Network Working Group P Karn Internet Draft Qualcomm W A Simpson DayDreamer expires in six months November 1995 The Photuris Session Key Management Protocol draft-ietf-ipsec-photuris-08.txt | Status of this Memo This document is a submission to the IP Security Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Comments should be submitted to the ipsec@ans.net mailing list. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its Areas, and its Working Groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet Drafts. Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months, and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is not appropriate to use Internet Drafts as reference material, or to cite them other than as a ``working draft'' or ``work in progress.'' To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the internet-drafts Shadow Directories on: ftp.is.co.za (Africa) nic.nordu.net (Europe) ds.internic.net (US East Coast) ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast) munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim) Abstract Photuris is an experimental session-key management protocol intended for use with the IP Security Protocols (AH and ESP). Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page i] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 1. Introduction The ultimate goal of Internet Security is to facilitate direct IP connectivity between sensitive hosts and users across the Internet. Users will rely on Internet Security to protect the confidentiality of the traffic they send across the Internet and depend on it to block unauthorized external access to their internal hosts and networks. Users must have confidence in every Internet Security component, including key management. Without this confidence, users may erect barriers that impede legitimate use of the Internet, or forego the Internet entirely. Internet Security does not place any significance on easily forged IP Source addresses. It relies instead on proof of possession of secret knowledge: that is, a cryptographic key. However, secure manual distribution and maintainance of these keys is often cumbersome and problematic. User distribution often leads to long-lived keys, with concommitant opportunity for compromise of the keys. A fundamental role of this key management protocol is to verify the values exchanged, while ensuring that the resulting key is not known by another party. It has been shown [DOW92] that key exchange must be coupled to authentication. Each party requires assurance that an exchanged key is not shared with an imposter. Protecting sensitive data on the Internet against compromise -- either by interception or by unauthorized access -- is necessary, but not sufficient. The computing resources themselves must also be protected against malicious attack or sabotage. With these criteria in mind, Photuris [Firefly] is designed: 1. for frequent exchange of short-lived individual session-keys, with a minimum of configuration and effort. 2. to support the use of a variety of authentication methods, and facilitate the exchange of many identification types. 3. to thwart certain types of denial of service attacks on host resources. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 1] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Design Notes: Photuris was based on currently available tools, by experienced network protocol designers with an interest in cryptography, rather than by cryptographers with an interest in network protocols. This specification is intended to be readily implementable without requiring an extensive background in cryptography. Therefore, only minimal background cryptographic discussion and rationale is included in this document. Although some review has been provided by the general cryptographic community, it is anticipated that design decisions and tradeoffs will be thoroughly analysed in subsequent dissertations and debated for many years to come. Implementors will find details of cryptographic hashing (such as MD5), encryption algorithms and modes (such as DES), digital signatures (such as DSS), and other algorithms in [Schneier94]. 1.1. Terminology exchange-value The publically distributable value used to calculate a shared-secret. As used in this document, refers to a Diffie-Hellman exchange, as opposed to a public-key. private-key A key that is kept secret, and is part of a public/private key-pair. As used in this document, refers to RSA key pairs. public-key A publically distributable value that is part of a public/private key-pair. As used in this document, refers to RSA key pairs. secret-key A key that is not publically distributable, and not part of a public/private key-pair. An example is a user password. Security Association A collection of parameters describing the security relationship between two nodes. These parameters include the identities of the parties, the transform (including algorithm and algorithm mode), the key(s) (such as a session-key, secret-key, or appropriate public/private key-pair), and possibly other Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 2] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 information such as sensitivity labelling. For further details, see [RFC-1825]. Security Parameters Index (SPI) A number that indicates the Security Association. The number is relative to the IP Destination, which is the SPI Owner. session-key A key that is independently derived from a shared- secret by the parties, and used for keying one direction of traffic. This key is changed frequently. shared-secret As used in this document, the calculated result of the Photuris exchange. transform A cryptographic manipulation of a particular set of data. As used in this document, refers to certain well-specified methods (which are defined elsewhere). For example, AH-MD5 [RFC-1828] transforms an IP datagram into a one-way hash, and ESP-DES-CBC [RFC-1829] transforms plaintext to ciphertext and back again. 1.2. Protocol Description The Photuris protocol consists of several simple phases: 1. A "Cookie" Exchange guards against simple flooding attacks sent with bogus IP Sources. In addition, supported exchange-schemes are offered for | calculating the shared-secret. 2. A Value Exchange establishes a shared-secret between the parties. The Responder remains stateless until a shared-secret has been created. In addition, supported attributes are offered for use in the Security Associations. 3. An Identification Exchange identifies the parties to each other, and verifies the integrity of values sent in phases 1 and 2. The shared-secret provides a basis to generate separate Security Association session-keys in each direction, which are in turn used Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 3] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 for conventional authentication or encryption. Additional security attributes are also exchanged as needed. This exchange is also encrypted for privacy using another | permutation of the shared-secret. This protects the identities of the parties and hides the security parameter values. 4. Additional messages may be exchanged to periodically change the session-keys, and to establish new or revised security parameters. These exchanges are also encrypted for privacy in the same fashion | as above. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 4] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Initiator Responder ========= ========= Cookie_Request -> <- Cookie_Response offer schemes Exchange_Request -> pick scheme offer value offer attributes <- Exchange_Response offer value * offer attributes (generate shared-secret from exchanged values) Identification_Message -> make SPI pick SPI attribute(s) | identify self authenticate (make privacy key) | (encrypt) | <- Identification_Message make SPI pick SPI attribute(s) | identify self authenticate make SPI session-key(s) | (make privacy key) | (encrypt) | make SPI session-key(s) | (optional) Change_Message(s) -> make SPI | pick SPI attribute(s) | make SPI session-key(s) | make integrity key | authenticate | (encrypt) | <- Change_Message(s) make SPI | pick SPI attribute(s) | make SPI session-key(s) | make integrity key | authenticate | Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 5] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 (encrypt) | Either party may initiate an exchange at any time. For example, the Initiator need not be a "caller" in a telephony link. The Initiator is responsible for recovering from all message losses by retransmission. A Photuris exchange between two parties results in two SPI values (one in each direction). Each SPI is used in creating a separate session-key in each direction. When both parties initiate Photuris exchanges concurrently, or one party initiates more than one Photuris exchange, the Initiator Cookies (and UDP Ports) keep the exchanges separate. This results in more than one initial SPI for each Destination. To create multiple Security Associations with different parameters, the parties may also send Change_Messages. There is no requirement that all such outstanding SPIs be used. The sender selects an appropriate SPI for each datagram transmission. 1.3. Clogging Defense To grant access to authorized users regardless of location, it must be possible to cheaply detect and discard bogus datagrams. Otherwise, an attacker intent on sabotage might rapidly send datagrams to exhaust the host's CPU or memory resources. Using Internet Security authentication facilities, when a datagram does not pass an authentication check, it can be discarded without further processing. This is easily done with manual (null) key management between trusted hosts at relatively little cost, given the speed of cryptographic hashing functions compared to public-key algorithms. Unfortunately, such a trusted host will have only a fixed number of keys available. The keys will tend to have long lifetimes. This carries significant security risks. Automatic key management is necessary to generate keys between parties without prior arrangement. But, there is a potential Achilles heel in the key management protocol. Because of their use of CPU-intensive operations such as modular exponentiation, key management schemes based on public-key Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 6] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 cryptography are vulnerable to resource clogging attacks. Although a complete defense against such attacks is impossible, Photuris features make them much more difficult. Cookie Exchange Photuris exchanges a "cookie" before initiating any public-key operations, thwarting the saboteur from using random IP Source addresses. The simple validation of this cookie uses the same level of resources as other Internet Security authentication mechanisms. This forces the attacker to: 1) use its own valid IP address, or 2) gain access to a physical transmission link and appropriate those addresses, or 3) subvert Internet routing for the same purpose. The first option allows the target to detect and filter out such attacks, and significantly increases the likelihood of identifying the attacker. The latter two options are much more difficult than merely sending large numbers of datagrams with randomly chosen IP Source addresses from an arbitrary point on the Internet. The cookie does not protect against an observer that can copy a valid cookie, or an interceptor that can modify or substitute another cookie. However, these attacks are mitigated somewhat with time-variant cookies. Minimize State There is a small amount of state associated with the Photuris exchange itself. This includes the Cookies, Exchange-Values, and the computed shared-secret. During the initial Cookie Exchange, the Responder does not maintain any state for the exchange. This prevents memory resource exhaustion from a simple flooding attack. Later exchange phases require saving of state to perform the key establishment calculations and identity verification. An attacker that is willing to expose itself to a larger window of detection can waste substantial resources repeating all the steps of the Photuris process. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 7] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Precomputation Once exchange state has been established between nodes, repetitive exchanges can use many of the same previously computed values. This prevents an attacker with more CPU power from easily exhausting the target. Expiration All retained exchange state is subject to periodic expiration (typically 10 minutes). These Exchange LifeTimes are | implementation dependent and are not disclosed in any Photuris | message. When an Exchange-Value expires (or is replaced by a newer value), all related exchange state is purged. The periodic expiration and purge of exchange state reduces the risk of compromise of keys and secrets, and is an important consideration in attaining perfect forward secrecy. If an attacker has succeeded in overwhelming a target, the target will eventually recover as the expired state is purged. 1.4. Traffic Anonymity Although each datagram carries a cleartext IP Destination, the ultimate destination can be hidden by "laundering" it through an encrypted tunnel. The IP Source could be hidden in the same manner. If the Source has been dynamically allocated, it provides no useful information to an eavesdropper. This leaves the identifying information that the parties send during the Identification Exchange. One would often like to deny this information to an eavesdropper, especially when this would reveal the location of a user. The identification can be easily protected by encrypting the Identification Exchange with the shared-secret just established. This keeps a passive eavesdropper from learning the identities of the parties, either directly from the certificates or by checking signatures against a known database of public keys. The scheme is not foolproof. By posing as the Responder, an active attacker could trick the Initiator into revealing its identity. However, this active attack is considerably more difficult than passive vacuum-cleaner monitoring. Unless the attacker can steal the private/secret key belonging to the Responder, the Initiator will Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 8] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 discover the deception when verifying the Identification Exchange. 1.5. Security Parameters Photuris key management is used to determine a number of parameters for each Security Association between the communicating parties. This includes the particular authentication and/or encryption transforms, and the key(s) used to authenticate, encrypt or decrypt the payload. The key management implementation usually maintains a table containing the several parameters for each concurrent Security Association. The implementation needs to access that security parameter table to determine how to process each datagram. The Security Parameters Index (SPI) is assigned by the entity controlling the IP Destination: the SPI Owner (the receiver). The parties use the combination of SPI and IP Destination to distinguish the correct association. Each SPI has an associated LifeTime, specified by the SPI owner (receiver). This SPI LifeTime is usually related to the speed of the | link (typically 30 to 300 seconds). The SPI can also be deleted by the SPI Owner using the Change_Message. Once the SPI has expired or been deleted, the parties cease using the SPI, and purge the associated state. The SPI LifeTime may be shorter or longer than the Exchange LifeTime. | These LifeTimes are not required to be related to each other. When an Exchange-Value expires (or is replaced by a newer value), the | derived SPIs are not affected. This is important to allow traffic to continue without interruption during new Photuris exchanges. Implementation Notes: The method used for SPI assignment is implementation dependent. However, selection of a cryptographically random value can help prevent attacks that depend on a predicatable sequence of values. To prevent resurrection of old SPIs, implementations SHOULD remember those deleted or expired SPIs, but mark them as unusable until the shared-secret used to create them also expires. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 9] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 1.6. User Support The Photuris exchange results in two kinds of state, each with separate LifeTimes. 1) The small amount of state associated with the Photuris exchange itself. This state may be viewed as between Internet nodes. 2) The multiple Security Associations that are established. This state may be viewed as from nodes to users. Every node requires its own Identification. When the Photuris exchange is node to node, such as single user personal computers or unattended firewalls used in virtual private networks, the nodes themselves may be viewed as the users. Internet Security protects against threats that come from the external network, not from mutually hostile users of the nodes themselves. | A) A secure multi-user operating system MUST be able to protect its resources from hostile users, and protect one hostile user from damaging the resources controlled by another hostile user. | B) A secure multi-user operating system MUST incorporate strong | support for user-oriented discretionary access controls. | C) If the operating system has any security vulnerability, such that | internal information may be revealed or the information of one user may be inadvertantly disclosed to another user, then there is | no basis for separate user-oriented keying. | When required for secure multi-user environments, the Photuris Identification can be used to provide separate limited authentication from each user of one node when communicating with another common node. To provide user-oriented keying, the nodes can initiate multiple concurrent Photuris exchanges. These may provide separate user Identification from the Initiator to the Responder in each direction. Each secure multi-user operating system MUST be capable of separately maintaining multiple Identification Exchange SPI values for each Value Exchange calculated shared-secret. It is the responsibility of the Source to internally segregate the shared-secret and different session-keys provided per Destination, and select an appropriate SPI for each datagram transmission. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 10] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Implementation Notes: Once exchange state has been established between nodes, repetitive exchanges can use many of the same previously computed values. Successful use of user-oriented keying requires a significant level of operating system support. Use of multi-user segregated * exchanges likely requires added functionality in the transport API of the implementation operating system. Such a mechanism is outside the scope of this document. It has been suggested that the Photuris exchange could also be established between particular application or transport processes associated with a user of a node. Such a mechanism is emphatically outside the scope of this document. 1.7. Multicast Support Key management is more difficult in a multicast environment. Senders to a multicast group may share common a Security Parameters Index, if all communications are using the same security configuration parameters. In this case, the receiver only knows that the message came from a node knowing the SPI for the group, and cannot authenticate which member of the group sent the datagram. Multicast groups may also use a separate SPI value for each Source. If each sender is keyed separately and asymmetric algorithms are used, data origin authentication is also provided. A given Destination is not necessarily in control of the selection process. In the case of multicast groups, a single node or cooperating subset of the multicast group may work on behalf of the entire group to set up a Security Association. It is anticipated that Photuris would be used first to establish a distribution SPI and session-key, and that another orthogonal key distribution mechanism will use that SPI to send the group keys. This is a matter for future research. Such a mechanism is outside the scope of this document. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 11] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 2. Protocol Details The Initiator begins a Photuris exchange when it has: 1) a datagram that it wishes to send with privacy, and has no current Photuris exchange state with the IP Destination. 2) received the ICMP message Destination Unreachable: Communication Administratively Prohibited (Type 3, Code 13). 3) received the ICMP message Security Failures: Bad SPI (Type 40, | Code 0), that indicates an expired/invalid SPI. 4) received the ICMP message Security Failures: Need Authentication (Type 40, Code 4), that indicates a requirement for authentication. 5) received the ICMP message Security Failures: Need Authorization (Type 40, Code 5), that indicates a requirement for a different level of authorization. 6) received an Error_Message indicating that a new Cookie_Request should be sent. Other needs to initiate a Photuris exchange are likely to be a matter for considerable future debate. 2.1. UDP All Photuris messages use the User Datagram Protocol header [RFC- 768]. The Initiator sends to UDP Destination Port 468. When replying to the Initiator, the Responder swaps the IP Source and Destination, and the UDP Source and Destination Ports. The UDP checksum MUST be correctly calculated when sent. When a message is received with an incorrect UDP checksum, it is silently discarded. Implementation Note: It is expected that installation of Photuris will ensure that UDP checksums are enabled for the computer operating system and later disabling by operators is prevented. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 12] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 2.2. Header Format All of the messages have a format similar to the following, as transmitted left to right in network order (most significant to least significant): +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Initiator-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Responder-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Initiator-Cookie 16 octets. Responder-Cookie 16 octets. Type one octet. Each message type has a unique value. Further details and differences are elaborated in the individual messages. Design Note: The fixed size of the cookies was chosen for convenience, based on the output of commonly available cryptographic hashing functions. It is anticipated that this size is likely to be more than sufficient to protect against very high bit-rate flooding attacks. 2.3. Exchange Schemes +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Scheme | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Scheme two octets. A unique value indicating the | exchange-scheme. | Selection among several different exchange-schemes is needed to enable experimental and proprietary extensions without affecting the Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 13] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 basic protocol. The target of the exchange (Responder) specifies a list of the schemes supported, and the Initiator chooses one that it also supports. The scheme list includes alternative algorithms and distinguishing parameters. These are mixed in the same list for simplicity. The implementation can easily distinguish between the separate uses of | each supported scheme. These uses are indicated in the "Exchange | Scheme List" Appendix. Design Notes: Although exchange-schemes offer great flexibility, only a few | well-chosen algorithms and parameters are specified. This provides opportunity for intensive review by the cryptographic community, reduces implementation complexity, and improves potential for interoperability. Only one exchange-scheme (#2) is required to be supported, and | MUST be present in every Offered-Schemes list. 2.4. Attributes +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | Value(s) ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Type one octet. A unique value indicating the kind of | attribute. | When the Type is zero (padding), no Length field is | present. | Length one octet. The size of the Value(s) field in | octets. | When the Length is zero, no Value(s) field is | present. | Value(s) Zero or more octets. Further details are elaborated | in the "Attribute List" Appendix. | Selection among several different security parameter attributes is needed to enable future implementation changes without affecting the basic protocol. Each party (the sender) offers a list of the attributes supported and its peer (the receiver) selects from that Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 14] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 list when making its incoming Security Associations. The attribute list includes authentication, compression, encryption, identification, and other operational types available for exchange | between the parties. These are mixed in the same list for simplicity. The implementation can easily distinguish between the separate uses of each supported attribute. These uses are indicated | in the "Attribute List" Appendix. Encryption decisions are in the SPI User (sender) direction. Only the sender can determine whether each datagram needs privacy protection. It uses an encryption SPI created by the receiver, in addition to an authentication SPI (as needed). When the sender needs privacy protection for a datagram and Photuris exchange state has been established, but the potential receiver has no current encryption SPI, an Error_Message listing encryption attributes is sent and the original datagram is discarded. Authentication decisions are in the SPI Owner (receiver) direction. Only the receiver can determine that arriving traffic is authentic. Its need for authentication is indicated by choosing authentication attributes, and/or authenticated encryption attributes, when creating each SPI. It enforces the authentication through the simple expedient of dropping all datagrams with missing or invalid authentication, and sending an appropriate ICMP Security Failures | message. Design Notes: | Although attributes offer great flexibility, only a few well- chosen algorithms are specified. This provides opportunity for intensive review by the cryptographic community, reduces implementation complexity, and improves potential for interoperability. Support for some attributes is required (MD5 and DES-CBC), and SHOULD be present in every Offered-Attributes list. Where encryption is prohibited in a particular environment, the DES-CBC attributes MAY be omitted. Since SPI creation is in the receiver direction, but privacy (and potentially other) decisions are in the sending direction, a message is used from the sender to the receiver to stimulate the SPI creation. Typically, an encryption method is chosen for the primary attribute of the initial SPI in each direction. If integrity is needed, it is recommended that an authentication method be added Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 15] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 as an additional separate SPI. When both authentication and encryption attributes are used for | the same SPI, care must be exercised that there is no interaction between the algorithms that might reveal some portion of the session-key. There is no known interaction between MD5 and DES- CBC. When choices are made from the set of Offered-Attributes, it is not required that any Security Association include every kind of offered attribute in any single SPI, or that a separate SPI be created for every offered attribute. These combinations are implementation dependent. The authentication, compression, encryption and identification mechanisms, as well as the encapsulation mode (if any), need not be the same in both directions. 2.5. Variable Precision Numbers +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Size | Value ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Size two, four, or eight octets. The number of | significant bits used in the Value field. Always transmitted most significant octet first. When the Size is zero, no Value field is present; | there are no significant bits. This means "missing" or "null". It should not be confused with the value zero, which includes an indication of the number of significant bits. When the most significant octet is in the range 0 through 254 (0xfe), the field is two octets. Both octets are used to indicate the size of the Value field, which ranges from 1 to 65,279 significant bits (in 1 to 8,160 octets). When the most significant octet is 255 (0xff), the field is four octets. The remaining three octets are added to 65,280 to indicate the size of the Value field, which is limited to 16,776,959 significant bits (in 2,097,120 octets). Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 16] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 When the most significant two octets are 65,535 (0xffff), the field is eight octets. The remaining six octets are added to 16,776,960 to indicate the size of the Value field. This is vastly too long for these UDP messages, but is included for completeness. Value Zero or more octets. Always transmitted most | significant octet first. | The bits used are right justified within octet boundaries; that is, any unused bits are in the most significant octet. Unused bits are zero filled. * Shortened forms SHOULD NOT be used when the Value includes a number of leading zero significant bits. The Size SHOULD indicate the correct number of significant bits. Design Notes: Some of the message fields require a value which may vary in the number of bits. These bits may not make up an integral number of octets. The numbers are assumed to be unsigned. The emphasis on significant bits was based on concerns that cryptographic lengths and strengths be readily determined. This is in contrast to the usual concern that each number have only one unique (shortest) representation. 3. Cookie Exchange The Initiator initializes local state, and sends a Cookie_Request to the Responder. The Initiator also starts a retransmission timer. If no Cookie_Response is obtained within the time limit, the Cookie_Request is retransmitted. The Initiator-Cookie value in each such retransmission to the same IP Destination and UDP Port SHOULD be the same. On receipt of a Cookie_Request, the Responder determines if there are sufficient resources to begin another Photuris exchange. When too many SPI values are already in use for this particular peer, or some other resource limit is reached, an Error_Message is sent. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 17] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Otherwise, the Responder generates a cookie, and returns it in a Cookie_Response. The Responder-Cookie value in each successive response MAY be different. Note that the Responder creates no additional state at this time. On receipt of a Cookie_Response, the Initiator validates the Initiator-Cookie. Invalid messages are silently discarded. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 18] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 3.1. Cookie_Request +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Initiator-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Responder-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Initiator-Cookie 16 octets. A randomized value that identifies the exchange. The Initiator will use this value to reject invalid responses. Responder-Cookie 16 octets. Unused, MUST be set to zero when transmitted, and MUST be ignored when received. Type 0 3.2. Cookie_Response +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Initiator-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Responder-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Reserved | Offered-Schemes ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Initiator-Cookie 16 octets. Copied from the Cookie_Request. Responder-Cookie 16 octets. A randomized value that identifies the exchange. The Responder will use this value to reject invalid requests. Type 1 Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 19] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Reserved one octet. Unused, MUST be set to zero when transmitted, and MUST be ignored when received. Offered-Schemes Two or more octets. A list of one or more | exchange-schemes supported by the Responder, in increasing order of preference. Each value is two octets (see "Exchange Scheme List" Appendix). The end of the list is indicated by the UDP Length. 3.3. Cookie Generation The exact technique by which a Photuris party generates a cookie is implementation dependent. The method chosen must satisfy some basic requirements: 1. The cookie must depend on the specific parties. This prevents an attacker from obtaining a cookie using a real IP address and UDP port, and then using it to swamp the victim with requests from randomly chosen IP addresses or ports. 2. It must not be possible for anyone other than the issuing entity to generate cookies that will be accepted by that entity. This implies that the issuing entity must use local secret information in the generation and subsequent verification of a cookie. It must not be possible to deduce this secret information from any particular cookie. 3. The cookie generation and verification methods must be fast to thwart attacks intended to sabotage CPU resources. A recommended technique is to calculate a cryptographic hashing function (such as MD5) over the IP Source and Destination addresses, the UDP Source and Destination ports, and a locally generated secret random value. An incoming cookie can be verified at any time by regenerating it locally from values contained in the incoming IP datagram and the local secret random value. Initiator The Initiator secret random value that affects the cookie SHOULD change for each new Photuris exchange, and is thereafter internally cached on a per Responder basis. This provides improved synchronization and protection against replay attacks. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 20] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 An alternative is to cache the cookie instead of the secret value. Incoming cookies can be compared directly without the computational cost of regeneration. Responder The Responder secret random value MAY remain the same for many different Initiators. Instead, this secret SHOULD be changed whenever the Responder Exchange-Value is changed. During the initial Cookie Exchange, the Responder regenerates its cookie for validation. The cookie is not cached per Initiator to avoid saving state during the initial Cookie Exchange. Once the Exchange_Request is received, both Initiator and Responder cookies are cached to identify the exchange. 4. Value Exchange On receipt of a valid Cookie_Response, the Initiator chooses an | appropriate exchange-scheme and Exchange-Value, and sends an Exchange_Request. Later Cookie_Responses from the same Responder are silently discarded, until a new Cookie_Request is sent. The Initiator also starts a retransmission timer. If no valid Exchange_Response is obtained within the time limit, the same Exchange_Request is retransmitted. On receipt of an Exchange_Request, the Responder validates the Responder-Cookie and the Scheme-Choice. Whenever an invalid/expired cookie or scheme is detected by the Responder, an Error_Message is sent, and the message is discarded. When a valid Exchange_Request has been received, the Responder | chooses an appropriate Exchange-Value for the indicated scheme, and sends an Exchange_Response. The Responder keeps a copy of the incoming Exchange_Request values, and its Exchange_Response. If a duplicate Exchange_Request is received, it merely resends its previous Exchange_Response, and takes no further action. Implementation Notes: At this time, the Responder begins calculation of the shared- secret. This may take a substantial amount of time. The implementor should ensure that retransmission is not blocked by this calculation. This is not usually a problem, as Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 21] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 retransmission timeouts typically exceed calculation time. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 22] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 4.1. Exchange_Request +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Initiator-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Responder-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Reserved | Scheme-Choice | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Initiator-Exchange-Value ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Initiator-Offered-Attributes ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- Initiator-Cookie 16 octets. Copied from the Cookie_Response. Responder-Cookie 16 octets. Copied from the Cookie_Response. Type 2 Reserved one octet. For future use; MUST be set to zero when transmitted, and MUST be ignored when received. Scheme-Choice two octets. A value selected by the Initiator from the list of Offered-Schemes in the Cookie_Response. Initiator-Exchange-Value variable precision number. Provided by the Initiator for calculating a shared-secret between the parties. The format is indicated by the Scheme-Choice. The field may be any integral number of octets in length, as indicated by its Size field. It does not require any particular alignment. The 32-bit alignment shown is for convenience in the illustration. Initiator-Offered-Attributes Six or more octets. A list of three (mandatory) or | more Security Parameter attributes supported by the Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 23] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Initiator, in increasing order of preference. This list includes all attributes supported by the Initiator. Each Responder "-Choice" selects from this list. The formats are specified in the "Attribute List" Appendix, where mandatory attributes are also specified. The end of the list is indicated by the UDP Length. Design Notes: Having the scheme chosen by the Initiator allows the greatest protocol flexibility, and follows the requirement that no state be kept by the Responder until the shared-secret is calculated. Unfortunately, this allows the weakest scheme to be chosen by an attacker. This is no worse than the alternative: to have the Responder choose from weak schemes offered by the Initiator. 4.2. Exchange_Response +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Initiator-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Responder-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Reserved | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Responder-Exchange-Value ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Responder-Offered-Attributes ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- Initiator-Cookie 16 octets. Copied from the Exchange_Request. Responder-Cookie 16 octets. Copied from the Exchange_Request. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 24] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Type 3 Reserved Three octets. For future use; MUST be set to zero | when transmitted, and MUST be ignored when received. * Responder-Exchange-Value variable precision number. Provided by the Responder for calculating a shared-secret between the parties. The format is indicated by the Scheme-Choice. The field may be any integral number of octets in length, as indicated by its Size field. It does not require any particular alignment. The 32-bit alignment shown is for convenience in the illustration. Responder-Offered-Attributes Six or more octets. A list of three (mandatory) or | more Security Parameter attributes supported by the Responder, in increasing order of preference. This list includes all attributes supported by the Responder. Each Initiator "-Choice" selects from this list. The formats are specified in the "Attribute List" Appendix, where mandatory attributes are also specified. The end of the list is indicated by the UDP Length. 5. Identification Exchange * On receipt of a valid Exchange_Response, the Initiator begins its parallel computation of the shared-secret. When the Initiator completes computation, it sends an Identification_Message to the Responder. The Initiator also starts a retransmission timer. If no Identification_Message response is obtained within the time limit, the same Identification_Message request is retransmitted. When the Responder completes its parallel computation of the shared- secret, and upon receipt of a valid Identification_Message, it sends an Identification_Message to the Initiator. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 25] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 The Responder keeps a copy of the incoming Identification_Message values, and its Identification_Message. If a duplicate Identification_Message is received, it merely resends its previous Identification_Message, and takes no further action. Whenever an invalid/expired cookie or attribute is detected by the receiver, an Error_Message is sent, and the message is discarded. Implementation Notes: Calculation of the shared-secret by the Initiator and Responder is executed in parallel to minimize delay. The exchange-scheme, Exchange-Values, and resulting shared-secret | MAY be cached in short-term storage for the Exchange LifeTime. When repetitive Photuris exchanges occur between the same parties, | and the Exchange-Values are discovered to be unchanged, the cached shared-secret can be used to rapidly generate new session-keys. | The paranoid operator will have a fairly short Exchange LifeTime, | but it SHOULD NOT be zero, to protect against resource clogging | (described earlier). Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 26] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 5.1. Identification_Message +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Initiator-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Responder-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | LifeTime | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Security-Parameter-Index | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Identity-Choice | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | | ~ Identification ~ | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Verification ~ | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Attribute-Choices ... | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ... Padding | Pad Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Initiator-Cookie 16 octets. Copied from the Exchange_Request. Responder-Cookie 16 octets. Copied from the Exchange_Request. Type 4 LifeTime three octets. The number of seconds remaining before the indicated SPI expires. Must be greater than zero. Security-Parameter-Index four octets. The SPI to be used for incoming communications. Identity-Choice Two or more octets. An identity attribute is | selected from the list of Offered-Attributes sent by the peer, and is used to calculate the Verification. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 27] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 The field may be any integral number of octets in * length, as indicated by its Length field. It does not require any particular alignment. The 16-bit alignment shown is for convenience in the illustration. | Identification Zero or more octets. The content is specified by | the Identity-Choice attribute. The field may be any integral number of octets in length. It does not require any particular alignment. The 32-bit alignment shown is for convenience in the illustration. Verification variable precision number. The content is specified by the Identity-Choice attribute. The field may be any integral number of octets in length, as indicated by its Size field. It does not require any particular alignment. The 32-bit alignment shown is for convenience in the illustration. * Attribute-Choices Two or more octets. A list of one or more | attributes for this SPI, selected from the list of Attributes supported by the peer. The formats are specified in the "Attribute List" Appendix. The end of the list is indicated by the UDP Length minus the Pad Length and Padding. Padding Zero or more octets. Prior to encryption, it is | filled with unspecified implementation dependent (preferably random) values, to align the Pad Length field at a boundary appropriate to the Privacy- | Method. After decryption, it MUST be ignored. Pad Length one octet. The size of the Padding field in octets. It does not include the Pad Length fields. The value typically ranges from 0 to 7, but may be up to 255 to permit hiding of the actual data length. This field is always present, even though no | Privacy-Method is specified or no Padding is required. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 28] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 This field is opaque. That is, the value is set prior to encryption, and is examined only after decryption. 5.2. Shared-Secret | The shared-secret is used in a number of calculations. Regardless of | the internal representation of the shared-secret, when used in | calculations it is in the same form as the Value part of a Variable | Precision Number: | - most significant octet first. | - bits used are right justified within octet boundaries. | - any unused bits are in the most significant octet. | - unused bits are zero filled. | 5.3. Privacy * This message is encrypted using the Privacy-Method indicated by the | current Scheme-Choice. It is separate from any encryption specified | for Security Associations (see "Exchange Scheme List" Appendix). The fields protected, the length of the Padding (if any), and other | details are described for each Privacy-Method. See the "Attribute List" Appendix for details. The Privacy-Method specified key generation cryptographic hash is | used to create a special privacy session-key. This hash is | calculated over the following concatenated values: + the computed shared-secret, + the Initiator Cookie, | + the Responder Cookie, | + the SPI Owner (receiver) Exchange-Value, + the SPI User (sender) Exchange-Value, + the computed shared-secret again. * Since the order of the Exchange-Value fields is different in each | direction, the resulting privacy session-key will usually be different in each direction. | Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 29] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Implementation Notes: | This Privacy-Method is used to protect both | Identification_Messages and Change_Messages. | The chosen algorithm need not provide integrity, as sufficient | integrity is provided by the Identity Verification. 5.4. Identity Verification | The two parties now verify the identities received. The indicated | Identity-Choice method is calculated over the following concatenated | values: + the computed shared-secret, + the Offered-Schemes, + the SPI Owner (receiver) Exchange-Value, + the SPI User (sender) Exchange-Value, + the SPI Owner (receiver) Offered-Attributes, + the SPI User (sender) Offered-Attributes, + the Type, LifeTime and SPI, + the Identification (see notes below), + the Attribute-Choices following the Verification field, | + the authentication secret-key (if any), + the computed shared-secret again. Note that the order of the Exchange-Value and Offered-Attribute | fields is different in each direction. The SPI and Identification | fields are also likely to be different in each direction. If identity verification fails, the users are notified, an Error_Message is sent, and the Security Association is destroyed. On success, normal operation begins with the authentication and/or encryption of user datagrams. Implementation Notes: Any authenticated and/or encrypted user datagrams received before the completion of identity verification can be placed on a queue pending completion of this step. If verification succeeds, the queue is processed as though the datagrams had arrived subsequent to the verification. If verification fails, the queue is discarded. The exact details of the Identification that are included in the verification calculation are dependent on the Identity-Choice. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 30] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 See the "Attribute List" Appendix for details. Each party may wish to keep their own trusted databases, such as the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) web of trust, and accept only those identities found there. Failure to find the Identification in either an internal or external database results in the same Error_Message as failure of the verification computation. As previously noted, the purpose of verification is to protect against an insertion or modification attack. To provide anonymity for mobile nodes, the identity is not coupled with or restricted to any particular IP address. Each party implements local policy that determines what access, if any, is granted to the holder of a particular identity. For example, the party might allow anonymous FTP, but prohibit Telnet. Such policy considerations are outside the scope of this document. 5.5. Session-Key Computation Each Security Association SPI has one or more session-keys. These | keys are generated based on the attributes of the Security | Association. See the "Attribute List" Appendix for details. | The Attribute-Choice specified key generation cryptographic hash is | used to create a SPI session-key for that particular attribute. This | hash is calculated over the following concatenated values: + the computed shared-secret, + the Initiator Cookie, | + the Responder Cookie, | + the SPI Owner (receiver) Identity Verification, + the SPI User (sender) Identity Verification, + the SPI, * + the computed shared-secret again. Since the order of the Identity Verification fields is different in | each direction, and the SPI is likely to be different in each | direction, the resulting session-key will usually be different in each direction. Implementation Notes: | Inclusion of the Cookie and Verification fields together with the | SPI allows reuse of the same Exchange-Values and resulting | shared-secret among several parties and multiple users of the same node without generating the same session-keys. | Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 31] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 When both authentication and encryption attributes are used for | the same SPI, and such attributes use different key generation | hashing algorithms, there may be multiple session-keys associated | with the same SPI. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 32] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 6. Other Message Types The need for these messages has been indicated in previous processing descriptions. Details of use follow each message. 6.1. Change_Message +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Initiator-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Responder-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | LifeTime | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Security-Parameter-Index | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | * ~ Verification ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Attribute-Choices ... | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ... Padding | Pad Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Initiator-Cookie 16 octets. Copied from the Exchange_Request. Responder-Cookie 16 octets. Copied from the Exchange_Request. Type 5 LifeTime three octets. The number of seconds remaining before the indicated SPI expires. The value zero indicates deletion of the indicated SPI. Security-Parameter-Index four octets. The SPI to be used for incoming communications. This may be a new SPI value (for creation), or an existing SPI value (for deletion). The value zero indicates all old SPIs for this IP Destination (typically used for deletion). * Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 33] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Verification variable precision number. The calculation of the * value is described in the Verification section. The field may be any integral number of octets in length, as indicated by its Size field. It does not require any particular alignment. The 32-bit alignment shown is for convenience in the illustration. * Attribute-Choices Two or more octets. A list of one or more | attributes for this SPI, selected from the list of Attributes supported by the peer. The formats are specified in the "Attribute List" Appendix. The end of the list is indicated by the UDP Length minus the Pad Length and Padding. Padding Zero or more octets. Prior to encryption, it is | filled with unspecified implementation dependent (preferably random) values, to align the Pad Length field at a boundary appropriate to the Privacy- | Method. After decryption, it MUST be ignored. Pad Length one octet. The size of the Padding field in octets. It does not include the Pad Length fields. The value typically ranges from 0 to 7, but may be up to 255 to permit hiding of the actual data length. This field is always present, even though no | Privacy-Method is specified or no Padding is required. This field is opaque. That is, the value is set prior to encryption, and is examined only after decryption. At any time after completion of the Identification Exchange, either party can send a Change_Message. The message has effect in only one direction, from the SPI Owner to the SPI User. This message is required to be encrypted for privacy in the same | fashion specified for the Identification_Messages. Whenever an invalid/expired cookie or attribute is detected by the receiver, an Error_Message is sent, and the message is discarded. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 34] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 6.1.1. Creation This message can be used to create a new Security Association. Frequently, this message is used to create a separate authentication SPI when the initial SPI was used for encryption. In addition, this message allows more rapid SPI creation for high bandwidth applications. The messages flow in the opposite direction from the primary traffic flow. The new session-keys are calculated in the same fashion as the | Identification_Message. Since the SPI value is always different than any previous SPI during the lifetime of the shared-secret, the | resulting session-keys will necessarily be different from all others used in the same direction. When the peer's cookie or public-value has expired, it will send an Error_Message response. When the peer finds that too many SPI values are already in use for this party, or some other resource limit is reached, it will send an Error_Message response. No retransmission timer is necessary. Success is indicated by the peer use of the new SPI. Should all creation attempts fail, eventually the peer will find that all existing SPIs have expired, and will begin the Photuris exchange again from the Cookie_Request. 6.1.2. Deletion This message can be used to delete existing Security Associations. This is especially useful when all associations need deletion, such as when the application that needed them terminates. No retransmission timer is necessary. This message is advisory, to reduce the number of ICMP Security Failures messages. Should any deletion attempts fail, the peer will learn that the deleted SPIs are invalid through the normal ICMP Security Failures messages, and will begin the Photuris exchange again from the Cookie_Request. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 35] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 6.1.3. Modification This message cannot be used to modify existing Security Associations, such as lengthen an existing SPI LifeTime, resurrect an expired SPI, * or add or remove an Attribute-Choice. On receipt, such an otherwise valid message is silently discarded. 6.1.4. Privacy | This message is encrypted in the same fashion specified for the | Identification_Messages. | 6.1.5. Integrity Verification This message is authenticated using the Validity-Method indicated by | the current Scheme-Choice. It is separate from any authentication | specified for Security Associations (see "Exchange Scheme List" | Appendix). The Validity-Method specified cryptographic hash is calculated over | the following concatenated values: + the computed shared-secret, + the Initiator Cookie, | + the Responder Cookie, | + the SPI Owner (receiver) Identity Verification, + the SPI User (sender) Identity Verification, + the Type, LifeTime and SPI, | + the Attribute-Choices following the Verification field, | + the computed shared-secret again. Note that the order of the Identity Verification fields is different | in each direction. If the verification fails, the users are notified, and an Error_Message is sent, without adding or deleting any Security Associations. On success, normal operation begins with the authentication and/or encryption of user datagrams. Implementation Notes: Unlike the computationally intensive Identification Exchange, this | message requires independent verification of integrity when not | inherently provided by the Privacy-Method, to prevent malicious | forgery of Security Attributes. | Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 36] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 The Verification value is calculated prior to encryption for privacy, and verified after decryption. The Verification value is different from the SPI session-key that * is created. However, the initial octets of the concatenated values are the same, and the implementor may save some calculation effort when the generating methods are the same. As usual, the Cookies are checked first before performing | decryption and checking the Verification. This Verification re- | checks the Cookies again. Separate external and internal verification of the expected Cookies prevents clogging by replay of earlier Change_Messages. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 37] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 6.2. Error_Message +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Initiator-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ Responder-Cookie ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Code | Attributes-Needed ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- Initiator-Cookie 16 octets. Copied from the offending message. Responder-Cookie 16 octets. Copied from the offending message. Type 7 Code Indicates the problem: 0 implementation error 1 invalid/expired 2 resource limit 3 verification failure 4 need attributes Attributes-Needed variable. A list of zero or more attributes (for Code 4). The formats are specified in the "Attribute List" Appendix. The end of the list is indicated by the UDP Length. Issued in response to Photuris state loss or other problems. The message has effect in only one direction. No retransmission timer is necessary. This message is not encrypted for privacy in the fashion described for the Identification_Message. The receiver checks the Cookies for validity. Invalid messages are silently discarded. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 38] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 6.2.1. Implementation Error This Error_Message Code is sent when a scheme or an attribute is received which was not offered, or is not allowed for the feature specified. When this Code is received, the implementation SHOULD log the occurance, and notify an operator as appropriate. 6.2.2. Invalid/Expired This Error_Message Code is sent when certain Photuris messages are received (as indicated in their accompanying description), and the receiver's cookie is invalid or the associated public-value has expired. When this Code is received, which was not itself discarded for invalid/expired Cookies, the shared-secret and other state between the parties is purged, and a new Cookie_Request is sent instead. However, existing SPIs are not deleted. They expire normally, and are purged sometime later. 6.2.3. Resource Limit This Error_Message Code is sent when a Cookie_Request or Change_Message is received, and too many SPI values are already in use for that peer, or some other Photuris resource is unavailable. When this Code is received, the party SHOULD NOT instantiate another SPI until it has deleted an existing SPI, or waited for a cached SPI entry to expire. 6.2.4. Verification Failure This Error_Message Code is sent when an Identification_Message or Change_Message is received, and verification fails. When this Code is received, the implementation SHOULD log the occurance, and notify an operator as appropriate. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 39] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 6.2.5. Need Attributes This Error_Message Code is sent when a party needs particular attributes for a datagram (such as encryption), and the peer has not yet created a Security Association (SPI) that has those attributes. The missing attributes are included in the Error_Message. When this Code is received, the party SHOULD send a Change_Message that includes the necessary attributes. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 40] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 7. Public Value Exchanges Photuris is based on public-key cryptography, specifically Diffie- Hellman key exchange. Exchange of D-H Exchange-Values based on | private/secret values results in a mutual shared-secret between the parties. This shared-secret can be used on its own, or to generate a series of session-keys for authentication and encryption of subsequent traffic. Widespread deployment and use of an Internet Security protocol is possible without public-key cryptography. For example, Kerberos [RFC-1510] can generate host-pair keys for use in Internet Security, much as it now generates session-keys for use by encrypted telnet and other "kerberized" applications. The Kerberos model has some widely recognized drawbacks. Foremost is the requirement for a highly available on-line Key Distribution Center (KDC), with a database containing every principal's secret- key. This carries significant security risks. Public-key cryptography enables decentralization. Entities generate session-keys without real-time communication with any other party. This draft assumes familiarity with the Diffie-Hellman public-key algorithm. A good description can be found in [Schneier94]. 7.1. Perfect Forward Secrecy Many security breaches in cryptographic systems have been facilitated by designs that generate traffic-encrypting keys (or their equivalents) well before they are needed, and then keep them around longer than necessary. This creates many opportunities for compromise, especially by insiders. A carefully designed public-key system can avoid this problem. The rule is to avoid using any long-lived keys (such as an RSA key- pair) to encrypt session-keys or actual traffic. Such keys should be used solely for authentication purposes. All keys for traffic encryption should be randomly generated immediately before use, and then destroyed immediately after use, so that they cannot be recovered. The keys should not be based on the values of any previous keys, or any other long-lived stored information. The Photuris exchange messages can provide perfect forward secrecy, as defined by Diffie [Diffie90], using a combination of Diffie- Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 41] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Hellman (for key exchange) and authentication, as follows: 1. Agree on a shared-secret using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. 2. Authenticate the Diffie-Hellman exchanges. This authenticates the parties to each other, thwarting the "man in the middle" active attack against Diffie-Hellman. When the shared-secret generated in step 1 is eventually destroyed, it is unrecoverable. Theft of the private/secret key used to sign the exchanges in step 2 would allow the thief to impersonate the party in future conversations, but it would not decode any past traffic that might have been recorded. 7.2. Modular Exponentiation Groups The original Diffie-Hellman technique specified modular exponentiation. An Exchange-Value is generated using a generator | (g), raised to a private/secret exponent (x), modulo a prime (p). (g**x) mod p When two of these values are exchanged between parties, the parties can calculate a shared-secret value between themselves. Each modular exponentiation prime (p) must have the property that both p and (p-1)/2 are prime. A small set of such recommended strong primes for use as Photuris moduli are specified. The prime moduli used will be well-known, and embedded in the implementations. Use of a very limited number of moduli has one minor and two very significant advantages: Overhead Trivially avoids sending the full modulus. Prime and Generator Pair Selection Discovery of strong primes is extremely computationally intensive, and practically impossible for commercially available processors to find in a reasonable interactive time. Verification can take hours or days. The generator (g) should be chosen such that the secret exponents Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 42] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 will generate all possible public exponential values, evenly distributed throughout the range, without cycling through a smaller subset. Such a generator is called a "primitive root" (which is trivial to find when p is strong). When the strong prime and generator pair are well chosen, the difficulty of a discrete log attack is maximized. By choosing the pairs in advance, analysis of the pair characteristics is possible. This analysis can promote confidence in the security of the implementations. Precomputation Each party can precompute the D-H Exchange-Value. | A background process can periodically destroy the old values, generate a new random secret exponent, and recalculate the | Exchange-Value. This limits the exposure of both the secret exponent and shared-secret, as past secrets are not kept for possible discovery by a future intrusion, protecting earlier communications. Also, the secret exponent currently in use is less likely to be anticipated, as the element of random timing is introduced. Since these operations involve several time-consuming modular exponentiations, moving them to the "background" substantially speeds up the apparent execution speed of the Photuris protocol. It also reduces CPU loading sufficiently to allow a single public/private key-pair to be used in several closely spaced Photuris executions, when creating Security Associations with several different hosts over a short period of time. Other precomputation suggestions are described in [BGMW93]. 7.2.1. Moduli Strengths The cryptographic strength (resistance to discovery of the shared- secret) of modular exponentiation directly depends on the length of the prime moduli. Unfortunately, considerable additional length is needed for a few more bits of strength. The difficulty of finding the calculated shared-secret has long been presumed to be the same complexity as factoring an integer of the same size which is the product of two large primes: e ** ((ln p)**1/2 * (ln (ln p))**1/2) Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 43] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 More recent work (number field sieve) estimates that for large numbers the strength may approach an equivalent of: e ** (1.93 * (ln p)**1/3 * (ln (ln p))**2/3) This is significantly smaller, and raises questions about how much longer modular exponentiation will be a viable key exchange technique. There is another long-term problem with use of well-known moduli. The discrete logarithms for small(-ish) primes in the modulus field need only be calculated once, and the results can be combined to easily determine all past recorded shared-secret exchanges and all subsequent shared-secrets. Design Notes: The pessimistic estimates given for modular exponentiation in the | "Exchange Scheme List" Appendix are based on the number field | sieve. | The number field sieve formula is still theoretical. Experimental results can be used to estimate a time constant that should be applied to the formula in order to fit the formula to actual execution times. | The relevant data point for this document is that a 400-bit number can be factored in 250 MIPS years; this result is recent (circa 1995). This yields an estimate of the time constant at roughly 1.5 * 10**-15 MIPS years. These calculations yield an estimate of 30,000 MIPS years for | 512-bit moduli. Current processing power could produce the | discrete logarithm tables for any well-known 512-bit modulus in | about a year. This is unacceptable. | The estimate rises to 2.5*10**11 MIPS years for 1024-bit moduli. | This is considered sufficient to be infeasable to compute the discrete logarithm tables for any single well-known moduli within a decade. Ideally, cooperating parties will also use their own moduli. | Additional well-known moduli can be added at any time. Should any particular moduli be compromised, a vast number of alternatives may be easily substituted. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 44] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 7.2.2. Exponent Selection The cryptographic strength of the shared-secret is also dependent on | the work factor of solving for the randomly chosen secret exponents. Revealing the exponent(s) of either party will unravel the shared- secret. Each party depends upon the other to provide sufficiently strong exponents. There is surprisingly little guidance in the literature about the length of the secret exponents. The size of these exponents dramatically affects the speed of modular exponentiation. It is desirable to use the smallest random exponent that is consistent with good security. The exponent 0 will generate the public value 1, and exponent 1 will generate the public value g mod p. These exponents do not qualify as secret. The most conservative advice received to date [Hellman95] is to make the random exponents twice as long as the strength required of the intended session-key. This ensures that any space/time "meet in the middle" attack on the discrete logarithm problem will be at least as complex as a brute-force search on the resulting session-key space. Implementation Notes: A single modular exponentiation on a 486-66DX2 processor using RSAREF and Borland C under MS-DOS took 20 seconds with a 1024-bit prime modulus and a 1024-bit random exponent. This dropped to about 1 to 1.5 seconds when the random exponent was shortened to 128 bits, with the same 1024-bit modulus. The size of the exponent is entirely implementation dependent, is unknown to the other party, and can be easily changed. 7.3. Elliptic Curve Groups The points on an elliptic curve form a group under addition. This group can be used as the basis for the efficient implementation of the Diffie-Hellman operations. To uniquely specify the computation, the implementor must know the finite field for representation of the point coordinates, the elliptic curve, and the generator. The elliptic curve "addition" formulas are more complicated than straight-forward component-wise addition, and the use of finite fields further complicates the description of the algorithms. A good reference for a succinct description of elliptic curves with finite Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 45] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 fields is [P1363]; a more general treatment can be found in [Menezes]. A treatise on efficient software implementation is in [Schroeppel]. Note that while the literature uses the term "addition" for the group operation, it is directly analogous to "multiplication" in modular exponentiation groups. Thus, the analogous term for "g**r" is "r*g" (that is, the scalar multiple r of g). The generator is specified as the (x,y) coordinates of an elliptic curve point, and the representation of x and y is given with respect to a finite field. Multiples of the generator are (x,y) pairs. Thus, the Initiator and Responder Exchange-Values are to be interpreted as two concatenated bit values in the order (x,y). The lengths of the coordinates are implicit in the specification of the field. The field representation is uniquely determined by the irreducible polynomial specified in the group description. See the "Exchange Scheme List" Appendix for details. The principle advantage enjoyed by use of these elliptic curves is that calculation times are significantly reduced compared to modular exponentiation of the same cryptographic strength. The advantage of elliptic curves becomes more pronounced as the length of the shared- secret increases. Use of a very limited number of fields has similar advantages to those cited for modular exponentiation: reduced overhead, field and generator selection, and precomputation of the Exchange-Values. It | also allows great latitude in code optimization. Overhead Avoids sending the several polynomial parameters. Field Selection Discovery of elliptic curves with a large prime divisor is extremely computationally intensive, and practically impossible for commercially available processors to find in a reasonable interactive time. Verification can take days or weeks. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 46] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 7.3.1. Field Strengths Although analysis is still in early stages, it appears that elliptic curves do not suffer some limitations of modular exponentiation. The Diffie-Hellman algorithm, when implemented over elliptic curve groups, is not subject to the index calculus attack that leads to the equivalence of the difficulty of factoring with the difficulty of solving modular exponentiation. This means that elliptic curve groups have an overall strength that is equal to one half of the log of the group size. Increasing the length of the parameters appears to have a proportional improvement in cryptographic strength. 7.3.2. Exponent Selection As in modular exponentiation, the cryptographic strength of the shared-secret is also dependent on the work factor of solving for the | randomly chosen secret exponents. Unlike modular exponentiation, the size of the exponents does not dominate the speed of calculating the elliptic curve groups. The lengths of the randomly chosen secret exponents are usually the | same as the number of bits in the generated keying material. This is twice as long as the resulting overall strength. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 47] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 A. Exchange Scheme List Up-to-date values for the Exchange Schemes are specified in the most | recent "Assigned Numbers" [RFC-1700]. Implementors wishing a number | indicated as "unassigned" MUST request the number from IANA. Initial | values are assigned as follows: (0) Reserved. (1) Implementation Optional. Elliptic curve: curve: y^2 + xy = x^3 + 0x7338F generator: (0x7B, 0x1C8) irreducible polynomial: u^155 + u^62 + 1 Provides 155 bits of keying material (in 160 bits). The cryptographic strength is currently estimated to be equivalent to 155/2 bits. The x and y coordinates are 155 significant bits each (310 bits total). Exponent lengths are always 155 | bits each. The Identification_Message and Change_Message Privacy-Method is | DES-CBC-64. | The Change_Message Validity-Method is MD5. | Supplied by Hilarie Orman . (2) Implementation Required. Modular Exponentiation using a 1024- bit strong prime (p), expressed in hex: 97f6 4261 cab5 05dd 2828 e13f 1d68 b6d3 dbd0 f313 047f 40e8 56da 58cb 13b8 a1bf 2b78 3a4c 6d59 d5f9 2afc 6cff 3d69 3f78 b23d 4f31 60a9 502e 3efa f7ab 5e1a d5a6 5e55 4313 828d a83b 9ff2 d941 dee9 5689 fada ea09 36ad df19 71fe 635b 20af 4703 6460 3c2d e059 f54b 650a d8fa 0cf7 0121 c747 99d7 5871 32be 9b99 9bb9 b787 e8ab The recommended generator (g) for this prime is 2. Provides 1024 bits of keying material. The cryptographic strength is currently estimated to be equivalent to 86 bits (pessimistic) through 98 bits (optimistic). Exponent lengths of 196 to 256 bits are recommended. * Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 48] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 The Identification_Message and Change_Message Privacy-Method is | DES-CBC-64. The Change_Message Validity-Method is MD5. | This prime modulus was randomly generated by a freely available | program written by Phil Karn, verified using the | mpz_probab_prime() function Miller-Rabin test in the Gnu Math | Package (GMP) version 1.3.2; and also verified with GMP on | other platforms by Wei Dai and Frank A Stevenson, as well as | independently developed test libraries by Eric Young (Miller- | Rabin test), and Rich Schroeppel (complete Elliptic Curve | test). | (3) Moduli-indices of 3 to 8 are currently reserved, and are | specified in a companion document. | (9) Moduli-indices of 9 to 255 are currently unassigned. (256) Moduli-indices of 256 to 65535 are available for cooperating | parties to indicate private schemes. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 49] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 B. Attribute List Up-to-date values for the Attribute Type are specified in the most | recent "Assigned Numbers" [RFC-1700]. Implementors wishing a number indicated as "unassigned" MUST request the number from IANA. Initial values are assigned as follows: A I Type | 0 padding | 1 reserved | + + 2 MD2 | 3 reserved | + + 4 MD4 | * * 5 MD5 | + + 6 SHA | 7-11 unassigned (hashing) | + 12 RC2 | 13 reserved | + 14 RC4 | + 15 RC5 | + 16 DES-CBC, 0-bit IV | * 17 DES-CBC, 32-bit IV | * 18 DES-CBC, 64-bit IV | 19 reserved | + 20 Triple DES-CBC, 0-bit IV | + 21 Triple DES-CBC, 32-bit IV | + 22 Triple DES-CBC, 64-bit IV | 23 reserved | + 24 IDEA | + 25 DSS | + 26 PKCS | + 27 DNS-SIG certificate | + 28 PGP certificate | + 29 X.509 certificate chain | 30-31 unassigned (certificates) | + 32 Sensitivity Label | + 33 VJ Header Compression | + 34 LZ77 | + 35 Stac LZS | + 36 AH-Sequence | 37-254 unassigned | x x 255 Organizational | A Initiator/Responder Attribute-Choice | I Identity-Choice | * mandatory algorithm must be supported | + feature must be supported | when algorithm optionally supported | Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 50] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 x feature may be supported | when algorithm optionally supported | Attributes that are required to be supported are included in this document. Other attributes are specified in companion documents. | B.1. Padding | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Type 0 | Each attribute may have value fields that are multiple octets. To facilitate processing efficiency, these fields are aligned on | integral modulo 8 octet (64-bit) boundaries. Padding is accomplished by insertion of 1 to 7 Type 0 padding | octets before the attribute that needs alignment. No padding is used after the final attribute in a list. B.2. MD5 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Type 5 | Length 0 The selected Exchange Scheme SHOULD provide at least 64-bits of | cryptographic strength. Attribute-Choice * When selected as an Initiator or Responder Attribute-Choice, pursuant to [RFC-1828], MD5 is also used as the key generation | cryptographic hash for generating the SPI session-key. All | 128-bits of the generated hash are used for the key. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 51] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Identity-Choice | When selected as an Identity-Choice, the resulting Verification field is 128-bits (18 octets including Size). The MD5 hash is calculated as described in "Identity Verification". The authentication secret-key (as specified) is selected based on the contents of the Identification field. The Identification field contains a variable precision number. Valid Identifications and secret-keys are preconfigured by the parties. There is no required format or content for the Identification value. The value may be a number or string of any kind. Typically, the Identification is a user name, a Fully Qualified Domain Name, or an email address which contains a user name and a domain name. Examples include: user node.site. user@node.site. rcmd@node.site. There is no requirement that the domain name match any of the particular IP addresses in use by the parties. Validity-Method | When selected as a Validity-Method, the resulting Verification field | is 128-bits (18 octets including Size). The hash is calculated as described in "Change Verification". The leading shared-secret is not padded to any particular alignment. B.3. DES-CBC +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Type 16, 17 or 18 | Length 0 The selected Exchange Scheme SHOULD provide at least 56-bits of | Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 52] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 cryptographic strength. | Attribute-Choice When selected as an Initiator or Responder Attribute-Choice, pursuant to [RFC-1829], MD5 is used as the key generation | cryptographic hash for generating the SPI session-key. The most | significant 64-bits of the generated hash are used for the key. | The least significant bit of each octet is ignored (or set to | parity). Privacy-Method | When selected as a Privacy-Method, MD5 is used as the key generation | cryptographic hash for generating the privacy session-key. The most | significant 64-bits of the generated hash are used for the key. The | least significant bit of each octet is ignored (or set to parity). The 64-bit Initialization Vector (IV) is set to the Type, LifeTime, * and SPI fields. Encryption begins with the next field, and continues to the end of the data indicated by the UDP Length. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 53] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 B.4. Organizational +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | OUI +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ... | Kind | Value(s) ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Type 255 Length >= 4 | When the Length is four, no Value(s) field is | present. OUI three octets. The vendor's Organizationally Unique Identifier, assigned by IEEE 802 (see [RFC-1700] for contact details). The bits within the octet are in canonical order, and the most significant octet is transmitted first. Kind one octet. Indicates a sub-type for the OUI. There is no standardization for this field. Each OUI implements its own values. Value(s) Zero or more octets. The details are implementation | specific. Some implementors might not need or want to publish their proprietary algorithms and attributes. This OUI mechanism is available to specify these without encumbering the IANA with proprietary number requests. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 54] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 C. Scenarios Herewith are a few simplified examples of exchanges. These are not intended to be overly inclusive. There are opportunities for optimization, many of which are indicated in Implementation Notes in the main text. C.1. Virtual Private Network An administrator has two networks, and wishes all traffic between them to be encrypted. The boundary routers are 1.0.0.1 and 2.0.0.2. The commands to tunnel and encrypt are added. In the former router, route addp 2.0.0.0/8 tunnel 2.0.0.2 secure 2.0.0.2 and in the latter router, route addp 1.0.0.0/8 tunnel 1.0.0.1 secure 1.0.0.1 In each router, the lazy administrator uses the same username and password, user "root" "abracadabra" When the first datagram arrives at router 1.0.0.1 destined for node 2.2.2.2, the routing table indicates that it should be encapsulated for 2.0.0.2. However, the more specific routing table entry for 2.0.0.2 indicates that security is required. None is currently available, so the encapsulated datagram is tossed in the bit-bucket, and a Photuris exchange is initiated instead. Router 1.0.0.1 selects a random number (0x1111) and a UDP port (4097). It hashes these together with its IP Source and the IP Destination, and saves the hash value as its unique cookie for this exchange. A Cookie_Request is sent to 2.0.0.2 at UDP Port 468 containing the Initiator_Cookie. Router 2.0.0.2 also generates a random number (0x2222) and saves it in a global variable. When Router 2.0.0.2 receives the Cookie_Request, it hashes the UDP Ports (4097 and 468) together with its IP Source, the IP Destination, and its global random number, and sends a Cookie_Response. The reply also indicates that only Exchange Scheme 2 is offered. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 55] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 When Router 1.0.0.1 receives (and validates) the Cookie_Response, it generates a second random number with enough bits of strength for the strongest attributes supported (default 128-bits: 0x1111...1111), and | calculates an Exchange-Value for Exchange Scheme 2. An Exchange_Request is sent to 2.0.0.2 containing the scheme and value, and offering three attributes (MD5, DES-CBC-32, DES-CBC-64). When Router 2.0.0.2 receives (and validates) the Exchange_Request, it also generates a second random number with enough bits of strength for the strongest attributes supported (default 128-bits: 0x2222...2222), calculates an Exchange-Value for Exchange Scheme 2, | and sends an Exchange_Response. The reply also indicates that the next steps will be encrypted with DES-CBC-64, as well as offering three attributes (MD5, DES-CBC-32, DES-CBC-64). Router 2.0.0.2 begins calculating the shared-secret. When Router 1.0.0.1 receives (and validates) the Exchange_Response, it also calculates the shared-secret. When Router 1.0.0.1 finishes calculating the shared-secret, it generates a third random number for its SPI (0x12345678), and indicates an appropriate LifeTime (300 seconds). It chooses a set of Attributes (MD5 and DES-CBC-32). Based on its | Identity-Choice (MD5), Identification (root), and the secret (abracadabra), it calculates a hash over the many values exchanged, and stores this in the Verification field. Then, the Type through SPI fields are used as an Initialization Vector, and DES-CBC-64 is used to encrypt the remainder of the message after the SPI. The resulting Identification_Message is sent to 2.0.0.2. When Router 2.0.0.2 receives (and validates) the Identification_Message, and finishes calculating the shared-secret, it also generates a third random number for its SPI (0xdeadbeef), indicates an appropriate LifeTime (600 seconds), and performs the same functions described above. In this example, the Identification and secret-key are the same for both parties. Note that even in the face of implementations with very poor random number generation yielding the same random numbers for both parties at every step, the calculation order of the fields is different and the verification result will have a very high probability of difference. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 56] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 C.2. Authenticated Firewall Traversal An administrator has one or more networks, and a number of mobile users. It is desirable to restrict access to authorized external users. The boundary router is 3.0.0.3. Each user adds commands to tunnel and authenticate. route addp 3.0.0.0/8 tunnel 3.0.0.3 secure 3.0.0.3 authenticate-only The administrator gives each user a different username and password, together with a separate username and password for the router. (A lazy administrator can simply give one username and password to all users for both the user and the router, as described previously.) user "wanderer" "FalDaRee" user "router" "FalDaRah" The mobile host is assigned a temporary local IP address (4.0.0.4). When the first datagram is generated destined for node 3.3.3.3, the routing table indicates that it should be encapsulated for 3.0.0.3. However, the more specific routing table entry for 3.0.0.3 indicates that authentication is required. None is currently available, so the encapsulated datagram is tossed in the bit-bucket, and a Photuris exchange is initiated instead. The Photuris exchange proceeds as previously described, except that two Identifications are involved. Router 3.0.0.3 may be configured with all the usernames permitted, or more likely will access an external database of usernames and passwords using a mechanism such as RADIUS. Even though router 3.0.0.3 includes DES-CBC-32 in its Attribute- Choices, the mobile node configuration does not require that every datagram be encrypted. That is, the specific policy of this mobile node is that an AH be added whenever traffic is sent to 3.0.0.3, but that no ESP is used. In this example, the boundary router has no configured policy with respect to the mobile node. This would be difficult, as the actual IP address assignment is unpredictable. However, a serendipitous SPI has been created by the mobile node. When the router prepares to forward a datagram from inside net 3, it will discover that the routing table entry for 4.0.0.4 includes a security association. The router implementor could legitimately use Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 57] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 that SPI for AH and/or ESP in the absence of contrary policy configuration. Therefore, the mobile node must be capable of receiving encapsulated authenticated and/or encrypted traffic using its SPI. It must also be capable of receiving unauthenticated and unencrypted traffic. C.3. Automated Firewall Bypass Although the previous examples may be adequate in early stages of deployment, where many nodes have not yet been upgraded to include Internet Security, the "ultimate goal" is direct IP connectivity. This is particularly required when both nodes are mobile, and there are no fixed well-known routers between them. This will also reduce configuration, and facilitate network renumbering. Instead of relying on an administrator, the users are empowered to select their own usernames and passwords. They may change them at any time with the standard tools provided by their operating systems. (A lazy user can simply have one username and password on all systems, as described previously.) user "myself@LapTop.WhereEver" "o,WabM," user "myself@DeskTop.WhereEver" "o,WabD!" The user may find it convenient (or be required by the operating system) to use a more formal naming syntax (above), simply to keep the many accessible systems separate. When the LapTop is attempting to access the DeskTop, it may be obstructed by an intervening router acting as a firewall. This is indicated by the ICMP message Destination Unreachable: Communication Administratively Prohibited (Type 3, Code 13). The Photuris exchange proceeds as previously described, except that rather than sending to the firewall, the exchange is attempted to the actual target system first. This will work when the firewall is capable of passing Photuris datagrams, as well as AH and ESP protected datagrams. If the implementation continues to receive ICMP messages in response to the Cookie_Request, it should abandon the exchange and attempt a new Photuris exchange with the intervening router instead. This may be problematic when the router does not have a public-key form of signature available, as by definition the user has not configured the presence of this router. Such a mechanism is outside the scope of this document. Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 58] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 C.4. Multi-User Access Control In certain extremely security conscious environments, all valid users sharing a node might not have the same level of authorization. Each user or process requires its own identification and access contol. These "Multi-Level Secure" environments require two or more Photuris exchanges. These exchanges involve 4 or more entities: user "myself@SomeWhere" "mairsydotes" user "system@SomeWhere" "doesydotes" user "myself@ElseWhere" "liddellamsydivy" user "system@ElseWhere" "kiddellydivy" The first Photuris exchange might be triggered when sending a datagram from SomeWhere to ElseWhere. The Initiator would naturally use the Identification which is associated with the triggering transport-level process (myself@SomeWhere). Because Photuris is a network-level session key management protocol, the Responder Identification will be associated with the operating system which is processing the network-level exchange (system@ElseWhere). Thus, the resulting SPI could be described as myself-system-SPI:ElseWhere. Note that myself-system-SPI:ElseWhere was authenticated by the Initiator. Since authentication policy is in the receiver direction, when datagrams arrive at ElseWhere with the given SPI, the access policy will be dependent on the Initiator Identification. Likewise, when datagrams arrive at SomeWhere with system-myself- SPI:SomeWhere, the access policy will be dependent on the Responder Identification. This may not match the authorization level required for access. This is indicated by the ICMP message Security Failures: Need Authorization (Type 40, Code 5). The Responder in turn becomes the Initiator in a second exchange, and delivers the Identification which is associated with the triggering transport-level process (myself@ElseWhere), creating myself-system- SPI:SomeWhere. The peer might use its system-wide Identification (system@SomeWhere), creating system-myself-SPI:ElseWhere. When repetitive Photuris exchanges occur between the same parties, | and the Exchange-Values are discovered to be unchanged, the cached shared-secret can be used to rapidly generate new session-keys. Only myself-system-SPI:SomeWhere and myself-system-SPI:ElseWhere Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 59] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 provide user-level keying in each direction. Depending on policy, these might be the only SPIs used. C.5. Long LifeTime SPIs | In certain minimalist security environments, it may be desirable to | reduce the number of Photuris Exchanges. | For example, repeated crashes of servers will normally cause the | clients to re-initiate a Photuris Exchange as the system reboots and | comes on-line. When thousands of nodes are involved, the Photuris | Exchanges may consume a large amount of computation, effectively | lengthening the outage. | In addition, when perfect forward secrecy is not needed (such as | authenticated firewall traversal without encryption), there is no | requirement that the SPI session-key LifeTime be kept short, or | limited to a certain amount of data. | Instead, the SPI session-keys may be cached in long-term storage. | The size of the Photuris SPI LifeTime is sufficient for weeks or | months of long-term storage (2**24-1 seconds is about half a year). | This depends upon a design feature of Photuris. The SPI LifeTime is | not related to the Photuris Exchange LifeTime. That is, any | particular SPI session-key can be stored for long periods of time | without compromising other uses of the same calculated shared-secret. | Implementation Notes: | The careful reader will undoubtedly notice that this scenario is | somewhat tongue-in-cheek. Repeated crashes of servers might be | fixed by changing to a different vendor.... | The shared-secrets MUST NOT be cached to long-term storage. | Encryption session-keys MUST NOT be cached to long-term storage. | Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 60] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Security Considerations Security issues are the primary topic of this memo. The security of Photuris critically depends on the quality of the secret random numbers generated by each party. A poor random number generator at either party will compromise the shared-secret produced by the algorithm. Generating cryptographic quality random numbers on a general purpose computer without hardware assistance is a very tricky problem. In general, this requires using a cryptographic hashing function to "distill" the entropy from a large number of semi-random external events, such as the timing of key strokes. An excellent discussion can be found in [RFC-1750]. Each Photuris exchange generates a calculated shared-secret. The strength of the shared-secret is essential to the strength of the Security Associations. Discovery of the underlying shared-secret would compromise the Security Associations relying upon it. Photuris generation of session-keys involves a cryptographic hash over the shared-secret. The shared-secret is itself only indirectly used for creating those keys that actually protect session traffic. This protects the shared-secret from discovery, and allows repeated use of the shared-secret for generating multiple session-keys. Discovery of one such key should not reveal related session-keys. This use of the calculated shared-secret, for message integrity, for privacy, and for creating multiple session-keys by hashing with a new SPI, substantially depends on the quality of the chosen cryptographic hashing function(s) that generate the keys. This is mitigated by | carefully organized differences in calculation of the integrity, privacy, and SPI session-keys in each direction, and the optional * concealment of the algorithms chosen for each SPI. When an interceptor can modify or substitute another SPI, alteration of the SPI will interrupt communication, but the attacker will gain no additional information. The Verification method must not allow "message recovery", to prevent determination of the shared-secret or any long-term distributed secret-key (where applicable). More specifically, it should not be feasible to compute any of the bits of an authenticated message from the verification value. In general, where a secret (such as the shared-secret or session- Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 61] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 keys) is involved in any calculation, the algorithms selected should not reveal information about the secret, either directly or indirectly. The modular exponentiation, elliptic curve, and key generation algorithms provide a differing number of bits of keying material. It is important to distinguish the characteristics of these bits. A. The length of the shared-secret depends on the modulus or field size. B. The strength of the shared-secret depends on the modulus or field selection, and the minimum exponent length used by either party. C. The length of the generated keying material depends on the details of the key generation algorithm. D. The strength of the generated keying material depends on the strength of the shared-secret, and is limited by the length of the generated keying material itself. E. The length of the session-key used by a transform depends on the details of the transform. F. The strength of the session-key used by a transform depends on the strength of the keying material, and is limited by the length of the session-key used by the transform itself. The length of the shared-secret affects the difficulty of finding hash collisions that might reveal the shared-secret. The lengths of the shared-secret and hashing function combinations are considered sufficient to provide greater robustness than the cryptographic strength of the public-key exchange itself. That is, it is likely to be easier to find the underlying shared- secret through analysis of the Exchange-Values than to determine | collisions for a particular generated key. Use of exponents or a key generation algorithm that produces less strength than required for a selected transform results in less robust security than would otherwise be expected. Different attributes require different levels of session-key strength. Each party should offer exchange-schemes and use exponents | that provide the length and strength required for the strongest offered attribute. Once an exchange-scheme has been selected, the implementation should Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 62] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 limit attribute choices to those which need no more than the shared- secret strength provided. It is the responsibility of the implementor to choose a useful set of attributes for each Security Association, that provide the best tradeoff of security and performance for a given application. In general, when more than one attribute providing the same function is offered, the strongest algorithm should be selected. Acknowledgements Thou shalt make no law restricting the size of integers that may be multiplied together, nor the number of times that an integer may be multiplied by itself, nor the modulus by which an integer may be reduced. [Prime Commandment] Phil Karn is principally responsible for the design of the protocol phases, particularly the clogging defense, and initial internet security protocol implementation experience spanning more than 4 years. William Simpson was responsible for adding attributes, other message types, editing and formatting. All such mistakes are his responsibity. This protocol was later discovered to have many elements in common with the Station-To-Station authentication protocol, described in [DOW92]. Paul C van Oorschot suggested signing both the public exponents and * the session-key, to provide an authentication-only version of identity verification. Hilarie Orman provided text regarding elliptic curves, and extensive review of the protocol details. Randall Atkinson, James Hughes, Angelos Keromytis, Brian LaMacchia, Cheryl Madson, Perry Metzger, Ron Rivest, Rich Schroeppel, and Bill | Sommerfeld provided useful critiques of earlier versions of this document. References [BGMW93] E. Brickell, D. Gordon, K. McCurley, and D. Wilson, "Fast Exponentiation with Precomputation (Extended Abstract)", Advances in Cryptology -- EUROCRYPT '92, Lecture Notes in Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 63] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Computer Science, 658 (1993), Springer-Verlag, 200-207. [Diffie90] Whitfield Diffie, "Authenticated Key Exchange and Secure Interactive Communication", Northern Telecom, Securicom '90, Paris France, 16 March 1990. [DOW92] Whitfield Diffie, Paul C van Oorshot, Michael J Wiener, "Authentication and Authenticated Key Exchanges", Designs, Codes and Cryptography, v 2 pp 107-125, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992. [Firefly] "Photuris" is the latin name for the firefly. "Firefly" is in turn the name for the USA National Security Administration's (classified) key exchange protocol for the STU-III secure telephone. Informed speculation has it that Firefly is based on very similar design principles. [Hellman95] Martin Hellman, personal communication. [Menezes] Alfred J. Menezes, "Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptosystems", Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993. [P1363] Alfred J. Menezes, Minghua Qu, and Scott A. Vanstone, "Standard for RSA, Diffie-Hellman and Related Public Key Cryptography", Working Draft of IEEE P1363 Standard, Oct. 30, 1994. http://www.rsa.com/pub/p1363/draft/ [Prime Commandment] A derivation of an apocryphal quote from the usenet sci.crypt. [RFC-768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, August 1980. [RFC-1510] Kohl, J., Neuman, B., "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", September 1993. [RFC-1700] Reynolds, J., and Postel, J., "Assigned Numbers", STD 2, USC/Information Sciences Institute, October 1994. [RFC-1750] Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller, "Randomness Recommendations Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 64] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 for Security", December 1994. [RFC-1825] Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", Naval Research Laboratory, July 1995. [RFC-1828] Metzger, P., Simpson, W., "IP Authentication using Keyed MD5", July 1995. [RFC-1829] Karn, P., Metzger, P., Simpson, W., "The ESP DES-CBC Transform", July 1995. [Schneier94] Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography", John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, 1994. ISBN 0-471-59756-2. [Schroeppel95] R. Schroeppel, H. Orman, S. O'Malley, and O. Spatscheck, "Fast Key Exchange with Elliptic Curve Systems", Advances in Cryptology -- Crypto '95, Santa Barbara, California, August 1995. ftp://ftp.cs.arizona.edu/reports/1995/TR95-03.ps Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 65] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Author's Address(es) Questions about this memo can also be directed to: Phil Karn Qualcomm, Inc. 6455 Lusk Blvd. San Diego, California 92121-2779 karn@qualcomm.com karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org (prefered) William Allen Simpson Daydreamer Computer Systems Consulting Services 1384 Fontaine Madison Heights, Michigan 48071 Bill.Simpson@um.cc.umich.edu bsimpson@MorningStar.com (prefered) Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page 66] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 Table of Contents 1. Introduction .......................................... 1 1.1 Terminology ..................................... 2 1.2 Protocol Description ............................ 3 1.3 Clogging Defense ................................ 6 1.4 Traffic Anonymity ............................... 8 1.5 Security Parameters ............................. 9 1.6 User Support .................................... 10 1.7 Multicast Support ............................... 11 2. Protocol Details ...................................... 12 2.1 UDP ............................................. 12 2.2 Header Format ................................... 13 2.3 Exchange Schemes ................................ 13 2.4 Attributes ...................................... 14 2.5 Variable Precision Numbers ...................... 16 3. Cookie Exchange ....................................... 17 3.1 Cookie_Request .................................. 19 3.2 Cookie_Response ................................. 19 3.3 Cookie Generation ............................... 20 4. Value Exchange ........................................ 21 4.1 Exchange_Request ................................ 23 4.2 Exchange_Response ............................... 24 5. Identification Exchange ............................... 25 5.1 Identification_Message .......................... 27 5.2 Shared-Secret ...................................29 5.3 Privacy ......................................... 29 5.4 Identity Verification ........................... 30 5.5 Session-Key Computation ......................... 31 6. Other Message Types ................................... 33 6.1 Change_Message .................................. 33 6.1.1 Creation ........................................ 35 6.1.2 Deletion ........................................ 35 6.1.3 Modification .................................... 36 6.1.4 Privacy .........................................36 6.1.5 Integrity Verification .......................... 36 6.2 Error_Message ................................... 38 6.2.1 Implementation Error ............................ 39 6.2.2 Invalid/Expired ................................. 39 6.2.3 Resource Limit .................................. 39 6.2.4 Verification Failure ............................ 39 6.2.5 Need Attributes ................................. 40 Karn & Simpson expires in six months [Page ii] DRAFT Photuris November 1995 7. Public Value Exchanges ................................ 41 7.1 Perfect Forward Secrecy ......................... 41 7.2 Modular Exponentiation Groups ................... 42 7.2.1 Moduli Strengths ................................ 43 7.2.2 Exponent Selection .............................. 45 7.3 Elliptic Curve Groups ........................... 45 7.3.1 Field Strengths ................................. 47 7.3.2 Exponent Selection .............................. 47 APPENDICES ................................................... 48 A. Exchange Scheme List .................................. 48 B. Attribute List ........................................ 50 B.1 Padding ......................................51 B.2 MD5 .......................................... 51 B.3 DES-CBC ......................................... 52 B.4 Organizational .................................. 54 C. Scenarios ............................................. 55 C.1 Virtual Private Network ......................... 55 C.2 Authenticated Firewall Traversal ................ 57 C.3 Automated Firewall Bypass ....................... 58 C.4 Multi-User Access Control ....................... 59 C.5 Long LifeTime SPIs ..............................60 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ...................................... 61 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................. 63 REFERENCES ................................................... 63 AUTHOR'S ADDRESS .............................................66 |