JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-09

Abstract

The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification enumerates cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK) specifications.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as “work in progress.”

This Internet-Draft will expire on October 25, 2013.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
   1.1. Notational Conventions
2. Terminology
   2.1. Terms Incorporated from the JWS Specification
   2.2. Terms Incorporated from the JWESpecification
   2.3. Terms Incorporated from the JWK Specification
   2.4. Defined Terms
3. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWS
   3.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS
   3.2. MAC with HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, or HMAC SHA-512
   3.3. Digital Signature with RSA SHA-256, RSA SHA-384, or RSA SHA-512
   3.4. Digital Signature with ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, or ECDSA P-521 SHA-512
   3.5. Using the Algorithm "none"
   3.6. Additional Digital Signature/MAC Algorithms and Parameters
4. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWE
4.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE
4.2. "enc" (Encryption Method) Header Parameter Values for JWE
4.3. Key Encryption with RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5
4.4. Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP
4.5. Key Wrapping with AES Key Wrap
4.6. Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key
4.7. Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static (ECDH-ES)
4.7.1. Key Derivation for "ECDH-ES"
4.8. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms
4.8.1. Conventions Used in Defining AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2
4.8.2. Generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithm
4.8.2.1. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Encryption
4.8.2.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Decryption
4.8.3. AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
4.8.4. AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512
4.8.5. Plaintext Encryption with AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2
4.9. Plaintext Encryption with AES GCM
4.10. Additional Encryption Algorithms and Parameters
5. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWK
5.1. "kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values for JWK
5.2. JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys
5.2.1. JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Public Keys
5.2.1.1. "crv" (Curve) Parameter
5.2.1.2. "x" (X Coordinate) Parameter
5.2.1.3. "y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter
5.2.2. JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Private Keys
5.2.2.1. "d" (ECC Private Key) Parameter
5.3. JWK Parameters for RSA Keys
5.3.1. JWK Parameters for RSA Public Keys
5.3.1.1. "n" (Modulus) Parameter
5.3.1.2. "e" (Exponent) Parameter
5.3.2. JWK Parameters for RSA Private Keys
5.3.2.1. "d" (Private Exponent) Parameter
5.3.2.2. "p" (First Prime Factor) Parameter
5.3.2.3. "q" (Second Prime Factor) Parameter
5.3.2.4. "dp" (First Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter
5.3.2.5. "dq" (Second Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter
5.3.2.6. "qi" (First CRT Coefficient) Parameter
5.3.2.7. "oth" (Other Primes Info) Parameter
5.3.3. JWK Parameters for Symmetric Keys
5.3.3.1. "k" (Key Value) Parameter
5.4. Additional Key Types and Parameters
6. IANA Considerations
6.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry
6.1.1. Template
6.1.2. Initial Registry Contents
6.2. JSON Web Key Types Registry
6.2.1. Registration Template
6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents
6.3. JSON Web Key Parameters Registration
6.3.1. Registry Contents
7. Security Considerations
8. References
8.1. Normative References
8.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference
Appendix B. Encryption Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference
Appendix C. Test Cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms
C.1. Test Cases for AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
C.2. Test Cases for AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512
Appendix D. Acknowledgements
Appendix E. Document History
§ Author’s Address
1. Introduction

The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification enumerates cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS], JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE], and JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] specifications. All these specifications utilize JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627] based data structures. This specification also describes the semantics and operations that are specific to these algorithms and key types.

Enumerating the algorithms and identifiers for them in this specification, rather than in the JWS, JWE, and JWK specifications, is intended to allow them to remain unchanged in the face of changes in the set of required, recommended, optional, and deprecated algorithms over time.

1.1. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119].

2. Terminology

2.1. Terms Incorporated from the JWS Specification

These terms defined by the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] specification are incorporated into this specification:

- JSON Web Signature (JWS): A data structure representing a digitally signed or MACed message. The structure represents three values: the JWS Header, the JWS Payload, and the JWS Signature.
- JSON Text Object: A UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded text string representing a JSON object; the syntax of JSON objects is defined in Section 2.2 of [RFC4627].
- JWS Header: A JSON Text Object that describes the digital signature or MAC operation applied to create the JWS Signature value.
- JWS Payload: The sequence of octets to be secured -- a.k.a., the message. The payload can contain an arbitrary sequence of octets.
- JWS Signature: A sequence of octets containing the cryptographic material that ensures the integrity of the JWS Header and the JWS Payload. The JWS Signature value is a digital signature or MAC value calculated over the JWS Signing Input using the parameters specified in the JWS Header.
- Base64url Encoding: The URL- and filename-safe Base64 encoding described in RFC 4648 [RFC4648], Section 5, with the (non URL-safe) '=' padding characters omitted, as permitted by Section 3.2. (See Appendix C of [JWS] for notes on implementing base64url encoding without padding.)
- Encoded JWS Header: Base64url encoding of the JWS Header.
- Encoded JWS Payload: Base64url encoding of the JWS Payload.
- Encoded JWS Signature: Base64url encoding of the JWS Signature.
- JWS Signing Input: The concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload.
- Collision Resistant Namespace
A namespace that allows names to be allocated in a manner such that they are highly unlikely to collide with other names. For instance, collision resistance can be achieved through administrative delegation of portions of the namespace or through use of collision-resistant name allocation functions. Examples of Collision Resistant Namespaces include: Domain Names, Object Identifiers (OIDs) as defined in the ITU-T X.660 and X.670 Recommendation series, and Universally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs) \[RFC4122\]. When using an administratively delegated namespace, the definer of a name needs to take reasonable precautions to ensure they are in control of the portion of the namespace they use to define the name.

2.2. Terms Incorporated from the JWE Specification

These terms defined by the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) \[JWE\] specification are incorporated into this specification:

- **JSON Web Encryption (JWE)**
  A data structure representing an encrypted message. The structure represents five values: the JWE Header, the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE Initialization Vector, the JWE Ciphertext, and the JWE Authentication Tag.

- **Authenticated Encryption**
  An Authenticated Encryption algorithm is one that provides an integrated content integrity check. Authenticated Encryption algorithms accept two inputs, the Plaintext and the Additional Associated Data value, and produce two outputs, the Ciphertext and the Authentication Tag value. AES Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is one such algorithm.

- **Plaintext**
  The sequence of octets to be encrypted -- a.k.a., the message. The plaintext can contain an arbitrary sequence of octets.

- **Ciphertext**
  An encrypted representation of the Plaintext.

- **Additional Associated Data (AAD)**
  An input to an Authenticated Encryption operation that is integrity protected but not encrypted.

- **Authentication Tag**
  An output of an Authenticated Encryption operation that ensures the integrity of the Ciphertext and the Additional Associated Data.

- **Content Encryption Key (CEK)**
  A symmetric key for the Authenticated Encryption algorithm used to encrypt the Plaintext for the recipient to produce the Ciphertext and the Authentication Tag.

- **JWE Header**
  A JSON Text Object that describes the encryption operations applied to create the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE Ciphertext, and the JWE Authentication Tag.

- **JWE Encrypted Key**
  The result of encrypting the Content Encryption Key (CEK) with the intended recipient's key using the specified algorithm. Note that for some algorithms, the JWE Encrypted Key value is specified as being the empty octet sequence.

- **JWE Initialization Vector**
  A sequence of octets containing the Initialization Vector used when encrypting the Plaintext.

- **JWE Ciphertext**
  A sequence of octets containing the Ciphertext for a JWE.

- **JWE Authentication Tag**
  A sequence of octets containing the Authentication Tag for a JWE.

- **Encoded JWE Header**
  Base64url encoding of the JWE Header.

- **Encoded JWE Encrypted Key**
  Base64url encoding of the JWE Encrypted Key.

- **Encoded JWE Initialization Vector**
  Base64url encoding of the JWE Initialization Vector.

- **Encoded JWE Ciphertext**
  Base64url encoding of the JWE Ciphertext.

- **Encoded JWE Authentication Tag**
  Base64url encoding of the JWE Authentication Tag.

- **Key Management Mode**
  \[RFC4122\]
A method of determining the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value to use. Each algorithm used for determining the CEK value uses a specific Key Management Mode. Key Management Modes employed by this specification are Key Encryption, Key Wrapping, Direct Key Agreement, Key Agreement with Key Wrapping, and Direct Encryption.

**Key Encryption**
A Key Management Mode in which the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value is encrypted to the intended recipient using an asymmetric encryption algorithm.

**Key Wrapping**
A Key Management Mode in which the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value is encrypted to the intended recipient using a symmetric key wrapping algorithm.

**Direct Key Agreement**
A Key Management Mode in which a key agreement algorithm is used to agree upon the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value.

**Key Agreement with Key Wrapping**
A Key Management Mode in which a key agreement algorithm is used to agree upon a symmetric key used to encrypt the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value to the intended recipient using a symmetric key wrapping algorithm.

**Direct Encryption**
A Key Management Mode in which the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value used is the secret symmetric key value shared between the parties.

### 2.3. Terms Incorporated from the JWK Specification

These terms defined by the JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] specification are incorporated into this specification:

- **JSON Web Key (JWK)**
  A JSON object that represents a cryptographic key.

- **JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set)**
  A JSON object that contains an array of JWKs as the value of its `keys` member.

### 2.4. Defined Terms

These terms are defined for use by this specification:

- **Header Parameter Name**
  The name of a member of the JSON object representing a JWS Header or JWE Header.

- **Header Parameter Value**
  The value of a member of the JSON object representing a JWS Header or JWE Header.

### 3. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWS

JWS uses cryptographic algorithms to digitally sign or create a Message Authentication Codes (MAC) of the contents of the JWS Header and the JWS Payload. The use of the following algorithms for producing JWSs is defined in this section.

### 3.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS

The table below is the set of `alg` (algorithm) header parameter values defined by this specification for use with JWS, each of which is explained in more detail in the following sections:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>alg Parameter Value</th>
<th>Digital Signature or MAC Algorithm</th>
<th>Implementation Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
3.2. MAC with HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, or HMAC SHA-512

Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) enable one to use a secret plus a cryptographic hash function to generate a Message Authentication Code (MAC). This can be used to demonstrate that the MAC matches the hashed content, in this case the JWS Signing Input, which therefore demonstrates that whoever generated the MAC was in possession of the secret. The means of exchanging the shared key is outside the scope of this specification.

The algorithm for implementing and validating HMACs is provided in RFC 2104 [RFC2104]. This section defines the use of the HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, and HMAC SHA-512 functions [SHS]. The alg (algorithm) header parameter values HS256, HS384, and HS512 are used in the JWS Header to indicate that the Encoded JWS Signature contains a base64url encoded HMAC value using the respective hash function.

A key of the same size as the hash output (for instance, 256 bits for HS256) or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.

The HMAC SHA-256 MAC is generated per RFC 2104, using SHA-256 as the hash algorithm "H", using the octets of the ASCII [USASCII] representation of the JWS Signing Input as the "text" value, and using the shared key. The HMAC output value is the JWS Signature. The JWS signature is base64url encoded to produce the Encoded JWS Signature.

The HMAC SHA-256 MAC for a JWS is validated by computing an HMAC value per RFC 2104, using SHA-256 as the hash algorithm "H", using the octets of the ASCII representation of the received JWS Signing Input as the "text" value, and using the shared key. This computed HMAC value is then compared to the result of base64url decoding the received Encoded JWS signature. Alternatively, the computed HMAC value can be base64url encoded and compared to the received Encoded JWS Signature, as this comparison produces the same result as comparing the unencoded values. In either case, if the values match, the HMAC has been validated. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST be rejected.

Securing content with the HMAC SHA-384 and HMAC SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for HMAC SHA-256 - just using the corresponding hash algorithm with correspondingly larger minimum key sizes and result values: 384 bits each for HMAC SHA-384 and 512 bits each for HMAC SHA-512.

An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWS].
3.3. Digital Signature with RSA SHA-256, RSA SHA-384, or RSA SHA-512

This section defines the use of the RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 digital signature algorithm as defined in Section 8.2 of [RFC3447], (commonly known as PKCS #1), using SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 [SHS] as the hash functions. The \texttt{alg} (algorithm) header parameter values \texttt{RS256}, \texttt{RS384}, and \texttt{RS512} are used in the JWS Header to indicate that the Encoded JWS Signature contains a base64url encoded RSA digital signature using the respective hash function.

A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms.

The RSA SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows:

1. Generate a digital signature of the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input using RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN and the SHA-256 hash function with the desired private key. The output will be an octet sequence.
2. Base64url encode the resulting octet sequence.

The output is the Encoded JWS Signature for that JWS.

The RSA SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as follows:

1. Take the Encoded JWS Signature and base64url decode it into an octet sequence. If decoding fails, the JWS MUST be rejected.
2. Submit the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input and the public key corresponding to the private key used by the signer to the RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY algorithm using SHA-256 as the hash function.
3. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST be rejected.

Signing with the RSA SHA-384 and RSA SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for RSA SHA-256 - just using the corresponding hash algorithm with correspondingly larger result values: 384 bits for RSA SHA-384 and 512 bits for RSA SHA-512.

An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.2 of [JWS].

3.4. Digital Signature with ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, or ECDSA P-521 SHA-512

The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [DSS] provides for the use of Elliptic Curve cryptography, which is able to provide equivalent security to RSA cryptography but using shorter key sizes and with greater processing speed. This means that ECDSA digital signatures will be substantially smaller in terms of length than equivalently strong RSA digital signatures.

This specification defines the use of ECDSA with the P-256 curve and the SHA-256 cryptographic hash function, ECDSA with the P-384 curve and the SHA-384 hash function, and ECDSA with the P-521 curve and the SHA-512 hash function. The P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves are defined in [DSS]. The \texttt{alg} (algorithm) header parameter values \texttt{ES256}, \texttt{ES384}, and \texttt{ES512} are used in the JWS Header to indicate that the Encoded JWS Signature contains a base64url encoded ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, or ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 digital signature, respectively.

The ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows:

1. Generate a digital signature of the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 with the desired private key. The output will be the pair (R, S), where R and S are 256 bit unsigned integers.
2. Turn R and S into octet sequences in big endian order, with each array being 32 octets long. The array representations MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero octets contained in the values.
3. Concatenate the two octet sequences in the order R and then S. (Note that many ECDSA implementations will directly produce this concatenation as their
4. Base64url encode the resulting 64 octet sequence.

The output is the Encoded JWS Signature for the JWS.

The ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as follows:

1. Take the Encoded JWS Signature and base64url decode it into an octet sequence. If decoding fails, the JWS MUST be rejected.
2. The output of the base64url decoding MUST be a 64 octet sequence. If decoding does not result in a 64 octet sequence, the JWS MUST be rejected.
3. Split the 64 octet sequence into two 32 octet sequences. The first array will be R and the second S (with both being in big endian octet order).
4. Submit the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input R, S and the public key \((x, y)\) to the ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 validator.
5. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST be rejected.

Note that ECDSA digital signature contains a value referred to as \(K\), which is a random number generated for each digital signature instance. This means that two ECDSA digital signatures using exactly the same input parameters will output different signature values because their \(K\) values will be different. A consequence of this is that one cannot validate an ECDSA signature by recomputing the signature and comparing the results.

Signing with the ECDSA P-384 SHA-384 and ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 - just using the corresponding hash algorithm with correspondingly larger result values. For ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, R and S will be 384 bits each, resulting in a 96 octet sequence. For ECDSA P-521 SHA-512, R and S will be 521 bits each, resulting in a 132 octet sequence.

Examples using these algorithms are shown in Appendices A.3 and A.4 of [JWS].

3.5. Using the Algorithm "none"

JWSs MAY also be created that do not provide integrity protection. Such a JWS is called a "Plaintext JWS". Plaintext JWSs MUST use the \(alg\) value none, and are formatted identically to other JWSs, but with the empty string for its JWS Signature value.

3.6. Additional Digital Signature/MAC Algorithms and Parameters

Additional algorithms MAY be used to protect JWSs with corresponding \(alg\) (algorithm) header parameter values being defined to refer to them. New \(alg\) header parameter values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry Section 6.1 or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. In particular, it is permissible to use the algorithm identifiers defined in XML DSIG [RFC3275], XML DSIG 2.0 [W3C.CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124], and related specifications as \(alg\) values.

As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common \(alg\) value space. The values used by the two specifications MUST be distinct, as the \(alg\) value can be used to determine whether the object is a JWS or JWE.

Likewise, additional reserved Header Parameter Names MAY be defined via the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry [JWS]. As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by both specifications, its usage must be compatible between the specifications.

4. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWE

JWE uses cryptographic algorithms to encrypt the Content Encryption Key (CEK) and the Plaintext. This section specifies a set of specific algorithms for these purposes.
4.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE

The table below is the set of alg (algorithm) header parameter values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE. These algorithms are used to encrypt the CEK, producing the JWE Encrypted Key, or to use key agreement to agree upon the CEK.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>alg Parameter Value</th>
<th>Key Management Algorithm</th>
<th>Implementation Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSA_1_5</td>
<td>RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 [RFC3447]</td>
<td>REQUIRED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA-OAEP</td>
<td>RSAES using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [RFC3447], with the default parameters specified by RFC 3447 in Section A.2.1</td>
<td>OPTIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A128KW</td>
<td>Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm [RFC3394] using the default initial value specified in Section 2.2.3.1 and using 128 bit keys</td>
<td>RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A256KW</td>
<td>AES Key Wrap Algorithm using the default initial value specified in Section 2.2.3.1 and using 256 bit keys</td>
<td>RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dir</td>
<td>Direct use of a shared symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) for the block encryption step (rather than using the symmetric key to wrap the CEK)</td>
<td>RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDH-ES</td>
<td>Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static [RFC6090] key agreement using the Concat KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800-56A], with the agreed-upon key being used directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) (rather than being used to wrap the CEK), as specified in Section 4.7</td>
<td>RECOMMENDED+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDH-ES+A128KW</td>
<td>Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static key agreement per ECDH-ES and Section 4.7, but where the agreed-upon key is used to wrap the Content Encryption Key (CEK) with the A128KW function (rather than being used directly as the CEK)</td>
<td>RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDH-ES+A256KW</td>
<td>Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static key agreement per ECDH-ES and Section 4.7, but where the agreed-upon key is used to wrap the Content Encryption Key (CEK) with the A256KW function (rather than being used directly as the CEK)</td>
<td>RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification.

4.2. "enc" (Encryption Method) Header Parameter Values for JWE

The table below is the set of enc (encryption method) header parameter values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE. These algorithms are used to encrypt the Plaintext, which produces the Ciphertext.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>enc Parameter Value</th>
<th>Block Encryption Algorithm</th>
<th>Implementation Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A128CBC-HS256</td>
<td>The AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 authenticated encryption algorithm, as defined in Section 4.8.3. This algorithm uses a 256 bit key.</td>
<td>REQUIRED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A256CBC-HS512</td>
<td>The AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 authenticated encryption algorithm, as defined in Section 4.8.4. This algorithm uses a 512 bit key.</td>
<td>REQUIRED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A128GCM</td>
<td>AES in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [AES] [NIST.800-38D] using 128 bit keys</td>
<td>RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A256GCM</td>
<td>AES GCM using 256 bit keys</td>
<td>RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All the names are short because a core goal of JWE is for the representations to be compact. However, there is no a priori length restriction on alg values.

See Appendix B for a table cross-referencing the encryption alg (algorithm) and enc (encryption method) values used in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.

4.3. Key Encryption with RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5

This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 [RFC3447]. The alg header parameter value RSA1_5 is used in this case.

A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.

An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.2 of [JWE].

4.4. Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP

This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with RSAES using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [RFC3447], with the default parameters specified by RFC 3447 in Section A.2.1. The alg header parameter value RSA-OAEP is used in this case.

A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.

An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWE].

4.5. Key Wrapping with AES Key Wrap

This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm [RFC3394] using the default initial value specified in Section 2.2.3.1 using 128 or 256 bit keys. The alg header parameter values A128KW or A256KW are used in this case.

An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.3 of [JWE].

4.6. Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key

This section defines the specifics of directly performing symmetric key encryption without performing a key wrapping step. In this case, the shared symmetric key is used directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value for the enc algorithm. An empty octet sequence is used as the JWE Encrypted Key value. The alg header parameter value dir is used in this case.

4.7. Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static (ECDH-ES)

This section defines the specifics of key agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static [RFC6090], and using the Concat KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800-56A]. The key agreement result can be used in one of two ways:

1. directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) for the enc algorithm, in the Direct Key Agreement mode, or
2. as a symmetric key used to wrap the CEK with either the A128KW or A256KW
The alg header parameter value \textit{ECDH-ES} is used in the Direct Key Agreement mode and the values \textit{ECDH-ES+A128KW} and \textit{ECDH-ES+A256KW} are used in the Key Agreement with Key Wrapping mode.

In the Direct Key Agreement case, the output of the Concat KDF MUST be a key of the same length as that used by the \textit{enc} algorithm; in this case, the empty octet sequence is used as the JWE Encrypted Key value. In the Key Agreement with Key Wrapping case, the output of the Concat KDF MUST be a key of the length needed for the specified key wrapping algorithm, either 128 or 256 bits respectively.

A new epk (ephemeral public key) value MUST be generated for each key agreement transaction.

### 4.7.1. Key Derivation for "ECDH-ES"

The key derivation process derives the agreed upon key from the shared secret Z established through the ECDH algorithm, per Section 6.2.2.2 of [NIST.800-56A].

Key derivation is performed using the Concat KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800-56A], where the Digest Method is SHA-256. The Concat KDF parameters are set as follows:

- **Z**: This is set to the representation of the shared secret Z as an octet sequence.
- **keydatalen**: This is set to the number of bits in the desired output key. For \textit{ECDH-ES}, this is length of the key used by the \textit{enc} algorithm. For \textit{ECDH-ES+A128KW}, and \textit{ECDH-ES+A256KW}, this is 128 and 256, respectively.
- **AlgorithmID**: This is set to the concatenation of keydatalen represented as a 32 bit big endian integer and the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the \textit{alg} header parameter value.
- **PartyUInfo**: The PartyUInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data, where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a fixed-length, big endian 32 bit counter that indicates the length (in octets) of Data, with || being concatenation. If an \textit{apu} (agreement PartyUInfo) header parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url decoding the \textit{apu} value and Datalen is set to the number of octets in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to the empty octet sequence.
- **PartyVInfo**: The PartyVInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data, where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a fixed-length, big endian 32 bit counter that indicates the length (in octets) of Data, with || being concatenation. If an \textit{apv} (agreement PartyVInfo) header parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url decoding the \textit{apv} value and Datalen is set to the number of octets in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to the empty octet sequence.
- **SuppPubInfo**: This is set to the empty octet sequence.
- **SuppPrivInfo**: This is set to the empty octet sequence.

### 4.8. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms

This section defines a family of authenticated encryption algorithms built using a composition of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with PKCS \#5 padding [AES] [NIST.800-38A] operations and HMAC [RFC2104] [SHS] operations. This algorithm family is called AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2. It also defines two instances of this family, one using 128 bit CBC keys and HMAC SHA-256 and the other using 256 bit CBC keys and
HMAC SHA-512. Test cases for these algorithms can be found in Appendix C.

These algorithms are based upon Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA [I-D.mcgrew-ead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2], performing the same cryptographic computations, but with the Initialization Vector and Authentication Tag values remaining separate, rather than being concatenated with the Ciphertext value in the output representation. This algorithm family is a generalization of the algorithm family in [I-D.mcgrew-ead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2], and can be used to implement those algorithms.

4.8.1. Conventions Used in Defining AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2

We use the following notational conventions.

CBC-PKCS5-ENC(X,P) denotes the AES CBC encryption of P using PKCS #5 padding using the cipher with the key X.

MAC(Y, M) denotes the application of the Message Authentication Code (MAC) to the message M, using the key Y.

The concatenation of two octet strings A and B is denoted as A || B.

4.8.2. Generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithm

This section defines AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 in a manner that is independent of the AES CBC key size or hash function to be used. Section 4.8.2.1 and Section 4.8.2.2 define the generic encryption and decryption algorithms. Section 4.8.3 and Section 4.8.4 define instances of AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 that specify those details.

4.8.2.1. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Encryption

The authenticated encryption algorithm takes as input four octet strings: a secret key K, a plaintext P, associated data A, and an initialization vector IV. The authenticated ciphertext value E and the authentication tag value T are provided as outputs. The data in the plaintext are encrypted and authenticated, and the associated data are authenticated, but not encrypted.

The encryption process is as follows, or uses an equivalent set of steps:

1. The secondary keys MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY are generated from the input key K as follows. Each of these two keys is an octet string.

   MAC_KEY consists of the initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in order.
   ENC_KEY consists of the final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in order.

   Here we denote the number of octets in the MAC_KEY as MAC_KEY_LEN, and the number of octets in ENC_KEY as ENC_KEY_LEN; the values of these parameters are specified by the AEAD algorithms (in Section 4.8.3 and Section 4.8.4). The number of octets in the input key K is the sum of MAC_KEY_LEN and ENC_KEY_LEN. When generating the secondary keys from K, MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY MUST NOT overlap. Note that the MAC key comes before the encryption key in the input key K; this is in the opposite order of the algorithm names in the identifier "AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2".

2. The Initialization Vector (IV) used is a 128 bit value generated randomly or pseudorandomly for use in the cipher.

3. The plaintext is CBC encrypted using PKCS #5 padding using ENC_KEY as the key, and the IV. We denote the ciphertext output from this step as E.

4. The octet string AL is equal to the number of bits in A expressed as a 64-bit
unsigned integer in network byte order.

5. A message authentication tag T is computed by applying HMAC [RFC2104] to the following data, in order:
   - the associated data A,
   - the initialization vector IV,
   - the ciphertext E computed in the previous step, and
   - the octet string AL defined above.

   The string MAC_KEY is used as the MAC key. We denote the output of the MAC computed in this step as M. The first T_LEN bits of M are used as T.

6. The Ciphertext E and the Authentication Tag T are returned as the outputs of the authenticated encryption.

The encryption process can be illustrated as follows. Here K, P, A, IV, and E denote the key, plaintext, associated data, initialization vector, and ciphertext, respectively.

\[
\begin{align*}
    \text{MAC\_KEY} &= \text{initial MAC\_KEY\_LEN bytes of } K, \\
    \text{ENC\_KEY} &= \text{final ENC\_KEY\_LEN bytes of } K, \\
    E &= \text{CBC-PKCS5-ENC(ENC\_KEY, P)}, \\
    M &= \text{MAC(MAC\_KEY, A || IV || E || AL)}, \\
    T &= \text{initial T\_LEN bytes of } M.
\end{align*}
\]

### 4.8.2.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Decryption

The authenticated decryption operation has four inputs: K, A, E, and T as defined above. It has only a single output, either a plaintext value P or a special symbol FAIL that indicates that the inputs are not authentic. The authenticated decryption algorithm is as follows, or uses an equivalent set of steps:

1. The secondary keys MAC\_KEY and ENC\_KEY are generated from the input key K as in Step 1 of Section 4.8.2.1.
2. The integrity and authenticity of A and E are checked by computing an HMAC with the inputs as in Step 5 of Section 4.8.2.1. The value T, from the previous step, is compared to the first MAC\_KEY length bits of the HMAC output. If those values are identical, then A and E are considered valid, and processing is continued. Otherwise, all of the data used in the MAC validation are discarded, and the AEAD decryption operation returns an indication that it failed, and the operation halts. (But see Section 10 of [JWE] for security considerations on thwarting timing attacks.)
3. The value E is decrypted and the PKCS #5 padding is removed. The value IV is used as the initialization vector. The value ENC\_KEY is used as the decryption key.
4. The plaintext value is returned.

### 4.8.3. AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256

This algorithm is a concrete instantiation of the generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithm above. It uses the HMAC message authentication code [RFC2104] with the SHA-256 hash function [SHS] to provide message authentication, with the HMAC output truncated to 128 bits, corresponding to the HMAC-SHA-256-128 algorithm defined in [RFC4868]. For encryption, it uses AES in the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode of operation as defined in Section 6.2 of [NIST.800-38A], with PKCS #5 padding.

The input key K is 32 octets long.

The AES CBC IV is 16 octets long. ENC\_KEY\_LEN is 16 octets.
The SHA-256 hash algorithm is used in HMAC. MAC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets. The HMAC-SHA-256 output is truncated to T_LEN=16 octets, by stripping off the final 16 octets.

### 4.8.4. AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512

AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 is based on AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256, but with the following differences:

- A 256 bit AES CBC key is used instead of 128.
- SHA-512 is used in HMAC instead of SHA-256.
- ENC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets.
- MAC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets.
- The length of the input key K is 64 octets.
- The HMAC SHA-512 value is truncated to T_LEN=32 octets instead of 16 octets.

### 4.8.5. Plaintext Encryption with AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2

The algorithm value **A128CBC-HS256** is used as the **alg** value when using AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 with JWE. The algorithm value **A256CBC-HS512** is used as the **alg** value when using AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 with JWE. In both cases, the Additional Authenticated Data value used is the concatenation of the Encoded JWE Header value, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key. The JWE Initialization Vector value used is the IV value.

### 4.9. Plaintext Encryption with AES GCM

This section defines the specifics of encrypting the JWE Plaintext with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [AES][NIST.800-38D] using 128 or 256 bit keys. The **enc** header parameter values **A128GCM** or **A256GCM** are used in this case.

The CEK is used as the encryption key.

Use of an initialization vector of size 96 bits is REQUIRED with this algorithm.

The Additional Authenticated Data parameter is used to secure the header and key values. (The Additional Authenticated Data value used is the octets of the ASCII representation of the concatenation of the Encoded JWE Header, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key per Section 5 of the JWE specification.) This same Additional Authenticated Data value is used when decrypting as well.

The requested size of the Authentication Tag output MUST be 128 bits, regardless of the key size.

The JWE Authentication Tag is set to be the Authentication Tag value produced by the encryption. During decryption, the received JWE Authentication Tag is used as the Authentication Tag value.

An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWE].

Note: AES GCM MUST NOT be used when using the JWE JSON Serialization for multiple recipients, since this would result in the same Initialization Vector and Plaintext values being used for multiple GCM encryptions. This is prohibited by the GCM specification because of severe security vulnerabilities that would result, were GCM used in this way.
4.10. Additional Encryption Algorithms and Parameters

Additional algorithms MAY be used to protect JWEs with corresponding \texttt{alg} (algorithm) and \texttt{enc} (encryption method) header parameter values being defined to refer to them. New \texttt{alg} and \texttt{enc} header parameter values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry Section 6.1 or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. In particular, it is permissible to use the algorithm identifiers defined in XML Encryption [W3C.REC-xmllenc-core-20021210], XML Encryption 1.1 [W3C.CR-xmllenc-core1-20120313], and related specifications as \texttt{alg} and \texttt{enc} values.

As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common \texttt{alg} value space. The values used by the two specifications MUST be distinct, as the \texttt{alg} value can be used to determine whether the object is a JWS or JWE.

Likewise, additional reserved Header Parameter Names MAY be defined via the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry [JWS]. As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by both specifications, its usage must be compatible between the specifications.

5. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWK

A JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627] data structure that represents a cryptographic key. A JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) is a JSON data structure for representing a set of JWKs. This section specifies a set of key types to be used for those keys and the key type specific parameters for representing those keys. Parameters are defined for public, private, and symmetric keys.

5.1. "kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values for JWK

The table below is the set of \texttt{kty} (key type) parameter values that are defined by this specification for use in JWKs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>kty Parameter Value</th>
<th>Key Type</th>
<th>Implementation Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Elliptic Curve [DSS] key type</td>
<td>RECOMMENDED+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>RSA [RFC3447] key type</td>
<td>REQUIRED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oct</td>
<td>Octet sequence key type (used to represent symmetric keys)</td>
<td>RECOMMENDED+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the names are short because a core goal of JWK is for the representations to be compact. However, there is no a priori length restriction on \texttt{kty} values.

The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification.

5.2. JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys

JWKs can represent Elliptic Curve [DSS] keys. In this case, the \texttt{kty} member value MUST be \texttt{EC}.

5.2.1. JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Public Keys

These members MUST be present for Elliptic Curve public keys:
5.2.1.1. "crv" (Curve) Parameter

The crv (curve) member identifies the cryptographic curve used with the key. Curve values from [DSS] used by this specification are:

- P-256
- P-384
- P-521

Additional crv values MAY be used, provided they are understood by implementations using that Elliptic Curve key. The crv value is a case sensitive string.

5.2.1.2. "x" (X Coordinate) Parameter

The x (x coordinate) member contains the x coordinate for the elliptic curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the coordinate's big endian representation as an octet sequence. The array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero octets contained in the value. For instance, when representing 521 bit integers, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain 66 octets, including any leading zero octets.

5.2.1.3. "y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter

The y (y coordinate) member contains the y coordinate for the elliptic curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the coordinate's big endian representation as an octet sequence. The array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero octets contained in the value. For instance, when representing 521 bit integers, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain 66 octets, including any leading zero octets.

5.2.2. JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Private Keys

In addition to the members used to represent Elliptic Curve public keys, the following member MUST be present to represent Elliptic Curve private keys:

5.2.2.1. "d" (ECC Private Key) Parameter

The d (ECC private key) member contains the Elliptic Curve private key value. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero octets. For instance, when representing 521 bit integers, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain 66 octets, including any leading zero octets.

5.3. JWK Parameters for RSA Keys

JWKs can represent RSA [RFC3447] keys. In this case, the kty member value MUST be RSA.
5.3.1. JWK Parameters for RSA Public Keys

These members MUST be present for RSA public keys:

5.3.1.1. "n" (Modulus) Parameter

The n (modulus) member contains the modulus value for the RSA public key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero octets. For instance, when representing 2048 bit integers, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain 256 octets, including any leading zero octets.

5.3.1.2. "e" (Exponent) Parameter

The e (exponent) member contains the exponent value for the RSA public key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The array representation MUST utilize the minimum number of octets to represent the value. For instance, when representing the value 65537, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST consist of the three octets [1, 0, 1].

5.3.2. JWK Parameters for RSA Private Keys

In addition to the members used to represent RSA public keys, the following members are used to represent RSA private keys. All are REQUIRED for RSA private keys except for oth, which is sometimes REQUIRED and sometimes MUST NOT be present, as described below.

5.3.2.1. "d" (Private Exponent) Parameter

The d (private exponent) member contains the private exponent value for the RSA private key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero octets. For instance, when representing 2048 bit integers, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain 256 octets, including any leading zero octets.

5.3.2.2. "p" (First Prime Factor) Parameter

The p (first prime factor) member contains the first prime factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.

5.3.2.3. "q" (Second Prime Factor) Parameter

The q (second prime factor) member contains the second prime factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.

5.3.2.4. "dp" (First Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter
The \( \text{dp} \) (first factor CRT exponent) member contains the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) exponent of the first factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.

### 5.3.2.5. "dq" (Second Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter

The \( \text{dq} \) (second factor CRT exponent) member contains the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) exponent of the second factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.

### 5.3.2.6. "qi" (First CRT Coefficient) Parameter

The \( \text{dp} \) (first CRT coefficient) member contains the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) coefficient of the second factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.

### 5.3.2.7. "oth" (Other Primes Info) Parameter

The \( \text{oth} \) (other primes info) member contains an array of information about any third and subsequent primes, should they exist. When only two primes have been used (the normal case), this parameter MUST be omitted. When three or more primes have been used, the number of array elements MUST be the number of primes used minus two. Each array element MUST be an object with the following members:

#### 5.3.2.7.1. "r" (Prime Factor)

The \( \text{r} \) (prime factor) parameter within an \( \text{oth} \) array member represents the value of a subsequent prime factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.

#### 5.3.2.7.2. "d" (Factor CRT Exponent)

The \( \text{d} \) (Factor CRT Exponent) parameter within an \( \text{oth} \) array member represents the CRT exponent of the corresponding prime factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.

#### 5.3.2.7.3. "t" (Factor CRT Coefficient)

The \( \text{t} \) (factor CRT coefficient) parameter within an \( \text{oth} \) array member represents the CRT coefficient of the corresponding prime factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.

### 5.3.3. JWK Parameters for Symmetric Keys

When the JWK \( \text{kty} \) member value is \( \text{oct} \) (octet sequence), the following member is used to represent a symmetric key (or another key whose value is a single octet sequence):
5.3.3.1. "k" (Key Value) Parameter

The k (key value) member contains the value of the symmetric (or other single-valued) key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the octet sequence containing the key value.

5.4. Additional Key Types and Parameters

Keys using additional key types can be represented using JWK data structures with corresponding kty (key type) parameter values being defined to refer to them. New kty parameter values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Key Types registry Section 6.2 or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace.

Likewise, parameters for representing keys for additional key types or additional key properties SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Key Parameters registry [JWK] or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace.

6. IANA Considerations

The following registration procedure is used for all the registries established by this specification.

Values are registered with a Specification Required [RFC5226] after a two-week review period on the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.

Registration requests must be sent to the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list for review and comment, with an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request for access token type: example"). [[Note to RFC-EDITOR: The name of the mailing list should be determined in consultation with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name: jose-reg-review.]] Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.

IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list.

6.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry

This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry for values of the JWS and JWE alg (algorithm) and enc (encryption method) header parameters. The registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm usage locations from the set alg and enc, implementation requirements, and a reference to the specification that defines it. The same algorithm name MAY be registered multiple times, provided that the sets of usage locations are disjoint. The implementation requirements of an algorithm MAY be changed over time by the Designated Experts(s) as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the status of an algorithm to DEPRECATED, or to change the status of an algorithm from OPTIONAL to RECOMMENDED or REQUIRED.

6.1.1. Template

Algorithm Name:

The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be
6.1.2. Initial Registry Contents

- Algorithm Name: HS256
- Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
- Implementation Requirements: REQUIRED
- Change Controller: IETF
- Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: HS384
- Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
- Implementation Requirements: OPTIONAL
- Change Controller: IETF
- Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: HS512
- Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
- Implementation Requirements: OPTIONAL
- Change Controller: IETF
- Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: RS256
- Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
- Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED
- Change Controller: IETF
- Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: RS384
- Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
- Implementation Requirements: OPTIONAL
- Change Controller: IETF
- Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: RS512
- Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
- Implementation Requirements: OPTIONAL
- Change Controller: IETF
- Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: ES256
- Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
- Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED+
- Change Controller: IETF
- Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: ES384
- Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
- Implementation Requirements: OPTIONAL
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: ES512
  - Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
  - Implementation Requirements: OPTIONAL
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: none
  - Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
  - Implementation Requirements: REQUIRED
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: RSA1_5
  - Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
  - Implementation Requirements: REQUIRED
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: RSA-0AEP
  - Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
  - Implementation Requirements: OPTIONAL
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: A128KW
  - Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
  - Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: A256KW
  - Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
  - Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: dir
  - Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
  - Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: ECDH-ES
  - Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
  - Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED+
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: ECDH-ES+A128KW
  - Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
  - Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: ECDH-ES+A256KW
  - Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg
  - Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Algorithm Name: A128CBC-HS256
  - Algorithm Usage Location(s): enc
  - Implementation Requirements: REQUIRED
  - Change Controller: IETF
6.2. JSON Web Key Types Registry

This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Key Types registry for values of the JWK kty (key type) parameter. The registry records the kty value and a reference to the specification that defines it. This specification registers the values defined in Section 5.1.

6.2.1. Registration Template

"kty" Parameter Value:
The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted.

Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.

Implementation Requirements:
The algorithm implementation requirements, which must be one the words REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED, OPTIONAL, or DEPRECATED. Optionally, the word can be followed by a "+" or "-". The use of "+" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. The use of "-" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a future version of the specification.

Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.

6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents

- "kty" Parameter Value: EC
- Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED+
- Change Controller: IETF
- Specification Document(s): Section 5.1 of [[ this document ]]

- "kty" Parameter Value: RSA
- Implementation Requirements: REQUIRED
- Change Controller: IETF
- Specification Document(s): Section 5.1 of [[ this document ]]
6.3. JSON Web Key Parameters Registration

This specification registers the parameter names defined in Sections 5.2, 5.3, and 5.3.3 in the IANA JSON Web Key Parameters registry [JWK].

6.3.1. Registry Contents

- Parameter Name: **crv**
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.1.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Parameter Name: **x**
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.1.2 of [[ this document ]]

- Parameter Name: **y**
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.1.3 of [[ this document ]]

- Parameter Name: **d**
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.2.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Parameter Name: **n**
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.1.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Parameter Name: **e**
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.1.2 of [[ this document ]]

- Parameter Name: **d**
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2.1 of [[ this document ]]

- Parameter Name: **p**
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2.2 of [[ this document ]]

- Parameter Name: **q**
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2.3 of [[ this document ]]

- Parameter Name: **dp**
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2.4 of [[ this document ]]

- Parameter Name: **dq**
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2.5 of [[ this document ]]

- Parameter Name: **qi**
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2.6 of [[ this document ]]

- Parameter Name: **oth**
  - Change Controller: IETF
  - Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2.7 of [[ this document ]]
7. Security Considerations

All of the security issues faced by any cryptographic application must be faced by a JWS/JWE/JWK agent. Among these issues are protecting the user's private and symmetric keys, preventing various attacks, and helping the user avoid mistakes such as inadvertently encrypting a message for the wrong recipient. The entire list of security considerations is beyond the scope of this document, but some significant considerations are listed here.

The security considerations in [AES], [DSS], [JWE], [JWK], [JWS], [NIST.800-38A], [NIST.800-38D], [NIST.800-56A], [RFC2104], [RFC3394], [RFC3447], [RFC5116], [RFC6090], and [SHS] apply to this specification.

Eventually the algorithms and/or key sizes currently described in this specification will no longer be considered sufficiently secure and will be removed. Therefore, implementers and deployments must be prepared for this eventuality.

Algorithms of matching strengths should be used together whenever possible. For instance, when AES Key Wrap is used with a given key size, using the same key size is recommended when AES GCM is also used.

While Section 8 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] explicitly calls for people not to adopt RSASSA-PKCS1 for new applications and instead requests that people transition to RSASSA-PSS, this specification does include RSASSA-PKCS1, for interoperability reasons, because it commonly implemented.

Keys used with RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 must follow the constraints in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447]. In particular, keys with a low public key exponent value must not be used.

Plaintext JWSs (JWSs that use the alg value none) provide no integrity protection. Thus, they must only be used in contexts where the payload is secured by means other than a digital signature or MAC value, or need not be secured.

Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could send certificates with keys that would result in excessive cryptographic processing, for example, keys larger than those mandated in this specification, which could swamp the processing element. Agents that use such keys without first validating the certificate to a trust anchor are advised to have some sort of cryptographic resource management system to prevent such attacks.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)," draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress), April 2013 (HTML).
[NIST.800-56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Appendix A. Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference

This appendix contains a table cross-referencing the digital signature and MAC alg (algorithm) values used in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. See XML DSIG [RFC3275], XML DSIG 2.0 [W3C.CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124], and Java Cryptography Architecture [JCA] for more information about the names defined by those documents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>JWS</th>
<th>XML DSIG</th>
<th>JCA</th>
<th>OID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMAC/SHA-256</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha256">http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha256</a></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HmacSHA256</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2.840.113549.2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algorithm</td>
<td>JWE</td>
<td>XML ENC</td>
<td>JCA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5</td>
<td>RSA1_5</td>
<td><a href="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5">http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5</a></td>
<td>RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSAES using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP)</td>
<td>RSA-OAEP</td>
<td><a href="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p">http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p</a></td>
<td>RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-1AndMGF1Padding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm using 128 bit keys</td>
<td>A128KW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix C. Test Cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms

The following test cases can be used to validate implementations of the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithms defined in Section 4.8. They are also intended to correspond to test cases that may appear in a future version of [I-D.mcgreaw-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2], demonstrating that the cryptographic computations performed are the same.

The variable names are those defined in Section 4.8. All values are hexadecimal.

#### C.1. Test Cases for AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256</th>
<th><a href="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc">http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc</a></th>
<th>AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| AES_KEY_WRAP Algorithm using 256 bit keys | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes256 | AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding |

| AES in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with PKCS #5 padding using 128 bit keys | A128CBC-HS256 | AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding |

| AES in CBC mode with PKCS #5 padding using 256 bit keys | A256CBC-HS512 | AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding |

| AES in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) using 128 bit keys | A128GCM | AES/GCM/NoPadding |

| AES GCM using 256 bit keys | A256GCM | AES/GCM/NoPadding |

| AES in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with PKCS #5 padding using 256 bit keys | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc | AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding |

| AES in CBC mode with PKCS #5 padding using 256 bit keys | A256CBC-HS512 | AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding |

| AES in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) using 128 bit keys | A128GCM | AES/GCM/NoPadding |

| AES GCM using 256 bit keys | A256GCM | AES/GCM/NoPadding |
### C.2. Test Cases for AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>K</th>
<th>MAC_KEY</th>
<th>ENC_KEY</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>AL</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00 01</td>
<td>00 02 03</td>
<td>04 05 06 07 08 09</td>
<td>0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f</td>
<td>10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f</td>
<td>20 21 22 23 24 25 26</td>
<td>27 28 29</td>
<td>2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd</td>
<td>d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04</td>
<td>54 68 65 20</td>
<td>73 65 63 6f</td>
<td>6e 64 20</td>
<td>70 72 69 6e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5a</td>
<td>00 00 00 00 00 00</td>
<td>00 01 50</td>
<td>4a ff</td>
<td>aa ad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4d d3 b4 c0 88 a7 f4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Solutions for signing and encrypting JSON content were previously explored by Magic Signatures [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign [JSS], Canvas Applications [CanvasApp], JSON Simple Encryption [JSE], and JavaScript Message Security Format [I-D.rescorla-jsms], all of which influenced this draft.

The Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2] specification, upon which the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithms are based, was written by David A. McGrew and Kenny Paterson. The test cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 are based upon those for [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2] by John Foley.

This specification is the work of the JOSE Working Group, which includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular, the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording that influenced this specification:


Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and Sean Turner and Stephen Farrell served as Security area directors during the creation of this specification.

Appendix E. Document History

[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]

-09

- Expanded the scope of the JWK parameters to include private and symmetric key representations, as specified by draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-symmetric-key-00.
- Changed term "JWS Secured Input" to "JWS Signing Input".
- Changed from using the term "byte" to "octet" when referring to 8 bit values.
- Specified that AES Key Wrap uses the default initial value specified in Section 2.2.3.1 of RFC 3394. This addressed issue #19.
- Added Key Management Mode definitions to terminology section and used the defined terms to provide clearer key management instructions. This addressed issue #5.
- Replaced A128CBC+HS256 and A256CBC+HS512 with A128CBC-HS256 and A256CBC-HS512. The new algorithms perform the same cryptographic computations as [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2], but with the Initialization Vector and Authentication Tag values remaining separate from the Ciphertext value in the output representation. Also deleted the header parameters epu (encryption PartyUInfo) and epv (encryption PartyVInfo), since they are no longer used.
- Changed from using the term "Integrity Value" to "Authentication Tag".

-08

- Changed the name of the JWK key type parameter from alg to kty.
- Replaced uses of the term "AEAD" with "Authenticated Encryption", since the term AEAD in the RFC 5116 sense implied the use of a particular data representation, rather than just referring to the class of algorithms that perform authenticated encryption with associated data.
- Applied editorial improvements suggested by Jeff Hodges. Many of these simplified the terminology used.
- Added seriesInfo information to Internet Draft references.

-07

- Added a data length prefix to PartyUInfo and PartyVInfo values.
- Changed the name of the JWK RSA modulus parameter from mod to n and the name of the JWK RSA exponent parameter from xpo to e, so that the identifiers are the same as those used in RFC 3447.
- Made several local editorial changes to clean up loose ends left over from the decision to only support block encryption methods providing integrity.

- Removed the int and kdf parameters and defined the new composite Authenticated Encryption algorithms A128CBC+HS256 and A256CBC+HS512 to replace the former uses of AES CBC, which required the use of separate integrity and key derivation functions.

- Included additional values in the Concat KDF calculation -- the desired output size and the algorithm value, and optionally PartyUInfo and PartyVInfo values.

- Added the optional header parameters apu (agreement PartyUInfo), apv (agreement PartyVInfo), epu (encryption PartyUInfo), and epv (encryption PartyVInfo).

- Changed the name of the JWKS RSA exponent parameter from exp to xpo so as to allow the potential use of the name exp for a future extension that might define an expiration parameter for keys. (The exp name is already used for this purpose in the JWT specification.)

- Applied changes made by the RFC Editor to RFC 6749's registry language to this specification.

- Support both direct encryption using a shared or agreed upon symmetric key, and the use of a shared or agreed upon symmetric key to key wrap the CMK. Specifically, added the alg values dir, ECDH-ES+A128KW, and ECDH-ES+A256KW to finish filling in this set of capabilities.

- Updated open issues.

- Added text requiring that any leading zero bytes be retained in base64url encoded key value representations for fixed-length values.

- Added this language to Registration Templates: "This name is case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted."

- Described additional open issues.

- Applied editorial suggestions.

- Always use a 128 bit "authentication tag" size for AES GCM, regardless of the key size.

- Specified that use of a 128 bit IV is REQUIRED with AES CBC. It was previously RECOMMENDED.

- Removed key size language for ECDSA algorithms, since the key size is implied by the algorithm being used.

- Stated that the int key size must be the same as the hash output size (and not larger, as was previously allowed) so that its size is defined for key generation purposes.

- Added the kdf (key derivation function) header parameter to provide crypto agility for key derivation. The default KDF remains the Concat KDF with the SHA-256 digest function.

- Clarified that the mod and exp values are unsigned.

- Added Implementation Requirements columns to algorithm tables and Implementation Requirements entries to algorithm registries.

- Changed AES Key Wrap to RECOMMENDED.

- Moved registries JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters and JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values to the JWS specification.

- Moved JSON Web Key Parameters registry to the JWK specification.

- Changed registration requirements from RFC Required to Specification Required with Expert Review.

- Added Registration Template sections for defined registries.

- Added Registry Contents sections to populate registry values.

- No longer say "the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Secured Input (which is the same as the ASCII representation)". Just call it "the ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input".

- Added "Collision Resistant Namespace" to the terminology section.
Numerous editorial improvements.

For AES GCM, use the "additional authenticated data" parameter to provide integrity for the header, encrypted key, and ciphertext and use the resulting "authentication tag" value as the JWE Authentication Tag.

Defined minimum required key sizes for algorithms without specified key sizes.

Defined KDF output key sizes.

Specified the use of PKCS #5 padding with AES CBC.

Generalized text to allow key agreement to be employed as an alternative to key wrapping or key encryption.

Clarified that ECDH-ES is a key agreement algorithm.

Required implementation of AES-128-KW and AES-256-KW.

Removed the use of A128GCM and A256GCM for key wrapping.

Removed A512KW since it turns out that it's not a standard algorithm.

Clarified the relationship between typ header parameter values and MIME types.

Generalized language to refer to Message Authentication Codes (MACs) rather than Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) unless in a context specific to HMAC algorithms.

Established registries: JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters, JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms, JSON Web Signature and Encryption "typ" Values, JSON Web Key Parameters, and JSON Web Key Algorithm Families.

Moved algorithm-specific definitions from JWK to JWA.

Reformatted to give each member definition its own section heading.

Moved definition of "alg":"none" for JWSs here from the JWT specification since this functionality is likely to be useful in more contexts that just for JWTs.

Added Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm using 512 bit keys (A512KW).

Added text "Alternatively, the Encoded JWS Signature MAY be base64url decoded to produce the JWS Signature and this value can be compared with the computed HMAC value, as this comparison produces the same result as comparing the encoded values".

Corrected the Magic Signatures reference.

Made other editorial improvements suggested by JOSE working group participants.

Created the initial IETF draft based upon draft-jones-json-web-signature-04 and draft-jones-json-web-encryption-02 with no normative changes.

Changed terminology to no longer call both digital signatures and HMACs "signatures".

Author's Address
Michael B. Jones
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URL: http://self-issued.info/