YANG Data Types and Groupings for CryptographyWatsen Networkskent+ietf@watsen.net
Operations
NETCONF Working GroupThis document presents a YANG 1.1 (RFC 7950) module defining identities,
typedefs, and groupings useful to cryptographic applications.Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)This draft contains placeholder values that need to be replaced
with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes
all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor
instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
progress. Please apply the following replacements:
AAAA --> the assigned RFC value for this draft
Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date
of publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:
2021-02-10 --> the publication date of this draft
The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:
. Change Log
IntroductionThis document presents a YANG 1.1
module defining identities, typedefs, and groupings useful to
cryptographic applications.Relation to other RFCsThis document presents one or more YANG modules
that are part of a collection of RFCs that work together to,
ultimately, enable the configuration of the clients and
servers of both the NETCONF and RESTCONF
protocols.The modules have been defined in a modular fashion to enable
their use by other efforts, some of which are known to be in
progress at the time of this writing, with many more expected
to be defined in time.The normative dependency relationship between the various RFCs in the collection
is presented in the below diagram. The labels in the diagram
represent the primary purpose provided by each RFC. Hyperlinks to
each RFC are provided below the diagram.
Label to RFC Mapping
Label in Diagram
Originating RFC
crypto-types
truststore
keystore
tcp-client-server
ssh-client-server
tls-client-server
http-client-server
netconf-client-server
restconf-client-server
Specification LanguageThe key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14
when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.Adherence to the NMDAThis document in compliant with the Network Management Datastore
Architecture (NMDA) . It does not define
any protocol accessible nodes that are "config false".The "ietf-crypto-types" ModuleThis section defines a YANG 1.1 module called
"ietf-crypto-types". A high-level overview of the module is provided in
. Examples illustatrating the module's use
are provided in Examples. The YANG
module itself is defined in .Data Model OverviewThis section provides an overview of the "ietf-crypto-types" module
in terms of its features, indentities, typedefs, and groupings.FeaturesThe following diagram lists all the "feature" statements
defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module:IdentitiesThe following diagram illustrates the relationship amongst the
"identity" statements defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module:Comments:
The diagram shows that there are four base identities. The
first three identities are used to indicate the format that key
data, while the fourth identity is used to indicate the format
for encrypted values. The base identities are "abstract",
in the object orientied programming sense, in that they only
define a "class" of formats, rather than a specific format.
The various "leaf" identities define specific encoding
formats. The derived identities defined in this document are
sufficient for the effort described in
but, by nature of them being identities, additional derived
identities MAY be defined by future efforts.
Identities used to specify uncommon formats are enabled by
"feature" statements, allowing applications to support them
when needed.
TypedefsThe following diagram illustrates the relationship amongst the
"typedef" statements defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module:Comments:
All of the typedefs defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module
extend the "binary" type defined in .
Additionally, all the typedefs define a type for encoding an ASN.1
structure using DER .
The "trust-anchor-*" and "end-entity-*" typedefs are syntactically
identical to their base typedefs and only distiguish themselves
by the expected nature of their content. These typedefs are
defined to facilitate common modeling needs.
GroupingsThe "ietf-crypto-types" module defines the following "grouping" statements:
encrypted-value-grouping
password-grouping
symmetric-key-grouping
public-key-grouping
asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
trust-anchor-cert-grouping
end-entity-cert-grouping
generate-csr-grouping
asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping
asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.The "encrypted-value-grouping" GroupingThe following tree diagram illustrates the
"encrypted-value-grouping" grouping:Comments:
The "encrypted-by" node is an empty container (difficult to
see in the diagram) that a consuming module MUST augment key
references into. The "ietf-crypto-types" module is unable to
populate this container as the module only defines groupings.
presents an example illustrating
a consuming module populating the "encrypted-by" container.
The "encrypted-value" node is the value, encrypted by the
key referenced by the "encrypted-by" node, and encoded in
the format appropriate for the kind of key it was encrypted
by.
If the value is encrypted by a symmetric key, then the
encrypted value is encoded using the format associated with
the "symmetrically-encrypted-value-format" identity.
If the value is encrypted by an asymmetric key, then the
encrypted value is encoded using the format associated with
the "asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format" identity.
See for information about
the "format" identities.
The "password-grouping" GroupingThis section presents two tree diagrams illustrating the
"password-grouping" grouping. The first tree diagram does
not expand the internally used grouping statement(s):The following tree diagram expands the internally used grouping statement(s),
enabling the grouping's full structure to be seen:Comments:
For the referenced grouping statement(s):
The "encrypted-value-grouping" grouping is discussed in
.
The "choice" statement enables the password data to be cleartext or
encrypted, as follows:
The "cleartext-password" node can encode any cleartext value.
The "encrypted-password" node's structure is discussed in
.
The "symmetric-key-grouping" GroupingThis section presents two tree diagrams illustrating the
"symmetric-key-grouping" grouping. The first tree diagram does
not expand the internally used grouping statement(s):The following tree diagram expands the internally used grouping statement(s),
enabling the grouping's full structure to be seen:Comments:
For the referenced grouping statement(s):
The "encrypted-value-grouping" grouping is discussed in
.
The "key-format" node is an identity-reference to the "symmetric-key-format"
abstract base identity discussed in ,
enabling the symmetric key to be encoded using the format defined
by any of the derived identities.
The "choice" statement enables the private key data to be cleartext,
encrypted, or hidden, as follows:
The "cleartext-key" node can encode any cleartext key value.
The "hidden-key" node is of type "empty" as the real
value cannot be presented via the management interface.
The "encrypted-key" node's structure is discussed in
.
The "public-key-grouping" GroupingThe following tree diagram illustrates the
"public-key-grouping" grouping:Comments:
The "public-key-format" node is an identity-reference to the "public-key-format"
abstract base identity discussed in ,
enabling the public key to be encoded using the format defined by any of
the derived identities.
The "public-key" node is the public key data in the selected format.
No "choice" statement is used to hide or encrypt the public key data
because it is unecessary to do so for public keys.
The "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" GroupingThis section presents two tree diagrams illustrating the
"asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping. The first tree diagram does
not expand the internally used grouping statement(s):The following tree diagram expands the internally used grouping statement(s),
enabling the grouping's full structure to be seen:Comments:
For the referenced grouping statement(s):
The "public-key-grouping" grouping is discussed in
.
The "encrypted-value-grouping" grouping is discussed in
.
The "private-key-format" node is an identity-reference to the "private-key-format"
abstract base identity discussed in ,
enabling the private key to be encoded using the format defined by
any of the derived identities.
The "choice" statement enables the private key data to be cleartext,
encrypted, or hidden, as follows:
The "cleartext-private-key" node can encode any cleartext key value.
The "hidden-private-key" node is of type "empty" as the real
value cannot be presented via the management interface.
The "encrypted-private-key" node's structure is discussed in
.
The "certificate-expiration-grouping" GroupingThe following tree diagram illustrates the
"certificate-expiration-grouping" grouping:Comments:
This grouping's only purpose is to define the "certificate-expiration"
notification statement, used by the groupings defined in
and
.
The "certificate-expiration" notification enables servers to
notify clients when certificates are nearing expiration.
The "expiration-date" node indicates when the designated
certificate will (or did) expire.
Identification of the certificate that is expiring is built
into the notification itself. For an example, please see
.
The "trust-anchor-cert-grouping" GroupingThis section presents two tree diagrams illustrating the
"trust-anchor-cert-grouping" grouping. The first tree diagram does
not expand the internally used grouping statement(s):The following tree diagram expands the internally used grouping statement(s),
enabling the grouping's full structure to be seen:Comments:
For the referenced grouping statement(s):
The "certificate-expiration-grouping" grouping is discussed in
.
The "cert-data" node contains a chain of one or more certificates encoded
using a "signed-data-cms" typedef discussed in .
The "end-entity-cert-grouping" GroupingThis section presents two tree diagrams illustrating the
"end-entity-cert-grouping" grouping. The first tree diagram does
not expand the internally used grouping statement(s):The following tree diagram expands the internally used grouping statement(s),
enabling the grouping's full structure to be seen:Comments:
For the referenced grouping statement(s):
The "certificate-expiration-grouping" grouping is discussed in
.
The "cert-data" node contains a chain of one or more certificates encoded
using a "signed-data-cms" typedef discussed in .
The "generate-csr-grouping" GroupingThe following tree diagram illustrates the
"generate-csr-grouping" grouping:Comments:
This grouping's only purpose is to define the "generate-certificate-signing-request"
action statement, used by the groupings defined in
and .
This action takes as input a "csr-info" type and returns a
"csr" type, both of which are discussed in .
For an example, please see .
The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" GroupingThis section presents two tree diagrams illustrating the
"asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" grouping. The first tree diagram does
not expand the internally used grouping statement(s):The following tree diagram expands the internally used grouping statement(s),
enabling the grouping's full structure to be seen:Comments:
This grouping defines an asymmetric key with at most one associated
certificate, a commonly needed combination in protocol models.
For the referenced grouping statement(s):
The "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping is discussed in
.
The "end-entity-cert-grouping" grouping is discussed in
.
The "generate-csr-grouping" grouping is discussed in
.
The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" GroupingThis section presents two tree diagrams illustrating the
"asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping. The first tree diagram does
not expand the internally used grouping statement(s):The following tree diagram expands the internally used grouping statement(s),
enabling the grouping's full structure to be seen:Comments:
This grouping defines an asymmetric key with one or more
associated certificates, a commonly needed combination in
configuration models.
For the referenced grouping statement(s):
The "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping is discussed in
.
The "end-entity-cert-grouping" grouping is discussed in
.
The "generate-csr-grouping" grouping is discussed in
.
Protocol-accessible NodesThe "ietf-crypto-types" module does not contain any protocol-accessible nodes,
but the module needs to be "implemented", as described in , in order for the identities in
to be defined.Example UsageThe "symmetric-key-grouping" and "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" GroupingThe following non-normative module is constructed in order to illustrate the
use of the "symmetric-key-grouping" (), the
"asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" (),
and the "password-grouping" () grouping statements.Notably, this example illustrates a hidden asymmetric key (ex-hidden-asymmetric-key)
has been used to encrypt a symmetric key (ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetric-key)
that has been used to encrypt another asymmetric key (ex-encrypted-rsa-based-asymmetric-key).
Additionally, the symmetric key is also used to encrypt a password (ex-encrypted-password).";
description
"This module illustrates the 'symmetric-key-grouping'
and 'asymmetric-key-grouping' groupings defined in
the 'ietf-crypto-types' module defined in RFC AAAA.";
revision "2021-02-10" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC AAAA: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
}
container symmetric-keys {
description
"A container of symmetric keys.";
list symmetric-key {
key name;
description
"A symmetric key";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ct:symmetric-key-grouping {
augment "key-type/encrypted-key/encrypted-key/"
+ "encrypted-by" {
description
"Augments in a choice statement enabling the
encrypting key to be any other symmetric or
asymmetric key.";
uses encrypted-by-choice-grouping;
}
}
}
}
container asymmetric-keys {
description
"A container of asymmetric keys.";
list asymmetric-key {
key name;
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping {
augment "private-key-type/encrypted-private-key/"
+ "encrypted-private-key/encrypted-by" {
description
"Augments in a choice statement enabling the
encrypting key to be any other symmetric or
asymmetric key.";
uses encrypted-by-choice-grouping;
}
}
description
"An asymmetric key pair with associated certificates.";
}
}
container passwords {
description
"A container of passwords.";
list password {
key name;
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this password.";
}
uses ct:password-grouping {
augment "password-type/encrypted-password/"
+ "encrypted-password/encrypted-by" {
description
"Augments in a choice statement enabling the
encrypting key to be any symmetric or
asymmetric key.";
uses encrypted-by-choice-grouping;
}
}
description
"A password.";
}
}
grouping encrypted-by-choice-grouping {
description
"A grouping that defines a choice enabling references
to other keys.";
choice encrypted-by-choice {
mandatory true;
description
"A choice amongst other symmetric or asymmetric keys.";
case symmetric-key-ref {
leaf symmetric-key-ref {
type leafref {
path "/ectu:symmetric-keys/ectu:symmetric-key/"
+ "ectu:name";
}
description
"Identifies the symmetric key used to encrypt this key.";
}
}
case asymmetric-key-ref {
leaf asymmetric-key-ref {
type leafref {
path "/ectu:asymmetric-keys/ectu:asymmetric-key/"
+ "ectu:name";
}
description
"Identifies the asymmetric key used to encrypt this key.";
}
}
}
}
}
]]>The tree diagram for this example module follows:Finally, the following example illustrates various symmetric and asymmetric keys
as they might appear in configration:ex-hidden-symmetric-keyex-octet-string-based-symmetric-keyct:octet-string-key-formatbase64encodedvalue==ex-one-symmetric-based-symmetric-keyct:one-symmetric-key-formatbase64encodedvalue==ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetric-keyct:one-symmetric-key-formatex-hidden-asymmetric-key
ct:cms-enveloped-data-format
base64encodedvalue==ex-hidden-asymmetric-key
ct:subject-public-key-info-format
base64encodedvalue==ex-hidden-asymmetric-key-certbase64encodedvalue==ex-rsa-based-asymmetric-key
ct:subject-public-key-info-format
base64encodedvalue==
ct:rsa-private-key-format
base64encodedvalue==
ex-certbase64encodedvalue==ex-one-asymmetric-based-asymmetric-key
ct:subject-public-key-info-format
base64encodedvalue==
ct:one-asymmetric-key-format
base64encodedvalue==
ex-encrypted-rsa-based-asymmetric-key
ct:subject-public-key-info-format
base64encodedvalue==
ct:rsa-private-key-format
ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetri\
c-key
ct:cms-encrypted-data-format
base64encodedvalue==ex-cleartext-passwordsuper-secretex-encrypted-passwordex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetri\
c-key
ct:cms-encrypted-data-format
base64encodedvalue==
]]>The "generate-certificate-signing-request" ActionThe following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-request"
action, discussed in , with the NETCONF protocol.REQUESTex-key-sect571r1base64encodedvalue==
]]>RESPONSE
base64encodedvalue==
]]>The "certificate-expiration" NotificationThe following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration"
notification, discussed in ,
with the NETCONF protocol.2018-05-25T00:01:00Zex-hidden-asymmetric-keyex-hidden-asymmetric-key2018-08-05T14:18:53-05:00
]]>YANG ModuleThis module has normative references to ,
, , ,
, , ,
, , ,
, , ,
, and .<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-crypto-types@2021-02-10.yang"
WG List:
Author: Kent Watsen ";
description
"This module defines common YANG types for cryptographic
applications.
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC AAAA
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcAAAA); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2021-02-10 {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC AAAA: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
/****************/
/* Features */
/****************/
feature one-symmetric-key-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'one-symmetric-key-format' identity.";
}
feature one-asymmetric-key-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'one-asymmetric-key-format' identity.";
}
feature symmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'symmetrically-encrypted-value-format' identity.";
}
feature asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format' identity.";
}
feature cms-enveloped-data-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'cms-enveloped-data-format' identity.";
}
feature cms-encrypted-data-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'cms-encrypted-data-format' identity.";
}
feature certificate-signing-request-generation {
description
"Indicates that the server implements the
'generate-certificate-signing-request' action.";
}
feature certificate-expiration-notification {
description
"Indicates that the server implements the
'certificate-expiration' notification.";
}
feature password-encryption {
description
"Indicates that the server supports password
encryption.";
}
feature symmetric-key-encryption {
description
"Indicates that the server supports encryption
of symmetric keys.";
}
feature private-key-encryption {
description
"Indicates that the server supports encryption
of private keys.";
}
/*************************************************/
/* Base Identities for Key Format Structures */
/*************************************************/
identity symmetric-key-format {
description "Base key-format identity for symmetric keys.";
}
identity public-key-format {
description "Base key-format identity for public keys.";
}
identity private-key-format {
description "Base key-format identity for private keys.";
}
/****************************************************/
/* Identities for Private Key Format Structures */
/****************************************************/
identity rsa-private-key-format {
base "private-key-format";
description
"Indicates that the private key value is encoded
as an RSAPrivateKey (from RFC 3447).";
reference
"RFC 3447: PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.2";
}
identity ec-private-key-format {
base "private-key-format";
description
"Indicates that the private key value is encoded
as an ECPrivateKey (from RFC 5915)";
reference
"RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure";
}
identity one-asymmetric-key-format {
if-feature "one-asymmetric-key-format";
base "private-key-format";
description
"Indicates that the private key value is a CMS
OneAsymmetricKey structure, as defined in RFC 5958,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5958: Asymmetric Key Packages
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
/***************************************************/
/* Identities for Public Key Format Structures */
/***************************************************/
identity ssh-public-key-format {
base "public-key-format";
description
"Indicates that the public key value is an SSH public key,
as specified by RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.:
string certificate or public key format
identifier
byte[n] key/certificate data.";
reference
"RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity subject-public-key-info-format {
base "public-key-format";
description
"Indicates that the public key value is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo
structure, as described in RFC 5280 encoded using ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
/******************************************************/
/* Identities for Symmetric Key Format Structures */
/******************************************************/
identity octet-string-key-format {
base "symmetric-key-format";
description
"Indicates that the key is encoded as a raw octet string.
The length of the octet string MUST be appropriate for
the associated algorithm's block size.
How the associated algorithm is known is outside the
scope of this module. This statement also applies when
the octet string has been encrypted.";
}
identity one-symmetric-key-format {
if-feature "one-symmetric-key-format";
base "symmetric-key-format";
description
"Indicates that the private key value is a CMS
OneSymmetricKey structure, as defined in RFC 6031,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 6031: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Symmetric Key Package Content Type
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
/*************************************************/
/* Identities for Encrytped Value Structures */
/*************************************************/
identity encrypted-value-format {
description
"Base format identity for encrypted values.";
}
identity symmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
if-feature "symmetrically-encrypted-value-format";
base "encrypted-value-format";
description
"Base format identity for symmetrically encrypted
values.";
}
identity asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
if-feature "asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format";
base "encrypted-value-format";
description
"Base format identity for asymmetrically encrypted
values.";
}
identity cms-encrypted-data-format {
if-feature "cms-encrypted-data-format";
base "symmetrically-encrypted-value-format";
description
"Indicates that the encrypted value conforms to
the 'encrypted-data-cms' type with the constraint
that the 'unprotectedAttrs' value is not set.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
identity cms-enveloped-data-format {
if-feature "cms-enveloped-data-format";
base "asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format";
description
"Indicates that the encrypted value conforms to the
'enveloped-data-cms' type with the following constraints:
The EnvelopedData structure MUST have exactly one
'RecipientInfo'.
If the asymmetric key supports public key cryptography
(e.g., RSA), then the 'RecipientInfo' must be a
'KeyTransRecipientInfo' with the 'RecipientIdentifier'
using a 'subjectKeyIdentifier' with the value set using
'method 1' in RFC 7093 over the recipient's public key.
Otherwise, if the asymmetric key supports key agreement
(e.g., ECC), then the 'RecipientInfo' must be a
'KeyAgreeRecipientInfo'. The 'OriginatorIdentifierOrKey'
value must use the 'OriginatorPublicKey' alternative.
The 'UserKeyingMaterial' value must not be present.
There must be exactly one 'RecipientEncryptedKeys' value
having the 'KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier' set to 'rKeyId'
with the value set using 'method 1' in RFC 7093 over the
recipient's public key.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
RFC 7093:
Additional Methods for Generating Key
Identifiers Values
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
/***************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 2986 */
/***************************************************/
typedef csr-info {
type binary;
description
"A CertificationRequestInfo structure, as defined in
RFC 2986, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding
rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
typedef csr {
type binary;
description
"A CertificationRequest structure, as specified in
RFC 2986, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding
rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
/***************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 5280 */
/***************************************************/
typedef x509 {
type binary;
description
"A Certificate structure, as specified in RFC 5280,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
typedef crl {
type binary;
description
"A CertificateList structure, as specified in RFC 5280,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
/***************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 6960 */
/***************************************************/
typedef oscp-request {
type binary;
description
"A OCSPRequest structure, as specified in RFC 6960,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 6960:
X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
typedef oscp-response {
type binary;
description
"A OCSPResponse structure, as specified in RFC 6960,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 6960:
X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
/***********************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from 5652 */
/***********************************************/
typedef cms {
type binary;
description
"A ContentInfo structure, as specified in RFC 5652,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5652:
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
typedef data-content-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
data content type, as described by Section 4 in RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef signed-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
signed-data content type, as described by Section 5 in
RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef enveloped-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
enveloped-data content type, as described by Section 6
in RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef digested-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
digested-data content type, as described by Section 7
in RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef encrypted-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
encrypted-data content type, as described by Section 8
in RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef authenticated-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
authenticated-data content type, as described by Section 9
in RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
/*********************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures related to RFC 5280 */
/*********************************************************/
typedef trust-anchor-cert-x509 {
type x509;
description
"A Certificate structure that MUST encode a self-signed
root certificate.";
}
typedef end-entity-cert-x509 {
type x509;
description
"A Certificate structure that MUST encode a certificate
that is neither self-signed nor having Basic constraint
CA true.";
}
/*********************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures related to RFC 5652 */
/*********************************************************/
typedef trust-anchor-cert-cms {
type signed-data-cms;
description
"A CMS SignedData structure that MUST contain the chain of
X.509 certificates needed to authenticate the certificate
presented by a client or end-entity.
The CMS MUST contain only a single chain of certificates.
The client or end-entity certificate MUST only authenticate
to last intermediate CA certificate listed in the chain.
In all cases, the chain MUST include a self-signed root
certificate. In the case where the root certificate is
itself the issuer of the client or end-entity certificate,
only one certificate is present.
This CMS structure MAY (as applicable where this type is
used) also contain suitably fresh (as defined by local
policy) revocation objects with which the device can
verify the revocation status of the certificates.
This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData
structure that is commonly used to disseminate X.509
certificates and revocation objects (RFC 5280).";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.";
}
typedef end-entity-cert-cms {
type signed-data-cms;
description
"A CMS SignedData structure that MUST contain the end
entity certificate itself, and MAY contain any number
of intermediate certificates leading up to a trust
anchor certificate. The trust anchor certificate
MAY be included as well.
The CMS MUST contain a single end entity certificate.
The CMS MUST NOT contain any spurious certificates.
This CMS structure MAY (as applicable where this type is
used) also contain suitably fresh (as defined by local
policy) revocation objects with which the device can
verify the revocation status of the certificates.
This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData
structure that is commonly used to disseminate X.509
certificates and revocation objects (RFC 5280).";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.";
}
/*****************/
/* Groupings */
/*****************/
grouping encrypted-value-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for a value that has been encrypted by
a symmetric or asymmetric key in the Keystore.";
container encrypted-by {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description
"An empty container enabling a reference to the key that
encrypted the value to be augmented in. The referenced
key MUST be a symmetric key or an asymmetric key.
A symmetric key MUST be referenced via a leaf node called
'symmetric-key-ref'. An asymmetric key MUST be referenced
via a leaf node called 'asymmetric-key-ref'.
The leaf nodes MUST be direct descendents in the data tree,
and MAY be direct descendents in the schema tree.";
}
leaf encrypted-value-format {
type identityref {
base encrypted-value-format;
}
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the format of the 'encrypted-value' leaf.
If 'encrypted-by' points to a symmetric key, then a
'symmetrically-encrypted-value-format' based identity
MUST by set (e.g., cms-encrypted-data-format).
If 'encrypted-by' points to an asymmetric key, then an
'asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format' based identity
MUST by set (e.g., cms-enveloped-data-format).";
}
leaf encrypted-value {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type binary;
must "../encrypted-by";
mandatory true;
description
"The value, encrypted using the referenced symmetric
or asymmetric key. The value MUST be encoded using
the format associated with the 'encrypted-value-format'
leaf.";
}
}
grouping password-grouping {
description
"A password that MAY be encrypted.";
choice password-type {
nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true;
description
"Choice between password types.";
case cleartext-password {
leaf cleartext-password {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type string;
description
"The cleartext value of the password.";
}
}
case encrypted-password {
if-feature password-encryption;
container encrypted-password {
description
"A container for the encrypted password value.";
uses encrypted-value-grouping;
}
}
}
}
grouping symmetric-key-grouping {
description
"A symmetric key.";
leaf key-format {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type identityref {
base symmetric-key-format;
}
description
"Identifies the symmetric key's format. Implementations
SHOULD ensure that the incoming symmetric key value is
encoded in the specified format.
For encrypted keys, the value is the same as it would
have been if the key were not encrypted.";
}
choice key-type {
nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true;
description
"Choice between key types.";
case cleartext-key {
leaf cleartext-key {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type binary;
must "../key-format";
description
"The binary value of the key. The interpretation of
the value is defined by the 'key-format' field.";
}
}
case hidden-key {
leaf hidden-key {
type empty;
must "not(../key-format)";
description
"A hidden key. How such keys are created is outside
the scope of this module.";
}
}
case encrypted-key {
if-feature symmetric-key-encryption;
container encrypted-key {
must "../key-format";
description
"A container for the encrypted symmetric key value.
The interpretation of the 'encrypted-value' node
is via the 'key-format' node";
uses encrypted-value-grouping;
}
}
}
}
grouping public-key-grouping {
description
"A public key.";
leaf public-key-format {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type identityref {
base public-key-format;
}
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the public key's format. Implementations SHOULD
ensure that the incoming public key value is encoded in the
specified format.";
}
leaf public-key {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"The binary value of the public key. The interpretation
of the value is defined by 'public-key-format' field.";
}
}
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping {
description
"A private key and its associated public key. Implementations
SHOULD ensure that the two keys are a matching pair.";
uses public-key-grouping;
leaf private-key-format {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type identityref {
base private-key-format;
}
description
"Identifies the private key's format. Implementations SHOULD
ensure that the incoming private key value is encoded in the
specified format.
For encrypted keys, the value is the same as it would have
been if the key were not encrypted.";
}
choice private-key-type {
nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true;
description
"Choice between key types.";
case cleartext-private-key {
leaf cleartext-private-key {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type binary;
must "../private-key-format";
description
"The value of the binary key The key's value is
interpreted by the 'private-key-format' field.";
}
}
case hidden-private-key {
leaf hidden-private-key {
type empty;
must "not(../private-key-format)";
description
"A hidden key. How such keys are created is
outside the scope of this module.";
}
}
case encrypted-private-key {
if-feature private-key-encryption;
container encrypted-private-key {
must "../private-key-format";
description
"A container for the encrypted asymmetric private key
value. The interpretation of the 'encrypted-value'
node is via the 'private-key-format' node";
uses encrypted-value-grouping;
}
}
}
}
grouping certificate-expiration-grouping {
description
"A notification for when a certificate is about to, or
already has, expired.";
notification certificate-expiration {
if-feature certificate-expiration-notification;
description
"A notification indicating that the configured certificate
is either about to expire or has already expired. When to
send notifications is an implementation specific decision,
but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.";
leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
}
}
}
grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping {
description
"A trust anchor certificate, and a notification for when
it is about to (or already has) expire.";
leaf cert-data {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type trust-anchor-cert-cms;
description
"The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
}
uses certificate-expiration-grouping;
}
grouping end-entity-cert-grouping {
description
"An end entity certificate, and a notification for when
it is about to (or already has) expire. Implementations
SHOULD assert that, where used, the end entity certificate
contains the expected public key.";
leaf cert-data {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type end-entity-cert-cms;
description
"The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
}
uses certificate-expiration-grouping;
}
grouping generate-csr-grouping {
description
"Defines the 'generate-certificate-signing-request' action.";
action generate-certificate-signing-request {
if-feature certificate-signing-request-generation;
nacm:default-deny-all;
description
"Generates a certificate signing request structure for
the associated asymmetric key using the passed subject
and attribute values.
This action statement is only available when the
associated 'public-key-format' node's value is
'subject-public-key-info-format'.";
reference
"RFC 6125:
Representation and Verification of Domain-Based
Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the
Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
input {
leaf csr-info {
type ct:csr-info;
mandatory true;
description
"A CertificationRequestInfo structure, as defined in
RFC 2986.
Enables the client to provide a fully-populated
CertificationRequestInfo structure that the server
only needs to sign in order to generate the complete
'CertificationRequest' structure to return in the
'output'.
The 'AlgorithmIdentifier' field contained inside
the 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo' field MUST be one known
to be supported by the device.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
RFC AAAA:
YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
}
output {
leaf certificate-signing-request {
type ct:csr;
mandatory true;
description
"A CertificationRequest structure, as defined in
RFC 2986.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
RFC AAAA:
YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
}
}
} // generate-csr-grouping
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping {
description
"A private/public key pair and an associated certificate.
Implementations SHOULD assert that certificates contain
the matching public key.";
uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
uses end-entity-cert-grouping;
uses generate-csr-grouping;
} // asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping {
description
"A private/public key pair and associated certificates.
Implementations SHOULD assert that certificates contain
the matching public key.";
uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
container certificates {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description
"Certificates associated with this asymmetric key.";
list certificate {
key "name";
description
"A certificate for this asymmetric key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the certificate.";
}
uses end-entity-cert-grouping {
refine cert-data {
mandatory true;
}
}
}
}
uses generate-csr-grouping;
} // asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
}
]]><CODE ENDS>Security ConsiderationsNo Support for CRMFThis document uses PKCS #10 for the
"generate-certificate-signing-request" action. The use of Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF) was considered,
but it was unclear if there was market demand for it. If it is desired
to support CRMF in the future, a backwards compatible solution can be
defined at that time.No Support for Key GenerationEarly revisions of this document included "rpc" statements for
generating symmetric and asymmetric keys. There statements were
removed due to an inability to obtain consensus for how to
identify the key-algorithm to use. Thusly, the solution presented
in this document only supports keys to be configured via an external
client, which does not support Security best practice.Unconstrained Public Key UsageThis module defines the "public-key-grouping" grouping, which
enables the configuration of public keys without constraints on
their usage, e.g., what operations the key is allowed to be used
for (encryption, verification, both).The "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping uses the aforementioned
"public-key-grouping" grouping, and carries the same traits.The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" grouping uses the
aforementioned "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping, whereby
each certificate may constrain the usage of the public key
according to local policy.Unconstrained Private Key UsageThis module defines the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping,
which enables the configuration of private keys without
constraints on their usage, e.g., what operations the key is
allowed to be used for (e.g., signature, decryption, both).The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" uses the aforementioned
"asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping, whereby configured certificates
(e.g., identity certificates) may constrain the use of the public
key according to local policy.Strength of Keys ConfiguredWhen configuring key values, implementations SHOULD ensure that
the strength of the key being configured is not greater than the
strength of the underlying secure transport connection over which
it is communicated. Implementations SHOULD fail the write-request
if ever the strength of the private key is greater then the strength
of the underlying transport.Encrypting PasswordsThe module contained within this document enables passwords to be
encrypted. Passwords may be encrypted via a symmetric key using
the "cms-encrypted-data-format" format. This format uses the CMS
EncryptedData structure, which allows any encryption algorithm
to be used.In order to thrawt rainbow attacks, algorithms that result
in a unique output for the same input SHOULD be used. For instance,
AES using "EBC" SHOULD NOT be used to encrypt passwords, whereas "CBC"
mode is okay since it a unique initialization vector (IV) should
be used for each run.Deletion of Cleartext Key ValuesThis module defines storage for cleartext key values that SHOULD
be zeroized when deleted, so as to prevent the remnants of their
persisted storage locations from being analyzed in any meaningful
way.The cleartext key values are the "cleartext-key" node defined in the
"symmetric-key-grouping" grouping ()
and the "cleartext-private-key" node defined in the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping"
grouping (").The "ietf-crypto-types" YANG ModuleThe YANG module in this document defines "grouping" statements
that are designed to be accessed via YANG based management
protocols, such as NETCONF and RESTCONF
. Both of these protocols have
mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS)
with mutual authentication.The NETCONF access control model (NACM)
provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a
pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and
content.Since the module in this document only define groupings,
these considerations are primarily for the designers of other
modules that use these groupings.Some of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module
may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
environments. It is thus important to control read access
(e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these
data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes and
their sensitivity/vulnerability:
The "cleartext-key" node:
The "cleartext-key" node defined in the "symmetric-key-grouping"
grouping is additionally sensitive to read operations such that,
in normal use cases, it should never be returned to a client.
For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-all" has been
applied to it.
The "cleartext-private-key" node:
The "cleartext-private-key" node defined in the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping"
grouping is additionally sensitive to read operations such that, in
normal use cases, it should never be returned to a client. For this
reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-all" has been applied.
All of the writable data nodes defined by all the groupings defined
in this module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in
some network environments. For instance, even the modification
of a public key or a certificate can dramatically alter the
implemented security policy. For this reason, the NACM extension
"default-deny-write" has been applied to all the data nodes
defined in the module.Some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is
thus important to control access to these operations. These
are the operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
generate-certificate-signing-request:
This "action" statement SHOULD only be executed by authorized
users. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-all"
has been applied. Note that NACM uses "default-deny-all"
to protect "RPC" and "action" statements; it does not define,
e.g., an extension called "default-deny-execute".
For this action, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations assert
channel binding , so as to ensure
that the application layer that sent the request is the same
as the device authenticated when the secure transport layer
was established.
IANA ConsiderationsThe "IETF XML" RegistryThis document registers one URI in the "ns" subregistry
of the "IETF XML" registry . Following
the format in , the following
registration is requested:The "YANG Module Names" RegistryThis document registers one YANG module in the
"YANG Module Names" registry .
Following the format in , the
following registration is requested:ReferencesNormative ReferencesKey words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement LevelsIn many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1This memo represents a republication of PKCS #1 v2.1 from RSA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series, and change control is retained within the PKCS process. The body of this document is taken directly from the PKCS #1 v2.1 document, with certain corrections made during the publication process. This memo provides information for the Internet community.The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer ProtocolThe Secure Shell (SSH) is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network services over an insecure network.This document describes the SSH transport layer protocol, which typically runs on top of TCP/IP. The protocol can be used as a basis for a number of secure network services. It provides strong encryption, server authentication, and integrity protection. It may also provide compression.Key exchange method, public key algorithm, symmetric encryption algorithm, message authentication algorithm, and hash algorithm are all negotiated.This document also describes the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method and the minimal set of algorithms that are needed to implement the SSH transport layer protocol. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) ProfileThis memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This syntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message content. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Asymmetric Key PackagesThis document defines the syntax for private-key information and a content type for it. Private-key information includes a private key for a specified public-key algorithm and a set of attributes. The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), as defined in RFC 5652, can be used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt the asymmetric key format content type. This document obsoletes RFC 5208. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Symmetric Key Package Content TypeThis document defines the symmetric key format content type. It is transport independent. The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) can be used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt this content type. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Common YANG Data TypesThis document introduces a collection of common data types to be used with the YANG data modeling language. This document obsoletes RFC 6021.Additional Methods for Generating Key Identifiers ValuesThis document specifies additional example methods for generating Key Identifier values for use in the AKI (Authority Key Identifier) and SKI (Subject Key Identifier) certificate extensions.The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling LanguageYANG is a data modeling language used to model configuration data, state data, Remote Procedure Calls, and notifications for network management protocols. This document describes the syntax and semantics of version 1.1 of the YANG language. YANG version 1.1 is a maintenance release of the YANG language, addressing ambiguities and defects in the original specification. There are a small number of backward incompatibilities from YANG version 1. This document also specifies the YANG mappings to the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF).Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key WordsRFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.Network Configuration Access Control ModelThe standardization of network configuration interfaces for use with the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) or the RESTCONF protocol requires a structured and secure operating environment that promotes human usability and multi-vendor interoperability. There is a need for standard mechanisms to restrict NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol access for particular users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content. This document defines such an access control model.This document obsoletes RFC 6536.Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1):
Specification of basic notation
International Telecommunication UnionInformation Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)International Telecommunication UnionInformative ReferencesPKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7This memo represents a republication of PKCS #10 v1.7 from RSA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series, and change control is retained within the PKCS process. The body of this document, except for the security considerations section, is taken directly from the PKCS #9 v2.0 or the PKCS #10 v1.7 document. This memo provides information for the Internet community.The IETF XML RegistryThis document describes an IANA maintained registry for IETF standards which use Extensible Markup Language (XML) related items such as Namespaces, Document Type Declarations (DTDs), Schemas, and Resource Description Framework (RDF) Schemas.Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)This document describes the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) syntax and semantics. This syntax is used to convey a request for a certificate to a Certification Authority (CA), possibly via a Registration Authority (RA), for the purposes of X.509 certificate production. The request will typically include a public key and the associated registration information. This document does not define a certificate request protocol. [STANDARDS-TRACK]On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure ChannelsThe concept of channel binding allows applications to establish that the two end-points of a secure channel at one network layer are the same as at a higher layer by binding authentication at the higher layer to the channel at the lower layer. This allows applications to delegate session protection to lower layers, which has various performance benefits.This document discusses and formalizes the concept of channel binding to secure channels. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Elliptic Curve Private Key StructureThis document specifies the syntax and semantics for conveying Elliptic Curve (EC) private key information. The syntax and semantics defined herein are based on similar syntax and semantics defined by the Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG). This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)YANG is a data modeling language used to model configuration and state data manipulated by the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF), NETCONF remote procedure calls, and NETCONF notifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)Many application technologies enable secure communication between two entities by means of Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) certificates in the context of Transport Layer Security (TLS). This document specifies procedures for representing and verifying the identity of application services in such interactions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) defined in this document provides mechanisms to install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices. It uses an Extensible Markup Language (XML)-based data encoding for the configuration data as well as the protocol messages. The NETCONF protocol operations are realized as remote procedure calls (RPCs). This document obsoletes RFC 4741. [STANDARDS-TRACK]RESTCONF ProtocolThis document describes an HTTP-based protocol that provides a programmatic interface for accessing data defined in YANG, using the datastore concepts defined in the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF).YANG Tree DiagramsThis document captures the current syntax used in YANG module tree diagrams. The purpose of this document is to provide a single location for this definition. This syntax may be updated from time to time based on the evolution of the YANG language.Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)Datastores are a fundamental concept binding the data models written in the YANG data modeling language to network management protocols such as the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) and RESTCONF. This document defines an architectural framework for datastores based on the experience gained with the initial simpler model, addressing requirements that were not well supported in the initial model. This document updates RFC 7950.Change LogI-D to 00
Removed groupings and notifications.
Added typedefs for identityrefs.
Added typedefs for other RFC 5280 structures.
Added typedefs for other RFC 5652 structures.
Added convenience typedefs for RFC 4253, RFC 5280, and RFC 5652.
00 to 01
Moved groupings from the draft-ietf-netconf-keystore here.
01 to 02
Removed unwanted "mandatory" and "must" statements.
Added many new crypto algorithms (thanks Haiguang!)
Clarified in asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping,
in certificates/certificate/name/description, that
if the name MUST NOT match the name of a certificate
that exists independently in <operational>, enabling
certs installed by the manufacturer (e.g., an IDevID).
02 to 03
renamed base identity 'asymmetric-key-encryption-algorithm' to 'asymmetric-key-algorithm'.
added new 'asymmetric-key-algorithm' identities for secp192r1, secp224r1, secp256r1,
secp384r1, and secp521r1.
removed 'mac-algorithm' identities for mac-aes-128-ccm, mac-aes-192-ccm, mac-aes-256-ccm,
mac-aes-128-gcm, mac-aes-192-gcm, mac-aes-256-gcm, and mac-chacha20-poly1305.
for all -cbc and -ctr identities, renamed base identity 'symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm'
to 'encryption-algorithm'.
for all -ccm and -gcm identities, renamed base identity 'symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm'
to 'encryption-and-mac-algorithm' and renamed the identity to remove the "enc-" prefix.
for all the 'signature-algorithm' based identities, renamed from 'rsa-*' to 'rsassa-*'.
removed all of the "x509v3-" prefixed 'signature-algorithm' based identities.
added 'key-exchange-algorithm' based identities for 'rsaes-oaep' and 'rsaes-pkcs1-v1_5'.
renamed typedef 'symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm-ref' to 'symmetric-key-algorithm-ref'.
renamed typedef 'asymmetric-key-encryption-algorithm-ref' to 'asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref'.
added typedef 'encryption-and-mac-algorithm-ref'.
Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, and folding algorithm.
03 to 04
ran YANG module through formatter.
04 to 05
fixed broken symlink causing reformatted YANG module to not show.
Removed text from 'permanently-hidden' enum regarding
such keys not being backed up or restored.
Updated the boilerplate text in module-level "description"
statement to match copyeditor convention.
Added an explanation to the 'public-key-grouping' and
'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping' statements as for why the
nodes are not mandatory (e.g., because they may exist only
in <operational>.
Added 'must' expressions to the 'public-key-grouping' and
'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping' statements ensuring sibling
nodes are either all exist or do not all exist.
Added an explanation to the 'permanently-hidden' that the
value cannot be configured directly by clients and servers
MUST fail any attempt to do so.
Added 'trust-anchor-certs-grouping' and 'end-entity-certs-grouping'
(the plural form of existing groupings).
Now states that keys created in <operational> by the
*-hidden-key actions are bound to the lifetime of the parent
'config true' node, and that subsequent invocations of either
action results in a failure.
06 to 07
Added clarifications that implementations SHOULD assert that
configured certificates contain the matching public key.
Replaced the 'generate-hidden-key' and 'install-hidden-key' actions
with special 'crypt-hash' -like input/output values.
07 to 08
Removed the 'generate-key and 'hidden-key' features.
Added grouping symmetric-key-grouping
Modified 'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping' to have a 'choice'
statement for the keystone module to augment into, as well
as replacing the 'union' with leafs (having different NACM
settings.
08 to 09
Converting algorithm from identities to enumerations.
09 to 10
All of the below changes are to the algorithm enumerations defined in ietf-crypto-types.
Add in support for key exchange over x.25519 and x.448 based on RFC 8418.
Add in SHAKE-128, SHAKE-224, SHAKE-256, SHAKE-384 and SHAKE 512
Revise/add in enum of signature algorithm for x25519 and x448
Add in des3-cbc-sha1 for IPSec
Add in sha1-des3-kd for IPSec
Add in definit for rc4-hmac and rc4-hmac-exp. These two algorithms have been deprecated in RFC 8429. But some existing draft in i2nsf may still want to use them.
Add x25519 and x448 curve for asymmetric algorithms
Add in rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512 for SSH protocols (rfc8332)
10 to 11
Added a "key-format" identity.
Added symmetric keys to the example in .
11 to 12
Removed all non-essential (to NC/RC) algorithm types.
Moved remaining algorithm types each into its own module.
Added a 'config false' "algorithms-supported" list to each of the algorithm-type modules.
12 to 13
Added the four features: "[encrypted-]one-[a]symmetric-key-format", each protecting a 'key-format' identity of the same name.
Added 'must' expressions asserting that the 'key-format' leaf exists whenever a non-hidden key is specified.
Improved the 'description' statements and added 'reference' statements for the 'key-format' identities.
Added a questionable forward reference to "encrypted-*" leafs in a couple 'when' expressions.
Did NOT move "config false" alg-supported lists to SSH/TLS drafts.
13 to 14
Resolved the "FIXME: forward ref" issue by modulating 'must', 'when', and 'mandatory' expressions.
Moved the 'generatesymmetric-key' and 'generate-asymmetric-key' actions from ietf-keystore to
ietf-crypto-types, now as RPCs.
Cleaned up various description statements and removed lingering FIXMEs.
Converted the "iana-<alg-type>-algs" YANG modules to IANA registries with
instructions for how to generate modules from the registries, whenever they may
be updated.
14 to 15
Removed the IANA-maintained registries for symmetric, asymmetric, and hash algorithms.
Removed the "generate-symmetric-key" and "generate-asymmetric-key" RPCs.
Removed the "algorithm" node in the various symmetric and asymmetric key groupings.
Added 'typedef csr' and 'feature certificate-signing-request-generation'.
Refined a usage of "end-entity-cert-grouping" to make the "cert" node mandatory true.
Added a "Note to Reviewers" note to first page.
15 to 16
Updated draft title (refer to "Groupings" too).
Removed 'end-entity-certs-grouping' as it wasn't being used anywhere.
Removed 'trust-anchor-certs-grouping' as it was no longer being used
after modifying 'local-or-truststore-certs-grouping' to use lists (not
leaf-lists).
Renamed "cert" to "cert-data" in trust-anchor-cert-grouping.
Added "csr-info" typedef, to complement the existing "csr" typedef.
Added "ocsp-request" and "ocsp-response" typedefs, to complement
the existing "crl" typedef.
Added "encrypted" cases to both symmetric-key-grouping and
asymmetric-key-pair-grouping (Moved from Keystore draft).
Expanded "Data Model Overview section(s) [remove "wall" of tree diagrams].
Updated the Security Considerations section.
16 to 17
[Re]-added a "Strength of Keys Configured" Security Consideration
Prefixed "cleartext-" in the "key" and "private-key" node names.
17 to 18
Fixed issues found by the SecDir review of the "keystore" draft.
Added "password-grouping", discussed during the IETF 108 session.
18 to 19
Added a "Unconstrained Public Key Usage" Security Consideration to address
concern raised by SecDir of the 'truststore' draft.
Added a "Unconstrained Private Key Usage" Security Consideration to address
concern raised by SecDir of the 'truststore' draft.
Changed the encryption strategy, after conferring with Russ Housley.
Added a "password-grouping" example to the "crypto-types-usage" example.
Added an "Encrypting Passwords" section to Security Consideration.
Addressed other comments raised by YANG Doctor.
AcknowledgementsThe authors would like to thank for following for
lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered
by first name):
Balazs Kovacs,
Eric Voit,
Juergen Schoenwaelder,
Liang Xia,
Martin Bjorklund,
Nick Hancock,
Rich Salz,
Rob Wilton,
Russ Housley,
Sandra Murphy,
Tom Petch,
and Wang Haiguang.