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# SAML 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-22

### Abstract

This specification defines the use of a Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Bearer Assertion as a means for requesting an OAuth 2.0 access token as well as for use as a means of client authentication.

### **Status of This Memo**

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## 1. Introduction

The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] is an XML-based framework that allows identity and security information to be shared across security domains. The SAML specification, while primarily targeted at providing cross domain Web browser single sign-on, was also designed to be modular and extensible to facilitate use in other contexts.

The Assertion, an XML security token, is a fundamental construct of SAML that is often adopted for use in other protocols and specifications. (Some examples include [OASIS.WSS-SAMLTokenProfile] and [OASIS.WS-Fed].) An Assertion is generally issued by an identity provider and consumed by a service provider who relies on its content to identify the Assertion's subject for security related purposes.

The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] provides a method for making authenticated HTTP requests to a resource using an access token. Access tokens are issued to third-party clients by an authorization server (AS) with the (sometimes implicit) approval of the resource owner. In OAuth, an authorization grant is an abstract term used to describe intermediate credentials that represent the resource owner authorization. An authorization grant is used by the client to obtain an access token. Several authorization grant types are defined to support a wide range of client types and user experiences. OAuth also allows for the definition of new extension grant types to support additional clients or to provide a bridge between OAuth and other trust frameworks. Finally, OAuth allows the definition of additional authentication mechanisms to be used by clients when interacting with the authorization server.

The Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants [I-D.ietf-oauthassertions] specification is an abstract extension to OAuth 2.0 that provides a general framework for the use of Assertions as client credentials and/or authorization grants with OAuth 2.0. This specification profiles the Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants [I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions] specification to define an extension grant type that uses a SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion to request an OAuth 2.0 access token as well as for use as client credentials. The format and processing rules for the SAML Assertion defined in this specification are intentionally similar, though not identical, to those in the Web Browser SSO Profile defined in the SAML Profiles [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os] specification. This specification is reusing, to the extent reasonable, concepts and patterns from that well-established Profile.

This document defines how a SAML Assertion can be used to request an access token when a client wishes to utilize an existing trust relationship, expressed through the semantics of (and digital signature or keyed message digest calculated over) the SAML Assertion, without a direct user approval step at the authorization server. It also defines how a SAML Assertion can be used as a client authentication mechanism. The use of an Assertion for client authentication is orthogonal to and separable from using an Assertion as an authorization grant. They can be used either in combination or separately. Client assertion authentication is nothing more than an alternative way for a client to authenticate to the token endpoint and must be used in conjunction with some grant type to form a complete and meaningful protocol request. Assertion authorization grants may be used with or without client authentication or identification. Whether or not client authentication is needed in conjunction with an assertion authorization grant, as well as the supported types of client authentication, are policy decisions at the discretion of the authorization server.

The process by which the client obtains the SAML Assertion, prior to exchanging it with the authorization server or using it for client authentication, is out of scope.

## **1.1. Notational Conventions**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD", "SHOULD", "NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values are case sensitive.

### 1.2. Terminology

All terms are as defined in The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749], the Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants [I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions], and the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] specifications.

### 2. HTTP Parameter Bindings for Transporting Assertions

The Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants [I-D.ietf-oauthassertions] specification defines generic HTTP parameters for transporting Assertions during interactions with a token endpoint. This section defines specific parameters and treatments of those parameters for use with SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertions.

### 2.1. Using SAML Assertions as Authorization Grants

To use a SAML Bearer Assertion as an authorization grant, the client uses an access token request as defined in Section 4 of the Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants [I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions] specification with the following specific parameter values and encodings.

The value of the grant\_type parameter is urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer.

The value of the assertion parameter contains a single SAML 2.0 Assertion. It MUST NOT contain more than one SAML 2.0 assertion. The SAML Assertion XML data MUST be encoded using base64url, where the encoding adheres to the definition in Section 5 of RFC 4648 [RFC4648] and where the padding bits are set to zero. To avoid the need for subsequent encoding steps (by "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" [W3C.REC-html401-19991224], for example), the base64url encoded data MUST NOT be line wrapped and pad characters ("=") MUST NOT be included.

The scope parameter may be used, as defined in the Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants [I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions] specification, to indicate the requested

scope.

Authentication of the client is optional, as described in Section 3.2.1 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] and consequently, the client\_id is only needed when a form of client authentication that relies on the parameter is used.

The following example demonstrates an Access Token Request with an assertion as an authorization grant (with extra line breaks for display purposes only):

POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant\_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Asaml2-bearer& assertion=PHNhbWxwOI...[omitted for brevity]...ZT4

# 2.2. Using SAML Assertions for Client Authentication

To use a SAML Bearer Assertion for client authentication, the client uses the following parameter values and encodings.

The value of the client\_assertion\_type parameter is urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer.

The value of the client\_assertion parameter MUST contain a single SAML 2.0 Assertion. The SAML Assertion XML data MUST be encoded using base64url, where the encoding adheres to the definition in Section 5 of RFC 4648 [RFC4648] and where the padding bits are set to zero. To avoid the need for subsequent encoding steps (by "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" [W3C.REC-html401-19991224], for example), the base64url encoded data SHOULD NOT be line wrapped and pad characters ("=") SHOULD NOT be included.

The following example demonstrates a client authenticating using an assertion during the presentation of an authorization code grant in an Access Token Request (with extra line breaks for display purposes only):

POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant\_type=authorization\_code& code=vAZEIHjQTHuGgaSvyW9hO0RpusLzkvTOww3trZBxZpo& client\_assertion\_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth %3Aclient-assertion-type%3Asaml2-bearer& client\_assertion=PHNhbW...[omitted for brevity]...ZT

# 3. Assertion Format and Processing Requirements

In order to issue an access token response as described in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] or to rely on an Assertion for client authentication, the authorization server MUST validate the Assertion according to the criteria below. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the authorization server.

- The Assertion's <Issuer> element MUST contain a unique identifier for the entity that issued the Assertion. In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, compliant applications MUST compare Issuer values using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC 3986 [RFC3986].
- 2. The Assertion MUST contain a <Conditions> element with an <AudienceRestriction> element with an <Audience> element that identifies the authorization server as an intended audience. Section 2.5.1.4 of Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion

Markup Language [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] defines the <AudienceRestriction> and <Audience> elements and, in addition to the URI references discussed there, the token endpoint URL of the authorization server MAY be used as a URI that identifies the authorization server as an intended audience. The Authorization Server MUST reject any assertion that does not contain its own identity as the intended audience. In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, compliant applications MUST compare the audience values using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC 3986 [RFC3986]. As noted in Section 5, the precise strings to be used as the audience for a given Authorization Server must be configured out-of-band by the Authorization Server and the Issuer of the assertion.

- 3. The Assertion MUST contain a <Subject> element identifying the principal that is the subject of the Assertion. Additional information identifying the subject/principal MAY be included in an <AttributeStatement>.
  - A. For the authorization grant, the Subject typically identifies an authorized accessor for which the access token is being requested (i.e., the resource owner or an authorized delegate), but in some cases, may be a pseudonymous identifier or other value denoting an anonymous user.
  - B. For client authentication, the Subject MUST be the client\_id of the OAuth client.
- 4. The Assertion MUST have an expiry that limits the time window during which it can be used. The expiry can be expressed either as the NotOnOrAfter attribute of the <Conditions> element or as the NotOnOrAfter attribute of a suitable <SubjectConfirmationData> element.
- 5. The <Subject> element MUST contain at least one <SubjectConfirmation> element that has a Method attribute with a value of urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer. If the Assertion does not have a suitable NonOnOrAfter attribute on the <Conditions> element, the <SubjectConfirmation> element MUST contain a <SubjectConfirmationData> element. When present, the <SubjectConfirmationData> element MUST have a Recipient attribute with a value indicating the token endpoint URL of the authorization server (or an acceptable alias). The authorization server MUST verify that the value of the Recipient attribute matches the token endpoint URL (or an acceptable alias) to which the Assertion was delivered. The <SubjectConfirmationData> element MUST have a NotOnOrAfter attribute that limits the window during which the Assertion can be confirmed. The <SubjectConfirmationData> element MUST have a NotOnOrAfter attribute that limits the authorization can be delivered. Verification of the Address is at the discretion of the authorization server.
- 6. The authorization server MUST reject the entire Assertion if the NotOnOrAfter instant on the <Conditions> element has passed (subject to allowable clock skew between systems). The authorization server MUST reject the <SubjectConfirmation> (but MAY still use the rest of the Assertion) if the NotOnOrAfter instant on the <SubjectConfirmationData> has passed (subject to allowable clock skew). Note that the authorization server may reject Assertions with a NotOnOrAfter instant that is unreasonably far in the future. The authorization server MAY ensure that Bearer Assertions are not replayed, by maintaining the set of used ID values for the length of time for which the Assertion would be considered valid based on the applicable NotOnOrAfter instant.
- 7. If the Assertion issuer directly authenticated the subject, the Assertion SHOULD contain a single <AuthnStatement> representing that authentication event. If the Assertion was issued with the intention that the client act autonomously on behalf of the subject, an <AuthnStatement> SHOULD NOT be included and the client presenting the assertion SHOULD be identified in the <NameID> or similar element in the <SubjectConfirmation> element, or by other available means like SAML V2.0 Condition for Delegation Restriction [OASIS.saml-deleg-cs].
- 8. Other statements, in particular <AttributeStatement> elements, MAY be included in the

Assertion.

- The Assertion MUST be digitally signed or have a Message Authentication Code applied by the issuer. The authorization server MUST reject assertions with an invalid signature or Message Authentication Code.
- 10. Encrypted elements MAY appear in place of their plain text counterparts as defined in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os].
- 11. The authorization server MUST reject an Assertion that is not valid in all other respects per [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os], such as (but not limited to) all content within the Conditions element including the NotOnOrAfter and NotBefore attributes, unknown condition types, etc.

# **3.1. Authorization Grant Processing**

Assertion authorization grants may be used with or without client authentication or identification. Whether or not client authentication is needed in conjunction with an assertion authorization grant, as well as the supported types of client authentication, are policy decisions at the discretion of the authorization server. However, if client credentials are present in the request, the authorization server MUST validate them.

If the Assertion is not valid (including if its subject confirmation requirements cannot be met), the authorization server constructs an error response as defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. The value of the error parameter MUST be the invalid\_grant error code. The authorization server MAY include additional information regarding the reasons the Assertion was considered invalid using the error\_description or error\_uri parameters.

For example:

```
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
    "error":"invalid_grant",
    "error_description":"Audience validation failed"
}
```

# **3.2. Client Authentication Processing**

If the client Assertion is not valid (including if its subject confirmation requirements cannot be met), the authorization server constructs an error response as defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. The value of the error parameter MUST be the invalid\_client error code. The authorization server MAY include additional information regarding the reasons the Assertion was considered invalid using the error\_description or error\_uri parameters.

## 4. Authorization Grant Example

The following examples illustrate what a conforming Assertion and an access token request would look like.

The example shows an assertion issued and signed by the SAML Identity Provider identified as https://samlidp.example.com. The subject of the assertion is identified by email address as brian@example.com, who authenticated to the Identity Provider by means of a digital signature where the key was validated as part of an X.509 Public Key Infrastructure. The intended audience of the assertion is https://saml-sp.example.net, which is an identifier for a SAML Service Provider with which the authorization server identifies itself. The assertion is sent as part of an access token request to the authorization server's token endpoint at https://authz.example.net/token.oauth2.

Below is an example SAML 2.0 Assertion (whitespace formatting is for display purposes only):

<Assertion IssueInstant="2010-10-01T20:07:34.619Z" ID="ef1xsbZxPV2oqjd7HTLRLIBIBb7" Version="2.0" xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"> lssuer>https://saml-idp.example.com</lssuer></lssuer> <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> [...omitted for brevity...] </ds:Signature> <Subject> <NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress"> brian@example.com </NameID> < SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"> < SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="2010-10-01T20:12:34.619Z" Recipient="https://authz.example.net/token.oauth2"/> </SubjectConfirmation> </Subject> <Conditions> <AudienceRestriction> <Audience>https://saml-sp.example.net</Audience> </AudienceRestriction> </Conditions> <AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2010-10-01T20:07:34.371Z"> <AuthnContext> <AuthnContextClassRef> urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:X509 </AuthnContextClassRef> </AuthnContext> </AuthnStatement> </Assertion>

#### Figure 1: Example SAML 2.0 Assertion

To present the Assertion shown in the previous example as part of an access token request, for example, the client might make the following HTTPS request (with extra line breaks for display purposes only):

POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1 Host: authz.example.net Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant\_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Asaml2bearer&assertion=PEFzc2VydGlvbiBJc3N1ZUluc3RhbnQ9IjIwMTEtMDU [...omitted for brevity...]aG5TdGF0ZW1lbnQ-PC9Bc3NlcnRpb24-

#### Figure 2: Example Request

### 5. Interoperability Considerations

Agreement between system entities regarding identifiers, keys, and endpoints is required in order to achieve interoperable deployments of this profile. Specific items that require agreement are as follows: values for the issuer and audience identifiers, the location of the token endpoint, the key used to apply and verify the digital

signature over the assertion, one-time use restrictions on assertions, maximum assertion lifetime allowed, and the specific subject and attribute requirements of the assertion. The exchange of such information is explicitly out of scope for this specification and typical deployment of it will be done alongside existing SAML Web SSO deployments that have already established a means of exchanging such information. Metadata for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 [OASIS.saml-metadata-2.0-os] is one common method of exchanging SAML related information about system entities.

The RSA-SHA256 algorithm, from [RFC6931], is a mandatory to implement XML signature algorithm for this profile.

# 6. Security Considerations

The security considerations described within the Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants [I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions], The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749], and the Security and Privacy Considerations for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 [OASIS.samI-sec-consider-2.0-os] specifications are all applicable to this document.

The specification does not mandate replay protection for the SAML assertion usage for either the authorization grant or for client authentication. It is an optional feature, which implementations may employ at their own discretion.

# 7. Privacy Considerations

A SAML Assertion may contain privacy-sensitive information and, to prevent disclosure of such information to unintended parties, should only be transmitted over encrypted channels, such as TLS. In cases where it is desirable to prevent disclosure of certain information the client, the Subject and/or individual attributes of a SAML Assertion should be encrypted to the authorization server.

Deployments should determine the minimum amount of information necessary to complete the exchange and include only that information in an Assertion (typically by limiting what information is included in an <AttributeStatement> or omitting it altogether). In some cases, the Subject can be a value representing an anonymous or pseudonymous user, as described in Section 6.3.1 of the Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants [I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions].

# 8. IANA Considerations

# 8.1. Sub-Namespace Registration of urn:ietf:params:oauth:granttype:saml2-bearer

This is a request to IANA to please register the value grant-type:saml2-bearer in the registry urn:ietf:params:oauth established in An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth [RFC6755].

- URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer
- Common Name: SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion Grant Type Profile for OAuth 2.0
- Change controller: IESG
- Specification Document: [[this document]]

# 8.2. Sub-Namespace Registration of urn:ietf:params:oauth:clientassertion-type:saml2-bearer

This is a request to IANA to please register the value client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer in the registry urn:ietf:params:oauth established in An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth [RFC6755].

• URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer

- Common Name: SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
- Change controller: IESG
- Specification Document: [[this document]]

### 9. References

### 9.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions]	Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M. and Y. Goland, "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-oauth-assertions, October 2014.
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]	Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R. and E. Maler, "Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-2.0-os, March 2005.
[OASIS.saml-deleg-cs]	Cantor, S., "SAML V2.0 Condition for Delegation Restriction", Nov 2009.
[OASIS.samI-sec-consider-2.0-os]	Hirsch, F., Philpott, R. and E. Maler, "Security and Privacy Considerations for the OASIS Security Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-sec-consider-2.0-os, March 2005.
[RFC2119]	Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3986]	Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R. and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, January 2005.
[RFC4648]	Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
[RFC6749]	Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, October 2012.
[RFC6931]	Eastlake, D., "Additional XML Security Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 6931, April 2013.

### 9.2. Informative References

[OASIS.WS-Fed]	Goodner, M. and T. Nadalin, "Web Services Federation Language (WS- Federation) Version 1.2", May 2009.
[OASIS.WSS-SAMLTokenProfile]	Monzillo, R., Kaler, C., Nadalin, T., Hallam-Baker, P. and C. Milono, "Web Services Security SAML Token Profile Version 1.1.1", May 2012.
[OASIS.saml-metadata-2.0-os]	Cantor, S., Moreh, J., Philpott, R. and E. Maler, "Metadata for the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml- metadata-2.0-os, March 2005.
[OASIS.samI-profiles-2.0-os]	Hughes, J., Cantor, S., Hodges, J., Hirsch, F., Mishra, P., Philpott, R. and E. Maler, "Profiles for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os, March 2005.
[RFC6755]	Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth", RFC 6755, October 2012.
[W3C.REC-html401-19991224]	Raggett, D., Hors, A. and I. Jacobs, "HTML 4.01 Specification", World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation REC-html401-19991224, December 1999.

# Appendix A. Acknowledgements

The following people contributed wording and concepts to this document: Paul Madsen, Patrick Harding, Peter Motykowski, Eran Hammer, Peter Saint-Andre, Ian Barnett, Eric Fazendin, Torsten Lodderstedt, Susan

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# **Appendix B. Document History**

[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-22

• Changes/suggestions from IESG reviews.

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-21

 Added Privacy Considerations section per AD review discussion http://www.ietf.org/mailarchive/web/oauth/current/msg13148.html and http://www.ietf.org/mailarchive/web/oauth/current/msg13144.html

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-20

• Clarified some text around the treatment of subject based on the rough rough consensus from the thread staring at http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg12630.html

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-19

• Updated references.

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-18

- Clean up language around subject per http://www.ietf.org/mailarchive/web/oauth/current/msg12254.html.
- As suggested in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg12253.html stated that "In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, compliant applications MUST compare the audience/issuer values using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC 3986."
- Clarify the potentially confusing language about the AS confirming the assertion http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg12255.html.
- Combine the two items about AuthnStatement and drop the word presenter as discussed in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg12257.html.
- Added one-time use, maximum lifetime, and specific subject and attribute requirements to Interoperability Considerations based on http://www.ietf.org/mailarchive/web/oauth/current/msg12252.html.
- Reword security considerations and mention that replay protection is not mandated based on http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg12259.html.

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-17

• Stated that issuer and audience values SHOULD be compared using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC 3986 unless otherwise specified by the application.

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-16

- Changed title from "SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion Profiles for OAuth 2.0" to "SAML 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants" to be more explicit about the scope of the document per http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg11063.html.
- Fixed typo in text identifying the presenter from "or similar element, the" to "or similar element in the".
- Numbered the list of processing rules.
- Smallish editorial cleanups to try and improve readability and comprehensibility.
- Cleaner split out of the processing rules in cases where they differ for client authentication and authorization grants.

- Clarified the parameters that are used/available for authorization grants.
- Added Interoperability Considerations section and info reference to SAML Metadata.
- Added more explanatory context to the example in Section 4.

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-15

- Reference RFC 6749 and RFC 6755.
- Update draft-ietf-oauth-assertions reference to -06.
- Remove extraneous word per http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg10055.html

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-14

- Add more text to intro explaining that an assertion grant type can be used with or without client authentication/identification and that client assertion authentication is nothing more than an alternative way for a client to authenticate to the token endpoint
- Add examples to Sections 2.1 and 2.2
- Update references

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-13

- Update references: oauth-assertions-04, oauth-urn-sub-ns-05, oauth -28
- Changed "Description" to "Specification Document" in both registration requests in IANA Considerations per changes to the template in ietf-oauth-urn-sub-ns(-03)
- Added "(or an acceptable alias)" so that it's in both sentences about Recipient and the token endpoint URL so there's no ambiguity
- Update area and workgroup (now Security and OAuth was Internet and nothing)

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-12

• updated reference to draft-ietf-oauth-v2 from -25 to -26 and draft-ietf-oauth-assertions from -02 to -03

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-11

- Removed text about limited lifetime access tokens and the SHOULD NOT on issuing refresh tokens. The text was moved to draft-ietf-oauth-assertions-02 and somewhat modified per http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg08298.html.
- Fixed typo/missing word per http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg08733.html.
- Added Terminology section.

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-10

• fix a spelling mistake

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-09

- Attempt to address an ambiguity around validation requirements when the Conditions element contain a NotOnOrAfter and SubjectConfirmation/SubjectConfirmationData does too. Basically it needs to have at least one bearer SubjectConfirmation element but that element can omit SubjectConfirmationData, if Conditions has an expiry on it. Otherwise, a valid SubjectConfirmation must have a SubjectConfirmationData with Recipient and NotOnOrAfter. And any SubjectConfirmationData that has those elements needs to have them checked.
- clarified that AudienceRestriction is under Conditions (even though it's implied by schema)
- fix a typo

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-08

• fix some typos

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-07

- update reference from draft-campbell-oauth-urn-sub-ns to draft-ietf-oauth-urn-sub-ns
- Updated to reference draft-ietf-oauth-v2-20

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-06

• Fix three typos NamselD->NameID and (2x) Namspace->Namespace

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-05

- Allow for subject confirmation data to be optional when Conditions contain audience and NotOnOrAfter
- Rework most of the spec to profile draft-ietf-oauth-assertions for both authn and authz including (but not limited to):
  - remove requirement for issuer to be urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameidformat:entity
  - change wording on Subject requirements
- using a MAY, explicitly say that the Audience can be token endpoint URL of the authorization server
- Change title to be more generic (allowing for client authn too)
- added client authentication to the abstract
- register and use urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer for grant type rather than http://oauth.net/grant\_type/saml/2.0/bearer
- register urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer
- remove scope parameter as it is defined in http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-assertions
- remove assertion param registration because it [should] be in http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauthassertions
- fix typo(s) and update/add references

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-04

- Changed the grant\_type URI from "http://oauth.net/grant\_type/assertion/saml/2.0/bearer" to
   "http://oauth.net/grant\_type/saml/2.0/bearer" dropping the word assertion from the path. Recent
   versions of draft-ietf-oauth-v2 no longer refer to extension grants using the word assertion so this URI
   is more reflective of that. It also more closely aligns with the grant type URI in draft-jones-oauth-jwt bearer-00 which is "http://oauth.net/grant\_type/jwt/1.0/bearer".
- Added "case sensitive" to scope definition to align with draft-ietf-oauth-v2-15/16.
- Updated to reference draft-ietf-oauth-v2-16

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-03

• Cleanup of some editorial issues.

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-02

- Added scope parameter with text copied from draft-ietf-oauth-v2-12 (the reorg of draft-ietf-oauth-v2-12 made it so scope wasn't really inherited by this spec anymore)
- Change definition of the assertion parameter to be more generally applicable per the suggestion near the end of http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg05253.html
- Editorial changes based on feedback

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-01

- Update spec name when referencing draft-ietf-oauth-v2 (The OAuth 2.0 Protocol Framework -> The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol)
- Update wording in Introduction to talk about extension grant types rather than the assertion grant type which is a term no longer used in OAuth 2.0
- Updated to reference draft-ietf-oauth-v2-12 and denote as work in progress
- Update Parameter Registration Request to use similar terms as draft-ietf-oauth-v2-12 and remove

Related information part

• Add some text giving discretion to AS on rejecting assertions with unreasonably long validity window.

draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-00

- Added Parameter Registration Request for "assertion" to IANA Considerations.
- Changed document name to draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer in anticipation of becoming an OAUTH WG item.
- Attempt to move the entire definition of the 'assertion' parameter into this draft (it will no longer be defined in OAuth 2 Protocol Framework).

draft-campbell-oauth-saml-01

- Updated to reference draft-ietf-oauth-v2-11 and reflect changes from -10 to -11.
- Updated examples.
- Relaxed processing rules to allow for more than one SubjectConfirmation element.
- Removed the 'MUST NOT contain a NotBefore attribute' on SubjectConfirmationData.
- Relaxed wording that ties the subject of the Assertion to the resource owner.
- Added some wording about identifying the client when the subject hasn't directly authenticated including an informative reference to SAML V2.0 Condition for Delegation Restriction.
- Added a few examples to the language about verifying that the Assertion is valid in all other respects.
- Added some wording to the introduction about the similarities to Web SSO in the format and processing rules
- Changed the grant\_type (was assertion\_type) URI from http://oauth.net/assertion\_type/saml/2.0/bearer to http://oauth.net/grant\_type/assertion/saml/2.0/bearer
- Changed title to include "Grant Type" in it.
- Editorial updates based on feedback from the WG and others (including capitalization of Assertion when referring to SAML).

draft-campbell-oauth-saml-00

Initial I-D

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