpose.

9. JWS JSON Serialization

This section describes an alternative format for SD-JWTs and SD-JWT+KBs using the JWS JSON Serialization from [RFC7515]. Supporting this format is OPTIONAL.

9.1. New Unprotected Header Parameters

For both the General and Flattened JSON Serialization, the SD-JWT or SD-JWT+KB is represented as a JSON object according to Section 7.2 of [RFC7515]. The following new unprotected header parameters are defined:

  • disclosures: An array of strings where each element is an individual Disclosure as described in Section 5.2.
  • kb_jwt: Present only in an SD-JWT+KB, the Key Binding JWT as described in Section 5.3.

In an SD-JWT+KB, kb_jwt MUST be present when using the JWS JSON Serialization, and the digest in the sd_hash claim MUST be taken over the SD-JWT as described in Section 5.3.1. This means that even when using the JWS JSON Serialization, the representation as a regular SD-JWT MUST be created temporarily to calculate the digest. In detail, the SD-JWT part is built by concatenating the protected header, the payload, and the signature of the JWS JSON serialized SD-JWT using a . character as a separator, and using the Disclosures from the disclosures member of the unprotected header.

Unprotected headers other than disclosures are not covered by the digest, and therefore, as usual, are not protected against tampering.

9.2. Flattened JSON Serialization

In case of the Flattened JSON Serialization, there is only one unprotected header.

The following is a non-normative example of a JWS JSON serialized SD-JWT as issued using the Flattened JSON Serialization:

{
  "header": {
    "disclosures": [
      "WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgInN1YiIsICJqb2huX2RvZV80M
        iJd",
      "WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiSm9ob
        iJd",
      "WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkRvZ
        SJd",
      "WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTQwL
        TAxLTAxIl0"
    ]
  },
  "payload": "eyJfc2QiOiBbIjRIQm42YUlZM1d0dUdHV1R4LXFVajZjZGs2V0JwWn
    lnbHRkRmF2UGE3TFkiLCAiOHNtMVFDZjAyMXBObkhBQ0k1c1A0bTRLWmd5Tk9PQV
    ljVGo5SE5hQzF3WSIsICJjZ0ZkaHFQbzgzeFlObEpmYWNhQ2FhN3VQOVJDUjUwVk
    U1UjRMQVE5aXFVIiwgImpNQ1hWei0tOWI4eDM3WWNvRGZYUWluencxd1pjY2NmRl
    JCQ0ZHcWRHMm8iXSwgImlzcyI6ICJodHRwczovL2lzc3Vlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS
    IsICJpYXQiOiAxNjgzMDAwMDAwLCAiZXhwIjogMTg4MzAwMDAwMCwgIl9zZF9hbG
    ciOiAic2hhLTI1NiIsICJjbmYiOiB7Imp3ayI6IHsia3R5IjogIkVDIiwgImNydi
    I6ICJQLTI1NiIsICJ4IjogIlRDQUVSMTladnUzT0hGNGo0VzR2ZlNWb0hJUDFJTG
    lsRGxzN3ZDZUdlbWMiLCAieSI6ICJaeGppV1diWk1RR0hWV0tWUTRoYlNJaXJzVm
    Z1ZWNDRTZ0NGpUOUYySFpRIn19fQ",
  "protected":
    "eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImV4YW1wbGUrc2Qtand0In0",
  "signature": "warLAZGlbNiUwR1fbEo-VpyOINYjUPWQrq_Klnutf55JizVWyFAc
    xm7x_cutT39JBr3ieOhfCfZhWuBtSwyVmA"
}

The following is an SD-JWT+KB with two Disclosures:

{
  "header": {
    "disclosures": [
      "WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkRvZ
        SJd",
      "WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiSm9ob
        iJd"
    ],
    "kb_jwt": "eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImtiK2p3dCJ9.eyJub25j
      ZSI6ICIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwgImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL3ZlcmlmaWVyLmV4YW
      1wbGUub3JnIiwgImlhdCI6IDE3MTgyOTg3NjYsICJzZF9oYXNoIjogIjh2cWMx
      WVAyZ1BwdnBvVXVXS25FUC1laVU2dUtUYlJXdWpLWmdpc0V4clEifQ.fqydeQ2
      vbc1fQ0mOJ0fnpunxBQ2SgGpM4FQICquHJjU0QYqfc6Uo2kbzOOX-_zQ51pIiH
      GrOM1tswWBRjNkKxw"
  },
  "payload": "eyJfc2QiOiBbIjRIQm42YUlZM1d0dUdHV1R4LXFVajZjZGs2V0JwWn
    lnbHRkRmF2UGE3TFkiLCAiOHNtMVFDZjAyMXBObkhBQ0k1c1A0bTRLWmd5Tk9PQV
    ljVGo5SE5hQzF3WSIsICJjZ0ZkaHFQbzgzeFlObEpmYWNhQ2FhN3VQOVJDUjUwVk
    U1UjRMQVE5aXFVIiwgImpNQ1hWei0tOWI4eDM3WWNvRGZYUWluencxd1pjY2NmRl
    JCQ0ZHcWRHMm8iXSwgImlzcyI6ICJodHRwczovL2lzc3Vlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS
    IsICJpYXQiOiAxNjgzMDAwMDAwLCAiZXhwIjogMTg4MzAwMDAwMCwgIl9zZF9hbG
    ciOiAic2hhLTI1NiIsICJjbmYiOiB7Imp3ayI6IHsia3R5IjogIkVDIiwgImNydi
    I6ICJQLTI1NiIsICJ4IjogIlRDQUVSMTladnUzT0hGNGo0VzR2ZlNWb0hJUDFJTG
    lsRGxzN3ZDZUdlbWMiLCAieSI6ICJaeGppV1diWk1RR0hWV0tWUTRoYlNJaXJzVm
    Z1ZWNDRTZ0NGpUOUYySFpRIn19fQ",
  "protected":
    "eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImV4YW1wbGUrc2Qtand0In0",
  "signature": "warLAZGlbNiUwR1fbEo-VpyOINYjUPWQrq_Klnutf55JizVWyFAc
    xm7x_cutT39JBr3ieOhfCfZhWuBtSwyVmA"
}

9.3. General JSON Serialization

In case of the General JSON Serialization, there are multiple unprotected headers (one per signature). If present, disclosures and kb_jwt, MUST be included in the first unprotected header and MUST NOT be present in any following unprotected headers.

The following is a non-normative example of a presentation of a JWS JSON serialized SD-JWT including a Key Binding JWT using the General JSON Serialization:

{
  "payload": "eyJfc2QiOiBbIjRIQm42YUlZM1d0dUdHV1R4LXFVajZjZGs2V0JwWn
    lnbHRkRmF2UGE3TFkiLCAiOHNtMVFDZjAyMXBObkhBQ0k1c1A0bTRLWmd5Tk9PQV
    ljVGo5SE5hQzF3WSIsICJjZ0ZkaHFQbzgzeFlObEpmYWNhQ2FhN3VQOVJDUjUwVk
    U1UjRMQVE5aXFVIiwgImpNQ1hWei0tOWI4eDM3WWNvRGZYUWluencxd1pjY2NmRl
    JCQ0ZHcWRHMm8iXSwgImlzcyI6ICJodHRwczovL2lzc3Vlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS
    IsICJpYXQiOiAxNjgzMDAwMDAwLCAiZXhwIjogMTg4MzAwMDAwMCwgIl9zZF9hbG
    ciOiAic2hhLTI1NiIsICJjbmYiOiB7Imp3ayI6IHsia3R5IjogIkVDIiwgImNydi
    I6ICJQLTI1NiIsICJ4IjogIlRDQUVSMTladnUzT0hGNGo0VzR2ZlNWb0hJUDFJTG
    lsRGxzN3ZDZUdlbWMiLCAieSI6ICJaeGppV1diWk1RR0hWV0tWUTRoYlNJaXJzVm
    Z1ZWNDRTZ0NGpUOUYySFpRIn19fQ",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "header": {
        "disclosures": [
          "WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgI
            kRvZSJd",
          "WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiS
            m9obiJd"
        ],
        "kid": "issuer-key-1",
        "kb_jwt": "eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImtiK2p3dCJ9.eyJu
          b25jZSI6ICIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwgImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL3ZlcmlmaW
          VyLmV4YW1wbGUub3JnIiwgImlhdCI6IDE3MTgyOTg3NjYsICJzZF9oYXNo
          IjogImJ0UUVxRjlhUWp2VjNfNDVfVmczZ2p2UlB3MThYLUpHUVNjX25fWX
          dNYkkifQ.A6vjVAGV6YoGL1lmIrLj_QDNauipb1-NkNym43Vq610s7kBmz
          R_62i8UHD8JVZPlIrWc_-Twhleqplt08UECJQ"
      },
      "protected":
        "eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImV4YW1wbGUrc2Qtand0In0",
      "signature": "QUE5TWvbcB2f6TAibj3yg9z_hOKJFNgI1-Df8JWQHj3hGCJw
        OJ7sOSTSRmt5OBBc4awg03nEIJP9_dJPVmYbZQ"
    },
    {
      "header": {
        "kid": "issuer-key-2"
      },
      "protected":
        "eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImV4YW1wbGUrc2Qtand0In0",
      "signature": "JdK1CGTT6CoGZHmKnoSjWZL-sLvvoEXR62_h_WAq5jy80rOk
        JxA-AuIXZMVtTRnzm8reluIwAOV83p6bnT_GXg"
    }
  ]
}

9.4. Verification of the JWS JSON Serialized SD-JWT

Verification of the JWS JSON serialized SD-JWT follows the rules defined in Section 4.4, except for the following aspects:

  • The SD-JWT or SD-JWT+KB does not need to be split into component parts and the Disclosures can be found in the disclosures member of the unprotected header.
  • To verify the digest in sd_hash in the Key Binding JWT of an SD-JWT+KB, the Verifier MUST assemble the string to be hashed as described in Section 9.1.

10. Security Considerations

Security considerations in this section help achieve the following properties:

Selective Disclosure: An adversary in the role of the Verifier cannot obtain information from an SD-JWT about any claim name or claim value that was not explicitly disclosed by the Holder unless that information can be derived from other disclosed claims or sources other than the presented SD-JWT.

Integrity: A malicious Holder cannot modify names or values of selectively disclosable claims without detection by the Verifier.

Additionally, as described in Section 10.5, the application of Key Binding can ensure that the presenter of an SD-JWT credential is the legitimate Holder of the credential.

10.1. Mandatory Signing of the Issuer-signed JWT

The Issuer-signed JWT MUST be signed by the Issuer to protect integrity of the issued claims. An attacker can modify or add claims if this JWT is not signed (e.g., change the "email" attribute to take over the victim's account or add an attribute indicating a fake academic qualification).

The Verifier MUST always check the signature of the Issuer-signed JWT to ensure that it has not been tampered with since the issuance. The Issuer-signed JWT MUST be rejected if the signature cannot be verified.

The security of the Issuer-signed JWT depends on the security of the signature algorithm. Any of the JWS asymmetric digital signature algorithms registered in [IANA.JWS.Algorithms] can be used, including post-quantum algorithms, when they are ready.

10.2. Manipulation of Disclosures

Holders can manipulate the Disclosures by changing the values of the claims before sending them to the Verifier. The Verifier MUST check the Disclosures to ensure that the values of the claims are correct, i.e., the digests of the Disclosures are actually present in the signed SD-JWT.

A naive Verifier that extracts all claim values from the Disclosures (without checking the hashes) and inserts them into the SD-JWT payload is vulnerable to this attack. However, in a structured SD-JWT, without comparing the digests of the Disclosures, such an implementation could not determine the correct place in a nested object where a claim needs to be inserted. Therefore, the naive implementation would not only be insecure, but also incorrect.

The steps described in Section 8.3 ensure that the Verifier checks the Disclosures correctly.

10.3. Entropy of the salt

The security model that conceals the plaintext claims relies on the high entropy random data of the salt as additional input to the hash function. The randomness ensures that the same plaintext claim value does not produce the same digest value. It also makes it infeasible to guess the preimage of the digest (thereby learning the plaintext claim value) by enumerating the potential value space for a claim into the hash function to search for a matching digest value. It is therefore vitally important that unrevealed salts cannot be learned or guessed, even if other salts have been revealed. As such, each salt MUST be created in such a manner that it is cryptographically random, sufficiently long, and has high enough entropy that it is infeasible to guess. A new salt MUST be chosen for each claim independently of other salts. See Randomness Requirements for Security [RFC4086] for considerations on generating random values.

The RECOMMENDED minimum length of the randomly-generated portion of the salt is 128 bits.

The Issuer MUST ensure that a new salt value is chosen for each claim, including when the same claim name occurs at different places in the structure of the SD-JWT. This can be seen in the example in Appendix A.2, where multiple claims with the name type appear, but each of them has a different salt.

10.4. Choice of a Hash Algorithm

To ensure privacy of claims that are selectively disclosable, but are not being disclosed in a given presentation, the hash function MUST ensure that it is infeasible to calculate any portion of the three elements (salt, claim name, claim value) from a particular digest. This implies the hash function MUST be preimage resistant, but should also not allow an observer to infer any partial information about the undisclosed content. In the terminology of cryptographic commitment schemes, the hash function MUST be computationally hiding.

To ensure the integrity of selectively disclosable claims, the hash function MUST be second-preimage resistant. That is, for any combination of salt, claim name and claim value, it is infeasible to find a different combination of salt, claim name and claim value that result in the same digest.

The hash function SHOULD also be collision resistant. Although not essential to the anticipated uses of SD-JWT, without collision resistance an Issuer may be able to find multiple disclosures that have the same hash value. In which case, the signature over the SD-JWT would not then commit the Issuer to the contents of the JWT. The collision resistance of the hash function used to generate digests SHOULD match the collision resistance of the hash function used by the signature scheme. For example, use of the ES512 signature algorithm would require a disclosure hash function with at least 256-bit collision resistance, such as SHA-512.

Note that inclusion in the "Named Information Hash Algorithm" registry [IANA.Hash.Algorithms] alone does not indicate a hash algorithm's suitability for use in SD-JWT (it contains several heavily truncated digests, such as sha-256-32 and sha-256-64, which are unfit for security applications).

Furthermore, the hash algorithms MD2, MD4, MD5, and SHA-1 revealed fundamental weaknesses and MUST NOT be used.

10.5. Key Binding

Key Binding aims to ensure that the presenter of an SD-JWT credential is actually the legitimate Holder of the credential. An SD-JWT compatible with Key Binding contains a public key, or a reference to a public key, that corresponds to a private key possessed by the Holder. The Verifier requires that the Holder prove possession of that private key when presenting the SD-JWT credential.

Without Key Binding, a Verifier only gets the proof that the credential was issued by a particular Issuer, but the credential itself can be replayed by anyone who gets access to it. This means that, for example, after a credential was leaked to an attacker, the attacker can present the credential to any verifier that does not require a binding. But also a malicious Verifier to which the Holder presented the credential can present the credential to another Verifier if that other Verifier does not require Key Binding.

Verifiers MUST decide whether Key Binding is required for a particular use case before verifying a credential. This decision can be informed by various factors including, but not limited to the following: business requirements, the use case, the type of binding between a Holder and its credential that is required for a use case, the sensitivity of the use case, the expected properties of a credential, the type and contents of other credentials expected to be presented at the same time, etc.

It is important that a Verifier does not make its security policy decisions based on data that can be influenced by an attacker. For this reason, when deciding whether Key Binding is required or not, Verifiers MUST NOT take into account whether the Holder has provided an SD-JWT+KB or a bare SD-JWT, since otherwise an attacker could strip the KB-JWT from an SD-JWT+KB and present the resulting SD-JWT.

Furthermore, Verifiers should be aware that Key Binding information may have been added to an SD-JWT in a format that they do not recognize and therefore may not be able to tell whether the SD-JWT supports Key Binding or not.

If a Verifier determines that Key Binding is required for a particular use case and the Holder presents either a bare SD-JWT or an SD-JWT+KB with an invalid Key Binding JWT, then the Verifier will reject the presentation when following the verification steps described in Section 8.3.

10.6. Blinding Claim Names

SD-JWT ensures that names of claims that are selectively disclosable are always blinded. This prevents an attacker from learning the names of the disclosable claims. However, the names of the claims that are not disclosable are not blinded. This includes the keys of objects that themselves are not blinded, but contain disclosable claims. This limitation needs to be taken into account by Issuers when creating the structure of the SD-JWT.

10.7. Selectively-Disclosable Validity Claims

An Issuer MUST NOT allow any content to be selectively disclosable that is critical for evaluating the SD-JWT's authenticity or validity. The exact list of such content will depend on the application and SHOULD be listed by any application-specific profile of SD-JWT. The following is a list of registered JWT claim names that SHOULD be considered as security-critical:

  • iss (Issuer)
  • aud (Audience), although issuers MAY allow individual entries in the array to be selectively disclosable
  • exp (Expiration Time)
  • nbf (Not Before)
  • cnf (Confirmation Key)

Issuers will typically include claims controlling the validity of the SD-JWT in plaintext in the SD-JWT payload, but there is no guarantee they would do so. Therefore, Verifiers cannot reliably depend on that and need to operate as though security-critical claims might be selectively disclosable.

Verifiers therefore MUST ensure that all claims they deem necessary for checking the validity of an SD-JWT in the given context are present (or disclosed, respectively) during validation of the SD-JWT. This is implemented in the last step of the verification defined in Section 8.1.

The precise set of required validity claims will typically be defined by ecosystem rules, application-specific profile, or the credential format and MAY include claims other than those listed herein.

10.8. Issuer Signature Key Distribution and Rotation

This specification does not define how signature verification keys of Issuers are distributed to Verifiers. However, it is RECOMMENDED that Issuers publish their keys in a way that allows for efficient and secure key rotation and revocation, for example, by publishing keys at a predefined location using the JSON Web Key Set (JWKS) format [RFC7517]. Verifiers need to ensure that they are not using expired or revoked keys for signature verification using reasonable and appropriate means for the given key-distribution method.

10.9. Forwarding Credentials

Any entity in possession of an SD-JWT (including an SD-JWT extracted from an SD-JWT+KB) can forward it to any third party that does not enforce Key Binding. When doing so, that entity may remove Disclosures such that the receiver learns only a subset of the claims contained in the original SD-JWT.

For example, a device manufacturer might produce an SD-JWT containing information about upstream and downstream supply chain contributors. Each supply chain party can verify only the claims that were selectively disclosed to them by an upstream party, and they can choose to further reduce the disclosed claims when presenting to a downstream party.

In some scenarios this behavior could be desirable, but if it is not, Issuers need to support and Verifiers need to enforce Key Binding.

10.10. Integrity of SD-JWTs and SD-JWT+KBs

With an SD-JWT, the Issuer-signed JWT is integrity-protected by the Issuer's signature, and the values of the Disclosures are integrity-protected by the digests included therein. The specific set of Disclosures, however, is not integrity-protected - the SD-JWT can be modified by adding or removing Disclosures and still be valid.

With an SD-JWT+KB, the set of selected Disclosures is integrity-protected. The signature in the Key Binding JWT covers a specific SD-JWT, with a specific Issuer-signed JWT and a specific set of Disclosures. Thus, the signature on the Key Binding JWT, in addition to proving Key Binding, also assures the authenticity and integrity of the set of Disclosures the Holder disclosed. The set of Disclosures in an SD-JWT+KB is the set that the Holder intended to send; no intermediate party has added, removed, or modified the list of Disclosures.

10.11. Explicit Typing

Section 3.11 of [RFC8725] describes the use of explicit typing to prevent confusion attacks in which one kind of JWT is mistaken for another. SD-JWTs are also potentially vulnerable to such confusion attacks, so it is RECOMMENDED to specify an explicit type by including the typ header parameter when the SD-JWT is issued, and for Verifiers to check this value.

When explicit typing is employed for an SD-JWT, it is RECOMMENDED that a media type name of the format "application/example+sd-jwt" be used, where "example" is replaced by the identifier for the specific kind of SD-JWT. The definition of typ in Section 4.1.9 of [RFC7515] recommends that the "application/" prefix be omitted, so "example+sd-jwt" would be the value of the typ header parameter.

11. Privacy Considerations

The privacy principles of [ISO.29100] should be adhered to.

11.1. Storage of Signed User Data

Wherever End-User data is stored, it represents a potential target for an attacker. This target can be of particularly high value when the data is signed by a trusted authority like an official national identity service. For example, in OpenID Connect, signed ID Tokens can be stored by Relying Parties. In the case of SD-JWT, Holders have to store SD-JWTs, and Issuers and Verifiers may decide to do so as well.

Not surprisingly, a leak of such data risks revealing private data of End-Users to third parties. Signed End-User data, the authenticity of which can be easily verified by third parties, further exacerbates the risk. As discussed in Section 10.5, leaked SD-JWTs may also allow attackers to impersonate Holders unless Key Binding is enforced and the attacker does not have access to the Holder's cryptographic keys. Altogether, leaked SD-JWT credentials may have a high monetary value on black markets.

Due to these risks, systems implementing SD-JWT SHOULD be designed to minimize the amount of data that is stored. All involved parties SHOULD store SD-JWTs containing privacy-sensitive data only for as long as needed, including in log files.

After Issuance, Issuers SHOULD NOT store the Issuer-signed JWT or the respective Disclosures if they contain privacy-sensitive data.

Holders SHOULD store SD-JWTs only in encrypted form, and, wherever possible, use hardware-backed encryption in particular for the private Key Binding key. Decentralized storage of data, e.g., on End-User devices, SHOULD be preferred for End-User credentials over centralized storage. Expired SD-JWTs SHOULD be deleted as soon as possible.

After Verification, Verifiers SHOULD NOT store the Issuer-signed JWT or the respective Disclosures if they contain privacy-sensitive data. It may be sufficient to store the result of the verification and any End-User data that is needed for the application.

If reliable and secure key rotation and revocation is ensured according to Section 10.8, Issuers may opt to publish expired or revoked private signing keys (after a grace period that ensures that the keys are not cached any longer at any Verifier). This reduces the value of any leaked credentials as the signatures on them can no longer be trusted to originate from the Issuer.

11.2. Confidentiality during Transport

If the SD-JWT is transmitted over an insecure channel during issuance or presentation, an adversary may be able to intercept and read the End-User's personal data or correlate the information with previous uses of the same SD-JWT.

Usually, transport protocols for issuance and presentation of credentials are designed to protect the confidentiality of the transmitted data, for example, by requiring the use of TLS.

This specification therefore considers the confidentiality of the data to be provided by the transport protocol and does not specify any encryption mechanism.

Implementers MUST ensure that the transport protocol provides confidentiality if the privacy of End-User data or correlation attacks by passive observers are a concern.

To encrypt the SD-JWT when transmitted over an insecure channel, implementers MAY use JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516] by nesting the SD-JWT as the plaintext payload of a JWE. Especially, when an SD-JWT is transmitted via a URL and information may be stored/cached in the browser or end up in web server logs, the SD-JWT SHOULD be encrypted using JWE.

11.3. Decoy Digests

The use of decoy digests is RECOMMENDED when the number of claims (or the existence of particular claims) can be a side-channel disclosing information about otherwise undisclosed claims. In particular, if a claim in an SD-JWT is present only if a certain condition is met (e.g., a membership number is only contained if the End-User is a member of a group), the Issuer SHOULD add decoy digests when the condition is not met.

Decoy digests increase the size of the SD-JWT. The number of decoy digests (or whether to use them at all) is a trade-off between the size of the SD-JWT and the privacy of the End-User's data.

11.4. Unlinkability

Unlinkability is a property whereby adversaries are prevented from correlating credential presentations of the same user beyond the user's consent. Without unlinkability, an adversary might be able to learn more about the user than the user intended to disclose, for example:

  • Cooperating Verifiers might want to track users across services to build advertising profiles.
  • Issuers might want to track where users present their credentials to enable surveillance.
  • After a data breach at multiple Verifiers, publicly available information might allow linking identifiable information presented to Verifier A with originally anonymous information presented to Verifier B, therefore revealing the identities of users of Verifier B.

The following types of unlinkability are considered here:

  • Presentation Unlinkability: A Verifier should not be able to link two presentations of the same credential.
  • Verifier/Verifier Unlinkability: Two colluding Verifiers should not be able to learn that they have received presentations of the same credential.
  • Issuer/Verifier Unlinkability (Honest Verifier): An Issuer of a credential should not be able to know that a user presented the credential to a certain Verifier that is not behaving maliciously.
  • Issuer/Verifier Unlinkability (Colluding/Compromised Verifier): An Issuer of a credential should not be able to tell that a user presented the credential to a certain Verifier, even if the Verifier colludes with the Issuer or becomes compromised and leaks stored credentials from presentations.

In all cases, unlinkability is limited to cases where the disclosed claims do not contain information that directly or indirectly identifies the user. For example, when a taxpayer identification number is contained in the disclosed claims, the Issuer and Verifier can easily link the user's transactions. However, when the user only discloses a birthdate to one Verifier and a postal code to another Verifier, the two Verifiers should not be able to determine that they were interacting with the same user.

Issuer/Verifier unlinkability with a colluding or compromised Verifier cannot be achieved in salted-hash based selective disclosure approaches, such as SD-JWT, as the issued credential with the Issuer's signature is directly presented to the Verifier, who can forward it to the Issuer.

Contrary to that, Issuer/Verifier unlinkability with an honest Verifier can generally be achieved. However, a callback from the Verifier to the Issuer, such as a revocation check, could potentially disclose information about the credential's usage to the Issuer. Where such callbacks are necessary, they MUST be executed in a manner that preserves privacy and does not disclose details about the credential to the Issuer. It is important to note that the timing of such requests could potentially serve as a side-channel.

Verifier/Verifier unlinkablility and presentation unlinkablility can be achieved using batch issuance: A batch of credentials based on the same claims is issued to the Holder instead of just a single credential. The Holder can then use a different credential for each Verifier or even for each session with a Verifier. New key binding keys and salts MUST be used for each credential in the batch to ensure that the Verifiers cannot link the credentials using these values. Likewise, claims carrying time information, like iat, exp, and nbf, MUST either be randomized within a time period considered appropriate (e.g., randomize iat within the last 24 hours and calculate exp accordingly) or rounded (e.g., rounded down to the beginning of the day).

11.5. Issuer Identifier

An Issuer issuing only one type of SD-JWT might have privacy implications, because if the Holder has an SD-JWT issued by that Issuer, its type and claim names can be determined.

For example, if the National Cancer Institute only issued SD-JWTs with cancer registry information, it is possible to deduce that the Holder owning its SD-JWT is a cancer patient.

Moreover, the issuer identifier alone may reveal information about the user.

For example, when a military organization or a drug rehabilitation center issues a vaccine credential, verifiers can deduce that the holder is a military member or may have a substance use disorder.

To mitigate this issue, a group of issuers may elect to use a common Issuer identifier. A group signature scheme outside the scope of this specification may also be used, instead of an individual signature.

12. Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Anders Rundgren, Arjan Geluk, Christian Bormann, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, Jacob Ward, Jeffrey Yasskin, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Michael Fraser, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Peter Altmann, Pieter Kasselman, Richard "fnord" Barnes, Rohan Mahy, Ryosuke Abe, Sami Rosendahl, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations.

The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway.

13. IANA Considerations

13.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration

This specification requests registration of the following Claims in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT] established by [RFC7519].

  • Claim Name: _sd
  • Claim Description: Digests of Disclosures for object properties
  • Change Controller: IETF
  • Specification Document(s): [[ Section 5.2.4.1 of this specification ]]


  • Claim Name: ...
  • Claim Description: Digest of the Disclosure for an array element
  • Change Controller: IETF
  • Specification Document(s): [[ Section 5.2.4.2 of this specification ]]


  • Claim Name: _sd_alg
  • Claim Description: Hash algorithm used to generate Disclosure digests and digest over presentation
  • Change Controller: IETF
  • Specification Document(s): [[ Section 5.1.1 of this specification ]]


  • Claim Name: sd_hash
  • Claim Description: Digest of the SD-JWT to which the KB-JWT is tied
  • Change Controller: IETF
  • Specification Document(s): [[ Section 5.3 of this specification ]]

13.2. Media Type Registration

This section requests registration of the following media types [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the manner described in [RFC6838].

Note: For the media type value used in the typ header in the Issuer-signed JWT itself, see Section 10.11.

To indicate that the content is an SD-JWT:

  • Type name: application
  • Subtype name: sd-jwt
  • Required parameters: n/a
  • Optional parameters: n/a
  • Encoding considerations: binary; application/sd-jwt values are a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') or tilde ('~') characters.
  • Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[ this specification ]], [RFC7519], and [RFC8725].
  • Interoperability considerations: n/a
  • Published specification: [[ this specification ]]
  • Applications that use this media type: TBD
  • Fragment identifier considerations: n/a

  • Additional information:

    • Magic number(s): n/a
    • File extension(s): n/a
    • Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
  • Person & email address to contact for further information: Daniel Fett, mail@danielfett.de
  • Intended usage: COMMON
  • Restrictions on usage: none
  • Author: Daniel Fett, mail@danielfett.de
  • Change Controller: IETF
  • Provisional registration? No


To indicate that the content is a JWS JSON serialized SD-JWT:

  • Type name: application
  • Subtype name: sd-jwt+json
  • Required parameters: n/a
  • Optional parameters: n/a
  • Encoding considerations: binary; application/sd-jwt+json values are represented as a JSON Object; UTF-8 encoding SHOULD be employed for the JSON object.
  • Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[ this specification ]], and [RFC7515].
  • Interoperability considerations: n/a
  • Published specification: [[ this specification ]]
  • Applications that use this media type: TBD
  • Fragment identifier considerations: n/a

  • Additional information:

    • Magic number(s): n/a
    • File extension(s): n/a
    • Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
  • Person & email address to contact for further information: Daniel Fett, mail@danielfett.de
  • Intended usage: COMMON
  • Restrictions on usage: none
  • Author: Daniel Fett, mail@danielfett.de
  • Change Controller: IETF
  • Provisional registration? No


To indicate that the content is a Key Binding JWT:

  • Type name: application
  • Subtype name: kb+jwt
  • Required parameters: n/a
  • Optional parameters: n/a
  • Encoding considerations: binary; A Key Binding JWT is a JWT; JWT values are encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') characters.
  • Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[ this specification ]], [RFC7519], and [RFC8725].
  • Interoperability considerations: n/a
  • Published specification: [[ this specification ]]
  • Applications that use this media type: TBD
  • Fragment identifier considerations: n/a

  • Additional information:

    • Magic number(s): n/a
    • File extension(s): n/a
    • Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
  • Person & email address to contact for further information: Daniel Fett, mail@danielfett.de
  • Intended usage: COMMON
  • Restrictions on usage: none
  • Author: Daniel Fett, mail@danielfett.de
  • Change Controller: IETF
  • Provisional registration? No

13.3. Structured Syntax Suffix Registration

This section requests registration of the "+sd-jwt" structured syntax suffix in the "Structured Syntax Suffix" registry [IANA.StructuredSuffix] in the manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the media type is encoded as an SD-JWT.

  • Name: SD-JWT
  • +suffix: +sd-jwt
  • References: [[ this specification ]]
  • Encoding considerations: binary; SD-JWT values are a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') or tilde ('~') characters.
  • Interoperability considerations: n/a
  • Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
  • Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[ this specification ]], [RFC7519], and [RFC8725].
  • Contact: Daniel Fett, mail@danielfett.de
  • Author/Change controller: IETF

14. References

14.1. Normative References

[RFC0020]
Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange", STD 80, RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7515]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516]
Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7519]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7800]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)", RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259]
Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.

14.2. Informative References

[EUDIW.ARF]
Commission, E., "The European Digital Identity Wallet Architecture and Reference Framework", <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/european-digital-identity-wallet-architecture-and-reference-framework>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc]
Terbu, O., Fett, D., and B. Campbell, "SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credentials (SD-JWT VC)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-03>.
[IANA.Hash.Algorithms]
IANA, "Named Information Hash Algorithm", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information/named-information.xhtml>.
[IANA.JWS.Algorithms]
IANA, "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/jose.xhtml#web-signature-encryption-algorithms>.
[IANA.JWT]
IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
[IANA.MediaTypes]
IANA, "Media Types", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types/media-types.xhtml>.
[IANA.StructuredSuffix]
IANA, "Structured Syntax Suffixs", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-type-structured-suffix/media-type-structured-suffix.xhtml>.
[ISO.29100]
ISO, "ISO/IEC 29100:2011 Information technology — Security techniques — Privacy framework", <https://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/index.html>.
[OIDC.IDA]
Lodderstedt, T., Fett, D., Haine, M., Pulido, A., Lehmann, K., and K. Koiwai, "OpenID Connect for Identity Assurance 1.0", <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-4-identity-assurance-1_0-13.html>.
[RFC2046]
Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC4086]
Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC5234]
Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[RFC6838]
Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC7517]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC8725]
Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725, DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8725>.
[RFC8785]
Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.
[VC_DATA_v2.0]
Sporny, M., Steele, O., Jones, M. B., Cohen, G., and O. Terbu, "Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0", , <https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/>.

Appendix A. Additional Examples

Important: The following examples are not normative and are provided for illustrative purposes only. In particular, neither the structure of the claims nor the selection of selectively disclosable claims is normative.

Line breaks have been added for readability.

A.1. Simple Structured SD-JWT

In this example, in contrast to Section 6, the Issuer decided to create a structured object for the address claim, allowing to separately disclose individual members of the claim.

The Issuer is using the following input claim set:

{
  "sub": "6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c",
  "given_name": "太郎",
  "family_name": "山田",
  "email": "\"unusual email address\"@example.jp",
  "phone_number": "+81-80-1234-5678",
  "address": {
    "street_address": "東京都港区芝公園４丁目２−８",
    "locality": "東京都",
    "region": "港区",
    "country": "JP"
  },
  "birthdate": "1940-01-01"
}

The Issuer also decided to add decoy digests to prevent the Verifier from deducing the true number of claims.

The following payload is used for the SD-JWT:

{
  "_sd": [
    "C9inp6YoRaEXR427zYJP7Qrk1WH_8bdwOA_YUrUnGQU",
    "Kuet1yAa0HIQvYnOVd59hcViO9Ug6J2kSfqYRBeowvE",
    "MMldOFFzB2d0umlmpTIaGerhWdU_PpYfLvKhh_f_9aY",
    "X6ZAYOII2vPN40V7xExZwVwz7yRmLNcVwt5DL8RLv4g",
    "Y34zmIo0QLLOtdMpXGwjBgLvr17yEhhYT0FGofR-aIE",
    "fyGp0WTwwPv2JDQln1lSiaeobZsMWA10bQ5989-9DTs",
    "ommFAicVT8LGHCB0uywx7fYuo3MHYKO15cz-RZEYM5Q",
    "s0BKYsLWxQQeU8tVlltM7MKsIRTrEIa1PkJmqxBBf5U"
  ],
  "iss": "https://issuer.example.com",
  "iat": 1683000000,
  "exp": 1883000000,
  "address": {
    "_sd": [
      "6aUhzYhZ7SJ1kVmagQAO3u2ETN2CC1aHheZpKnaF0_E",
      "AzLlFobkJ2xiaupREPyoJz-9-NSldB6Cgjr7fUyoHzg",
      "PzzcVu0qbMuBGSjulfewzkesD9zutOExn5EWNwkrQ-k",
      "b2Dkw0jcIF9rGg8_PF8ZcvncW7zwZj5ryBWvXfrpzek",
      "cPYJHIZ8Vu-f9CCyVub2UfgEk8jvvXezwK1p_JneeXQ",
      "glT3hrSU7fSWgwF5UDZmWwBTw32gnUldIhi8hGVCaV4",
      "rvJd6iq6T5ejmsBMoGwuNXh9qAAFATAci40oidEeVsA",
      "uNHoWYhXsZhVJCNE2Dqy-zqt7t69gJKy5QaFv7GrMX4"
    ]
  },
  "_sd_alg": "sha-256"
}

The following Disclosures are created:

Claim sub:

  • SHA-256 Hash: X6ZAYOII2vPN40V7xExZwVwz7yRmLNcVwt5DL8RLv4g
  • Disclosure:
    WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgInN1YiIsICI2YzVjMGE0OS1i
    NTg5LTQzMWQtYmFlNy0yMTkxMjJhOWVjMmMiXQ
  • Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "sub",
    "6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c"]

Claim given_name:

  • SHA-256 Hash: ommFAicVT8LGHCB0uywx7fYuo3MHYKO15cz-RZEYM5Q
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiXHU1
    OTJhXHU5MGNlIl0
  • Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "given_name", "\u592a\u90ce"]

Claim family_name:

  • SHA-256 Hash: C9inp6YoRaEXR427zYJP7Qrk1WH_8bdwOA_YUrUnGQU
  • Disclosure:
    WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIlx1
    NWM3MVx1NzUzMCJd
  • Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "family_name", "\u5c71\u7530"]

Claim email:

  • SHA-256 Hash: Kuet1yAa0HIQvYnOVd59hcViO9Ug6J2kSfqYRBeowvE
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgImVtYWlsIiwgIlwidW51c3Vh
    bCBlbWFpbCBhZGRyZXNzXCJAZXhhbXBsZS5qcCJd
  • Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "email", "\"unusual email
    address\"@example.jp"]

Claim phone_number:

  • SHA-256 Hash: s0BKYsLWxQQeU8tVlltM7MKsIRTrEIa1PkJmqxBBf5U
  • Disclosure:
    WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgInBob25lX251bWJlciIsICIr
    ODEtODAtMTIzNC01Njc4Il0
  • Contents: ["Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA", "phone_number",
    "+81-80-1234-5678"]

Claim street_address:

  • SHA-256 Hash: 6aUhzYhZ7SJ1kVmagQAO3u2ETN2CC1aHheZpKnaF0_E
  • Disclosure:
    WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgInN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIiwg
    Ilx1Njc3MVx1NGVhY1x1OTBmZFx1NmUyZlx1NTMzYVx1ODI5ZFx1NTE2Y1x1
    NTcxMlx1ZmYxNFx1NGUwMVx1NzZlZVx1ZmYxMlx1MjIxMlx1ZmYxOCJd
  • Contents: ["AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA", "street_address", "\u6771\u4eac\u
    90fd\u6e2f\u533a\u829d\u516c\u5712\uff14\u4e01\u76ee\uff12\u
    2212\uff18"]

Claim locality:

  • SHA-256 Hash: rvJd6iq6T5ejmsBMoGwuNXh9qAAFATAci40oidEeVsA
  • Disclosure:
    WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlx1Njc3
    MVx1NGVhY1x1OTBmZCJd
  • Contents: ["Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ", "locality", "\u6771\u4eac\u90fd"]

Claim region:

  • SHA-256 Hash: PzzcVu0qbMuBGSjulfewzkesD9zutOExn5EWNwkrQ-k
  • Disclosure:
    WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgInJlZ2lvbiIsICJcdTZlMmZc
    dTUzM2EiXQ
  • Contents: ["G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA", "region", "\u6e2f\u533a"]

Claim country:

  • SHA-256 Hash: uNHoWYhXsZhVJCNE2Dqy-zqt7t69gJKy5QaFv7GrMX4
  • Disclosure:
    WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiSlAiXQ
  • Contents: ["lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA", "country", "JP"]

Claim birthdate:

  • SHA-256 Hash: MMldOFFzB2d0umlmpTIaGerhWdU_PpYfLvKhh_f_9aY
  • Disclosure:
    WyJ5eXRWYmRBUEdjZ2wyckk0QzlHU29nIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTQw
    LTAxLTAxIl0
  • Contents: ["yytVbdAPGcgl2rI4C9GSog", "birthdate", "1940-01-01"]

The following decoy digests are added:

  • AzLlFobkJ2xiaupREPyoJz-9-NSldB6Cgjr7fUyoHzg
  • cPYJHIZ8Vu-f9CCyVub2UfgEk8jvvXezwK1p_JneeXQ
  • glT3hrSU7fSWgwF5UDZmWwBTw32gnUldIhi8hGVCaV4
  • b2Dkw0jcIF9rGg8_PF8ZcvncW7zwZj5ryBWvXfrpzek
  • fyGp0WTwwPv2JDQln1lSiaeobZsMWA10bQ5989-9DTs
  • Y34zmIo0QLLOtdMpXGwjBgLvr17yEhhYT0FGofR-aIE

The following is how a presentation of the SD-JWT that discloses only region and country of the address property could look like:

eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImV4YW1wbGUrc2Qtand0In0.eyJfc2QiOiBb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.YqwIXcbqOwwcN7OBKOPc9d6Jm8xX_mMPKo3W0ER6hyqatGqOM8m5XEhGwCcWb
Vwa9MnmBvv-7-R2A8cXivLpJw~WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgInJlZ2
lvbiIsICJcdTZlMmZcdTUzM2EiXQ~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImN
vdW50cnkiLCAiSlAiXQ~

A.2. Complex Structured SD-JWT

In this example, an SD-JWT with a complex object is represented. The data structures defined in OIDC4IDA [OIDC.IDA] are used.

The Issuer is using the following input claim set:

{
  "verified_claims": {
    "verification": {
      "trust_framework": "de_aml",
      "time": "2012-04-23T18:25Z",
      "verification_process": "f24c6f-6d3f-4ec5-973e-b0d8506f3bc7",
      "evidence": [
        {
          "type": "document",
          "method": "pipp",
          "time": "2012-04-22T11:30Z",
          "document": {
            "type": "idcard",
            "issuer": {
              "name": "Stadt Augsburg",
              "country": "DE"
            },
            "number": "53554554",
            "date_of_issuance": "2010-03-23",
            "date_of_expiry": "2020-03-22"
          }
        }
      ]
    },
    "claims": {
      "given_name": "Max",
      "family_name": "Müller",
      "nationalities": [
        "DE"
      ],
      "birthdate": "1956-01-28",
      "place_of_birth": {
        "country": "IS",
        "locality": "Þykkvabæjarklaustur"
      },
      "address": {
        "locality": "Maxstadt",
        "postal_code": "12344",
        "country": "DE",
        "street_address": "Weidenstraße 22"
      }
    }
  },
  "birth_middle_name": "Timotheus",
  "salutation": "Dr.",
  "msisdn": "49123456789"
}

The following payload is used for the SD-JWT:

{
  "_sd": [
    "-aSznId9mWM8ocuQolCllsxVggq1-vHW4OtnhUtVmWw",
    "IKbrYNn3vA7WEFrysvbdBJjDDU_EvQIr0W18vTRpUSg",
    "otkxuT14nBiwzNJ3MPaOitOl9pVnXOaEHal_xkyNfKI"
  ],
  "iss": "https://issuer.example.com",
  "iat": 1683000000,
  "exp": 1883000000,
  "verified_claims": {
    "verification": {
      "_sd": [
        "7h4UE9qScvDKodXVCuoKfKBJpVBfXMF_TmAGVaZe3Sc",
        "vTwe3raHIFYgFA3xaUD2aMxFz5oDo8iBu05qKlOg9Lw"
      ],
      "trust_framework": "de_aml",
      "evidence": [
        {
          "...": "tYJ0TDucyZZCRMbROG4qRO5vkPSFRxFhUELc18CSl3k"
        }
      ]
    },
    "claims": {
      "_sd": [
        "RiOiCn6_w5ZHaadkQMrcQJf0Jte5RwurRs54231DTlo",
        "S_498bbpKzB6Eanftss0xc7cOaoneRr3pKr7NdRmsMo",
        "WNA-UNK7F_zhsAb9syWO6IIQ1uHlTmOU8r8CvJ0cIMk",
        "Wxh_sV3iRH9bgrTBJi-aYHNCLt-vjhX1sd-igOf_9lk",
        "_O-wJiH3enSB4ROHntToQT8JmLtz-mhO2f1c89XoerQ",
        "hvDXhwmGcJQsBCA2OtjuLAcwAMpDsaU0nkovcKOqWNE"
      ]
    }
  },
  "_sd_alg": "sha-256"
}

The following Disclosures are created by the Issuer:

Claim time:

  • SHA-256 Hash: vTwe3raHIFYgFA3xaUD2aMxFz5oDo8iBu05qKlOg9Lw
  • Disclosure:
    WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgInRpbWUiLCAiMjAxMi0wNC0y
    M1QxODoyNVoiXQ
  • Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "time", "2012-04-23T18:25Z"]

Claim verification_process:

  • SHA-256 Hash: 7h4UE9qScvDKodXVCuoKfKBJpVBfXMF_TmAGVaZe3Sc
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgInZlcmlmaWNhdGlvbl9wcm9j
    ZXNzIiwgImYyNGM2Zi02ZDNmLTRlYzUtOTczZS1iMGQ4NTA2ZjNiYzciXQ
  • Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "verification_process",
    "f24c6f-6d3f-4ec5-973e-b0d8506f3bc7"]

Claim type:

  • SHA-256 Hash: G5EnhOAOoU9X_6QMNvzFXjpEA_Rc-AEtm1bG_wcaKIk
  • Disclosure:
    WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiZG9jdW1lbnQi
    XQ
  • Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "type", "document"]

Claim method:

  • SHA-256 Hash: WpxQ4HSoEtcTmCCKOeDslB_emucYLz2oO8oHNr1bEVQ
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgIm1ldGhvZCIsICJwaXBwIl0
  • Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "method", "pipp"]

Claim time:

  • SHA-256 Hash: 9wpjVPWuD7PK0nsQDL8B06lmdgV3LVybhHydQpTNyLI
  • Disclosure:
    WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgInRpbWUiLCAiMjAxMi0wNC0y
    MlQxMTozMFoiXQ
  • Contents: ["Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA", "time", "2012-04-22T11:30Z"]

Claim document:

  • SHA-256 Hash: IhwFrWUB63RcZq9yvgZ0XPc7Gowh3O2kqXeBIswg1B4
  • Disclosure:
    WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImRvY3VtZW50IiwgeyJ0eXBl
    IjogImlkY2FyZCIsICJpc3N1ZXIiOiB7Im5hbWUiOiAiU3RhZHQgQXVnc2J1
    cmciLCAiY291bnRyeSI6ICJERSJ9LCAibnVtYmVyIjogIjUzNTU0NTU0Iiwg
    ImRhdGVfb2ZfaXNzdWFuY2UiOiAiMjAxMC0wMy0yMyIsICJkYXRlX29mX2V4
    cGlyeSI6ICIyMDIwLTAzLTIyIn1d
  • Contents: ["AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA", "document", {"type": "idcard",
    "issuer": {"name": "Stadt Augsburg", "country": "DE"},
    "number": "53554554", "date_of_issuance": "2010-03-23",
    "date_of_expiry": "2020-03-22"}]

Array Entry:

  • SHA-256 Hash: tYJ0TDucyZZCRMbROG4qRO5vkPSFRxFhUELc18CSl3k
  • Disclosure:
    WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIjl3cGpWUFd1
    RDdQSzBuc1FETDhCMDZsbWRnVjNMVnliaEh5ZFFwVE55TEkiLCAiRzVFbmhP
    QU9vVTlYXzZRTU52ekZYanBFQV9SYy1BRXRtMWJHX3djYUtJayIsICJJaHdG
    cldVQjYzUmNacTl5dmdaMFhQYzdHb3doM08ya3FYZUJJc3dnMUI0IiwgIldw
    eFE0SFNvRXRjVG1DQ0tPZURzbEJfZW11Y1lMejJvTzhvSE5yMWJFVlEiXX1d
  • Contents: ["Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ", {"_sd":
    ["9wpjVPWuD7PK0nsQDL8B06lmdgV3LVybhHydQpTNyLI",
    "G5EnhOAOoU9X_6QMNvzFXjpEA_Rc-AEtm1bG_wcaKIk",
    "IhwFrWUB63RcZq9yvgZ0XPc7Gowh3O2kqXeBIswg1B4",
    "WpxQ4HSoEtcTmCCKOeDslB_emucYLz2oO8oHNr1bEVQ"]}]

Claim given_name:

  • SHA-256 Hash: S_498bbpKzB6Eanftss0xc7cOaoneRr3pKr7NdRmsMo
  • Disclosure:
    WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiTWF4
    Il0
  • Contents: ["G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA", "given_name", "Max"]

Claim family_name:

  • SHA-256 Hash: Wxh_sV3iRH9bgrTBJi-aYHNCLt-vjhX1sd-igOf_9lk
  • Disclosure:
    WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIk1c
    dTAwZmNsbGVyIl0
  • Contents: ["lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA", "family_name", "M\u00fcller"]

Claim nationalities:

  • SHA-256 Hash: hvDXhwmGcJQsBCA2OtjuLAcwAMpDsaU0nkovcKOqWNE
  • Disclosure:
    WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0JJZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwgIm5hdGlvbmFsaXRpZXMiLCBb
    IkRFIl1d
  • Contents: ["nPuoQnkRFq3BIeAm7AnXFA", "nationalities", ["DE"]]

Claim birthdate:

  • SHA-256 Hash: WNA-UNK7F_zhsAb9syWO6IIQ1uHlTmOU8r8CvJ0cIMk
  • Disclosure:
    WyI1YlBzMUlxdVpOYTBoa2FGenp6Wk53IiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTU2
    LTAxLTI4Il0
  • Contents: ["5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw", "birthdate", "1956-01-28"]

Claim place_of_birth:

  • SHA-256 Hash: RiOiCn6_w5ZHaadkQMrcQJf0Jte5RwurRs54231DTlo
  • Disclosure:
    WyI1YTJXMF9OcmxFWnpmcW1rXzdQcS13IiwgInBsYWNlX29mX2JpcnRoIiwg
    eyJjb3VudHJ5IjogIklTIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IjogIlx1MDBkZXlra3ZhYlx1
    MDBlNmphcmtsYXVzdHVyIn1d
  • Contents: ["5a2W0_NrlEZzfqmk_7Pq-w", "place_of_birth", {"country":
    "IS", "locality": "\u00deykkvab\u00e6jarklaustur"}]

Claim address:

  • SHA-256 Hash: _O-wJiH3enSB4ROHntToQT8JmLtz-mhO2f1c89XoerQ
  • Disclosure:
    WyJ5MXNWVTV3ZGZKYWhWZGd3UGdTN1JRIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7ImxvY2Fs
    aXR5IjogIk1heHN0YWR0IiwgInBvc3RhbF9jb2RlIjogIjEyMzQ0IiwgImNv
    dW50cnkiOiAiREUiLCAic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiAiV2VpZGVuc3RyYVx1
    MDBkZmUgMjIifV0
  • Contents: ["y1sVU5wdfJahVdgwPgS7RQ", "address", {"locality":
    "Maxstadt", "postal_code": "12344", "country": "DE",
    "street_address": "Weidenstra\u00dfe 22"}]

Claim birth_middle_name:

  • SHA-256 Hash: otkxuT14nBiwzNJ3MPaOitOl9pVnXOaEHal_xkyNfKI
  • Disclosure:
    WyJIYlE0WDhzclZXM1FEeG5JSmRxeU9BIiwgImJpcnRoX21pZGRsZV9uYW1l
    IiwgIlRpbW90aGV1cyJd
  • Contents: ["HbQ4X8srVW3QDxnIJdqyOA", "birth_middle_name", "Timotheus"]

Claim salutation:

  • SHA-256 Hash: -aSznId9mWM8ocuQolCllsxVggq1-vHW4OtnhUtVmWw
  • Disclosure:
    WyJDOUdTb3VqdmlKcXVFZ1lmb2pDYjFBIiwgInNhbHV0YXRpb24iLCAiRHIu
    Il0
  • Contents: ["C9GSoujviJquEgYfojCb1A", "salutation", "Dr."]

Claim msisdn:

  • SHA-256 Hash: IKbrYNn3vA7WEFrysvbdBJjDDU_EvQIr0W18vTRpUSg
  • Disclosure:
    WyJreDVrRjE3Vi14MEptd1V4OXZndnR3IiwgIm1zaXNkbiIsICI0OTEyMzQ1
    Njc4OSJd
  • Contents: ["kx5kF17V-x0JmwUx9vgvtw", "msisdn", "49123456789"]

The following is how a presentation of the SD-JWT could look like:

eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImV4YW1wbGUrc2Qtand0In0.eyJfc2QiOiBb
Ii1hU3puSWQ5bVdNOG9jdVFvbENsbHN4VmdncTEtdkhXNE90bmhVdFZtV3ciLCAiSUti
cllObjN2QTdXRUZyeXN2YmRCSmpERFVfRXZRSXIwVzE4dlRScFVTZyIsICJvdGt4dVQx
NG5CaXd6TkozTVBhT2l0T2w5cFZuWE9hRUhhbF94a3lOZktJIl0sICJpc3MiOiAiaHR0
cHM6Ly9pc3N1ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCAiaWF0IjogMTY4MzAwMDAwMCwgImV4cCI6
IDE4ODMwMDAwMDAsICJ2ZXJpZmllZF9jbGFpbXMiOiB7InZlcmlmaWNhdGlvbiI6IHsi
X3NkIjogWyI3aDRVRTlxU2N2REtvZFhWQ3VvS2ZLQkpwVkJmWE1GX1RtQUdWYVplM1Nj
IiwgInZUd2UzcmFISUZZZ0ZBM3hhVUQyYU14Rno1b0RvOGlCdTA1cUtsT2c5THciXSwg
InRydXN0X2ZyYW1ld29yayI6ICJkZV9hbWwiLCAiZXZpZGVuY2UiOiBbeyIuLi4iOiAi
dFlKMFREdWN5WlpDUk1iUk9HNHFSTzV2a1BTRlJ4RmhVRUxjMThDU2wzayJ9XX0sICJj
bGFpbXMiOiB7Il9zZCI6IFsiUmlPaUNuNl93NVpIYWFka1FNcmNRSmYwSnRlNVJ3dXJS
czU0MjMxRFRsbyIsICJTXzQ5OGJicEt6QjZFYW5mdHNzMHhjN2NPYW9uZVJyM3BLcjdO
ZFJtc01vIiwgIldOQS1VTks3Rl96aHNBYjlzeVdPNklJUTF1SGxUbU9VOHI4Q3ZKMGNJ
TWsiLCAiV3hoX3NWM2lSSDliZ3JUQkppLWFZSE5DTHQtdmpoWDFzZC1pZ09mXzlsayIs
ICJfTy13SmlIM2VuU0I0Uk9IbnRUb1FUOEptTHR6LW1oTzJmMWM4OVhvZXJRIiwgImh2
RFhod21HY0pRc0JDQTJPdGp1TEFjd0FNcERzYVUwbmtvdmNLT3FXTkUiXX19LCAiX3Nk
X2FsZyI6ICJzaGEtMjU2In0._KmHQNb2OfswLjbG0GTNeyoA6Ok7x8AlQ94OMhSemZUM
b_qGn8X4DL8FhXgaAvWbotrd5xa0orAvxvdqiiIdGw~WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2Zye
U5STjl3IiwgInRpbWUiLCAiMjAxMi0wNC0yM1QxODoyNVoiXQ~WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1
VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIjl3cGpWUFd1RDdQSzBuc1FETDhCMDZsbWRnVj
NMVnliaEh5ZFFwVE55TEkiLCAiRzVFbmhPQU9vVTlYXzZRTU52ekZYanBFQV9SYy1BRX
RtMWJHX3djYUtJayIsICJJaHdGcldVQjYzUmNacTl5dmdaMFhQYzdHb3doM08ya3FYZU
JJc3dnMUI0IiwgIldweFE0SFNvRXRjVG1DQ0tPZURzbEJfZW11Y1lMejJvTzhvSE5yMW
JFVlEiXX1d~WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgIm1ldGhvZCIsICJwaXBwI
l0~WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiTWF4Il0~W
yJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIk1cdTAwZmNsb
GVyIl0~WyJ5MXNWVTV3ZGZKYWhWZGd3UGdTN1JRIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7ImxvY2Fsa
XR5IjogIk1heHN0YWR0IiwgInBvc3RhbF9jb2RlIjogIjEyMzQ0IiwgImNvdW50cnkiO
iAiREUiLCAic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiAiV2VpZGVuc3RyYVx1MDBkZmUgMjIifV0~

After the validation, the Verifier will have the following data for further processing:

{
  "iss": "https://issuer.example.com",
  "iat": 1683000000,
  "exp": 1883000000,
  "verified_claims": {
    "verification": {
      "trust_framework": "de_aml",
      "evidence": [
        {
          "method": "pipp"
        }
      ],
      "time": "2012-04-23T18:25Z"
    },
    "claims": {
      "given_name": "Max",
      "family_name": "Müller",
      "address": {
        "locality": "Maxstadt",
        "postal_code": "12344",
        "country": "DE",
        "street_address": "Weidenstraße 22"
      }
    }
  }
}

A.3. SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credentials (SD-JWT VC)

This example shows how the artifacts defined in this specification could be used in the context of SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credentials (SD-JWT VC) [I-D.ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc] to represent the concept of a Person Identification Data (PID) [EUDIW.ARF] using the data of a German citizen.

Key Binding is applied using the Holder's public key passed in a cnf claim in the SD-JWT.

The Issuer is using the following input claim set:

{
  "vct": "https://bmi.bund.example/credential/pid/1.0",
  "given_name": "Erika",
  "family_name": "Mustermann",
  "birthdate": "1963-08-12",
  "source_document_type": "id_card",
  "address": {
    "street_address": "Heidestraße 17",
    "locality": "Köln",
    "postal_code": "51147",
    "country": "DE"
  },
  "nationalities": [
    "DE"
  ],
  "gender": "female",
  "birth_family_name": "Gabler",
  "place_of_birth": {
    "locality": "Berlin",
    "country": "DE"
  },
  "also_known_as": "Schwester Agnes",
  "age_equal_or_over": {
    "12": true,
    "14": true,
    "16": true,
    "18": true,
    "21": true,
    "65": false
  }
}

The following is the issued SD-JWT:

eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogInZjK3NkLWp3dCJ9.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjBIWm1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.tcZBDjR2_Usugp9FqxrZLzuTXFgdqCoIsTBwcKbcPzribIEKq5q6iO
Rs50489rqZHZeQbVLNqnGzJ4LGHt9Mhg~WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3Iiw
gImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiRXJpa2EiXQ~WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwg
ImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIk11c3Rlcm1hbm4iXQ~WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtd
lZBIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTYzLTA4LTEyIl0~WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZ
W5IZGhRIiwgInNvdXJjZV9kb2N1bWVudF90eXBlIiwgImlkX2NhcmQiXQ~WyJRZ19PNj
R6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgInN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIiwgIkhlaWRlc3RyYVx1MD
BkZmUgMTciXQ~WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIkt
cdTAwZjZsbiJd~WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgInBvc3RhbF9jb2RlIi
wgIjUxMTQ3Il0~WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiRE
UiXQ~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7Il9zZCI6IFs
iWEZjN3pYUG03enpWZE15d20yRXVCZmxrYTVISHF2ZjhVcF9zek5HcXZpZyIsICJiZDF
FVnpnTm9wVWs0RVczX2VRMm4zX05VNGl1WE9IdjlYYkdITjNnMVRFIiwgImZfRlFZZ3Z
RV3Z5VnFObklYc0FSbE55ZTdZR3A4RTc3Z1JBamFxLXd2bnciLCAidjRra2JfcFAxamx
2VWJTanR5YzVicWNXeUEtaThYTHZoVllZN1pUMHRiMCJdfV0~WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0J
JZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwgIm5hdGlvbmFsaXRpZXMiLCBbIkRFIl1d~WyI1YlBzMUlxdVpOYT
Boa2FGenp6Wk53IiwgImdlbmRlciIsICJmZW1hbGUiXQ~WyI1YTJXMF9OcmxFWnpmcW1
rXzdQcS13IiwgImJpcnRoX2ZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkdhYmxlciJd~WyJ5MXNWVTV3ZG
ZKYWhWZGd3UGdTN1JRIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIkJlcmxpbiJd~WyJIYlE0WDhzclZXM
1FEeG5JSmRxeU9BIiwgInBsYWNlX29mX2JpcnRoIiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIldwaEhvSUR5b
1diQXBEQzR6YnV3UjQweGwweExoRENfY3Y0dHNTNzFyRUEiXSwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiR
EUifV0~WyJDOUdTb3VqdmlKcXVFZ1lmb2pDYjFBIiwgImFsc29fa25vd25fYXMiLCAiU
2Nod2VzdGVyIEFnbmVzIl0~WyJreDVrRjE3Vi14MEptd1V4OXZndnR3IiwgIjEyIiwgd
HJ1ZV0~WyJIM28xdXN3UDc2MEZpMnllR2RWQ0VRIiwgIjE0IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJPQktsV
FZsdkxnLUFkd3FZR2JQOFpBIiwgIjE2IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJNMEpiNTd0NDF1YnJrU3V5c
kRUM3hBIiwgIjE4IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJEc210S05ncFY0ZEFIcGpyY2Fvc0F3IiwgIjIxI
iwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJlSzVvNXBIZmd1cFBwbHRqMXFoQUp3IiwgIjY1IiwgZmFsc2Vd~

The following payload is used for the SD-JWT:

{
  "_sd": [
    "0HZmnSIPz337kSWe7C34l--88gzJi-eBJ2Vz_HJwATg",
    "9ZbplC7TdEW7qal6BBZlMtqJdmeEOiXevdJloXVJdRQ",
    "I00fcFUoDXCucp5yy2ujqPssDVGaWNiUliNz_awD0gc",
    "IEBYSJGNhXIlrQo58ykXm2Zx3yll9ZlTtToPo17QQiY",
    "Lai6IU6d7GQagXR7AvGTrnXgSld3z8EIg_fv3fOZ1Wg",
    "hvDXhwmGcJQsBCA2OtjuLAcwAMpDsaU0nkovcKOqWNE",
    "ikuur8Q4k8q3VcyA7dC-mNjZBkReDTU-CG4niTE7OTU",
    "qvzNLj2vh9o4SEXOfMiYDuvTykdsWCNg0wTdlr0AEIM",
    "wzW15bhCkvksxVvuJ8RF3xi8i64ln1jo_76BC2oa1ug",
    "zOeBXhxvIS4ZzmQcLlxKuEAOGGByjOqa1z2IoVx_YDQ"
  ],
  "iss": "https://issuer.example.com",
  "iat": 1683000000,
  "exp": 1883000000,
  "vct": "https://bmi.bund.example/credential/pid/1.0",
  "age_equal_or_over": {
    "_sd": [
      "Fc8I_07LOcgPwrDJKQyIGO97wVsOplMLjHvRC4R4-Wg",
      "XLtLjadUWc9zN_9hMJRoqy46UsCKb1IshZuuqUFKSCA",
      "aoCCzsC7p4qhZIAh_idRCSCa641uycnc8zPfNWz8nx0",
      "f1-P0A2dKWavv1uFnMX2A7-EXxvhoxv5aHhuEIN-W64",
      "k5hy2r018vrsJjo-Vjd6g6yt7AaonKonniuJ9zel3jo",
      "qp7Z_Ky1Yip0sYgDO3zVug2MFuPNjHxksBDnJZ4aI-c"
    ]
  },
  "_sd_alg": "sha-256",
  "cnf": {
    "jwk": {
      "kty": "EC",
      "crv": "P-256",
      "x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
      "y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
    }
  }
}

The following Disclosures are created by the Issuer:

Claim given_name:

  • SHA-256 Hash: 0HZmnSIPz337kSWe7C34l--88gzJi-eBJ2Vz_HJwATg
  • Disclosure:
    WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiRXJp
    a2EiXQ
  • Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "given_name", "Erika"]

Claim family_name:

  • SHA-256 Hash: I00fcFUoDXCucp5yy2ujqPssDVGaWNiUliNz_awD0gc
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIk11
    c3Rlcm1hbm4iXQ
  • Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "family_name", "Mustermann"]

Claim birthdate:

  • SHA-256 Hash: Lai6IU6d7GQagXR7AvGTrnXgSld3z8EIg_fv3fOZ1Wg
  • Disclosure:
    WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTYz
    LTA4LTEyIl0
  • Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "birthdate", "1963-08-12"]

Claim source_document_type:

  • SHA-256 Hash: qvzNLj2vh9o4SEXOfMiYDuvTykdsWCNg0wTdlr0AEIM
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInNvdXJjZV9kb2N1bWVudF90
    eXBlIiwgImlkX2NhcmQiXQ
  • Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "source_document_type",
    "id_card"]

Claim street_address:

  • SHA-256 Hash: bd1EVzgNopUk4EW3_eQ2n3_NU4iuXOHv9XbGHN3g1TE
  • Disclosure:
    WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgInN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIiwg
    IkhlaWRlc3RyYVx1MDBkZmUgMTciXQ
  • Contents: ["Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA", "street_address",
    "Heidestra\u00dfe 17"]

Claim locality:

  • SHA-256 Hash: f_FQYgvQWvyVqNnIXsARlNye7YGp8E77gRAjaq-wvnw
  • Disclosure:
    WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIktcdTAw
    ZjZsbiJd
  • Contents: ["AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA", "locality", "K\u00f6ln"]

Claim postal_code:

  • SHA-256 Hash: XFc7zXPm7zzVdMywm2EuBflka5HHqvf8Up_szNGqvig
  • Disclosure:
    WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgInBvc3RhbF9jb2RlIiwgIjUx
    MTQ3Il0
  • Contents: ["Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ", "postal_code", "51147"]

Claim country:

  • SHA-256 Hash: v4kkb_pP1jlvUbSjtyc5bqcWyA-i8XLvhVYY7ZT0tb0
  • Disclosure:
    WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiREUiXQ
  • Contents: ["G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA", "country", "DE"]

Claim address:

  • SHA-256 Hash: zOeBXhxvIS4ZzmQcLlxKuEAOGGByjOqa1z2IoVx_YDQ
  • Disclosure:
    WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7Il9zZCI6
    IFsiWEZjN3pYUG03enpWZE15d20yRXVCZmxrYTVISHF2ZjhVcF9zek5HcXZp
    ZyIsICJiZDFFVnpnTm9wVWs0RVczX2VRMm4zX05VNGl1WE9IdjlYYkdITjNn
    MVRFIiwgImZfRlFZZ3ZRV3Z5VnFObklYc0FSbE55ZTdZR3A4RTc3Z1JBamFx
    LXd2bnciLCAidjRra2JfcFAxamx2VWJTanR5YzVicWNXeUEtaThYTHZoVllZ
    N1pUMHRiMCJdfV0
  • Contents: ["lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA", "address", {"_sd":
    ["XFc7zXPm7zzVdMywm2EuBflka5HHqvf8Up_szNGqvig",
    "bd1EVzgNopUk4EW3_eQ2n3_NU4iuXOHv9XbGHN3g1TE",
    "f_FQYgvQWvyVqNnIXsARlNye7YGp8E77gRAjaq-wvnw",
    "v4kkb_pP1jlvUbSjtyc5bqcWyA-i8XLvhVYY7ZT0tb0"]}]

Claim nationalities:

  • SHA-256 Hash: hvDXhwmGcJQsBCA2OtjuLAcwAMpDsaU0nkovcKOqWNE
  • Disclosure:
    WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0JJZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwgIm5hdGlvbmFsaXRpZXMiLCBb
    IkRFIl1d
  • Contents: ["nPuoQnkRFq3BIeAm7AnXFA", "nationalities", ["DE"]]

Claim gender:

  • SHA-256 Hash: IEBYSJGNhXIlrQo58ykXm2Zx3yll9ZlTtToPo17QQiY
  • Disclosure:
    WyI1YlBzMUlxdVpOYTBoa2FGenp6Wk53IiwgImdlbmRlciIsICJmZW1hbGUi
    XQ
  • Contents: ["5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw", "gender", "female"]

Claim birth_family_name:

  • SHA-256 Hash: ikuur8Q4k8q3VcyA7dC-mNjZBkReDTU-CG4niTE7OTU
  • Disclosure:
    WyI1YTJXMF9OcmxFWnpmcW1rXzdQcS13IiwgImJpcnRoX2ZhbWlseV9uYW1l
    IiwgIkdhYmxlciJd
  • Contents: ["5a2W0_NrlEZzfqmk_7Pq-w", "birth_family_name", "Gabler"]

Claim locality:

  • SHA-256 Hash: WphHoIDyoWbApDC4zbuwR40xl0xLhDC_cv4tsS71rEA
  • Disclosure:
    WyJ5MXNWVTV3ZGZKYWhWZGd3UGdTN1JRIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIkJlcmxp
    biJd
  • Contents: ["y1sVU5wdfJahVdgwPgS7RQ", "locality", "Berlin"]

Claim place_of_birth:

  • SHA-256 Hash: wzW15bhCkvksxVvuJ8RF3xi8i64ln1jo_76BC2oa1ug
  • Disclosure:
    WyJIYlE0WDhzclZXM1FEeG5JSmRxeU9BIiwgInBsYWNlX29mX2JpcnRoIiwg
    eyJfc2QiOiBbIldwaEhvSUR5b1diQXBEQzR6YnV3UjQweGwweExoRENfY3Y0
    dHNTNzFyRUEiXSwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiREUifV0
  • Contents: ["HbQ4X8srVW3QDxnIJdqyOA", "place_of_birth", {"_sd":
    ["WphHoIDyoWbApDC4zbuwR40xl0xLhDC_cv4tsS71rEA"], "country":
    "DE"}]

Claim also_known_as:

  • SHA-256 Hash: 9ZbplC7TdEW7qal6BBZlMtqJdmeEOiXevdJloXVJdRQ
  • Disclosure:
    WyJDOUdTb3VqdmlKcXVFZ1lmb2pDYjFBIiwgImFsc29fa25vd25fYXMiLCAi
    U2Nod2VzdGVyIEFnbmVzIl0
  • Contents: ["C9GSoujviJquEgYfojCb1A", "also_known_as", "Schwester
    Agnes"]

Claim 12:

  • SHA-256 Hash: Fc8I_07LOcgPwrDJKQyIGO97wVsOplMLjHvRC4R4-Wg
  • Disclosure:
    WyJreDVrRjE3Vi14MEptd1V4OXZndnR3IiwgIjEyIiwgdHJ1ZV0
  • Contents: ["kx5kF17V-x0JmwUx9vgvtw", "12", true]

Claim 14:

  • SHA-256 Hash: f1-P0A2dKWavv1uFnMX2A7-EXxvhoxv5aHhuEIN-W64
  • Disclosure:
    WyJIM28xdXN3UDc2MEZpMnllR2RWQ0VRIiwgIjE0IiwgdHJ1ZV0
  • Contents: ["H3o1uswP760Fi2yeGdVCEQ", "14", true]

Claim 16:

  • SHA-256 Hash: k5hy2r018vrsJjo-Vjd6g6yt7AaonKonniuJ9zel3jo
  • Disclosure:
    WyJPQktsVFZsdkxnLUFkd3FZR2JQOFpBIiwgIjE2IiwgdHJ1ZV0
  • Contents: ["OBKlTVlvLg-AdwqYGbP8ZA", "16", true]

Claim 18:

  • SHA-256 Hash: qp7Z_Ky1Yip0sYgDO3zVug2MFuPNjHxksBDnJZ4aI-c
  • Disclosure:
    WyJNMEpiNTd0NDF1YnJrU3V5ckRUM3hBIiwgIjE4IiwgdHJ1ZV0
  • Contents: ["M0Jb57t41ubrkSuyrDT3xA", "18", true]

Claim 21:

  • SHA-256 Hash: aoCCzsC7p4qhZIAh_idRCSCa641uycnc8zPfNWz8nx0
  • Disclosure:
    WyJEc210S05ncFY0ZEFIcGpyY2Fvc0F3IiwgIjIxIiwgdHJ1ZV0
  • Contents: ["DsmtKNgpV4dAHpjrcaosAw", "21", true]

Claim 65:

  • SHA-256 Hash: XLtLjadUWc9zN_9hMJRoqy46UsCKb1IshZuuqUFKSCA
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlSzVvNXBIZmd1cFBwbHRqMXFoQUp3IiwgIjY1IiwgZmFsc2Vd
  • Contents: ["eK5o5pHfgupPpltj1qhAJw", "65", false]

The following is how an SD-JWT+KB that discloses only nationality and the fact that the person is over 18 years old could look like:

eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogInZjK3NkLWp3dCJ9.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjBIWm1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.tcZBDjR2_Usugp9FqxrZLzuTXFgdqCoIsTBwcKbcPzribIEKq5q6iO
Rs50489rqZHZeQbVLNqnGzJ4LGHt9Mhg~WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0JJZUFtN0FuWEZBIiw
gIm5hdGlvbmFsaXRpZXMiLCBbIkRFIl1d~WyJNMEpiNTd0NDF1YnJrU3V5ckRUM3hBIi
wgIjE4IiwgdHJ1ZV0~eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImtiK2p3dCJ9.eyJub
25jZSI6ICIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwgImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL3ZlcmlmaWVyLmV4YW1wb
GUub3JnIiwgImlhdCI6IDE3MTgyOTg3NjYsICJzZF9oYXNoIjogImloOWZfbEhRUmhza
zJnMzBQV3NjUF93cTJOVnZ0RExhTlpBMGFITzFWVk0ifQ.j6tYhpYw4EiDmoDOiVthxm
57cdjf6SPGOVAD_mH6BCySbwh7CQ7YSoECT4qvtD7htdMMjoqvred6x407TUvUqw

The following is the payload of a corresponding Key Binding JWT:

{
  "nonce": "1234567890",
  "aud": "https://verifier.example.org",
  "iat": 1718298766,
  "sd_hash": "ih9f_lHQRhsk2g30PWscP_wq2NVvtDLaNZA0aHO1VVM"
}

After the validation, the Verifier will have the following data for further processing:

{
  "iss": "https://issuer.example.com",
  "iat": 1683000000,
  "exp": 1883000000,
  "vct": "https://bmi.bund.example/credential/pid/1.0",
  "age_equal_or_over": {
    "18": true
  },
  "cnf": {
    "jwk": {
      "kty": "EC",
      "crv": "P-256",
      "x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
      "y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
    }
  },
  "nationalities": [
    "DE"
  ]
}

A.4. W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0

This non-normative example illustrates how the artifacts defined in this specification could be used to express a W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0 [VC_DATA_v2.0] payload.

Key Binding is applied using the Holder's public key passed in a cnf claim in the SD-JWT.

The Issuer is using the following input claim set:

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1",
    "https://w3id.org/vaccination/v1"
  ],
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "VaccinationCertificate"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://example.com/issuer",
  "issuanceDate": "2023-02-09T11:01:59Z",
  "expirationDate": "2028-02-08T11:01:59Z",
  "name": "COVID-19 Vaccination Certificate",
  "description": "COVID-19 Vaccination Certificate",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "vaccine": {
      "type": "Vaccine",
      "atcCode": "J07BX03",
      "medicinalProductName": "COVID-19 Vaccine Moderna",
      "marketingAuthorizationHolder": "Moderna Biotech"
    },
    "nextVaccinationDate": "2021-08-16T13:40:12Z",
    "countryOfVaccination": "GE",
    "dateOfVaccination": "2021-06-23T13:40:12Z",
    "order": "3/3",
    "recipient": {
      "type": "VaccineRecipient",
      "gender": "Female",
      "birthDate": "1961-08-17",
      "givenName": "Marion",
      "familyName": "Mustermann"
    },
    "type": "VaccinationEvent",
    "administeringCentre": "Praxis Sommergarten",
    "batchNumber": "1626382736",
    "healthProfessional": "883110000015376"
  }
}

The following is the issued SD-JWT:

eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImV4YW1wbGUrc2Qtand0In0.eyJAY29udGV4
dCI6IFsiaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMTgvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvdjEiLCAiaHR0
cHM6Ly93M2lkLm9yZy92YWNjaW5hdGlvbi92MSJdLCAidHlwZSI6IFsiVmVyaWZpYWJs
ZUNyZWRlbnRpYWwiLCAiVmFjY2luYXRpb25DZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSJdLCAiaXNzdWVyIjog
Imh0dHBzOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vaXNzdWVyIiwgImlzc3VhbmNlRGF0ZSI6ICIyMDIz
LTAyLTA5VDExOjAxOjU5WiIsICJleHBpcmF0aW9uRGF0ZSI6ICIyMDI4LTAyLTA4VDEx
OjAxOjU5WiIsICJuYW1lIjogIkNPVklELTE5IFZhY2NpbmF0aW9uIENlcnRpZmljYXRl
IiwgImRlc2NyaXB0aW9uIjogIkNPVklELTE5IFZhY2NpbmF0aW9uIENlcnRpZmljYXRl
IiwgImNyZWRlbnRpYWxTdWJqZWN0IjogeyJfc2QiOiBbIjFWX0stOGxEUThpRlhCRlhi
Wlk5ZWhxUjRIYWJXQ2k1VDB5Ykl6WlBld3ciLCAiSnpqTGd0UDI5ZFAtQjN0ZDEyUDY3
NGdGbUsyenk4MUhNdEJnZjZDSk5XZyIsICJSMmZHYmZBMDdaX1lsa3FtTlp5bWExeHl5
eDFYc3RJaVM2QjFZYmwySlo0IiwgIlRDbXpybDdLMmdldl9kdTdwY01JeXpSTEhwLVll
Zy1GbF9jeHRyVXZQeGciLCAiVjdrSkJMSzc4VG1WRE9tcmZKN1p1VVBIdUtfMmNjN3la
UmE0cVYxdHh3TSIsICJiMGVVc3ZHUC1PRERkRm9ZNE5semxYYzN0RHNsV0p0Q0pGNzVO
dzhPal9nIiwgInpKS19lU01YandNOGRYbU1aTG5JOEZHTTA4ekozX3ViR2VFTUotNVRC
eTAiXSwgInZhY2NpbmUiOiB7Il9zZCI6IFsiMWNGNWhMd2toTU5JYXFmV0pyWEk3Tk1X
ZWRMLTlmNlkyUEE1MnlQalNaSSIsICJIaXk2V1d1ZUxENWJuMTYyOTh0UHY3R1hobWxk
TURPVG5CaS1DWmJwaE5vIiwgIkxiMDI3cTY5MWpYWGwtakM3M3ZpOGViT2o5c214M0Mt
X29nN2dBNFRCUUUiXSwgInR5cGUiOiAiVmFjY2luZSJ9LCAicmVjaXBpZW50IjogeyJf
c2QiOiBbIjFsU1FCTlkyNHEwVGg2T0d6dGhxLTctNGw2Y0FheHJZWE9HWnBlV19sbkEi
LCAiM256THE4MU0yb04wNndkdjFzaEh2T0VKVnhaNUtMbWREa0hFREpBQldFSSIsICJQ
bjFzV2kwNkc0TEpybm4tX1JUMFJiTV9IVGR4blBKUXVYMmZ6V3ZfSk9VIiwgImxGOXV6
ZHN3N0hwbEdMYzcxNFRyNFdPN01HSnphN3R0N1FGbGVDWDRJdHciXSwgInR5cGUiOiAi
VmFjY2luZVJlY2lwaWVudCJ9LCAidHlwZSI6ICJWYWNjaW5hdGlvbkV2ZW50In0sICJf
c2RfYWxnIjogInNoYS0yNTYiLCAiY25mIjogeyJqd2siOiB7Imt0eSI6ICJFQyIsICJj
cnYiOiAiUC0yNTYiLCAieCI6ICJUQ0FFUjE5WnZ1M09IRjRqNFc0dmZTVm9ISVAxSUxp
bERsczd2Q2VHZW1jIiwgInkiOiAiWnhqaVdXYlpNUUdIVldLVlE0aGJTSWlyc1ZmdWVj
Q0U2dDRqVDlGMkhaUSJ9fX0.cRWkeJjXfUEDW8d9e_XiU95KrY8WeuIbJS06kIczUaRn
Im8shqeHFpPvLv4GjJH9LiFApTbOmTgjomraa2Q5HA~WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2Zye
U5STjl3IiwgImF0Y0NvZGUiLCAiSjA3QlgwMyJd~WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4
QV9BIiwgIm1lZGljaW5hbFByb2R1Y3ROYW1lIiwgIkNPVklELTE5IFZhY2NpbmUgTW9k
ZXJuYSJd~WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgIm1hcmtldGluZ0F1dGhvcml
6YXRpb25Ib2xkZXIiLCAiTW9kZXJuYSBCaW90ZWNoIl0~WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGV
OZW5IZGhRIiwgIm5leHRWYWNjaW5hdGlvbkRhdGUiLCAiMjAyMS0wOC0xNlQxMzo0MDo
xMloiXQ~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImNvdW50cnlPZlZhY2NpbmF0
aW9uIiwgIkdFIl0~WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImRhdGVPZlZhY2Np
bmF0aW9uIiwgIjIwMjEtMDYtMjNUMTM6NDA6MTJaIl0~WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhn
Z3ZfdWZRIiwgIm9yZGVyIiwgIjMvMyJd~WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiw
gImdlbmRlciIsICJGZW1hbGUiXQ~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImJp
cnRoRGF0ZSIsICIxOTYxLTA4LTE3Il0~WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0JJZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwg
ImdpdmVuTmFtZSIsICJNYXJpb24iXQ~WyI1YlBzMUlxdVpOYTBoa2FGenp6Wk53IiwgI
mZhbWlseU5hbWUiLCAiTXVzdGVybWFubiJd~WyI1YTJXMF9OcmxFWnpmcW1rXzdQcS13
IiwgImFkbWluaXN0ZXJpbmdDZW50cmUiLCAiUHJheGlzIFNvbW1lcmdhcnRlbiJd~WyJ
5MXNWVTV3ZGZKYWhWZGd3UGdTN1JRIiwgImJhdGNoTnVtYmVyIiwgIjE2MjYzODI3MzY
iXQ~WyJIYlE0WDhzclZXM1FEeG5JSmRxeU9BIiwgImhlYWx0aFByb2Zlc3Npb25hbCIs
ICI4ODMxMTAwMDAwMTUzNzYiXQ~

The following payload is used for the SD-JWT:

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1",
    "https://w3id.org/vaccination/v1"
  ],
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "VaccinationCertificate"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://example.com/issuer",
  "issuanceDate": "2023-02-09T11:01:59Z",
  "expirationDate": "2028-02-08T11:01:59Z",
  "name": "COVID-19 Vaccination Certificate",
  "description": "COVID-19 Vaccination Certificate",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "_sd": [
      "1V_K-8lDQ8iFXBFXbZY9ehqR4HabWCi5T0ybIzZPeww",
      "JzjLgtP29dP-B3td12P674gFmK2zy81HMtBgf6CJNWg",
      "R2fGbfA07Z_YlkqmNZyma1xyyx1XstIiS6B1Ybl2JZ4",
      "TCmzrl7K2gev_du7pcMIyzRLHp-Yeg-Fl_cxtrUvPxg",
      "V7kJBLK78TmVDOmrfJ7ZuUPHuK_2cc7yZRa4qV1txwM",
      "b0eUsvGP-ODDdFoY4NlzlXc3tDslWJtCJF75Nw8Oj_g",
      "zJK_eSMXjwM8dXmMZLnI8FGM08zJ3_ubGeEMJ-5TBy0"
    ],
    "vaccine": {
      "_sd": [
        "1cF5hLwkhMNIaqfWJrXI7NMWedL-9f6Y2PA52yPjSZI",
        "Hiy6WWueLD5bn16298tPv7GXhmldMDOTnBi-CZbphNo",
        "Lb027q691jXXl-jC73vi8ebOj9smx3C-_og7gA4TBQE"
      ],
      "type": "Vaccine"
    },
    "recipient": {
      "_sd": [
        "1lSQBNY24q0Th6OGzthq-7-4l6cAaxrYXOGZpeW_lnA",
        "3nzLq81M2oN06wdv1shHvOEJVxZ5KLmdDkHEDJABWEI",
        "Pn1sWi06G4LJrnn-_RT0RbM_HTdxnPJQuX2fzWv_JOU",
        "lF9uzdsw7HplGLc714Tr4WO7MGJza7tt7QFleCX4Itw"
      ],
      "type": "VaccineRecipient"
    },
    "type": "VaccinationEvent"
  },
  "_sd_alg": "sha-256",
  "cnf": {
    "jwk": {
      "kty": "EC",
      "crv": "P-256",
      "x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
      "y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
    }
  }
}

The following Disclosures are created by the Issuer:

Claim atcCode:

  • SHA-256 Hash: 1cF5hLwkhMNIaqfWJrXI7NMWedL-9f6Y2PA52yPjSZI
  • Disclosure:
    WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImF0Y0NvZGUiLCAiSjA3Qlgw
    MyJd
  • Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "atcCode", "J07BX03"]

Claim medicinalProductName:

  • SHA-256 Hash: Hiy6WWueLD5bn16298tPv7GXhmldMDOTnBi-CZbphNo
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgIm1lZGljaW5hbFByb2R1Y3RO
    YW1lIiwgIkNPVklELTE5IFZhY2NpbmUgTW9kZXJuYSJd
  • Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "medicinalProductName", "COVID-19
    Vaccine Moderna"]

Claim marketingAuthorizationHolder:

  • SHA-256 Hash: Lb027q691jXXl-jC73vi8ebOj9smx3C-_og7gA4TBQE
  • Disclosure:
    WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgIm1hcmtldGluZ0F1dGhvcml6
    YXRpb25Ib2xkZXIiLCAiTW9kZXJuYSBCaW90ZWNoIl0
  • Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "marketingAuthorizationHolder",
    "Moderna Biotech"]

Claim nextVaccinationDate:

  • SHA-256 Hash: R2fGbfA07Z_YlkqmNZyma1xyyx1XstIiS6B1Ybl2JZ4
  • Disclosure:
    WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgIm5leHRWYWNjaW5hdGlvbkRh
    dGUiLCAiMjAyMS0wOC0xNlQxMzo0MDoxMloiXQ
  • Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "nextVaccinationDate",
    "2021-08-16T13:40:12Z"]

Claim countryOfVaccination:

  • SHA-256 Hash: JzjLgtP29dP-B3td12P674gFmK2zy81HMtBgf6CJNWg
  • Disclosure:
    WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImNvdW50cnlPZlZhY2NpbmF0
    aW9uIiwgIkdFIl0
  • Contents: ["Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA", "countryOfVaccination", "GE"]

Claim dateOfVaccination:

  • SHA-256 Hash: zJK_eSMXjwM8dXmMZLnI8FGM08zJ3_ubGeEMJ-5TBy0
  • Disclosure:
    WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImRhdGVPZlZhY2NpbmF0aW9u
    IiwgIjIwMjEtMDYtMjNUMTM6NDA6MTJaIl0
  • Contents: ["AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA", "dateOfVaccination",
    "2021-06-23T13:40:12Z"]

Claim order:

  • SHA-256 Hash: b0eUsvGP-ODDdFoY4NlzlXc3tDslWJtCJF75Nw8Oj_g
  • Disclosure:
    WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgIm9yZGVyIiwgIjMvMyJd
  • Contents: ["Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ", "order", "3/3"]

Claim gender:

  • SHA-256 Hash: 3nzLq81M2oN06wdv1shHvOEJVxZ5KLmdDkHEDJABWEI
  • Disclosure:
    WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImdlbmRlciIsICJGZW1hbGUi
    XQ
  • Contents: ["G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA", "gender", "Female"]

Claim birthDate:

  • SHA-256 Hash: Pn1sWi06G4LJrnn-_RT0RbM_HTdxnPJQuX2fzWv_JOU
  • Disclosure:
    WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImJpcnRoRGF0ZSIsICIxOTYx
    LTA4LTE3Il0
  • Contents: ["lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA", "birthDate", "1961-08-17"]

Claim givenName:

  • SHA-256 Hash: lF9uzdsw7HplGLc714Tr4WO7MGJza7tt7QFleCX4Itw
  • Disclosure:
    WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0JJZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwgImdpdmVuTmFtZSIsICJNYXJp
    b24iXQ
  • Contents: ["nPuoQnkRFq3BIeAm7AnXFA", "givenName", "Marion"]

Claim familyName:

  • SHA-256 Hash: 1lSQBNY24q0Th6OGzthq-7-4l6cAaxrYXOGZpeW_lnA
  • Disclosure:
    WyI1YlBzMUlxdVpOYTBoa2FGenp6Wk53IiwgImZhbWlseU5hbWUiLCAiTXVz
    dGVybWFubiJd
  • Contents: ["5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw", "familyName", "Mustermann"]

Claim administeringCentre:

  • SHA-256 Hash: TCmzrl7K2gev_du7pcMIyzRLHp-Yeg-Fl_cxtrUvPxg
  • Disclosure:
    WyI1YTJXMF9OcmxFWnpmcW1rXzdQcS13IiwgImFkbWluaXN0ZXJpbmdDZW50
    cmUiLCAiUHJheGlzIFNvbW1lcmdhcnRlbiJd
  • Contents: ["5a2W0_NrlEZzfqmk_7Pq-w", "administeringCentre", "Praxis
    Sommergarten"]

Claim batchNumber:

  • SHA-256 Hash: V7kJBLK78TmVDOmrfJ7ZuUPHuK_2cc7yZRa4qV1txwM
  • Disclosure:
    WyJ5MXNWVTV3ZGZKYWhWZGd3UGdTN1JRIiwgImJhdGNoTnVtYmVyIiwgIjE2
    MjYzODI3MzYiXQ
  • Contents: ["y1sVU5wdfJahVdgwPgS7RQ", "batchNumber", "1626382736"]

Claim healthProfessional:

  • SHA-256 Hash: 1V_K-8lDQ8iFXBFXbZY9ehqR4HabWCi5T0ybIzZPeww
  • Disclosure:
    WyJIYlE0WDhzclZXM1FEeG5JSmRxeU9BIiwgImhlYWx0aFByb2Zlc3Npb25h
    bCIsICI4ODMxMTAwMDAwMTUzNzYiXQ
  • Contents: ["HbQ4X8srVW3QDxnIJdqyOA", "healthProfessional",
    "883110000015376"]

The following is how an SD-JWT+KB that discloses only type, medicinalProductName, atcCode of the vaccine, type of the recipient, type, order and dateOfVaccination could look like:

eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImV4YW1wbGUrc2Qtand0In0.eyJAY29udGV4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.cRWkeJjXfUEDW8d9e_XiU95KrY8WeuIbJS06kIczUaRn
Im8shqeHFpPvLv4GjJH9LiFApTbOmTgjomraa2Q5HA~WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ
3ZfdWZRIiwgIm9yZGVyIiwgIjMvMyJd~WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwg
ImRhdGVPZlZhY2NpbmF0aW9uIiwgIjIwMjEtMDYtMjNUMTM6NDA6MTJaIl0~WyIyR0xD
NDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImF0Y0NvZGUiLCAiSjA3QlgwMyJd~WyJlbHVWNU9
nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgIm1lZGljaW5hbFByb2R1Y3ROYW1lIiwgIkNPVklELTE
5IFZhY2NpbmUgTW9kZXJuYSJd~eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImtiK2p3dC
J9.eyJub25jZSI6ICIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwgImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL3ZlcmlmaWVyL
mV4YW1wbGUub3JnIiwgImlhdCI6IDE3MTgyOTg3NjYsICJzZF9oYXNoIjogIkd5TDk3S
m5CZkMxWUVKdS1pZC1nVU8wejQyZ0dmWUp5V01nTnZPUDBHTGsifQ.6dLWIuv75ruyn7
Eb4nc07KiGwRgeWfo9tgOBy5rZ17jakNHdi_pUoSDtV6xHxAJz5AQkVPLeOyDQxvA29k
5LRA

After the validation, the Verifier will have the following data for further processing:

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1",
    "https://w3id.org/vaccination/v1"
  ],
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "VaccinationCertificate"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://example.com/issuer",
  "issuanceDate": "2023-02-09T11:01:59Z",
  "expirationDate": "2028-02-08T11:01:59Z",
  "name": "COVID-19 Vaccination Certificate",
  "description": "COVID-19 Vaccination Certificate",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "vaccine": {
      "type": "Vaccine",
      "atcCode": "J07BX03",
      "medicinalProductName": "COVID-19 Vaccine Moderna"
    },
    "recipient": {
      "type": "VaccineRecipient"
    },
    "type": "VaccinationEvent",
    "order": "3/3",
    "dateOfVaccination": "2021-06-23T13:40:12Z"
  },
  "cnf": {
    "jwk": {
      "kty": "EC",
      "crv": "P-256",
      "x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
      "y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
    }
  }
}

A.5. Elliptic Curve Key Used in the Examples

The following Elliptic Curve public key, represented in JWK format, can be used to validate the Issuer signatures in the above examples:

{
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "b28d4MwZMjw8-00CG4xfnn9SLMVMM19SlqZpVb_uNtQ",
  "y": "Xv5zWwuoaTgdS6hV43yI6gBwTnjukmFQQnJ_kCxzqk8"
}

The public key used to validate a Key Binding JWT can be found in the examples as the content of the cnf claim.

Appendix B. Disclosure Format Considerations

As described in Section 5.2, the Disclosure structure is JSON containing salt and the cleartext content of a claim, which is base64url encoded. The encoded value is the input used to calculate a digest for the respective claim. The inclusion of digest value in the signed JWT ensures the integrity of the claim value. Using encoded content as the input to the integrity mechanism is conceptually similar to the approach in JWS and particularly useful when the content, like JSON, can have differences but be semantically equivalent. Some further discussion of the considerations around this design decision follows.

When receiving an SD-JWT, a Verifier must be able to re-compute digests of the disclosed claim values and, given the same input values, obtain the same digest values as signed by the Issuer.

Usually, JSON-based formats transport claim values as simple properties of a JSON object such as this:

...
  "family_name": "Möbius",
  "address": {
    "street_address": "Schulstr. 12",
    "locality": "Schulpforta"
  }
...

However, a problem arises when computation over the data need to be performed and verified, like signing or computing digests. Common signature schemes require the same byte string as input to the signature verification as was used for creating the signature. In the digest approach outlined above, the same problem exists: for the Issuer and the Verifier to arrive at the same digest, the same byte string must be hashed.

JSON, however, does not prescribe a unique encoding for data, but allows for variations in the encoded string. The data above, for example, can be encoded as

...
"family_name": "M\u00f6bius",
"address": {
  "street_address": "Schulstr. 12",
  "locality": "Schulpforta"
}
...

or as

...
"family_name": "Möbius",
"address": {"locality":"Schulpforta", "street_address":"Schulstr. 12"}
...

The two representations of the value in family_name are very different on the byte-level, but yield equivalent objects. Same for the representations of address, varying in white space and order of elements in the object.

The variations in white space, ordering of object properties, and encoding of Unicode characters are all allowed by the JSON specification, including further variations, e.g., concerning floating-point numbers, as described in [RFC8785]. Variations can be introduced whenever JSON data is serialized or deserialized and unless dealt with, will lead to different digests and the inability to verify signatures.

There are generally two approaches to deal with this problem:

  1. Canonicalization: The data is transferred in JSON format, potentially introducing variations in its representation, but is transformed into a canonical form before computing a digest. Both the Issuer and the Verifier must use the same canonicalization algorithm to arrive at the same byte string for computing a digest.
  2. Source string hardening: Instead of transferring data in a format that may introduce variations, a representation of the data is serialized. This representation is then used as the hashing input at the Verifier, but also transferred to the Verifier and used for the same digest calculation there. This means that the Verifier can easily compute and check the digest of the byte string before finally deserializing and accessing the data.

Mixed approaches are conceivable, i.e., transferring both the original JSON data plus a string suitable for computing a digest, but such approaches can easily lead to undetected inconsistencies resulting in time-of-check-time-of-use type security vulnerabilities.

In this specification, the source string hardening approach is used, as it allows for simple and reliable interoperability without the requirement for a canonicalization library. To harden the source string, any serialization format that supports the necessary data types could be used in theory, like protobuf, msgpack, or pickle. In this specification, JSON is used and plaintext contents of each Disclosure are encoded using base64url-encoding for transport. This approach means that SD-JWTs can be implemented purely based on widely available JWT, JSON, and Base64 encoding and decoding libraries.

A Verifier can then easily check the digest over the source string before extracting the original JSON data. Variations in the encoding of the source string are implicitly tolerated by the Verifier, as the digest is computed over a predefined byte string and not over a JSON object.

It is important to note that the Disclosures are neither intended nor suitable for direct consumption by an application that needs to access the disclosed claim values after the verification by the Verifier. The Disclosures are only intended to be used by a Verifier to check the digests over the source strings and to extract the original JSON data. The original JSON data is then used by the application. See Section 8.3 for details.

Appendix C. Document History

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]

-09

-08

-07

-06

-05

-04

-03

-02

-01

-00

[[ pre Working Group Adoption: ]]

-02

-01

-00

Authors' Addresses

Daniel Fett
Authlete
URI: https://danielfett.de/
Kristina Yasuda
Keio University
Brian Campbell
Ping Identity