IPCDN Internet-Draft Eugene Nechamkin Document: draft-ietf-ipcdn-pktc-mtamib-02.txt Broadcom Corp. Jean-Francois Mule CableLabs Expires: April 2004 October 2003 Multimedia Terminal Adapter (MTA) Management Information Base for PacketCable and IPCablecom compliant devices Status of this Memo Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. Abstract This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols in the Internet community. In particular, it defines a basic set of managed objects for SNMP- based management of PacketCable and IPCablecom compliant Multimedia Terminal Adapter devices. Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 1] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 Table of Contents 1. The Internet-Standard Management Framework....................2 2. Terminology...................................................3 2.1 DOCSIS....................................................3 2.2 Cable Modem...............................................3 2.3 Multimedia Terminal Adapter...............................3 2.4 Endpoint..................................................3 2.5 X.509 Certificate.........................................4 2.6 Voice Over IP.............................................4 2.7 Public Key Certificate....................................4 2.8 DHCP......................................................4 2.9 Call Management Server....................................4 2.10 CODEC, Voice Coder-Decoder...............................4 2.11 Operations Systems Support...............................4 2.12 Key Distribution Center..................................5 2.13 Security Association.....................................5 3. Overview......................................................5 3.1 Structure of the MTA MIB..................................5 3.2 pktcMtaDevBase............................................6 3.3 pktcMtaDevServer..........................................6 3.4 pktcMtaDevSecurity........................................7 3.5 Relationship between MIB Objects in the MTA MIB...........7 4. Definitions...................................................9 5. Acknowledgments..............................................40 6. Normative References.........................................41 7. Informative References.......................................42 8. Security Considerations......................................43 9. Intellectual Property........................................46 10. Authors' Addresses..........................................46 11. Full Copyright Statement....................................47 1. The Internet-Standard Management Framework For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to section 7 of RFC 3410 [RFC3410]. Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed the Management Information Base or MIB. MIB objects are generally accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the Structure of Management Information (SMI). This memo specifies a MIB module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in STD 58, RFC 2578 [RFC2578], STD 58, RFC 2579 [RFC2579] and STD 58, RFC 2580 [RFC2580]. Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 2] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 2. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL", when used in the guidelines in this memo, are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. The terms "MIB module" and "information module" are used interchangeably in this memo. As used here, both terms refer to any of the three types of information modules defined in Section 3 of RFC 2578 [RFC2578]. Some of the terms used in this memo are defined below. Some additional terms are also defined in the PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification [PKT-SP-PROV-I07-030728] and the PacketCable Security Specification [PKT-SP-SEC-I09-030728]. 2.1 DOCSIS The CableLabs(R) Certified(TM) Cable Modem project, also known as DOCSIS(R) (Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification), defines interface requirements for cable modems involved in high-speed data distribution over cable television system networks. DOCSIS also refers to the ITU-T J.112 recommendation, Annex B for cable modem systems [ITU-T-J112]. 2.2 Cable Modem A Cable Modem (CM) acts as a data transport agent used to transfer call management and voice data packets over a DOCSIS compliant cable system. 2.3 Multimedia Terminal Adapter A Multimedia Terminal Adapter (MTA) is a PacketCable or IPCablecom compliant device providing telephony services over a cable or hybrid system used to deliver video signals to a community. It contains an interface to endpoints, a network interface, CODECs, and all signaling and encapsulation functions required for Voice over IP transport, call signaling, and Quality of Service signaling. A MTA can be an embedded or a standalone device. An Embedded MTA (E- MTA) is a MTA device containing an embedded DOCSIS Cable Modem. A Standalone MTA (S-MTA) is a MTA device separated from the DOCSIS cable modem by non-DOCSIS MAC interface (e.g. Ethernet, USB). 2.4 Endpoint Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 3] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 An endpoint or MTA endpoint is a standard RJ-11 telephony physical port located on the MTA and used for attaching the telephone device to the MTA. 2.5 X.509 Certificate A X.509 certificate is an Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure certificate developed as part of the ITU-T X.500 Directory recommendations. It is defined in RFC 2459 [RFC2459]. 2.6 Voice Over IP Voice Over IP (VoIP) is a technology providing the means to transfer the digitized packets with the voice information over IP networks. 2.7 Public Key Certificate A Public Key Certificate (also known as a Digital Certificate) is a binding between an entity's public key and one or more attributes relating to its identity. 2.8 DHCP The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is defined by RFC 2131 [RFC2131]. In addition, commonly used DHCP options are defined in RFC 2132 [RFC2132]. Additional DHCP options used by PacketCable and IPCablecom MTAs can be found in the CableLabs Client Configuration DHCP specification, RFC 3495 [RFC3495]. 2.9 Call Management Server A Call Management Server (CMS) is an element of the PacketCable network infrastructure which controls audio connections between MTAs. 2.10 CODEC, COder-DECoder A Coder-DECoder is a hardware or software component used in audio/video systems to convert an analog signal to digital, and then (possibly) to compress it so that lower bandwidth telecommunications channels can be used. The signal is decompressed and converted (decoded) back to analog output by a compatible CODEC at the receiving end. 2.11 Operations Systems Support An Operations Systems Support system (OSS) is a system of back office software components used for fault, configuration, accounting, performance, and security management working in Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 4] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 interaction with each other and providing the operations support in deployed PacketCable systems. 2.12 Key Distribution Center A Key Distribution Center (KDC) is an element of the OSS systems functioning as a Kerberos Security Server providing mutual authentication of the various components of the PacketCable system (e.g. mutual authentication between a MTA and a CMS, or between a MTA and the Provisioning Server). 2.13 Security Association A Security Association (SA) is a one-way relationship between sender and receiver offering security services on the communication flow. 3. Overview This MIB module provides a set of objects required for the management of PacketCable, ETSI and ITU-T IPCablecom compliant MTA devices. The MTA MIB module is intended to supersede various MTA MIB modules from which it is partly derived: - the PacketCable 1.0 MTA MIB Specification [PKT-SP-MIB-MTA-I07-030728], - the ITU-T IPCablecom MTA MIB requirements [ITU-T-J168], - the ETSI MTA MIB [ETSI TS 101 909-8]. The ETSI MTA MIB requirements also refer to various signal characteristics defined in [EN 300 001] and [EN 300 659-1]. Several normative and informative references are used to help define MTA MIB objects. As a convention, wherever PacketCable and IPCablecom requirements are equivalent, the PacketCable reference is used in the object REFERENCE clause. IPCablecom compliant MTA devices MUST use the equivalent IPCablecom references. 3.1 Structure of the MTA MIB The MTA MIB module is identified by pktcMtaMib and is structured in three object groups: - pktcMtaDevBase defines the management information pertinent to the MTA device itself, - pktcMtaDevServer defines the management information pertinent to the provisioning back office servers, Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 5] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 - pktcMtaDevSecurity defines the management information pertinent to the PacketCable and IPCablecom security mechanisms. The first two object groups, pktcMtaDevBase and pktcMtaDevServer, contain only scalar information objects describing the corresponding characteristics of the MTA device and back office servers. The third group, pktcMtaDevSecurity, contains two tables controlling the logical associations between KDC realms and Application Servers (CMS and Provisioning Server). The rows in the various tables of the MTA MIB module can be created automatically (e.g. by the device according to the current state information) or they can be created by the management station depending on the operational situation. The tables defined in the MTA MIB module may have a mixture of both types of rows. 3.2 pktcMtaDevBase This object group contains the management information related to the MTA device itself. It also contains some objects used to control the MTA state. Some highlights are as follows: - pktcMtaDevSerialNumber, this object contains the MTA Serial Number, - pktcMtaDevEndPntCount, this object contains the number of endpoints present in the managed MTA, - pktcMtaDevProvisioningState, this object contains the information describing the completion state of the MTA initialization process, - pktcMtaDevEnabled, this object controls the administrative state of the MTA endpoints and allows operators to enable or disable telephony services on the device, - pktcMtaDevResetNow, this object is used to instruct the MTA to reset. 3.3 pktcMtaDevServer This object group contains the management information describing the back office servers and the parameters related to the communication timers. It also includes some objects controlling the initial MTA interaction with the Provisioning Server. Some highlights are as follows: - pktcMtaDevServerDhcp1, this object contains the IP address of the primary DHCP server designated for the MTA provisioning, Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 6] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 - pktcMtaDevServerDhcp2, this object contains the IP address of the secondary DHCP server designated for the MTA provisioning, - pktcMtaDevServerDns1, this object contains the IP address of the primary DNS used by the managed MTA to resolve the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) and IP addresses, - pktcMtaDevServerDns2, this object contains the IP address of the secondary DNS used by the managed MTA to resolve the FQDN and IP addresses, - pktcMtaDevConfigFile, this object contains the name of the provisioning configuration file the managed MTA must download from the Provisioning Server, - pktcMtaDevProvConfigHash, this object contains the hash value of the MTA configuration file calculated over its content. When the managed MTA downloads the file, it authenticates the configuration file using the hash value provided in this object. 3.4 pktcMtaDevSecurity This object group contains the management information describing the security related characteristics of the managed MTA. It contains two tables describing logical dependencies and parameters necessary to establish Security Associations between the MTA and other Application Servers (back office components and CMSes). The CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable) and the realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable) are used for managing the MTA signaling security. The realm table defines the CMS domains. The CMS table defines the CMS within the domains. Each MTA endpoint is associated with one CMS at any given time. The two tables in this object group are: - pktcMtaDevRealmTable, this table is used in conjunction with any Application Server that communicates securely with the managed MTA (CMS or Provisioning Server), - pktcMtaDevCmsTable, this table contains the parameters describing the SA establishment between the MTA and CMSes. 3.5 Relationship between MIB Objects in the MTA MIB This section clarifies the relationship between various MTA MIB objects with respect to the role they play in the process of establishing Security Associations. The process of Security Association establishment between a MTA and Application Servers is described in the PacketCable Security Specification [PKT-SP-SEC-I09-030728]. In particular, a MTA Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 7] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 communicates with 2 types of back office Application Servers: Call Management Servers and Provisioning Servers. The SA establishment process consists of two steps: a. Authentication Server exchange (AS-exchange): This step provides mutual authentication between the parties, i.e. between a MTA and an Authentication Server. The process of AS-exchange is defined by a number of parameters grouped per each realm. These parameters are gathered in the Realm Table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable). The Realm Table is indexed by the Index Counter and contains conceptual column with the Kerberos realm name. b. Application server exchange (AP-exchange): This step allows for the establishment of Security Associations between authenticated parties. The CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable) contains the parameters for the AP-exchange process between a MTA and a CMS. The CMS table is indexed by the Index Counter and contains the CMS FQDN (the conceptual column pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn). Each row contains the Kerberos realm name associated with each CMS FQDN. This allows for each CMS to exist in a different Kerberos realm. The MTA MIB module also contains a group of scalar MIB objects in the server group (pktcMtaDevServer). These objects define various parameters for the AP-exchange process between a MTA and the Provisioning Server. These objects are: - pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout, - pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout, - pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries, - pktcMtaDevProvSolicitedKeyTimeout. Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 8] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 4. Definitions PKTC-IETF-MTA-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, Unsigned32, NOTIFICATION-TYPE, mib-2 FROM SNMPv2-SMI RowStatus, TruthValue FROM SNMPv2-TC OBJECT-GROUP, MODULE-COMPLIANCE, NOTIFICATION-GROUP FROM SNMPv2-CONF InetAddressType, InetAddress FROM INET-ADDRESS-MIB sysDescr FROM SNMPv2-MIB SnmpAdminString FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB DocsX509ASN1DEREncodedCertificate FROM DOCS-IETF-BPI2-MIB ifPhysAddress FROM IF-MIB; pktcMtaMib MODULE-IDENTITY LAST-UPDATED "200309050000Z" -- September 05, 2003 ORGANIZATION "IETF IPCDN Working Group " CONTACT-INFO "Eugene Nechamkin Broadcom Corporation, 200-13711 International Place, Richmond, BC, V6V 2Z8 CANADA Phone: +1 604 233 8500 Fax: +1 604 233 8501 Email: enechamkin@broadcom.com Jean-Francois Mule Cable Television Laboratories, Inc. 400 Centennial Parkway, Louisville, CO 80027-1266 U.S.A. Phone: +1 303 661 9100 Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 9] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 Fax: +1 303 661 9199 Email: jf.mule@cablelabs.com IETF IPCDN Working Group General Discussion: ipcdn@ietf.org Subscribe: http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipcdn Archive: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf-mail-archive/ipcdn Co-Chair: Jean-Francois Mule, jf.mule@cablelabs.com Co-Chair: Richard Woundy, Richard_Woundy@cable.comcast.com" DESCRIPTION "This MIB module defines the basic management object for the Multimedia Terminal Adapter devices compliant with PacketCable and IPCablecom requirements. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). This version of this MIB module is part of RFC yyyy; see the RFC itself for full legal notices." -- RFC Ed: replace yyyy with actual RFC number and remove this note REVISION "200309050000Z" DESCRIPTION "Initial version, published as RFC yyyy." -- RFC Ed: replace yyyy with actual RFC number and remove this note ::= { mib-2 XXX } -- RFC Ed: replace XXX with IANA-assigned number and remove this -- note --================================================================= -- The MTA MIB module only supports a single Provisioning Server. --================================================================= pktcMtaMibObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMib 1 } pktcMtaDevBase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMibObjects 1 } pktcMtaDevServer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMibObjects 2 } pktcMtaDevSecurity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMibObjects 3 } -- -- The following pktcMtaDevBase group describes the base MTA objects -- pktcMtaDevResetNow OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX TruthValue MAX-ACCESS read-write Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 10] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object controls the MTA software reset. Reading this object always returns 'false'. Setting this object to 'true' causes the device to reset immediately and the following actions occur: 1. All connections (if present) are flushed locally. 2. All current actions such as ringing immediately terminate. 3. Requests for signaling notifications such as notification based on digit map recognition are flushed. 4. All endpoints are disabled. 5. The provisioning flow is started at step MTA-1." REFERENCE " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification." ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 1 } pktcMtaDevSerialNumber OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object identifies the manufacturer's serial number for this MTA." ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 2 } pktcMtaDevSwCurrentVers OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object identifies the software version currently operating in the MTA. An MTA MUST return a string descriptive of the current software load. This object should use the syntax defined by the individual vendor to identify the software version. The data presented in this object MUST be consistent with the software version information contained in the 'sysDescr' MIB object of the MTA." ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 3 } pktcMtaDevFQDN OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the Fully Qualified Domain Name for Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 11] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 this MTA." ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 4 } pktcMtaDevEndPntCount OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..255) MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the number of physical endpoints for this MTA." ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 5 } pktcMtaDevEnabled OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX TruthValue MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object controls the activation of the MTA voice services. If this object is set to 'true', the voice service is enabled. Otherwise, it is disabled." ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 6 } pktcMtaDevTypeIdentifier OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object provides the MTA device type identifier. The value of this object must be a copy of the DHCP option 60 value exchanged between the MTA and the DHCP server." REFERENCE " RFC 2132, DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions; PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification." ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 7 } pktcMtaDevProvisioningState OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX INTEGER { pass (1), inProgress (2), failConfigFileError (3), passWithWarning (4), passWithIncompleteParsing (5), failureInternalError (6), failOtherReason (7) } MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 12] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 " This object indicates the completion state of the MTA device provisioning process. The object value is sent as part of the final SNMP INFORM (step 25 of the MTA provisioning process). Refer to the MTA Device Provisioning Specification for the definition of the provisioning states." REFERENCE " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification." ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 8 } pktcMtaDevHttpAccess OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX TruthValue MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object indicates whether the HTTP protocol is supported for the MTA configuration file transfer." ::= { pktcMtaDevBase 9 } pktcMtaDevProvisioningTimer OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..30) UNITS "minutes" MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object enables setting the duration of the provisioning timeout timer. The timer covers the provisioning sequence from step MTA-1 to step MTA-23. The value is in minutes and setting the timer to '0' disables this timer." REFERENCE " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification." DEFVAL {10} ::= {pktcMtaDevBase 10} pktcMtaDevErrorOidsTable OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF PktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This table contains the list of configuration errors or warnings the MTA encountered when parsing the configuration file it received from the Provisioning Server. For each error, an entry is created in this table containing the configuration parameters the MTA rejected and the associated reason (e.g. wrong or unknown OID, inappropriate object values, etc.). If the MTA did not report a provisioning state of 'pass(1)' in Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 13] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 the pktcMtaDevProvisioningState object, this table MUST be populated for each error or warning instance. Even if different parameters share the same error type (e.g., all realm name configuration parameters are invalid), all observed errors or warnings must be reported as different instances. Errors are placed into the table in no particular order. The table MUST be cleared each time the MTA reboots." REFERENCE " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification." ::= {pktcMtaDevBase 11 } pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX PktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This entry contains the necessary information the MTA MUST attempt to provide in case of configuration file errors or warnings." INDEX { pktcMtaDevErrorOidIndex } ::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsTable 1} PktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry ::= SEQUENCE { pktcMtaDevErrorOidIndex Unsigned32, pktcMtaDevErrorOid SnmpAdminString, pktcMtaDevErrorValue SnmpAdminString, pktcMtaDevErrorReason SnmpAdminString } pktcMtaDevErrorOidIndex OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..1024) MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object is the index of the MTA configuration error table. It is an integer value which starts at value '1' and is incremented for each encountered configuration file error or warning." ::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry 1} pktcMtaDevErrorOid OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains a human readable representation (character string) of the OID corresponding to the Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 14] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 configuration file parameter that caused the particular error. For example, if the value of the pktcMtaDevEnabled object in the configuration file caused an error, then this object instance will contain the human readable string of '.1.3.6.1.2.1.XXX.1.1.6.0'. ************************************************************ * NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) * * * * Please replace XXX with the IANA-assigned number under * * mib-2. * * * ************************************************************ If the MTA generated an error because it was not able to recognize a particular OID, then this object instance would contain an empty value (zero-length string). For example, if the value of an OID in the configuration file was interpreted by the MTA as being .1.2.3.4.5, and the MTA was not able to recognize this OID as a valid one, this object instance will contain a zero-length string." ::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry 2} pktcMtaDevErrorValue OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the value of the OID corresponding to the configuration file parameter that caused the error. If the MTA cannot recognize the OID of the configuration parameter causing the error, then this object instance contains the OID itself as interpreted by the MTA in human readable representation. If the MTA can recognize the OID but generate an error due to a wrong value of the parameter, then the object instance contains the erroneous value of the parameter as read from the configuration file. In both cases, the value of this object must be represented in human readable form as a character string. For example, if the value of the pktcMtaDevEnabled object in the configuration file was 3 (invalid value), then the pktcMtaDevErrorValue object instance will contain the human readable (string) representation of value '3'. Similarly, if the OID in the configuration file has been interpreted by the MTA as being .1.2.3.4.5, and the MTA cannot recognize this OID as a valid one, then this pktcMtaDevErrorValue object instance will contain human Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 15] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 readable (string) representation of value '.1.2.3.4.5'" ::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry 3} pktcMtaDevErrorReason OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object indicates the reason for the error or warning, as per the MTA's interpretation, in human readable form. Example of possible reason values are: 'VALUE NOT IN RANGE', 'VALUE DOES NOT MATCH TYPE', 'UNSUPPORTED VALUE', 'LAST 4 BITS MUST BE SET TO ZERO', 'OUT OF MEMORY - CANNOT STORE', etc. This object may also contain vendor specific errors for private vendor OIDs and any proprietary error codes or messages which can help diagnose configuration errors." ::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry 4} -- -- The following group describes server access and parameters used -- for the initial MTA provisioning and bootstrapping phases. -- pktcMtaDevServerAddressType OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX InetAddressType MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the Internet address type for the PacketCable servers specified in MTA MIB." DEFVAL { ipv4 } ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 1} pktcMtaDevServerDhcp1 OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX InetAddress MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the Internet Address of the primary DHCP server the MTA uses during provisioning. The type of this address is determined by the value of the pktcMtaDevServerAddressType object. When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object contains the dotted IP address of the primary DHCP server. It is provided by the CM to the MTA via the DHCP option code 122 sub-option 1 as defined in RFC 3495. Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 16] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 The behavior of this object when the value of pktcMtaDevServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)' is not presently specified, but may be specified in future versions of this MIB module. If this object is of value '0.0.0.0', the MTA MUST stop all provisioning attempts as well as all other activities. If this object is of value '255.255.255.255', it means there was no preference given for the primary DHCP server, and, the MTA must follow the logic of RFC2131 and the value of DHCP option 122 sub-option 2 must be ignored." REFERENCE " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification; RFC 2131, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol; RFC 3495, DHCP Option for CableLabs Client Configuration." ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 2 } pktcMtaDevServerDhcp2 OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX InetAddress MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the Internet Address of the secondary DHCP server the MTA uses during provisioning. The type of this address is determined by the value of the pktcMtaDevServerAddressType object. When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object contains the dotted IP address of the secondary DHCP server. It is provided by the CM to the MTA via the DHCP option code 122 sub-option 2 as defined in RFC 3495. The behavior of this object when the value of pktcMtaDevServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)' is not presently specified, but may be specified in future versions of this MIB module. If there was no secondary DHCP server provided in DHCP Option 122 sub-option 2, this object must return the value '0.0.0.0'." REFERENCE " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification; RFC 3495, DHCP Option for CableLabs Client Configuration." ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 3 } pktcMtaDevServerDns1 OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX InetAddress MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the IP Address of the primary Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 17] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 DNS server to be used by the MTA. The type of this address is determined by the value of the pktcMtaDevServerAddressType object. When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object contains the dotted IP address of the primary DNS server. As defined in RFC 2132, PacketCable compliant MTAs receive the IP addresses of the DNS Servers in the DHCP option 6. The behavior of this object when the value of pktcMtaDevServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)' is not presently specified, but may be specified in future versions of this MIB module." REFERENCE " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification; RFC 2132, DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions." ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 4 } pktcMtaDevServerDns2 OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX InetAddress MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the IP Address of the secondary DNS server to be used by the MTA. The type of this address is determined by the value of the pktcMtaDevServerAddressType object. When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object contains the dotted IP address of the secondary DNS server. As defined in RFC 2132, PacketCable compliant MTAs receive the IP addresses of the DNS Servers in the DHCP option 6. The behavior of this object when the value of pktcMtaDevServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)' is not presently specified, but may be specified in future versions of this MIB module." REFERENCE " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification; RFC 2132, DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions." ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 5 } pktcMtaDevTimeServer OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX InetAddress MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the Internet Address of the Time Server used by a S-MTA for Time Synchronization. The type of this address is determined by the value of the pktcMtaDevServerAddressType object. Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 18] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object contains the IP address of the Time Server used for Time Synchronization. In the case of a S-MTA, this object must be populated with a value other than '0.0.0.0' as obtained from DHCP Option 4. The protocol by which the time of day MUST be retrieved is defined in RFC 868. In the case of an E-MTA, this object must contain a value of '0.0.0.0' if the address type is 'ipv4(1)' since an E-MTA does not use the Time Protocol for time synchronization (an E-MTA uses the time retrieved by the DOCSIS cable modem). The behavior of this object when the value of pktcMtaDevServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)' is not presently specified, but may be specified in future versions of this MIB module." REFERENCE " RFC 868, Time Protocol; RFC 2131, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol; RFC 2132, DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions." ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 6} pktcMtaDevConfigFile OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the configuration file name set by Provisioning Server. The MTA MUST support the TFTP access method for configuration file download, and MAY support the HTTP access method. In the case of the TFTP access method, the filename MUST be encoded using the following naming format: tftp:///mta-configfilename where the is the IPv4 address or the FQDN of the TFTP access server. In the case of HTTP access method, the filename MUST be URL-encoded using the following naming format: http:/// mta-configfilename where the is the IPv4 address or the FQDN of the HTTP access server. This object MUST return a zero-length string if the server address is unknown. The following three objects (pktcMtaDevConfigFile, pktcMtaDevConfigKey and pktcMtaDevConfigHash) MUST be SET in one SNMP PDU." ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 7 } pktcMtaDevSnmpEntity OBJECT-TYPE Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 19] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 SYNTAX SnmpAdminString MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the FQDN of the SNMP entity of the Provisioning Server. It is the server the MTA communicates with in order to receive the access method, location and the name of the configuration file. The SNMP entity is also the destination entity for all the provisioning notifications. It may be used for post-provisioning SNMP operations. During the provisioning phase, this SNMP entity FQDN is supplied to the MTA via the DHCP option 122 sub-option 3 as defined in RFC 3495. If all the valid DHCP OFFER messages contain a DHCP option 122 sub-option 3 of value '0.0.0.0', the MTA must stop provisioning and shut down until the modem is reset." REFERENCE " RFC 3495, DHCP Option for CableLabs Client Configuration." ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 8 } pktcMtaDevProvConfigHash OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(20)) MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the hash value of the content of the configuration file, calculated and sent to the MTA prior to sending the configuration file. The authentication algorithm used for calculating hash is SHA-1, and the length of hash is 160 bits. The hash calculation MUST follow the requirements of the PacketCable Security Specification. The following three objects (pktcMtaDevConfigFile, pktcMtaDevConfigKey and pktcMtaDevConfigHash) MUST be SET in one SNMP PDU." REFERENCE " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification; PacketCable Security Specification." ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 9 } pktcMtaDevProvConfigKey OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(0|8)) MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the key used to encrypt and decrypt the configuration file. It is sent to the MTA prior to sending the configuration file. If the privacy Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 20] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 algorithm is null, the length is 0. If the privacy algorithm is DES, the length is 64 bits. The following three objects (pktcMtaDevConfigFile, pktcMtaDevConfigKey and pktcMtaDevConfigHash) MUST be SET in one SNMP PDU." ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 10 } pktcMtaDevProvSolicitedKeyTimeout OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..180) UNITS "seconds" MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object defines a Kerberos Key Management timer on the MTA. It is the time period during which the MTA saves the nonce and Server Kerberos Principal Identifier to match an AP Request and its associated AP Reply response from the Provisioning Server. After the timeout has been exceeded, the client discards this (nonce, Server Kerberos Principal Identifier) pair, after which it will no longer accept a matching AP Reply. This timer only applies when the Provisioning Server initiated key management for SNMPv3 (with a Wake Up message)." DEFVAL { 3 } ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 11 } --================================================================= -- -- Unsolicited key updates are retransmitted based on an -- exponential back-off mechanism using two timers and a maximum -- retry counter for AS replies. -- The initial retransmission timer value is the nominal timer -- value (pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout). The -- retransmissions occur with an exponentially increasing interval -- that caps at the maximum timeout value -- (pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout). -- Retransmissions stop when the maximum retry counter is reached -- (pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries). -- For example, with values of 3 seconds for the nominal -- timer, 100 seconds for the maximum timeout, 8 retries max and -- an exponential value of 2, this results in retransmission -- intervals of 3 s, 6 s, 12 s, 24 s, 48 s, 96 s, 100 s, 100 s, and -- then retransmissions stop because the maximum number of -- retries (8) has been reached. -- --================================================================= -- Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 21] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 -- Timeouts for unsolicited key management updates are only -- pertinent before the first SNMP message is sent between the MTA -- and the Provisioning Server and before the configuration file is -- loaded. No SNMP communications should exist under PacketCable -- without existing Security Associations. -- The following objects are provided for diagnostic purposes. -- --================================================================= pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (15..600) UNITS "seconds" MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object defines the timeout value that applies to a MTA-initiated AP-REQ/REP key management exchange with the Provisioning Server. It is the maximum timeout value and it may not be exceeded in the exponential back-off algorithm. If the DHCP option code 122 sub-option 5 is provided to the MTA, it overwrites this value." REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." DEFVAL {600} ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 12 } pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..600) UNITS "seconds" MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object defines the starting value of the timeout for the AP-REQ/REP back-off and retry mechanism with exponential timeout. If the DHCP option code 122 sub-option 5 is provided to the MTA, it overwrites this value." REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." DEFVAL {3} ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 13} pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..32) MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains a retry counter that applies to Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 22] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 a MTA-initiated AP-REQ/REP key management exchange with the Provisioning Server. It is the maximum number of retries before the MTA stops attempting to establish a Security Association with Provisioning Server. If the DHCP option code 122 sub-option 5 is provided to the MTA, it overwrites this value." REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." DEFVAL {8} ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 14 } pktcMtaDevProvKerbRealmName OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..255)) MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the name of the associated provisioning Kerberos realm acquired during the MTA4 provisioning step (DHCP Ack). This object value is used as an index into the pktcMtaDevRealmTable. The upper case ASCII representation of the associated Kerberos realm name MUST be used by both the Manager (SNMP entity) and the MTA. The Kerberos realm name for the Provisioning Server is supplied to the MTA via DHCP option code 122 sub-option 6 as defined in RFC 3495. The value of the Kerberos realm name for the Provisioning Server supplied in the MTA configuration file must match the value supplied in the DHCP option code 122 sub-option 6." REFERENCE " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification; RFC 3495, DHCP Option for CableLabs Client Configuration." ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 15 } pktcMtaDevProvState OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX INTEGER { operational (1), waitingForSnmpSetInfo (2), waitingForTftpAddrResponse (3), waitingForConfigFile (4) } MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object defines the MTA provisioning state. If the state is: 'operational(1)', the device has completed the loading and processing of the initialization parameters. Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 23] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 'waitingForSnmpSetInfo(2)', the device is waiting on its configuration file download access information. 'waitingForTftpAddrResponse(3)', the device has sent a DNS request to resolve the server providing the configuration file and it is awaiting for a response. 'waitingForConfigFile(4)', the device has sent a request via TFTP or HTTP for the download of its configuration file and it is awaiting for a response or the file download is in progress." REFERENCE " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification, PacketCable Security Specification." ::= { pktcMtaDevServer 16 } -- -- The following object group describes the security objects. -- pktcMtaDevManufacturerCertificate OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX DocsX509ASN1DEREncodedCertificate MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the MTA Manufacturer Certificate. The object value must be the ASN.1 DER encoding of the MTA manufacturer's X.509 public key certificate. The MTA Manufacturer Certificate is issued to each MTA manufacturer and is installed into each MTA at the time of manufacture or with a secure code download. The specific requirements related to this certificate are defined in the PacketCable or IPCablecom Security specifications." REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." ::= {pktcMtaDevSecurity 1} pktcMtaDevCertificate OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX DocsX509ASN1DEREncodedCertificate MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the MTA Device Certificate. The object value must be the ASN.1 DER encoding of the MTA's X.509 public-key certificate issued by the manufacturer and installed into the MTA at the time of manufacture or with a secure code download. Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 24] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 This certificate contains the MTA MAC address. The specific requirements related to this certificate are defined in the PacketCable or IPCablecom Security specifications." REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." ::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 2 } pktcMtaDevCorrelationId OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains a correlation ID, an arbitrary value generated by the MTA that will be exchanged as part of the device capability data to the Provisioning Application. This random value is used as an identifier to correlate related events in the MTA provisioning sequence. This value is intended for use only during the MTA initialization and configuration file download." REFERENCE " PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification." ::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 3 } pktcMtaDevTelephonyRootCertificate OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX DocsX509ASN1DEREncodedCertificate MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the telephony Service Provider Root certificate. The object value is the ASN.1 DER encoding of the IP Telephony Service Provider Root X.509 public key certificate. This certification is stored in the MTA non-volatile memory and can be updated with a secure code download. This certificate is used to validate the initial AS Reply received by the MTA from the KDC during the MTA initialization. The specific requirements related to this certificate are defined in the PacketCable or IPCablecom Security specifications." REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." ::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 4 } --================================================================= -- -- Informative procedures for setting up Security Associations: -- -- A Security Association may be setup either via configuration or Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 25] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 -- via NCS signaling. -- -- I. Security association setup via configuration. -- -- The realm must be configured first. Associated with the realm -- is a KDC. The realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable) indicates -- information about the realm (e.g., name, organization name) and -- parameters associated with KDC communications (e.g., grace -- periods, AS Request/AS Reply adaptive back-off parameters). -- -- Once the realm is established, one or more CMS(es) may be -- defined in the realm. Associated with each CMS -- entry in the pktcMtaDevCmsTable is an explicit reference -- to a Realm via the realm name( pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName), -- the FQDN of the CMS, and parameters associated with IPSec -- key management with the CMS (e.g., clock skew, AP Request/ -- AP Reply adaptive back-off parameters). -- -- II. Security association setup via NCS signaling. -- -- The procedure of establishing the Security Associations -- for NCS signaling is described in the PacketCable Security -- specification. -- It involves the analysis of the pktcNcsEndPntConfigTable row -- for the corresponding endpoint number and correlating -- the CMS FQDN from this row with the CMS Table and -- consequently - with the Realm Table. Both of these tables -- are defined below. The pktcNcsEndPntConfigTable is defined in -- the IPCDN NCS Signaling MIB [RFCzzz]. -- ************************************************************ -- * NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) * -- * * -- * Please replace RFCzzz with this RFC number for * -- * draft-ietf-ipcdn-pktc-signaling-02.txt and remove * -- * the note. * -- ************************************************************ -- -- III. When the MTA receives wake-up or re-key messages from a -- CMS, it performs key management based on the corresponding -- entry in the CMS table. If the matching CMS entry does not -- exist, it must ignore the wake-up or re-key messages. -- --================================================================= --================================================================= -- -- pktcMtaDevRealmTable -- -- The pktcMtaDevRealmTable shows the KDC realms. The table is Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 26] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 -- indexed with pktcMtaDevRealmIndex. The Realm Table contains the -- pktcMtaDevRealmName in conjunction with any server which needs -- a Security Association with the MTA. Upper case must be use to -- compare the pktcMtaDevRealmName content. -- --================================================================= pktcMtaDevRealmAvailSlot OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..64) MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the index number of the first available entry in the realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable). If all the entries in the realm table have been assigned, this object contains the value of zero. A management station should create new entries in the realm table using the following procedure: first, issue a management protocol retrieval operation to determine the value of the first available index in the realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmAvailSlot); second, issue a management protocol SET operation to create an instance of the pktcMtaDevRealmStatus object by setting its value to 'createAndWait(5)'. third, if the SET operation succeeded, continue modifying the object instances corresponding to the newly created conceptual row, without fear of collision with other management stations. When all necessary conceptual columns of the row are properly populated (via SET operations or default values), the management station may SET the pktcMtaDevRealmStatus object to 'active(1)'." ::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 5 } pktcMtaDevRealmTable OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF PktcMtaDevRealmEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the realm table. The CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable) and the realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable) are used for managing the MTA-CMS Security Associations. The realm table defines the Kerberos realms for the Application Servers (CMSes & the Provisioning Server)." ::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 6 } pktcMtaDevRealmEntry OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX PktcMtaDevRealmEntry Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 27] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This table entry object lists the MTA security parameters for a single Kerberos realm. The conceptual rows MUST NOT persist across MTA reboots." INDEX { pktcMtaDevRealmIndex } ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmTable 1 } PktcMtaDevRealmEntry ::= SEQUENCE { pktcMtaDevRealmIndex Unsigned32, pktcMtaDevRealmName SnmpAdminString, pktcMtaDevRealmPkinitGracePeriod Unsigned32, pktcMtaDevRealmTgsGracePeriod Unsigned32, pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName SnmpAdminString, pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout Unsigned32, pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout Unsigned32, pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries Unsigned32, pktcMtaDevRealmStatus RowStatus } pktcMtaDevRealmIndex OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..32) MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object defines the realm table index." ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 1} pktcMtaDevRealmName OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..255)) MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object identifies the Kerberos realm name in all capitals. The MTA MUST prohibit the instantiation of any two rows with identical Kerberos realm names. The MTA MUST also verify that any search operation involving Kerberos realm names is done using the upper case ASCII representation of the characters." ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 2 } pktcMtaDevRealmPkinitGracePeriod OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (15..600) UNITS "minutes" MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 28] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 " This object contains the PKINIT Grace Period. For the purpose of key management with Application Servers (CMSes or the Provisioning Server), the MTA must utilize the PKINIT exchange to obtain Application Server tickets. The MTA may utilize the PKINIT exchange to obtain Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs), which are then used to obtain Application Server tickets in a TGS exchange. The PKINIT exchange occurs based on the current Ticket Expiration Time (TicketEXP) and on the PKINIT Grace Period (PKINITGP). The MTA MUST initiate the PKINIT exchange at the time: TicketEXP û PKINITGP." REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." DEFVAL { 15 } ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 3 } pktcMtaDevRealmTgsGracePeriod OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..600) UNITS "minutes" MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the Ticket Granting Server Grace Period (TGSGP). The Ticket Granting Server (TGS) Request / Reply exchange may be performed by the MTA on-demand û whenever an Application Server ticket is needed to establish security parameters. If the MTA possesses a ticket that corresponds to the Provisioning Server or a CMS that currently exists in the CMS table, the MTA MUST initiate the TGS Request / Reply exchange at the time: TicketEXP û TGSGP." REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." DEFVAL { 10 } ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 4 } pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString(SIZE (1..64)) MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the X.500 organization name attribute as defined in the subject name of the service provider certificate. The value of the organization name includes the prefix 'O='." REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 5 } Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 29] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 --================================================================= -- -- Unsolicited key updates are retransmitted based on an -- exponential back-off mechanism using two timers and a maximum -- retry counter for AS replies. -- The initial retransmission timer value is the nominal timer -- value (pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout). The -- retransmissions occur with an exponentially increasing interval -- that caps at the maximum timeout value -- (pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout). -- Retransmissions stop when the maximum retry counter is reached -- (pktcMatDevRealmUnsolicitedMaxRetries). -- For example, with values of 3 seconds for the nominal -- timer, 20 seconds for the maximum timeout and 5 retries max, -- this results in retransmission intervals of 3 s, 6 s, 12 s, -- 20 s, 20 s, and then retransmissions stop because the maximum -- number of retries has been reached. -- --================================================================= pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..600) UNITS "seconds" MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object specifies the maximum time the MTA will attempt to perform the exponential back-off algorithm. This timer only applies when the MTA initiated key management. If the DHCP option code 122 sub-option 4 is provided to the MTA, it overwrites this value. " REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." DEFVAL { 100 } ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 6 } pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (100..600000) UNITS "milliseconds" MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object specifies the initial timeout value for the AS-REQ/AS-REP exponential back-off and retry mechanism. If the DHCP option code 122 sub-option 4 is provided to the MTA, it overwrites this value. This value should account for the average roundtrip time between the MTA and the KDC as well as the Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 30] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 processing delay on the KDC." REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." DEFVAL { 3000 } ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 7 } pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..1024) MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object specifies the maximum number of retries the MTA attempts to obtain a ticket from the KDC." REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." DEFVAL { 5 } ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 8 } pktcMtaDevRealmStatus OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX RowStatus MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object defines the row status of this realm in the realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable). An entry in this table is not qualified for activation until the object instances of all corresponding columns have been initialized, either by default values, or via explicit SET operations. Until all object instances in this row are initialized, the status value for this realm must be 'notReady(3)'. In particular, two columnar objects must be explicitly SET: the realm name (pktcMtaDevRealmName) and the organization name (pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName). Once these 2 objects have been set and the row status is SET to 'active(1)', the MTA MUST NOT allow any modification of these 2 object values. The value of this object has no effect on whether other columnar objects in this row can be modified." ::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 9 } --================================================================= -- -- The CMS table, pktcMtaDevCmsTable -- -- The CMS table and the realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable) are used -- for managing the MTA signaling security. The CMS table defines Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 31] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 -- the CMSes the MTA is allowed to communicate with and contains -- the parameters describing the SA establishment between the MTA -- and a CMS. -- The CMS table is indexed by pktcMtaDevCmsIndex. The table -- contains the CMS FQDN (pktcMtaDevCmsFQDN) and the associated -- Kerberos realm name (pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName) so that the MTA -- can find the corresponding Kerberos realm name in the -- pktcMtaDevRealmTable. -- --================================================================= pktcMtaDevCmsAvailSlot OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..128) MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the index number of the first available entry in the CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable). If all the entries in the CMS table have been assigned, this object contains the value of zero. A management station should create new entries in the CMS table using the following procedure: first, issue a management protocol retrieval operation to determine the value of the first available index in the CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsAvailSlot); second, issue a management protocol SET operation to create an instance of the pktcMtaDevCmsStatus object by setting its value to 'createAndWait(5)'. third, if the SET operation succeeded, continue modifying the object instances corresponding to the newly created conceptual row, without fear of collision with other management stations. When all necessary conceptual columns of the row are properly populated (via SET operations or default values), the management station may SET the pktcMtaDevCmsStatus object to 'active(1)'." ::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 7 } pktcMtaDevCmsTable OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF PktcMtaDevCmsEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object defines the CMS table. The CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable) and the realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable) are used for managing security between the MTA and CMSes. Each CMS table entry defines a CMS the managed MTA is allowed to communicate with and contains security parameters for key management with that CMS." Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 32] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 ::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 8 } pktcMtaDevCmsEntry OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX PktcMtaDevCmsEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This table entry object lists the MTA key management parameters used when establishing Security Associations with a CMS. The conceptual rows MUST NOT persist across MTA reboots." INDEX { pktcMtaDevCmsIndex } ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsTable 1 } PktcMtaDevCmsEntry ::= SEQUENCE { pktcMtaDevCmsIndex Unsigned32, pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn SnmpAdminString, pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName SnmpAdminString, pktcMtaDevCmsSolicitedKeyTimeout Unsigned32, pktcMtaDevCmsMaxClockSkew Unsigned32, pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout Unsigned32, pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout Unsigned32, pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries Unsigned32, pktcMtaDevCmsIpsecCtrl TruthValue, pktcMtaDevCmsStatus RowStatus } pktcMtaDevCmsIndex OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..64) MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object defines the CMS table index." ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 1 } pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..255)) MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object specifies the CMS FQDN. The MTA must prohibit the instantiation of any two rows with identical FQDNs. The MTA must also verify that any search and/or comparison operation involving a CMS FQDN is case insensitive." ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 2 } pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..255)) Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 33] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object identifies the Kerberos realm name in upper case characters associated with the CMS defined in this conceptual row. The object value is a reference point to the corresponding Kerberos realm name in the realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmtable)." ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 3 } pktcMtaDevCmsMaxClockSkew OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..1800) UNITS "seconds" MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object specifies the maximum allowable clock skew between the MTA and the CMS defined in this row." DEFVAL { 300 } ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 4 } pktcMtaDevCmsSolicitedKeyTimeout OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (100..30000) UNITS "milliseconds" MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object defines a Kerberos Key Management timer on the MTA. It is the time period during which the MTA saves the nonce and Server Kerberos Principal Identifier to match an AP Request and its associated AP Reply response from the CMS. This timer only applies when the CMS initiated key management (with a Wake Up message or a Rekey message)." REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." DEFVAL { 1000 } ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 5 } --================================================================= -- -- Unsolicited key updates are retransmitted based on an -- exponential back-off mechanism using two timers and a maximum -- retry counter for AS replies. -- The initial retransmission timer value is the nominal timer -- value (pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout). The -- retransmissions occur with an exponentially increasing interval -- that caps at the maximum timeout value -- (pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout). -- Retransmissions stop when the maximum retry counter is reached Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 34] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 -- (pktcMatDevCmsUnsolicitedMaxRetries). -- For example, with values of 3 seconds for the nominal -- timer, 20 seconds for the maximum timeout and 5 retries max, -- this results in retransmission intervals of 3 s, 6 s, 12 s, -- 20 s, 20 s, and then retransmissions stop due to the -- maximum number of retries reached. -- --================================================================= pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..600) UNITS "seconds" MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object defines the timeout value that only applies to a MTA-initiated key management exchange. It is the maximum timeout and it may not be exceeded in the exponential back-off algorithm." REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." DEFVAL { 600 } ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 6 } pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (100..30000) UNITS "milliseconds" MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object defines the starting value of the timeout for a MTA-initiated key management. It should account for the average roundtrip time between the MTA and the CMS and the processing time on the CMS." REFERENCE " PacketCable Security Specification." DEFVAL { 500 } ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 7 } pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..1024) MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object contains the maximum number of retries before the MTA stops attempting to establish a Security Association with the CMS." REFERENCE Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 35] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 " PacketCable Security Specification." DEFVAL { 5 } ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 8 } pktcMtaDevCmsIpsecCtrl OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX TruthValue MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object specifies the MTA IPSec control flag. If the object value is 'true', the MTA must use Kerberos Key Management and IPsec to communicate with this CMS. If it is 'false', IPSec Signaling Security and Kerberos key management are disabled for this specific CMS." DEFVAL { true } ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 9 } pktcMtaDevCmsStatus OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX RowStatus MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This object defines the row status associated with this particular CMS in the CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable). An entry in this table is not qualified for activation until the object instances of all corresponding columns have been initialized, either by default values, or via explicit SET operations. Until all object instances in this row are initialized, the status value for this realm must be 'notReady(3)'. In particular, two columnar objects must be SET: the CMS FQDN (pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn) and the Kerberos realm name (pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName). Once these 2 objects have been set and the row status is SET to 'active(1)', the MTA MUST NOT allow any modification of these 2 object values. The value of this object has no effect on whether other columnar objects in this row can be modified." ::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 10 } pktcMtaDevResetKrbTickets OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX BITS { invalidateProvOnReboot (0), invalidateAllCmsOnReboot (1) } MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 36] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 DESCRIPTION " This object defines a Kerberos Ticket Control Mask that instructs the MTA to invalidate the specific Application Server Kerberos ticket(s) that are stored locally in the MTA NVRAM (non-volatile or persistent memory). If the MTA does not store Kerberos tickets in NVRAM, it MUST ignore setting of this object, and MUST report a BITS value of zero when the object is read. If the MTA supports Kerberos tickets storage in NVRAM, the object value is encoded as follows: - setting the invalidateProvOnReboot bit (bit 0) to 1 means that the MTA MUST invalidate the Kerberos Application Ticket(s) for the Provisioning Application at the next MTA reboot, - setting the invalidateAllCmsOnReboot bit (bit 1) to 1 means that the MTA MUST invalidate the Kerberos Application Ticket(s) for all CMSes currently assigned to the MTA endpoints." REFERENCE "PacketCable Security Specification." DEFVAL { { } } ::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 9 } pktcMtaNotificationPrefix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMib 2 } pktcMtaNotification OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaNotificationPrefix 0 } pktcMtaConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMib 3 } pktcMtaDevProvisioningEnrollment NOTIFICATION-TYPE OBJECTS { sysDescr, pktcMtaDevSwCurrentVers, pktcMtaDevTypeIdentifier, ifPhysAddress, pktcMtaDevCorrelationId } STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This inform is issued by the MTA to indicate the start of the PacketCable provisioning process. It contains the system description, the current software version, the MTA device type identifier, the MTA MAC address (obtained in the MTA ifTable in the ifPhysAddress object that corresponds to the ifIndex 1) and a correlation ID." ::= { pktcMtaNotification 1 } Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 37] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 pktcMtaDevProvisioningStatus NOTIFICATION-TYPE OBJECTS { ifPhysAddress, pktcMtaDevCorrelationId, pktcMtaDevProvisioningState } STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This inform is issued by the MTA to confirm the completion of the PacketCable provisioning process, and to report its provisioning completion status." ::= { pktcMtaNotification 2 } -- -- Compliance Statements -- pktcMtaCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaConformance 1 } pktcMtaGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaConformance 2 } pktcMtaBasicRFCyyyyCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE -- ************************************************************ -- * NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) * -- * * -- * Please replace RFCyyyy with this RFC number and remove * -- * the note. * -- ************************************************************ STATUS current DESCRIPTION " The compliance statement for MTA devices that implement PacketCable or IPCablecom requirements. This compliance statement applies to MTA implementations that support PacketCable 1.x or IPCablecom requirements, which are not IPv6-capable at the time of this RFC publication." MODULE MANDATORY-GROUPS { pktcMtaGroup, pktcMtaNotificationGroup } OBJECT pktcMtaDevServerAddressType SYNTAX InetAddressType DESCRIPTION " Support for address types other than 'ipv4(1)' is not presently specified and therefore, is not Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 38] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 required. It may be defined in future versions of this MIB module." ::= { pktcMtaCompliances 1 } pktcMtaGroup OBJECT-GROUP OBJECTS { pktcMtaDevResetNow, pktcMtaDevSerialNumber, pktcMtaDevSwCurrentVers, pktcMtaDevFQDN, pktcMtaDevEndPntCount, pktcMtaDevEnabled, pktcMtaDevErrorOid, pktcMtaDevErrorValue, pktcMtaDevErrorReason, pktcMtaDevTypeIdentifier, pktcMtaDevProvisioningState, pktcMtaDevHttpAccess, pktcMtaDevCertificate, pktcMtaDevCorrelationId, pktcMtaDevManufacturerCertificate, pktcMtaDevServerAddressType, pktcMtaDevServerDhcp1, pktcMtaDevServerDhcp2, pktcMtaDevServerDns1, pktcMtaDevServerDns2, pktcMtaDevTimeServer, pktcMtaDevConfigFile, pktcMtaDevSnmpEntity, pktcMtaDevRealmPkinitGracePeriod, pktcMtaDevRealmTgsGracePeriod, pktcMtaDevRealmAvailSlot, pktcMtaDevRealmName, pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName, pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout, pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout, pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries, pktcMtaDevRealmStatus, pktcMtaDevCmsAvailSlot, pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn, pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName, pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout, pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout, pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries, pktcMtaDevCmsSolicitedKeyTimeout, pktcMtaDevCmsMaxClockSkew, pktcMtaDevCmsIpsecCtrl, pktcMtaDevCmsStatus, Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 39] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 pktcMtaDevResetKrbTickets, pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout, pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout, pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries, pktcMtaDevProvKerbRealmName, pktcMtaDevProvSolicitedKeyTimeout, pktcMtaDevProvConfigHash, pktcMtaDevProvConfigKey, pktcMtaDevProvState, pktcMtaDevProvisioningTimer, pktcMtaDevTelephonyRootCertificate } STATUS current DESCRIPTION " A collection of objects for managing PacketCable or IPCablecom MTA implementations." ::= { pktcMtaGroups 1 } pktcMtaNotificationGroup NOTIFICATION-GROUP NOTIFICATIONS { pktcMtaDevProvisioningStatus, pktcMtaDevProvisioningEnrollment } STATUS current DESCRIPTION " A collection of notifications dealing with the change of MTA provisioning status." ::= { pktcMtaGroups 2 } END 5. Acknowledgments The current editors wish to express their gratitude to: Angela Lyda Arris Interactive Sumanth Channabasappa Alopa Networks Matt A. Osman CableLabs Klaus Hermanns Cisco Systems Rick Vetter, Sasha Medvinsky Motorola Roy Spitzer Telogy Networks, Inc. Itay Sherman, Satish Kumar Texas Instruments Rich Woundy Comcast Bert Wijnen Lucent Mike Heard Consultant Eric Rosenfeld CableLabs Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 40] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 6. Normative References [RFC868] Postel, J., "Time Protocol", STD 26, RFC 868, May 1983. [RFC2131] R. Droms, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", March 1997. [RFC2132] S. Alexander, R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions", March 1997. [RFC2459] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999. [RFC2578] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Structure of Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578, April 1999. [RFC2579] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Textual Conventions for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999. [RFC2580] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Conformance Statements for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2580, April 1999. [RFC2863] McCloghrie, K., Kastenholz, F., "The Interfaces Group MIB", June 2000. [RFC3411] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and Wijnen, B., "An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62, December 2002. [RFC3418] Presuhn, R., Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and Waldbusser, S., "Management Information Base (MIB) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, December 2002. [RFC3291] Daniele, M., Haberman, B., Routhier, S., Schoenwaelder, J., "Textual Conventions for Internet Network Addresses", RFC 3291, May 2002. ************************************************************ * NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) * * * * The I-D (or a * * successor) is expected to eventually replace RFC 3291. * Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 41] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 * If that draft (or a successor) is published as a RFC * * prior to or concurrently with this document, then the * * normative reference [RFC3291] should be updated to * * point to the replacement RFC, and the reference tag * * [RFC3291] should be updated to match. * * * ************************************************************ [RFC3495] B. Beser, P. Duffy, Ed., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Option for CableLabs Client Configuration.", RFC 3495, March 2003. [RFCyyyy] S. Green, K. Ozawa, A. Katsnelson, E. Cardona, "Management Information Base for DOCSIS Cable Modems and Cable Modem Termination Systems for Baseline Privacy Plus", RFCyyy, Monthyyy, 2003. ************************************************************ * NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) * * * * The I-D * * is expected to become RFC before this draft. * * Please replace RFCyyy with the RFC number of bpiplus and * * update the reference statement with the correct date: * * Monthyyy, 2003 * * * ************************************************************ [PKT-SP-PROV-I07-030728] Packetcable MTA Device Provisioning Specification, Issued, PKT-SP-PROV-I07-030728, July 2003. http://www.packetcable.com/specifications/ [PKT-SP-SEC-I09-030728] PacketCable Security Specification, Issued,PKT-SP-SEC-I09-030728, July 2003. http://www.packetcable.com/specifications/ [ITU-T-J112] Transmission Systems for Interactive Cable Television Services, Annex B, J.112, ITU-T, March, 1998. [ITU-T-J168] IPCablecom Multimedia Terminal Adapter (MTA) MIB requirements, J.168, ITU-T, March, 2001. 7. Informative References [RFC3410] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D. and B. Stewart, "Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet- Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410, December 2002. Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 42] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 [PKT-SP-MIB-MTA-I07-030728] Packetcable MTA MIB Specification, Issued, PKT-SP-MIB-MTA-I07-030728, July 2003. http://www.packetcable.com/specifications/ [ETSI TS 101 909-8] ETSI TS 101 909-8: "Access and Terminals (AT); Digital Broadband Cable Access to the Public Telecommunications Network; IP Multimedia Time Critical Services; Part 8: Media Terminal Adaptor (MTA) Management Information Base (MIB)". [EN 300 001] EN 300 001 V1.5.1 (1998-10):"European Standard (Telecommunications series) Attachments to Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN); General technical requirements for equipment connected to an analogue subscriber interface in the PSTN; Chapter 3: Ringing signal characteristics (national deviations are in Table 3.1.1)". [EN 300 659-1] EN 300 659-1: "Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN); Subscriber line protocol over the local loop for display (and related) services; Part 1: On hook data transmission". [RFCzzz] Beacham G., Kumar S., Channabasappa S., "Network Control Signaling (NCS) Signaling MIB for PacketCable and IPCablecom Multimedia Terminal Adapters (MTAs)", RFCzzz, Monthzzz, 2003. ************************************************************ * NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) * * * * The I-D < draft-ietf-ipcdn-pktc-signaling-02.txt> * * is expected to become RFC with this draft. * * Please replace RFCzzz with the RFC number of pktc-sig and* * update the reference statement with the correct date: * * Monthzzz, 2003 * * * ************************************************************ 8. Security Considerations There are a number of management objects defined in this MIB module with a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. Such Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 43] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 objects may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. The support for SET operations in a non-secure environment without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. Improper manipulation of the objects defined in this MIB may result in random behavior of MTA devices and may result in service disruption. These are the tables and objects and their sensitivity/vulnerability: - The following objects, if SET maliciously would cause the MTA device to reset and/or stop its service: pktcMtaDevResetNow, pktcMtaDevEnabled. - All writable objects in the pktcMtaDevServer group and some in the pktcMtaDevRealmTable share the potential, if SET maliciously, to prevent the MTA from provisioning properly. Hence they are considered very sensitive for service delivery. The objects in question are: pktcMtaDevProvisioningTimer, pktcMtaDevServerAddressType, pktcMtaDevServerDns1, pktcMtaDevServerDns2, pktcMtaDevTimeServer, pktcMtaDevConfigFile, pktcMtaDevProvConfigHash, pktcMtaDevProvConfigKey, pktcMtaDevProvSolicitedKeyTimeout, pktcMtaDevRealmName, pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName, pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout, pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout, pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries, pktcMtaDevRealmStatus. Certain of the above objects have additional specific vulnerabilities: o pktcMtaDevServerDns1 and pktcMtaDevServerDns2, if SET maliciously, could prevent the MTA from being authenticated and consequently from getting telephony services. o pktcMtaDevRealmStatus, if SET maliciously, could cause the whole row of the table to be deleted which may prevent MTA from getting telephony services. - All writable objects in the pktcMtaDevCmsTable table share the potential, if SET maliciously, to disrupt the telephony service by altering which Call Management Server the MTA must send signaling registration to, in particular: pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn, pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName, Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 44] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 pktcMtaDevCmsMaxClockSkew, pktcMtaDevCmsSolicitedKeyTimeout, pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout, pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout, pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries - this object, if set to a zero value '0', may prevent the MTA from retrying its attempt to establish a Security Association with the CMS, pktcMtaDevCmsStatus. - Some writable objects in the pktcMtaDevRealmTable table will not have an immediate effect on service, if SET maliciously. However, they may impact the service performance and cause avalanche attacks on provisioning and Kerberos KDC servers, especially after massive device reboots occur. The objects in question are: pktcMtaDevResetKrbTickets û this object, if set to 'true' value, will cause the MTA to request a new Kerberos ticket at reboot, pktcMtaDevRealmPkinitGracePeriod, pktcMtaDevRealmTgsGracePeriod û these 2 objects, if set to short time periods, will cause the MTA to renew its tickets more frequently. Some of the readable objects in this MIB module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Some of these objects may contain information that may be sensitive from a business or customer perspective. It is thus important to control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them over the network via SNMP. These are the tables and objects and their sensitivity and vulnerability: - Some readable objects in the pktcMtaDevBase, pktcMtaDevServer and pktcMtaDevSecurity groups share the potential, if read maliciously, to facilitate Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks against provisioning or Kerberos servers. The object in question are: pktcMtaDevServerDhcp1, pktcMtaDevServerDhcp2 and pktcMtaDevSnmpEntity - the values of these objects may be used to launch DoS attacks on the Telephony Service Provider DHCP or Provisioning servers, pktcMtaDevProvKerbRealmName, pktcMtaDevManufacturerCertificate, pktcMtaDevCertificate and pktcMtaDevTelephonyRootCertificate û the values of these objects may be used by attackers to launch DoS attacks against Kerberos servers. - One additional readable object may expose some security threats, pktcMtaDevFQDN. This object may include sensitive information about the domain name and potentially, the domain topology. Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 45] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security. Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec), even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this MIB module. It is RECOMMENDED that implementers consider the security features as provided by the SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410], section 8), including full support for the SNMPv3 cryptographic mechanisms (for authentication and privacy). Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT RECOMMENDED. Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to enable cryptographic security. It is then a customer/operator responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete) them. 9. Intellectual Property The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive Director. 10. Authors' Addresses Eugene Nechamkin Broadcom Corporation, 200 - 13711 International Place Richmond, BC, V6V 2Z8 CANADA Phone: +1 604 233 8500 Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 46] IPCDN MTA MIB October 2003 E-mail: enechamkin@broadcom.com Jean-Francois Mule Cable Television Laboratories, Inc. 400 Centennial Parkway Louisville, Colorado 80027-1266 U.S.A. Phone: +1 303-661-9100 E-mail: jf.mule@cablelabs.com 11. Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Nechamkin/Mule Expires - April 2004 [Page 47]