LTANS A. Jerman Blazic Internet-Draft SETCCE Intended status: Informational P. Sylvester Expires: April 26, 2007 EdelWeb C. Wallace Orion Security Solutions October 23, 2006 Long-term Archive Protocol (LTAP) draft-ietf-ltans-ltap-03 Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 26, 2007. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). Abstract This document describes a service operated as a trusted third party to securely archive electronic document called a long-term archive service (LTA). We describe an architecture framework and a protocol allowing clients to interact with such a service. Bindings to concrete transport and security protocol layers are given. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 1] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. Functional Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Service functions of an LTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3. Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.4. Life cycles of objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.5. Roles, Service Types, Policies and Configurations . . . . 12 3.6. Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.7. Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4. Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.1. Artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.2. Message Imprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.3. MetaData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.4. Nonce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.5. RawData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.6. DataOrTransaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.7. Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.8. SerialNumber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.9. RequestTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.10. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.11. EntityIdentifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.12. ServiceType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.13. StatusInformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.14. GeneralErrorNotice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.15. RequestInformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5. Top level protocol elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.1. Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.2. ErrorNotice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5.3. OperationResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5.4. Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6. Service Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6.1. ARCHIVE operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 6.2. STATUS operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6.3. EXPORT operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6.4. VERIFY operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6.5. DELETE operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 7. Presentation and Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 8. Security and Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 9. Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 11. IPR Patent Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 12. IANA consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 13.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 2] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 13.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Appendix B. XML schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 39 Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 3] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 1. Introduction Conservation of documents is important, one can even say that appropriate conservation rules are a prerequisite for data to be come a document. Conservation has several aspects, e.g., duration or accessibility, which vary based on the nature of the document. For example, a document may be conserved for a certain period and may be destroyed after that, or its lifetime may be extended when the documents becomes part of a conflict. Also, documents may become part of historical archives. A document may be accessible on a public or restricted basis to a set of potentially interested or authorized entities. The protocol described in this document enables the use of a specialized service for conservation of electronic documents. The service creates and delivers enough information to demonstrate the existence, integrity and authenticity of electronic data over any period of time. In other words, the service assumes the responsibility to retrieve and, optionally, store data for conservation, create and store evidence to guarantee data integrity and completeness, and to maintain accessibility of data and evidence created. This document describes a protocol for interacting with a long-term archive service (LTA). The document contains only description of a general request and response structure, and a detailed protocol description concerning access to an LTA. Other specifications and descriptions, e.g. a framework protocol containing mappings to transport and security services, are addressed elsewhere. The protocol is intended to be used in client-server architecture, where client is simply an end user (a physical user or another service) and the server as an LTA. The process of replacing paper based workflow and document handling is known as 'dematerialization', ignoring to a certain degree the requirements for long term stability of documents. Document conservation is generally performed by specialized services. For electronic formats it is proposed to use similar approaches, while maintaining the distance of technical characteristics (paper versus electronic). Conservation might be taken out from other workflow activities, while the same procedures (evidence creation) might be used for any milestone in electronic document lifecycle (e.g. version marking). Since conservation of documents created by one entity is only necessary if there is a potential entity to which the document may be presented at some time, the conservation service (LTA) acts as a trusted third party for those two entities. The main role of an LTA Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 4] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 is to generate and provide enough information for archived data existence in time, integrity and authenticity demonstration over long periods of time. Provision of data storage services is optional and may be assured by supportive infrastructure (e.g. database or document storage/management system). Conservation is more that just storing a document. Not only, but in particular when the life time is very long, appropriate measures to ensure the integrity of the document must be used. This aspect is handled by this specification. Sometimes, complete transfer of the document information to a new physical support has to be done like transformations from marble to paper or paper to microfilm. The need for such transformation make the definition of what constitutes the actual document somewhat difficult, in particular it should be done independantly of the support, and even independantly of a current format of the document information. Transformation of documents are largely the scope of this specification besides the obvious possibility of storing all formats of a document and assertions about the transformations. Note: This is still a very incomplete text. The abstract service and protocol is almost finished. Note: This document does not contain a concrete binding to lower layers. This may be added later or defined in a separate document. Means to exchange protocol messages are not explicitly defined. Transport should be possible over http/soap and other protocols. Defined data structures are presented in XSD and ASN1 forms. 1.1. Requirements notation The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 2. Background A conservation service or long term archive (LTA) consists of several functional blocks. Some of these blocks are not considered by LTANS as they present the basic infrastructure, such as the communication network, storage device, data management, etc. Instead, an LTA implements the archive interaction protocol as defined by this specification (LTAP) and manages archive objects (logically interpreted as packages of archive data and conservation attributes) and evidence records [I-D.ietf-ltans-ers]. An LTA is a part of a general archive service that provides evidence used to demonstrate the existence of an archived data object at a given time and the Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 5] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 integrity of the archived data object since that time. The LTA is the primary part tasked with creating and delivering conservation attributes for archived data. [I-D.ietf-ltans-reqs] defines the services that must be provided by an LTA. A pricipal function of the LTA is to generate or obtain evidence information for (archive) data submited. It may accept data and generate (or acquire from another service) evidence inforamtion or it may simply act as an evidence and demonstration information servce without data storage capabilities (it only handles evidence and demonstration information). Evidence generated and maintained by an LTA addresses the problems of long-term integrity and temporal existence. Archive objects are the central logical structures defined by the LTA and maintained on a long-term basis. They are atomic elements of an LTA service consisting of three logical elements. The logical structure of an archive object consists of: o Archive data (including meta-data or other related data) entering the LTA using the interaction protocol, o Archive process related meta or binding information and o Evidence information The archive data may contain any data type, e.g., raw data, signed data, encrypted data or time stamped data as defined by [I-D.ietf-ltans-reqs]. Archive data may be associated with additional data or attributes, e.g. meta information or digital signatures. Data generated or collected by the LTA are archive process related meta or binding information including demonstration information and evidence information. Archive meta data is needed to provide enough information for e.g. special (legal) purposes or validity demonstration purposes (e.g. complementary information to digital signatures). The LTA collects meta or binding information directly from a user or some other entity (e.g. Certificate Authority). Such information may contain the data owner name, organization, location, etc. Meta or binding information may be submitted by the LTAP protocol. Demonstration information is collected to demonstrate facts on the archive data. Such information may be digital signature reference information. The LTA may use external resources to collect such information usually without user intervention. Evidence data is generated by the LTA or collected from an external resource, e.g. a Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 6] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 time stamping authority. Evidence information is provided for all data: archive data submitted by a client and archive process related data (including binding and demonstration information) collected by the LTA from the client or alternative resource. The LTA performs perpetual maintenance of generated archive objects for the main purpose of demonstrating archive data existence in time and providing integrity information for the complete archiving time. Archive objects are periodically processed to provide long term stability (e.g. by proof-reading, copying to new material, or performing time stamp renewal). The LTAP protocol interprets the logical data structure to hold all needed information (including references) to build an archive object including archive data itself (or reference to archive data). The logical structure of the LTAP messages includes archive data, archiving process related information and references together with request and processing information. Using LTAP, the LTA should have enough information to build and perform operations on an archive object(s). 3. Framework This chapter describes a general framework for secure exchange of request and response messages between an archive client and archive server, e.g. an LTA. It provides a high level outline and identifies common and external aspects from the concrete protocol data units. 3.1. Functional Overview An LTA, as defined by [I-D.ietf-ltans-reqs], is a service that is responsible for preserving evidence data and/or data for long periods of time. The service is accessible using the protocol defined in this document. The protocol consists of two layers, the higher layer defines the available service functions and their mapping to encodings, the lower layer defines the rules for the exchange of protocol messages common for all all functions. It is assumed that an LTA ensures the long term availability of stored data and created evidence information, as necessary, and uses appropriate means to manage data and access rights. The details of these important features of an LTA are outside the scope of this specification. The common high-level architecture consists of a protocol used to Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 7] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 exchange requests and responses securely, potentially over different types of transport connections, to ensure the long term validity of responses. Clients and servers use one of several object types to build requests and responses. Data objects include raw (archive) data, request information, meta information, identification information and attestations. Requests and responses are exchanged in a secure way responding to different security requirements, which may concern the security of the transport as well as the long term validity of the data being exchanged. The LTA is not a method for implementing something like a secure file system. In general, archived data are rarely accessed, restored or transferred. Thus, the archive operation is the most important one and performance is an important concern. In this case that client applications need frequenet access to the data, they generally keep a copy of the data including evidence information, whose integrity can be compared from time to time or when requested. 3.2. Service functions of an LTA The primary aim of this protocol is to enable a formal interaction between a client and an LTA. The result of the interaction is a verifiable attestation of procedures performed by an LTA (e.g. archive data plus evidence record). The format for data structures used to demonstrate integrity, i.e. to demonstrate that data has not undergone any transformations while in the care of the archive, is partially defined in other documents, namely in [I-D.ietf-ltans-ers]. This specification does not place any requirements on the structure of archived data objects. However, it operates on elements that are derived from archive data objects (e.g. message imprints). The LTA interface enables clients to perform at least the following operations in cooperation with an LTA: ARCHIVE: Submit data to an LTA and request creation of evidence information for data STATUS: Inform about the status of data. VERIFY: Determine the integrity and validity of LTA archived data. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 8] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 EXPORT: Retrieve data (including archive data, meta information and evidence information) from an LTA DELETE: Remove data and/or evidence information from an LTA. These operation form the minimal set that MUST be implemented by an LTA service. Furthermore, there is a minimal profile for the parameter structures for transactions with a single server that does act as a final repository. Parameters and functions MAY be extended in order to allow services to propose more complex operations like data splitting or relaying. An LTA may propose additional service either by extending the operations by the means of additional parameters or by defining new operations. Often, an extension of the initial lifetime of an object must be possible. To extend the lifetime of an object, an EXPORT operation followed by an ARCHIVE operation has be used to transfer or copy the object to an LTA service having the required lifetime policy/ configuration. At last, the initial object may be deleted or not. The combination of such a sequence of operation into single one is an example of an extended service provided to clients. 3.3. Transactions The model for the exchange of LTAP requests and responses is borrowed from other environments like EDI, X.400 or ebXML. It's main caracteristic is that exchanges for LTAP are conceptually asynchronous. As a consequence, it is necessary to provide a mechanism to allow a client to determime that the LTA has received and processed a request. An LTAP exchange consists of sending a request and retrieving at least one of two different types of responses. A client initiates an archive service by submiting a request. This LTAP request consists of data to be archived and information related to the archive process. The process information may include client authorization, archive policy, service parameters, etc. The first type of response is a technical acknowledgement from the LTA that the request has been received and the process information has been accepted (or rejected). The second type of response is a statement from an LTA containing an indication of the outcome of the requested operation. This result (called an attestation) is, in general, a document with long term validity allowing the client to reference the operation, and, in particular, to reference the data that has been preserved by the LTA. The asynchronous nature of the LTAP protocol is required by LTA operations, which may require a specific amount of time to perform, Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 9] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 e.g. the archive operation needs to safely store the data and to produce evidence information. The possibility to deliver the result attestation in a asynchronous way permits cost effective implementations of the LTA. An LTA may deliver immediately a second type response. This occurs for example for a STATUS function or when an EXPORT operation is retried. A client can repeat an operation, since the request or the response might have been lost. For an ARCHIVE operation, the client can provide a unique identification for the request that to be used by the LTA to ensure idempotence of the operation. When retrying an ARCHIVE operation, a client MAY replace the raw data to be archived by a MessageDigest representing the data in order to reduce the payload size. For the ARCHIVE, DELETE, VERIFY operations, after receipt of the technical acknowledgement (first type response), the client can also use a STATUS operation for the object in order to indirectly determine the outcome of a transaction. Depending on the lower layer bindings, sending a STATUS request or retrying another operation may be the only way to determine the outcome of an archive operation. 3.4. Life cycles of objects Using the defined transactions and the operations on object, two levels of life cycles are defined. One is directly derived from the operation of a single transaction. The other is related to the long term situation of an object. 3.4.1. Transaction Level Life Cycle When a client initiates an archive operation, client and server have some knowledge of the progress of the operation. The following list explains the different states of a transaction seen by both the client and the service, and decribes actions and events changing the state of the transaction. T0: The client has not initiated an archive operation. The LTA does not know anything about an object. T1: The client has initiated an archive operation. The LTA may have received the object or not; the client cannot assume that the TAS has received the request. Client may retry the operation after a timeout. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 10] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 T2: The LTA has received the request and has generated a first type response. The server ensures idempotence of at least the ARCHIVE operation, i.e. on multiple occurrences of an identical request, the LTA sends the same response and transaction identification. The LTA may still loose the state, e.g., in case of a power failure. T3: The client has received the initial response. The client can retry the initial operation using the transaction identification at the place of the data in order to receive a final answer. In case of negative response, i.e. LTA in state T0, client can fall back to T1. T4: The LTA has send a definitive answer for an operation and has assumed the responsability of operation. T5: The client has received a definitive answer and can consider the operation as terminated. In case of negative reponses to a transaction, the LTA keeps the result for a certain time in order to provide a reasonable answer to a client that retries an operation. 3.4.2. Long term life cycle. When an LTA has archived an object, it keeps a certain number of metadata, which gives information about the current status of the object. Metadata may remain available even after deleting the object, among the remaining metadata there is the date of deletion or an information where the information can actually be received. We can distinguish the following phases in the lifetimes of an archived object: T0: The LTA has no knowledge about an object. T1: An LTA has received an archive object and is proceeding the request. The LTA may accept or reject the request, or may loose knowledge about it. T2: An LTA has archived an object. An LTA can accept other operations, i.e., EXPORT, DELETE or VERIFY operations. When receiving an EXPORT or VERIFY operation, some metadata may be updated, e.g., last time of access, last verification operation etc. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 11] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 T3: After a DELETE operation prior to the initially defined lifetime of the operation, the LTA MAY keep an information about the actual status of the object (e.g. deleted) until the end of the lifetime. If available, the LTA MAY returns other remaining metadata containing for example a new location of the data. T4: After the lifetime of an object, an object or the reference to is being deleted. At the end of this internal operation, the LTA is in state T0. With the basic operations it is not possible to extend directly the lifetime of an object. In order to do so, a client has to read the object and store it under a different service. A change from state T2 can also occur when an LTA determines loss of integrity or loss of data. 3.5. Roles, Service Types, Policies and Configurations The protocol assumes a number of different actors playing different roles. The basic roles are a client and a server. These roles are simply defined by the types of protocol data units, i.e., requests and responses. Several other roles may exist, which are currently not in the scope of the protocol specification. An example of an additional role is a relay or a proxy using both the basic roles of client and server. In general two entities are distinguished, based on different characteristics: an entity that requests its data to be archived or to be acted upon, and an entity that accepts data and assures responsibility of archived data, or acts on the data. Other entities serving as a lower layer transport services, data storage services or security services are out of the scope of protocol definition. Clients may occur in different roles. Besides users that archive data, there may be relying or controlling entities like a judge who must be able to get access to it. Or, there are entities like auditors that may access to some data. The protocol distinguish such roles by the definition of the following service types and service policy information. The LTA interface implementation MUST enable clients to perform all five service operations. A client implementation MAY only support a subset of the service types in order to have a small footprint. This is motivated from the fact that different operations are generally invoked by different entities in totally different environments, e.g., a client may only submit data and never verify an evidence record. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 12] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 As mentioned above, depending on the lower layer transport bindings, a client may be required to have implemented the STATUS operation in order to retrieve the outcome of another operation. The way a particular operation is performed is only defined at the LTA server side implementation and can be influenced by policy information parameters. A client MAY indicate one or more service policy identifiers associated to a service type in order to select different features to be performed by the LTA. The goal of policy identifiers is to have client configurations simple. An LTA service may provide additional features, which may be identified by clients, that govern how services are performed. An LTA might offer a series of features based on quality characteristics, e.g. number of timestamps used, refresh period, etc. The protocol specification builds on the assumption that features are clearly identifiable and are included in the protocol elements. Features enable clients to request specific handling by the LTA, such as requesting a premium service that assures prompt and immediate archiving vs. a standard service that handles queues and generates evidence data periodically based on data collections, i.e., one timestamp per a document bundle. Also, services may differ according to data storage characteristics (e.g. client may request full evidence and storage capacity or only evidence creation service), redundancy characteristics (single timestamp versus multiple time stamping), etc. Service characteristics are defined by archive or operation policies. An LTA may use external services, like validation and evidence creation services. Another service is provision of physical infrastructure or data storage and management systems. Such entities can also be referenced by service policy identifiers. In general, for each client, in particular those that are archiving, a default or single possible configuration is defined at the server in order to group features and policies into defined sets. A server may operate different configurations and from the protocol standpoint, general configuration is selected by the policy identificator. As a last mechanism to provide parameters to the archive server, LTA clients MAY use specific configuration parameters in their requests. The definition of such parameters is not in the scope of this protocol. Configuration parameters allow clients to transfer arbitary key/value pairs from the client to the server. In principle, a single sequence of policy information is sufficient to indicate both the service type and the configuration parameters. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 13] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 A multi-dimensional approach with configuration and service types rounds up the requirements for LTA and scenarios of archiving processes. This specification defines no particular policy or configuration. 3.6. Entities Entities that participate in protocol exchanges are represented by identifiers and may possess attributes. It is outside the scope of this definition to define an organisation of identifiers and attributes, in particular the way how entity identifiers are related to identifiers used for authentication, or what attributes are associated to data. As the current LTAP specification assumes end-to-end communication only, there is no distinction between technical roles like 'client, 'server', 'relay', 'proxy' or 'authorized agent'. For LTAP, only client and server roles are defined. The explicit usage of identifiers and attributes enables decisions to be traceable, i.e., the participating entities can indicate to a certain degree why they want a service or why it has been provided. Furthermore, entity identifiers and attributes MAY be provided by the transport or security layer information. These information can be added to protocol elements as trace attributes. 3.6.1. Entity Identifiers Entity identifiers are used in the protocol to indicate the participating entities. A client can indicate one or more identifiers indicating who is making the request or participating in its creation and one or more identifiers indicating who should perform the service. A server can indidate who has provided the service and who is the indented client. It MUST be ensured in some way that in an actual context of a client/ server network names are scalable and global both in terms of actual community space and time to live of the treated data objects. Identifiers are labeled in some way, i.e. string representations are typed and can be derived from various external layers. Identifiers SHOULD use an appropriate structure such as ASN.1 definition of GeneralName. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 14] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 3.6.2. Attributes Entities may possess additional attributes like roles, scopes or capabilities. Entities MAY indicate attribute values in protocol exchanges so that they can be used for authentication purposes or billing. Attributes may be related to attributes of data, for example, an entity may acts as a judge or arbitrator for a particular jurisdiction. The attribute jurisdiction is associated to the entity and to data treated by the service, and thus, can be used for authorisation control. 3.7. Data Model The data fields of a LTAP request are as follows: o request information or status information o raw data to archive, or references to data or to transactions. o metadata providing additional information about the data to archive o authorisation and authentication information of the entities paticipating in the procedure o other information, required for supporting functions like billing 3.7.1. Data objects The data to be archived are arbitrary binary data and, minimally, an associated type that MUST be either available as part of a server configuration policy or explicitly indicated by the client. Data can be referenced by identifiers. Data identifiers are used to uniquely identify data objects. Data identifiers SHOULD have an additional local structure (e.g., contain a checksum), in order to avoid or detect client copying errors. An additional measure to enhance the redundancy of identifiers is the usage of time values which can be used in combination with data identifiers. Servers MUST create a server-wide unique identifier for each data object managed by the LTA. The identifier MUST be global during the intended lifetime of an object. Clients may provide their own data identifiers in requests. Whether the client provided identifiers are unique is outside the scope of Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 15] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 the protocol. LTAs treat these identifiers as opaque information. In order to identify data for the short lifespan of a transaction, artifacts can be used to reference data or transactions. 3.7.2. Collection objects Data grouping can occur for various reasons, i.e. logical, contextual, semantic, operational, etc. It is out of the scope of the LTA to perform grouping for other reasons than operational, e.g. reducing costs or improving performance or scalability. Grouping is performed on the level of evidence creation by building hash trees as defined in [I-D.ietf-ltans-ers]. Grouping characteristics are defined by service policies, e.g. per user or on a daily or volume basis. The global parameters for selecting appropriate collection strategies are entity and policy identfiers. Collections of data can be defined explicitly or implicitly. A document is added to a collection using policy and entity identifiers to request a specific collection strategy (e.g. a collection of data that is processed on a daily basis for a specific user). A collection identifier may be presented as an extension to an object identifier and is intially local to one object. Adding another object to a collection requires the identification of the initial object and the identification of one object in the collection. 3.7.3. MetaData Meta information is associated with archive data and can be included implicitly, i.e. be a part of a document, or explicitly, i.e. as a document attachment. An LTA does not interprete meta data that may express logical relations among documents in the archive that is submitted selectively using several requests. For LTAs, the client is only in control of selecting and enclosing meta information, which is logically, contextually or for any other reason related to a document. Meta information may occur in various forms and may be an integral part of archive data, e.g. security attributes in form of digital signatures. To process such information, the LTA MUST retrieve enough information on the type and purpose of information enclosed, which may simply be defined with the use of an apropriate archive service policy, e.g. archive service for digitally signed documents. An LTA may perform specific actions related to meta information processing (and preservation, such as complementary data collection in form of digital certificates). This can also be done by an external service, e.g. [RFC3029] or SVCP. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 16] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 In some scenarios, a specific set of meta information must be preserved together with archive data, e.g. information identifying the document owner/author, location or time. The LTAP protocol does not define constraints on information type and structure. The LTAP request structure is defined to accept any type of data. 3.7.4. Binding Information Clients and servers MAY include additional information in their requests and responses concerning the lower layer binding to a transport like SOAP, HTTP or S/MIME, i.e. end-point addresses etc. This category may also include things like billing/accounting information, i.e. whatever a business transaction needs but which is not part of metadata, i.e. outside the scope of the archived data. Note: This section needs further discussion. 3.7.5. Evidence Data Evidence information demonstrates the integrity and existence of archived data. The LTA accepts data for the single purpose of generating or obtaining evidence information for data submitted by a client. The evidence information structure is defined in [I-D.ietf-ltans-ers]. In case the LTA accepts data only for the purpose of generating evidence information (without storage capabilites to avoid, e.g. confidentiality issues), the archivation process is limited in time. When an LTA performs a renewal of evidence, archived data may be required to be available, e.g. when renewing a hash tree. In such scenarios, the LTA requires availability of archived data for hash re-computation. The LTAP protocol does not support function for data re-submission. 4. Data Types A number of data types are common to both requests and responses. We give definitions of data as well in XML schema notation as well as in ASN.1. It is intended that an encoding using XML encoding rules of the ASN.1 defined data give the same encoding as the XML Schema defined type. We note that the ASN.1 definitions are not automatically derived from the XSD definitions (but almost). The following schema is defined by this text: Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 17] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 XML Schema Identification This text defines the following ASN.1 module. ASN.1 Module start LTAP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) ltans(11) id-mod(1) id-mod-ers(1) } DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN The asn.1 module exports all its identifiers and imports several identifiers according the following definition: ASN.1 Module Imports -- EXPORTS ALL -- IMPORTS AlgorithmIdentifier FROM AuthenticationFramework {joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) module(1)} 4.1. Artifacts Artificats are identifiers used to reference a transaction, or a result of a transaction. They can be returned as a protocol answer instead of a response, and allow to retrieve a response or progress of a transaction later by the initial client or another authorised entity. XML Schema element ASN.1 definition Artifact ::= UTF8STRING Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 18] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 4.2. Message Imprint A Message Imprint is a short representation of data which can be used in evidences to link to some data. This is just another way of saying that they are the result of a one way hash function applied to some data. We do not assume that a message imprint will always identify some data in a unique way (which is not the case by definition of a hash function), neither do we assume that collisions may not exist now or in the future. We only assume that within a bounded collection of data objects (in time and number), which are stored phyically safe, message imprints uniquely designate other data. Nevertheless, it is assumed that for the lifetime of protocol exchanges, hash functions used to create message imprints are crytographically safe. The structure of a message imprint is a sequence of an globally defined identification of a hash function and an representation of an octet string encoding a value of the hash function. Message Digests have two components, an identifier of the hash algorithm, and a value represention the result of the hash algorithm applied to the data. XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition MessageImprint ::= SEQUENCE { digestAlgorithms AlgorithmIdentifier, digestValue OCTET STRING } 4.3. MetaData Metadata are a list of open types which can be regarded as key/value pairs giving addtional information about entities or data and are related to preservation process. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 19] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition Metadata ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, value UTF8STRING } 4.4. Nonce A Nonce is an octetstring used to avoid replays of responses for the STATUS operation. If present in a request, a server MUST respond with a response containing the Nonce value.. XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition Nonce ::= OCTET STRING ; 4.5. RawData This type carries binary data to be verified, archived or returned. A client MAY select a metadata type to indicate the type of the data. TBD: For preservation purposes, an LTA must have information on archive data type (e.g. signed or unsigned). If type is not included, it is assumed that data retrived must be processed as binary string (e.g signatures are not verifed and artifacts collected). XML Schema element Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 20] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 ASN.1 Definition RawData ::= OCTET STRING ; 4.6. DataOrTransaction This choice type is used to identify data by: o themselves o an artifact identifying a transaction o a data identifier XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition DataOrTransaction::= CHOICE { raw RawData , artifact Artifact , datareference UTF8STRING } 4.7. Data This type is used to describe data together with metadata. XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition SerialNumber ::= Integer ; 4.9. RequestTime Clients and servers can add an indication of (its idea of) the time when a request or response was created. A time value is represented as string representation of the content of the ASN.1 type GENERALIZEDTIME permitted to be encoded in ASN.1 distinguished encodeing rules (DER). XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition Time ::= GENERALIZEDTIME ; Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 22] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 4.10. Version Version is used in requests and responses to indicate the protocol version used. This specification is provided for two values: o v0 - This version should be used by implementation that want to experiment with draft version of this specification. o v1 - this version is used to indicate that the request and response corresponds to this specification. TBD: The purpose of version identifier. XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition Version ::= ENUMERATED {v0(0), v1(1), ... } ; 4.11. EntityIdentifier Entity identifiers are used in the protocol to indicate the participating entities. A client can indicate one or more identifiers indicating who is making the request or participating in its creation and one or more identifiers indicating who should perform the service. A server can indidate who has provided the service and who is the indented client. It MUST be ensured in some way that in an actual context of a client/ server network names are scalable and global both in terms of actual community space and time to live of the treated data objects. Since identifiers can be derived from various external layers an appropriate structure in ASN.1 or XML structure is used. XML Schema element Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 23] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 ASN.1 Definition Entityidentifier ::= GeneralName ; 4.12. ServiceType This types is an enumeration of the different operations accessible by the protocol. This element provides an explicit general protocol element to indicate the intended class of operation which may not explicitely be available otherwise with policy information. TBA: ASN.1 and XML structure need redefintion. XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition ServiceType ::= ENUMERATED {archive , status, verify , export, delete }; 4.13. StatusInformation The LTA indicate the global status of a transaction using this enumeration type. The semantics of the values is as follows: The response is an initial first type reponse. The request has been technically accepted by the LTA. The response is an second type final response from the LTA. The response is an second type final response from the LTA. The operation performed by the LTA but only with some modifications. The operation has not been accepted. In case of modifications or error, the LTA MUST also return details using the following GeneralErrorNotice Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 24] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition ServiceType ::= ENUMERATED {waiting , granted, grantedWithMods, rejection }; 4.14. GeneralErrorNotice This item is used to indicate details of the status of a transaction. XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition -- TBD 4.15. RequestInformation This data structure comprises information about the request others that the raw data and metadata. TBA: ASN.1 and XML Structure to be redefined. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 25] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition RequestInformation ::= SEQUENCE { version Version DEFAULT v1 , nonce Nonce OPTIONAL, serial SerialNumber OPTIONAL, service ServiceType, time RequestTime OPTIONAL, requester SEQUENCE OF RequestEntityIdentifier OPTIONAL, server SEQUENCE OF RequestEntityIdentifier OPTIONAL, policies PolicyIdentifier } 5. Top level protocol elements On the top level, there are three protocol element, one is used in requests, and the two other are either describing the successful outcome of an operation or an error notice. 5.1. Request This data structure describes a request made by a client. It contains a RequestInformation data structure, as well as data or data references. At least one of the Data and MessageDigest elements must be provided. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 26] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition Request::= SEQUENCE { requestInformation RequestInformation, theData SEQUENCE OF Data OPTIONAL } 5.2. ErrorNotice A server may return a general error notice indicating an important failure with referencing the request. The element can be created either by the service, e.g., when a request cannot be decoded, but also by a client lower layer, e.g. when a connection cannot be established. XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition ErrorNotice::= SEQUENCE { errorIdentification INTEGER, errorInformation BIT STIRNG, } 5.3. OperationResponse This structure is returned on a successful or unsuccessful operation of the service. It references the initial request as well as the data that had been submitted. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 27] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition Response::= SEQUENCE { requestInformation RequestInformation , data SEQUENCE OF Data , serviceInformation ServiceInformation OPTIONAL } 5.4. Response This structure is returned on a successful or unsuccessful operation of the service. XML Schema element ASN.1 Definition Response::= CHOICE { response OperationResponse , error [0] ErrorNotice } 6. Service Operations This section describes in detail the different operations that a client can initiate with a request and their outcomes. All operations share the same data types for the input and output but the choices are filled in differently. For all operations, the archive service may react in the following Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 28] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 ways. o Error - The request is not understood or cannot be transmitted, an ErrorNotice is returned. o Acceptance - The request is accepted, an OperationResponse indicating that the transaction is 'waiting'. o Rejection - The request is rejected. an OperationResponse describing the error is returned. o Result - This a final response, an OperationResponse containing the result of the transaction is returned. 6.1. ARCHIVE operation The major operation of the archive service is the ARCHIVE operation. A client prepares the data and associated metadata, and transfers the request to the archive service When service returns acknowledgement only as an asynchronous notification, either the client has to perform a STATUS operation to determine the final outcome, or service pools client with service result status Client builds a Request with request information including service policy interpreting service characteristics and service configuration parameters. Data to be archived and meta data are enclosed. o the service type is set to "archive" o If this is an initial request, the data are filled in with a rawData and a messageDigest. o If this a retry of a previous operation, the client MAY choose either to simply repeat an identical operation, or remove the rawData and send the messageDigest and, if provided, an artifact. As a result the server responds with acknowledgement including service identification and data identification (artifact and/or message imprint is included) or service error. Server may also include service result. The server MAY use an artifact an optimization feature when the StatusInformation is 'waiting', in order to simplify its processing when the client retries the operation. When an operation is retried, the client SHOULD use the returned artifact. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 29] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 The final response contains a data reference to be usable in other operations concerning the same data object. 6.2. STATUS operation A client can request the status of a data object. Client builds a Request with request information including service policy interpreting service characteristics and service configuration parameters. o The service type is set to "status". o Data identification must be a data reference and/or a message imprint. In the final response, the LTA returns the current status and the metadata for the object. 6.3. EXPORT operation This operation allows a client to retrieve data. o Data identification must be a data reference and/or a message imprint. o The service type is set to "export". In the final response, the LTA returns data and metadata of the object. 6.4. VERIFY operation This operation allows a client to verify the authenticity of information stored in the archive. Depending on the actual status of the object and on the policy of the LTA, the LTA initiates an internal procedure to determine the validity of the data. The LTA MAY choose not to perform this proecdure for example if the actual status is sufficiently recent. In this case, the operation is identical to STATUS operation. o Data identification must be a data reference and/or a message imprint. o The service type is set to "verify". The LTA returns updated metadata of the object. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 30] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 6.5. DELETE operation This operation allows a client to delete data or request data shredding. After a successful operation, the the server does not maintain any status information about the object. Note that this does not mean that the server does not maintain a trace record of the delete operation. o Data identification must include data itself or data reference or message imprint. o The metadata MAY be set to replace the existing metadata of the object. o The service type is set to "delete". The LTA returns the updated metadata (or nothing). 7. Presentation and Bindings In the previous chapters we have presented all basic data types as well as XSD schema as in with ASN.1. This is done in order to allow implentations work on both data syntaxes and to be able to present and transform messages in a defined way. TBD: Complete data structures. 8. Security and Transport TBD: This chapter needs rework. TBD: LTAP requests may include security parameters in meta information section. TBD: Security may be provided using lower layers, e.g. XML Security for XML syntax based requests/responses. The protocol consists of the exchange of data objects encoded as different CMS content types, i.e. requests and responses. These data are optionally encapsulated by CMS content types that provide for authentication and/or confidentiality, e.g. SignedData or EnvelopedData. This document describes the usage of a SignedData construct of [RFC3852], where the content type indicated in the eContentType of the encapContentInfo is one of the LTAP content types and the Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 31] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 eContent of the encapContentInfo, carried as an octet string containing an encoded request or response structure. When using a SignedData structure for authentication, an LTAP request and response MAY contain one or more SignerInfo structures, each of which may contain countersignature attributes depending on operational environments. When an end user client creates a request, there is one SignerInfo. A relaying LTA MAY add an additional signature or a countersignature attribute. Clients and relays MUST ensure authenticity of a server when submitting data. In order to do so, they MAY add another encapsulation from [RFC3852] that provides for confidentiality, and/or MAY use a secure transport layer, e.g., TLS to perform server authentication and to ensure confidentiality of the transport. Responses are generally protected in similar way by using a SignedData encapsulation with one or more SignerInfos, and CounterSignatures, depending on the number of participating servers. The number of signatures is not related to the number of participating servers but rather to the number of entities that may be used to authenticate a response or part of it. In some circumstances, a client/server communication may be secured only by lower layer transport mechanism, e.g. SSL/TLS. A client MUST NOT trust a response that cannot be authenticated. Archive clients and servers MUST always create requests and responses that can be authenticated with the explicit exception of a global error status, which may be returned as a non-signed response. There is no mandatory transport mechanism in this document. All mechanisms are optional. Two examples of transport protocols are given that allow online exchange of request and a response, and asynchronous communication between a client and an LTA. A LTA MAY use a combination of protocols, for example in order to return additional responses. Protocol via HTTP or HTTPS: This subsection specifies means for conveying ASN.1-encoded messages for the LTAP protocol exchanges via the HyperText Transfer Protocol. The DER encoded LTAP requests and responses are encapsulated using a simple MIME object with Content- Type application/ltans (and with the default binary encoding). This MIME object can be sent and received using common HTTP or HTTPS processing engines and provides a simple client-server transport for ltans requests and responses. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 32] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 A server MUST understand an HTTP 1.1 request together with chunked input of a POST request. A server SHOULD understand a Content- Encoding value of gzip. In case of a HTTP 1.0 request and response, a positive value Content-Length indicating the total size of the data MUST be used. A clienst SHOULD send a Host header in the request. A client MUST be able to react to the following status codes: TBC Protocol using Email: This section specifies a means for conveying ASN.1-encoded messages for the protocol exchanges described via Internet mail. The DER encoded LTAP requests and responses are encapsulated using a simple MIME object with Content-Type application/ltans with an appropriate Content-Transfer-Encoding. This MIME object can be sent and received using MIME processing engines and provides a simple Internet mail transport for LTAP responses. In order to be able to associate a possible error response with a request, the requester SHOULD use the field 'transactionIdentifier'. The requester SHOULD not make any assumption about the usage of message header fields by the responding service, in particular the usage of fields like Subject, Message-ID or References. 9. Credits This document has been created using XML2RFC ([RFC2629]). 10. Security Considerations This section discusses addition security considerations of the framework. When designing an LTA service, the following considerations have been identified that have an impact upon the validity or "trust" in the ltans server responses. An LTA is assumed to operate with best effort. Nevertheless, an operation can fail or get totally lost. A client SHOULD be able to recover from lost requests, i.e., avoid deleting data until an attestation has been received. It is possible for an LTA to report loss of integrity for archived data, or simply non-existence of data which is equivalent to loss of data. Depending on the value of the data, appropriate measures to address these catastrophic scenarios need to be provided outside the basic service, e.g., by using redundant copies managed either by a client of internally of a broker type service. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 33] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 The validity of data should be checked by periodic execution of VERIFY operations intended to ensure data with demonstratable integrity is available throughout the lifetime of an archived data object. The rate of refresh will be driven by a number of factors, some of which have a direct impact of demonstration of integrity. For example, the confidence in the strength of cryptographic algorithms or the quality of storage devices are factors determining the verification intervals. Depending on the lifetime and the quality of data, relying on cryptographic protection of data object may not be a sufficient means to determine authenticity in time, other means may be required, e.g. physical protection of data storage material. It is imperative that keys used to sign responses are guarded with proper security and controls in order to minimize the possibility of compromise. Nevertheless, in case the private key does become compromised, an audit trail of all the response generated by the service SHOULD be kept as a means to help discriminate between genuine and false responses. Aa LTA MAY provide for a service to validate responses created by this service or another one solely based on the audit trail. As already indicated, when confidentiality and server authentication is required, requests and responses MAY be protected using appropriate mechanisms (e.g., CMS encapsulation [RFC3369] or TLS [RFC3546]). Server authentication is highly recommended for all service which transfer data to a server. Client identification and authentication MAY use services defined by TLS ([RFC3546]) instead of, or in addition to, using a document or message protection format, e.g. CMS. It is possible for an LTA to report loss of integrity for archived data, or simply non-existence of data which is equivalent to loss of data. Depending on the value of the data, appropriate measures to address these catastrophic scenarios need to be provided outside the basic service, e.g., by using redundant copies managed either by a client of internally of a broker type service. 11. IPR Patent Information The material presented in this document was initially drafted in 2005. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 34] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 The following United States Patents related to data validation and certification services, listed in chronological order, are known by the authors to exist at this time. This may not be an exhaustive list. Other patents may exist or be issued at any time. Implementers of this protocol and applications using the protocol SHOULD perform their own patent search and determine whether or not any encumberences exist on their implementation. The list is intitially taken from [RFC3029]. # 4,309,569 Method of Providing Digital Signatures (issued) January 5, 1982 (inventor) Ralph C. Merkle (assignee) The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University # 5,001,752 Public/Key Date-Time Notary Facility (issued) March 19, 1991 (inventor) Addison M. Fischer # 5,022,080 Electronic Notary (issued) June 4, 1991 (inventors) Robert T. Durst, Kevin D. Hunter # 5,136,643 Public/Key Date-Time Notary Facility (issued) August 4, 1992 (inventor) Addison M. Fischer (Note: This is a continuation of patent # 5,001,752.) # 5,136,646 Digital Document Time-Stamping with Catenate Certificate (issued) August 4, 1992 (inventors) Stuart A. Haber, Wakefield S. Stornetta Jr. (assignee) Bell Communications Research, Inc. # 5,136,647 Method for Secure Time-Stamping of Digital Documents (issued) August 4, 1992 (inventors) Stuart A. Haber, Wakefield S. Stornetta Jr. (assignee) Bell Communications Research, Inc. # 5,373,561 Method of Extending the Validity of a Cryptographic Certificate (issued) December 13, 1994 (inventors) Stuart A. Haber, Wakefield S. Stornetta Jr. (assignee) Bell Communications Research, Inc., # 5,422,95 Personal Date/Time Notary Device (issued) June 6, 1995 (inventor) Addison M. Fischer Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 35] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 # 5,781,629 Digital Document Authentication System (issued) July 14, 1998 (inventor) Stuart A. Haber, Wakefield S. Stornetta Jr. (assignee) Surety Technologies, Inc. 12. IANA consideration None. 13. References 13.1. Normative references [I-D.ietf-ltans-ers] Brandner, R., "Evidence Record Syntax (ERS)", draft-ietf-ltans-ers-08 (work in progress), October 2006. [I-D.ietf-ltans-reqs] Wallace, C., "Long-Term Archive Service Requirements", draft-ietf-ltans-reqs-09 (work in progress), October 2006. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC3369] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3369, August 2002. [RFC3546] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J., and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions", RFC 3546, June 2003. [RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3852, July 2004. 13.2. Informative references [RFC2629] Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629, June 1999. [RFC3029] Adams, C., Sylvester, P., Zolotarev, M., and R. Zuccherato, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Data Validation and Certification Server Protocols", RFC 3029, February 2001. Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 36] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 Appendix A. ASN.1 module The following ASN.1 module has been checked using the asn1c tool. LTANS_LTAP --OID TBD DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN -- EXPORTS ALL maybe not -- Appendix B. XML schema to be done. Authors' Addresses Aleksej Jerman Blazic SETCCE Jamova 39 Ljubljana SI-1000 SLOVENIA Fax: +386 1 4773861 Email: aljosa@setcce.org Peter Sylvester EdelWeb 15 quai de Dion-Bouton Puteaux F-92816 FRANCE Fax: +33 1 40 99 14 14 Email: Peter.Sylvester@edelweb.fr Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 37] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 Carl Wallace Orion Security Solutions Suite 300 1489 Chain Bridge Road McLean, VA 22101 Fax: +1 703 9170260 Email: cwallace@orionsec.com Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 38] Internet-Draft LTAP October 2006 Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Intellectual Property The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. Acknowledgment Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF Administrative Support Activity (IASA). Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 39]