| NETCONF Working Group | K. Watsen |
| Internet-Draft | S. Hanna |
| Intended status: Standards Track | Juniper Networks |
| Expires: January 2, 2015 | J. Clarke |
| Cisco Systems | |
| M. Abrahamsson | |
| T-Systems | |
| July 1, 2014 |
Zero Touch Provisioning for NETCONF Call Home (ZeroTouch)
draft-ietf-netconf-zerotouch-00
This draft presents a technique for establishing a secure NETCONF connection between a newly deployed IP-based device, configured with just its factory default settings, and the new owner's Network Management System (NMS).
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2015.
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
A fundamental business requirement is to reduce operational costs where possible. Deploying new IP-based devices is many times one of the largest costs in running a network, as sending trained specialists to each site to do an installation is both cost prohibitive and does not scale.
Both networking vendors and standard bodies have tried to address this issue, with varying levels of success. For instance, the Broadband Forum TR-069 specification [TR069] relies solely on DHCP for NMS discovery, but this can only work in environments where the DHCP server is locally administered, which is not the case when the device is connected to an ISP's network. In another example, some network vendors have enabled their devices to load an initial configuration from removable storage media (e.g., a USB flash drive), but not all devices have such ports.
The solution presented herein, ZeroTouch, enables a device to securely obtain an initial configuration from the network without any operator intervention. The discovered configuration initiates the device to "call home" using either the SSH or TLS, as described in [NETCONF-REVERSE-SSH] and [RFC5539bis] respectively.
+----------+ fetches Configlet
+-------| Device |-------------------+
| +----------+ |
| ^ |
| | V
| call home | +----------+
| | | Config |
| | | Server |<----+
| | produces +----------+ |
| | |
| | |
| +----------+ delegates trust |
| | Vendor |-------------------+ |
| +----------+ | |
| ^ | |
| | V |
| | +----------+ |
| | imports | Config | |
| | trust | Signer | |
| | anchor +----------+ |
| | ^ |
| | | |
| +---------+ requests signing | |
+------>| NMS |--------------------+ |
+---------+ |
| places signed Configlet onto |
+-------------------------------------+
Though not represented as a box in the diagram, the Configlet is also a first-class object in the solution.
A Configuration Server is the entity hosting configurations that can be downloaded over a network. This section describes the service interface a Configuration Server must implement as well as what's needed for transport security.
Configuration Servers are known to devices in the form of a URI. Configuration Servers MUST support the URI schemes "https" and "http". Other URI schemes are not supported.
When accessing a Configuration Server, the device appends its unique device identifier (UID) to the URI. The unique identifies MUST be the same as the identifier stored within the device's IDevID certificate.
http://example.com/zerotouch/devices/
https://example.com/zerotouch?id=
http://example.com/zerotouch/devices/<uid>
https://example.com/zerotouch?id=<uid>
For instance, if the URI were:
When accessing the Configuration Server, the HTTP Accept-Type MUST be set to either "application/zerotouch-config" or "application/zerotouch-bootimage". Please see Section 9.2. A wildcard Accept-Type (e.g., */*) SHOULD default to "application/zerotouch-config".
The Configuration server SHOULD to provide some user-facing interface to enable to the end-user to provide a Configlet and, optionally, an bootimage file. How the Configlet and bootimage file are provided to the Configuration Server is outside the scope of this document.
As described in Section 3, configurations MUST be signed and MAY be encrypted. As such, transport-level security is not needed to assure authenticity or confidentiality of the configuration itself. However, transport-level security enables devices to authenticate the Configuration Server and also extends confidentiality to the application-level protocol. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED for Configuration Servers to support transport-level encryption.
If a Configuration Server uses X.509-based encryption, then its X.509 certificate MUST have a chain of trust to a trust anchor known to devices (see Section 4.2. More specifically, the Configuration Server MUST possess all the intermediate certificates leading to the trust anchor.
When a Configuration Server negotiates encryption with the device, it provides the chain of certificates, from its own to, but not including, the trust anchor. Including the trust anchor's certificate is unnecessary since the device MUST be pre-provisioned with it. Devices need the chain of certificates to be passed so they can validate the server using only a list of Configuration Server trust anchors.
An expiration policy is needed to limit how long a Configuration Server needs to retain a configuration and, in turn, how many configurations it might need to retain at a given time.
It is expected that Configuration Servers will enable retention information to be given at the same time as when the configuration is provided to it. Options should be temporal in nature, not based on access counts, so as to thwart a DoS attack whereby the configuration is accessed by an entity other than the device. Configuration Servers SHOULD put a limit on the maximum amount of time it will hold onto a configuration before purging it, even if the configuration had never been accessed.
In order to facilitate troubleshooting and auditing, the Configuration Server SHOULD record into a log a record of the various Configlet download requests. This draft does not define what information should be kept or for how long.
A Configuration Signer MUST be able to sign configurations. This function requires the Configuration Signer be able to authenticate that the requestor is the true owner of the device, as identified within the contents of the configuration being signed.
The user interface a Configuration Signer provides to perform its role is outside the scope of this document. However, in order to meet operational expectations, the time it takes to respond to a request should be as expeditious as possible.
A Configuration Signer does not need to retain a configuration after signing it. The Configuration Signer SHOULD retain an audit log for indemnification purposes.
A Configlet Signer MUST have an X.509 certificate with Key Usage capable of signing data (digitalSignature) and be signed by a certificate authority having a chain of trust leading to a trust anchor known to the devices loading its Configlets. The Configlet Signer MUST possess all intermediate certificates leading to its trust anchor.
When a Configlet Signer signs a Configlet, it attaches both the signature and the chain of X.509 certificates, including its own, but not necessarily including the trust anchor's certificate. This chain of certificates is needed so a device can validate a Configlet using only the Configlet Signer trust anchors known to it.
A Configuration Signer MAY optionally encrypt configurations prior to signing them. This function requires the Configuration Signer know the device's unique public key, as encoded within its secure device identity certificate.
A device's vendor is the root of trust for all of its devices. That is, the vendor's devices implicitly trust the vendor for such things as software images, subscription updates, and licenses. As such, the vendor is the ultimate Configuration Signer for its devices.
However, both vendors and its customers may prefer a this role be performed by another entity. For instance, a vendor may not want this role due to it being outside its primary business function, and customers may not want the vendor to have this role for privacy reasons.
It is therefore provided that a vendor MAY delegate the Configuration Signer role to other entities. Using X.509 certificates, the Vendor need only sign the delegate's certificate signing request (CSR), providing back to the delegate a signed X.509 certificate authenticating its ability to perform the signing function.
In order enable a delegate to fulfill its operational role, as described in Section 3.1, the vendor MUST provide a mechanism that can be used to authenticate if a given requestor is the true owner of a specific device. Additionally, to support Configuration Signers that want to encrypt configurations, the vendor MUST also provide a means for the Configuration Signer to know the public key for a given device. How the vendor provides this information to Configuration Signers is outside the scope of this document.
The general expectation is that the Configuration Signer is an impartial 3rd-party. However, certain deployments may want to be able to perform the function for themselves. Yet without constraints, that deployment could sign configurations for devices that do not belong to it.
Resolving this concern is possible when 1) the deployment specific Configuration Signer's certificate is annotated with a customer identifier and 2) the devices sold to that customer have that same identifier encoded into their secure device identifier.
This entails the vendor augmenting its manufacturing process for these special devices, which would likely be sold directly to the customer, as opposed to through a sales channel. This takes extraordinary effort and likely only implemented for the most important customers, if at all.
While the wholistic solution, ZeroTouch, involves a number of entities, a device being powered-on is the essential event that sets things in motion.
Whenever a device boots with its factory default settings, it initiates ZeroTouch with the goal of finding a configuration to initialize itself with. Once a configuration is found, the device initializes its running datastore with it and then enters normal operation. Since the configuration initializes the device to call home upon entering its normal operating mode, the device immediately begins trying to establish a secure connection with the deployment specific NMS.
+------------------------------------------------------------------+ | <device> | | | | +------------------------------------------------------+ | | | <immutable storage> | | | | | | | | list of Configlet Signer trust anchor certificates | | | | list of Configuration Server trust anchor certs | | | +------------------------------------------------------+ | | | | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | | | <other storage> | | | | | | | | two sets of Configuration Server URIs | | | | IDevID entity & associated intermediate certificate(s) | | | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | | | | +----------------------+ | | | <secure storage> | | | | | | | | IDevID private key | | | +----------------------+ | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------+
Devices supporting ZeroTouch MUST have a manufacturer-provisioned secure device identifier, as defined in [Std-802.1AR-2009]. This identifier is known by the IEEE standard as the Initial Device Identifier (IDevID). The IDevID includes both an X.509 certificate, encoding a globally unique per-device identifier, and a chain of X.509 certificates leading to the manufacturer's well-known trust anchor. The IDevID is needed in order for the NMS to positively authenticate a device. For NETCONF over SSH Call Home ([NETCONF-REVERSE-SSH]), this certificate requirement constrains the SSH host key algorithms the device is allowed to advertise to those defined in [RFC6187].
Devices supporting ZeroTouch MUST be pre-provisioned with one or more URIs for Internet-based Configuration Servers. These URIs SHOULD be partitioned into one set that contains secure schemes (e.g. https://) and another set that contains insecure schemes (e.g., http://). The reason for partitioning the URIs is so all the secure schemes can attempted before any of the insecure schemes (see Section 4.3). When using a secure scheme, the Configuration Server MUST be authenticated using a trust anchor the device possesses. As each Configuration Server may use a different trust anchor, this generalizes to a list of Configuration Server trust anchor certificates.
In order to verify the signature on retrieved configurations, devices supporting ZeroTouch MUST also possess the trust anchor for the Configuration Signer that signed the configuration. Generally, only the manufacturer's trust anchor is needed, as it can then delegate trust for 3rd-party Configuration Signers (see Section 3.4). However, for various reasons, there may be a need for more than one root anchor and therefore this generalizes to a list of Configuration Signer trust anchor certificates.
Devices SHOULD ensure that the certificates for its trust anchors are protected from external modification. It is for this reason that the diagram shows the Configuration Signer and Configuration Server certificates in immutable storage. Similarly, per [Std-802.1AR-2009], the IDevID private key shall be stored confidentially and not available outside the DevID module, hence the diagram shows it is held within secure storage.
DEVICE DHCP CONFIGURATION NMS
| SERVER/RELAY SERVERS |
| | | |
+-->| | | |
| | | | |
| |--[if running config != factory default, boot normally]--+ |
| | | | | |
<---------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| |--(discovery)-->| [if no dhcp server found, boot normally] |
| | | | |
| | +---(offer)---| | |
| | | | | |
| | +--[add any listed config servers to built-in list]--+ |
| | | | | |
| |<------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | (iterate until match, else boot normally) | |
| |------------------------------------------------>| |
| | | | |
| |<------------------------------(zerotouch info)--| |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| |--[if current image != expected, get image]----->| |
| | | | |
| | +-------------------------------------(image)--| |
| | | | | |
| | +--[if image valid, install & reboot]--+ | |
| | | | | |
+---------------------------------------------+ | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
|--[get config]---------------------------------->| |
| | | |
| +------------------------------------(config)--| |
| | | | |
| +--[if config valid, merge into running]--+ | |
| | | | |
| +--------------------------------------+ | |
| | | | |
| +--[per new configuration, call home]----------------->|
| | | |
| | | |
Whenever a device boots with its factory default settings, it initiates ZeroTouch with the goal of finding a configuration that will enable it to call home to its deployment-specific NMS.
The process begins with the device using the DHCP protocol to obtain a dynamic assignment for its networking stack. When broadcasting the DISCOVERY request, the device may provide any DHCP options to identify itself or the type of device it is (e.g. IPV4 options 60 or 61).
If the DHCP servers reside on a locally administered network (see Section 1.3), then their OFFER responses MAY include the ZeroTouch Information DHCP option defined in Section 9.1, as well as the legacy DHCP options for TFTP server name, bootfile name, and/or vendor specific information (e.g. IPv4 options 43, 66, 67).
If a DHCP server provides both the ZeroTouch Information and the vendor specific information DHCP options, then the ZeroTouch Information option MUST be processed first. After exhausting all ZeroTouch options without being able to call home, a device MAY then process the information provided by the legacy DHCP options.
The ZeroTouch Information option Section 9.1 provides a set of Configuration Server URIs. If returned by the DHCP server, the device MUST append each URI to the end of one of its two sets of Configuration Server URIs, depending on if the URI's scheme is secure or not. URIs added this way MUST remain distinguishable from those URIs the device was shipped with, for reasons discussed next.
The device then iterates over its two sets of Configuration Server URIs. The device MUST first try all the URIs from the set having secure schemes before trying any of the URIs from the set having insecure schemes. For each URI, until a match is found and successfully loaded, the device attempts to initialize itself from the URI. If the URI uses a secure scheme (e.g., https), the device MUST validate the Configuration Server's certificate using one of its Configuration Server trust anchors. If the device is unable to verify the server's certificate, the device MUST skip that URI. If the device reaches the end of all its URIs without finding a usable match, it SHOULD continue its normal boot sequence using its factory default configuration.
When the device is accessing a Configuration Server URI that it was shipped with (i.e. not discovered while initializing its networking), it MUST do so by appending its GUID to the URI string and using the Accept-Type "application/zerotouch-config", as described in Section 2. For URIs discovered via the ZeroTouch Information option, the device MAY also try the raw URI after trying the permutation using its GUID.
If the Configuration Server returns a configuration, the device MUST first verify it before use. Configuration verification entails both verifying the configuration's signature using the device's list of Configuration Signer trust anchors, and also verifying that the unique identifier within the Configlet matches the device's unique identifier.
Once the configuration is authenticated, the device MUST compare its software image version with the expected version specified within the configuration. If there is a mismatch, the device MUST download the correct image version from the Configuration Server, by appending its GUID to the Configuration Server's URI string and using the Accept-Type "application/zerotouch-bootimage", as described in Section 2. For URIs discovered via the ZeroTouch Information option, the device MAY also try both the raw URI after trying the permutation using its GUID. Once the image has been downloaded, the device MUST install it and reboot, still with the factory default settings configured, so that ZeroTouch restarts when the device comes back up.
If the device is running the correct software image version, it merges the Configlet's contents into its running configuration. This step effectively modifies the device so that it is no longer having its factory default setting. However, since the Configlet configured the device to "call home," upon entering its normal operating mode, the device immediately begins trying to establish a call home connection, as specified by the Configlet.
If configured to establish a SSH connection, the the device MUST use its IDevID and associated intermediate X.509 certificates as its host key per RFC 6187 [RFC6187]. If configured to establish a TLS connection, the device MUST use its IDevID and associated intermediate X.509 certificates as its server-side certificate for the TLS connection.
In order to facilitate troubleshooting, the device SHOULD record into a log information relating to its stepping through the ZeroTouch sequence of steps. This draft does not define any specific log messages, for instance, for Syslog or SNMP.
The NMS is the ultimate destination of ZeroTouch for a device. It is the NMS's network address configured in the Configlet. The device will initiate a call home connection to the NMS, using either a SSH or TLS, as configured by the Configlet loaded.
+------------------------------------------------------------------+ | <nsm> | | | | +------------------------------------------------------+ | | | <immutable storage> | | | | | | | | list of Configuration Signer trust anchor certs | | | | list of expected device unique identifiers | | | +------------------------------------------------------+ | | | | +--------------------------------------------------+ | | | <secure storage> | | | | | | | | map of device identifiers to login credentials | | | +--------------------------------------------------+ | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------+
In order to authenticate the device, the NMS MUST possess the X.509 certificate for the trust anchor leading to the device's entity certificate. The NMS uses this certificate to validate the server-certificate the device presents during SSH or TLS transport negotiation. Because an NMS may interoperate with multiple vendors, and a vendor may have more than one trust anchor for signing its devices IDevID certificates, this generalizes into the NMS needing a list of trust anchor certificates. This certificates SHOULD be stored in a way that prevents tampering, which is why they are shown in immutable storage in the diagram.
In order for the NMS to validate that the specific device connecting to it is expected, the MUST have a list of unique device identifiers that it can use to validate the device's IDevID certificate with. The list SHOULD be protected from external modification, which is why it is shown in immutable storage in the diagram. In order for the NMS to know the unique identifiers, device manufacturers will need to provide a mechanism to convey this information to its customers. This draft not specify a format for this information exchange.
In addition to authenticating the device, the NMS must also authenticate itself to the device. How this is done is deployment specific, but generalizes to the NMS needing to have login credentials for each device. These credentials will entail knowing a secret (e.g., password, private key). For this reason the diagram shows the NMS storing a map of device credentials in secure storage.
When receiving a NETCONF call home connection from a device, the NSM completes the connection as specified in the SSH [NETCONF-REVERSE-SSH] and TLS [RFC5539bis] drafts.
In order for a Vendor's customers to preconfigure their NMSs with what devices are expected, as well as to know how to set the "unique-identifier" field within a Configlet when requesting a signing, Vendors need to provide a mechanism for customers to obtain the unique identifier value for the devices they have ordered. For instance, customers could receive emails containing shipping information for their devices.
Additionally, to facilitate workflows where the devices are initially received by a customer-specific warehouse, or moved after having been unboxed, it is ideal for the unique identifier to be easily tracked through labels affixed to the device as well as the box it is packaged in. A device's serial number is commonly treated this way and would be suitable for this purpose, so long as it is directly related to its IDevID identity.
In order for Configuration Signers to validate that a requestor is the true owner of a device (i.e. its IDevID identity), Vendors need to provide a mechanism enabling a near real-time lookup. The interface used to implement this lookup is outside the scope of this document.
A Configlet is an XML file, containing specific YANG-defined configuration, that has been signed by a trusted signer known to the device (e.g., the device's manufacturer).
The Configlet data-model, defined by the YANG module in this document (see Section 7), is just enough to configure a local user account and either reverse-SSH or reverse-TLS. More specifically, this data-model is a subset of what's defined in ietf-system and ietf-netconf-server YANG models. This focused data-model is consistent with the common use-case of having the NMS push a full configuration to a device when it calls home.
The signature on the Configlet is enveloped, meaning that the signature is contained inside the XML file itself. The signature block also contains the X.509 certificate of the Configlet Signer and its chain of trust.
Once a device authenticates the signature on a Configlet and matches the unique identifier (e.g., serial number) within the Configlet, it merges the configuration contained in the Configlet into its running datastore.
module: ietf-netconf-zerotouch
+--rw configlet
+--rw target-requirements
| +--rw unique-identifier string
| +--rw software-version string
+--rw configuration
The Configlet's data model is no more than a wrapper around a header (i.e. <target-requirements>) and a payload (i.e. <configuration>).
The <target-requirements> element contains information that MUST be validated by the device prior to processing the <configuration> element. Specifically, it contains:
The <configuration> element contains the configuration that is to be committed to the device's running datastore. This element uses the "anyxml" type, enabling it to contain either vendor-specific or standards-based data models. When using standard models, in order to complete a call home connection, only the following is needed:
All Configlets MUST be signed by a Configuration Signer in order to be authentic. Devices MUST reject any Configlet that is either unsigned or having an invalid signature. Configlets are signed using the W3C standard "XML Signature Syntax and Processing" [XMLSIG]. The entire contents of the Configlet MUST be signed. The signature block must also include the Configlet Signer's certificate and any intermediate certificates leading to a Configlet Signer trust anchor. A signed Configlet example is in section Appendix A.1.
Configlets MAY optionally be encrypted prior to being signed. Encrypting the Configlet provides confidentiality for the Configlet's contents without relying on transport-level security. Configlets are encrypted using the W3C standard "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing" [XMLENC]. The entire contents of the Configlet MUST be encrypted. An encrypted Configlet example is in section Appendix A.2.
Following is the YANG module for the Configlet:
module ietf-netconf-zerotouch {
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-zerotouch";
prefix "zerotouch";
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
<mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
WG Chair: Bert Wijnen
<mailto:bertietf@bwijnen.net>
Editor: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
description
"This module contains a collection of YANG definitions for
configuring NETCONF zerotouch.
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with actual RFC number and
// remove this note
// RFC Ed.: please update the date to the date of publication
revision "2014-07-01" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for NETCONF ZeroTouch Configlet";
}
container configlet {
description
"Top-level container for ZeroTouch configuration objects.";
container target-requirements {
description
"Specifies requirements for device this is loaded onto";
leaf unique-identifier {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The device MUST have this unique identifier. The value
MUST be the same as the 'subject' field in the device's
DevID credential, as specified by section 7.2.8 in
IEEE Std 802.1AR-2009.";
}
leaf software-version {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The device MUST must be running this version of software.
The value for this field is device-specific, but it MUST
be an exact match (e.g., 14.1R2.5)";
}
}
anyxml configuration {
mandatory true;
description
"The configuration to be committed to the device's running
datastore. The configuration MUST be valid for the target
device. Device's supporting ZeroTouch SHOULD at least
support both the following standard data-models:
ietf-system // the authentication container
ietf-system-tls-auth // everything, if TLS supported
ietf-netconf-server // the call-home container
These three data models contain everything needed to
support NETCONF call home using either SSH or TLS.";
}
}
}
Devices SHOULD ensure that all its trust anchor certificates, including those for the Configuration Signer and Configuration Server, are protected from external modification. It is for this reason that the diagram in Section 4.2 shows them in immutable storage.
However, it may be necessary to update these certificates over time (e.g., the vendor wants to delegate trust to a new CA). It is therefore expected that devices MAY update these trust anchors when needed through a verifiable process, such as a software upgrade using signed software images.
It is generally not possible to substitute a Configlet created for a different device, since devices assert that the Configlet contains their unique identifier (e.g., serial number).
However, it is possible to substitute a Configlet created for a device with a different Configlet created for the same device. Generally, unless imposed by the Configuration Signers, there is no limit to the number of Configlets that may be generated for a given device. This could be resolved, in part, by placing a timestamp into the Configlet and ensuring devices do not load Configlets older than some amount, but this requires the devices have an accurate clock when validating a Configlet and for Configuration Signers to not sign a Configlet when another Configlet is still active.
This draft allows devices to use insecure schemes when doing a Configuration Server lookup. This is deemed acceptable because the Configlet is tamper-proof, since it MUST be signed, only confidentiality is lost.
Confidentiality of a Configlet's contents is assured when either the Configlet is encrypted or when the a secure scheme is used when accessing the Configuration Server.
Some confidentiality is lost when an insecure scheme is used to access a Configuration Server, as then the device's unique identifier is in the clear.
Given the fairly regular format for unique identifiers, it is possible that an adversary to guess unique identifiers and access a device's Configlet. Configlets that have been encrypted do not disclose any confidential information.
Section 7.2.7.2 of the IEEE Std 802.1AR-2009 standard says that IDevID certificate should never expire (i.e. having a notAfter 99991231235959Z). Given the long-lived nature of these certificates, it is paramount to use a strong key length (e.g., 512-bit ECC). Vendors SHOULD deploy Online Certificate State Protocol (OCSP) responders or CRL Distribution Points (CDP) to revoke certificates in case necessary.
This draft mentions using the device's serial number as its unique identifier in its IDevID certificate. This is because serial numbers are ubiquitous and prominently contained in invoices and on labels affixed to devices and their packaging. That said, serial numbers many times encode revealing information, such as the device's model number, manufacture date, and/or sequence number. Knowledge of this information may provide an adversary with details needed to launch an attack. To address this concern, the certificate could contain the hash of the serial number instead, which the NMS could also compute, but doing so is much less intuitive and raises questions if it is just security through obscurity.
TBD, but it essentially returns a list of URIs.
TBD, but in accordance with RFC 6838, the draft registers: application/zerotouch-configlet and application/zerotouch-bootimage
The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): David Harrington, Dean Bogdanovic, Martin Bjorklund, Wes Hardaker, Russ Mundy, Reinaldo Penno, Randy Presuhn, Juergen Schoenwaelder.
Special thanks goes to Russ Mundy and Wes Hardaker for brainstorming the original I-D's solution during the IETF 87 meeting in Berlin.
| [TR069] | The Broadband Forum, , "TR-069 Amendment 3, CPE WAN Management Protocol", November 2010. |
This example illustrates a Configlet configuring both a local user account and call home using SSH. This Configlet includes both the Configuration Signer's certificate as well as an Intermediate certificate. Note that '\' characters have been added for formatting reasons.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<configlet xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-zerotouch">
<target-requirements>
<unique-identifier>0123456789</unique-identifier>
<software-version>14.1R3.5</software-version>
</target-requirements>
<configuration>
<!-- from ietf-system.yang -->
<system xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system">
<authentication>
<user>
<name>admin</name>
<ssh-key>
<name>admin's rsa ssh host-key</name>
<algorithm>ssh-rsa</algorithm>
<key-data>AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDeJMV8zrtsi8CgEsRC
jCzfve2m6zD3awSBPrh7ICggLQvHVbPL89eHLuecStKL3HrEgXaI/O2Mwj
E1lG9YxLzeS5p2ngzK61vikUSqfMukeBohFTrDZ8bUtrF+HMLlTRnoCVcC
WAw1lOr9IDGDAuww6G45gLcHalHMmBtQxKnZdzU9kx/fL3ZS5G76Fy6sA5
vg7SLqQFPjXXft2CAhin8xwYRZy6r/2N9PMJ2Dnepvq4H2DKqBIe340jWq
EIuA7LvEJYql4unq4Iog+/+CiumTkmQIWRgIoj4FCzYkO9NvRE6fOSLLf6
gakWVOZZgQ8929uWjCWlGlqn2mPibp2Go1</key-data>
</ssh-key>
<!--<password>$1$salt$hash</password>-->
</user>
</authentication>
</system>
<!-- from ietf-netconf-server.yang -->
<netconf-server xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-server">
<ssh>
<call-home>
<applications>
<application>
<name>config-mgr</name>
<description>
This entry requests the device to periodically
connect to the Configuration Manager application
</description>
<servers>
<server>
<address>config-mgr1.example.com</address>
</server>
<server>
<address>config-mgr2.example.com</address>
</server>
</servers>
<connection-type>
<periodic>
<timeout-mins>5</timeout-mins>
<linger-secs>10</linger-secs>
</periodic>
</connection-type>
<reconnect-strategy>
<start-with>last-connected</start-with>
<interval-secs>10</interval-secs>
<count-max>3</count-max>
</reconnect-strategy>
<host-keys>
<host-key>
<name>ssh_host_key_cert</name>
</host-key>
<host-key>
<name>ssh_host_key_cert2</name>
</host-key>
</host-keys>
</application>
</applications>
</call-home>
</ssh>
</netconf-server>
</configuration>
<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
<SignatureMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
<Reference>
<Transforms>
<Transform
Algorithm=\
"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
</Transforms>
<DigestMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<DigestValue>2xlFdlVifb1snGBLJuEZYrLjSUQ=</DigestValue>
</Reference>
</SignedInfo>
<SignatureValue>\
HUx3S7TZXGJGUhazWGRSB9CBMZ0T+tTrB1fOnTcKi9wU4UOnSw5KMWDvOVwc6ldM
UIOJIuJigWhSkn+VvWSWz6qy7LTYIywNcxDyghMvmMXfoRXETpL+qCDxribMi4VW
mVhEw1oe83kJt7W/0DJUE7FFKRUhPjy9EgxpQX/7WdKSK+4f2uYkSpq2UumW3DIU
LeK9vNRVQBbhmcF3zZWANmwKH5V4WeQimwWE497AeSYWgSImSetADI0NvvXfBZjx
JqzFEaYLNz8IB0ZVY+w14s1RZbN7YmxhN1R3q52wWvHjR2SylR/Z5BpIhYoDeKoD
HMQMf3HZL06Hm5S8r8rgGg==</SignatureValue>
<KeyInfo>
<X509Data>
<X509Certificate>\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</X509Certificate>
<X509Certificate>\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</X509Certificate>
</X509Data>
</KeyInfo>
</Signature>
</configlet>
This example is the same as to previous example (section Appendix A.1) except that the Configlet was encrypted using the device's public key prior to being signed using the Configuration Server's private key. Note that '\' characters have been added for formatting reasons.
// This example is currently missing