I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-GuSuwonGyeonggi-Do16419Republic of Korea+82 31 299 4957+82 31 290 7996pauljeong@skku.eduhttp://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-GuSuwonGyeonggi-Do16419Republic of Korea+82 31 299 4957patricklink@skku.edu
Huawei
7453 Hickory HillSalineMI48176USA+1-734-604-0332shares@ndzh.com
Huawei
101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai DistrictNanjingJiangsuChinaFrank.xialiang@huawei.com
Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology
Rheinstrasse 75Darmstadt64295Germanyhenk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.deInternet-Draft
This document proposes an information model and the corresponding YANG
data model of an interface for monitoring Network Security Functions
(NSFs) in the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) framework.
If the monitoring of NSFs is performed with the NSF monitoring interface
in a comprehensive way, it is possible to detect the indication of
malicious activity, anomalous behavior, the potential sign of denial of
service attacks, or system overload in a timely manner. This monitoring
functionality is based on the monitoring information that is generated
by NSFs. Thus, this document describes not only an information model
for the NSF monitoring interface along with a YANG data diagram, but
also the corresponding YANG data model.
According to , the interface
provided by a Network Security Function (NSF) (e.g., Firewall, IPS, or
Anti-DDoS function) to administrative entities (e.g.,
Security Controller) to enable remote management (i.e., configuring
and monitoring) is referred to as an I2NSF Monitoring Interface.
This interface enables the sharing of vital data from the NSFs
(e.g., alarms, records, and counters) to the Security Controller
through a variety of mechanisms (e.g., queries, notifications, and events).
The monitoring of NSF plays an important role in an overall
security framework, if it is done in a timely and comprehensive way. The
monitoring information generated by an NSF can be a good, early
indication of anomalous behavior or malicious activity, such as denial of service
attacks (DoS).
This document defines a comprehensive information model of an NSF
monitoring interface that provides visibility into an NSF for the NSF
data collector (e.g., Security Controller).
Note that an NSF data collector is defined as an entity to collect NSF
monitoring data from an NSF, such as Security Controller. It specifies the
information and illustrates the methods
that enable an NSF to provide the information required in order to be
monitored in a scalable and efficient way via the NSF Monitoring Interface.
The information model for the NSF monitoring interface presented in
this document is complementary for the security policy provisioning
functionality of the NSF-Facing Interface specified in
.
This document also defines a YANG data model for
the NSF monitoring interface, which is derived from the information model
for the NSF monitoring interface.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
when, and only
when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
This document uses the terminology described in .
This document follows the guidelines of , uses
the common YANG types defined in , and adopts
the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)
. The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams
is defined in .
As mentioned earlier, monitoring plays a critical role in an
overall security framework. The monitoring of the NSF provides very
valuable information to an NSF data collector (e.g., Security Controller) in maintaining the provisioned security posture.
Besides this, there are various other reasons to monitor the NSF as listed below:
The security administrator with I2NSF User can configure a policy that is
triggered on a specific event occurring in the NSF or the network .
If an NSF data collector detects the specified event, it
configures additional security functions as defined by policies.
The events triggered by an NSF as a result of security policy
violation can be used by Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) to detect any suspicious activity in a
larger correlation context.
The information (i.e., events, records, and counters)
from an NSF can be used to build advanced analytics, such as
behavior and predictive models to improve security posture in
large deployments.
The NSF data collector can use events from the NSF for
achieving high availability. It can take corrective actions
such as restarting a failed NSF and horizontally scaling up
the NSF.
The information (i.e., events, records, and counters)
from the NSF can aid in the root cause analysis of an operational
issue, so it can improve debugging.
The records from the NSF can be used to build historical
data for operation and business reasons.
In order to maintain a strong security posture, it is not only
necessary to configure an NSF's security policies but also to continuously
monitor the NSF by consuming acquirable and observable data. This enables
security administrators to assess the state of the networks and in a timely fashion. It is
not possible to block all the internal and external threats based on
static security posture. A more practical approach is supported by enabling dynamic security measures, for which
continuous visibility is required. This document defines a set of monitoring elements
and their scopes that can be acquired from an NSF and can be used as
NSF monitoring data. In essence, these types of monitoring data can be
leveraged to support constant visibility on multiple levels of
granularity and can be consumed by the corresponding functions.
Three basic domains about the monitoring data originating from a system entity , i.e., an NSF, are highlighted in this document.
Retention and Emission
Notifications, Events, and Records
Unsolicited Poll and Solicited Push
As with I2NSF components, every generic system entity can include a set of
capabilities that creates information about some context with monitoring data
(i.e., monitoring information), composition, configuration, state or behavior
of that system entity. This information is intended to be provided to other
consumers of information and in the scope of this document, which deals with
NSF monitoring data in an automated fashion.
A system entity (e.g., NSF) first retains I2NSF monitoring data inside its own system
before emitting the information another I2NSF component (e.g., NSF Data Collector).
The I2NSF monitoring information consist of I2NSF Event, I2NSF Record, and I2NSF Counter
as follows:
I2NSF Event is defined as an important occurrence
over time, that is, a change in the system being managed or a change in the
environment of the system being managed. An I2NSF Event requires immediate attention
and should be notified as soon as possible. When used in the context of an (imperative) I2NSF Policy Rule,
an I2NSF Event is used to determine whether the Condition clause of that Policy Rule can
be evaluated or not. The Alarm Management Framework in defines an event as
something that happens which may be of interest. Examples for an event are a fault, a change in status,
crossing a threshold, or an external input to the system. In the I2NSF
domain, I2NSF events are created following the definition of an
event in the Alarm Management Framework.
A record is defined as an item of information that is kept to be looked at and used in the future.
Unlike I2NSF Event, records do not require immediate attention but may be useful for visibility
and retroactive cyber forensic. Depending on the record format, there are different qualities
in regard to structure and detail. Records are typically stored in log-files or databases
on a system entity or NSF. Records in the form of log-files usually include less
structures but potentially more detailed information in regard to the changes of a
system entity's characteristics. In contrast, databases often use more strict schemas or data
models, therefore enforcing a better structure. However, they inhibit storing information
that does not match those models ("closed world assumption"). Records can be
continuously processed by a system entity as an I2NSF Producer and emitted with a format tailored
to a certain type of record. Typically, records are information generated by a system entity
(e.g., NSF) that is based on operational and informational data, that is, various changes in system
characteristics. The examples of records include as user activities, network/traffic status,
and network activity. They are important for debugging, auditing and security forensic of a
system entity or the network having the system entity.
An I2NSF Counter is defined as a specific representation of continuous value changes of information
elements that occur very frequently. Prominent examples are network interface
counters for protocol data unit (PDU) amount, byte amount, drop counters, and error counters.
Counters are useful in debugging and visibility into operational behavior of a system entity (e.g., NSF).
When an NSF data collector asks for the value of a counter to it, a system entity emits
For the utilization of the storage space for accumulated NSF monitoring data,
all of the information MUST provide the general information (e.g.,
timestamp) for purging existing records, which is discussed in
.
This document provides a YANG data model in
for the important I2NSF monitoring
information that should be retained. All of the information in
the data model is considered important and should be kept
permanently as the information might be useful in many
circumstances in the future. The allowed cases for removing
some monitoring information include the following:
When the system storage is full to create a fresh record
, the oldest record can be
removed.
The administrator deletes existing records manually after
analyzing the information in them.
The I2NSF monitoring information retained on a system entity
(e.g., NSF) may be delivered to a corresponding I2NSF User
via an NSF data collector. The information consists of the
aggregated records, typically in the form of log-files or
databases. For the NSF Monitoring Interface to deliver the
information to the NSF data collector, the NSF needs to
accommodate standardized delivery protocols, such as
NETCONF and RESTCONF
. The NSF data collector
can forward the information to the I2NSF User through one of
standardized delivery protocols. The interface for this
delivery is out of the scope of this document.
A specific task of I2NSF User is to process I2NSF Policy Rules.
The rules of a policy are composed of three clauses: Event,
Condition, and Action clauses. In consequence, an I2NSF Event is
specified to trigger an I2NSF Policy Rule. Such an I2NSF Event
is defined as any important occurrence over time in the system
being managed, and/or in the environment of the system being
managed, which aligns well with the generic definition of Event
from .
Another role of the I2NSF Event is to trigger a notification
for monitoring the status of an NSF.
A notification is defined in as an
unsolicited transmission of management information.
System alarm (called alarm) is defined as a warning related to
service degradation in system hardware in .
System event (called alert) is defined as a warning about any
changes of configuration, any access violation, the information
of sessions and traffic flows in .
Both an alarm and an alert are I2NSF Events that can be
delivered as a notification. The model illustrated in this
document introduces a complementary type of information that
can be a conveyed notification.
In I2NSF monitoring, a notification is used to deliver either
an event and a record via the I2NSF Monitoring Interface. The
difference between the event and record is the timing by
which the notifications are emitted. An event is emitted as
soon as it happens in order to notify an NSF Data Collector
of the problem that needs immediate attention. A record is
not emitted immediately to the NSF Data Collector, and it can
be emitted periodically to the NSF Data Collector every
certain time interval.
It is important to note that an NSF Data Collector as a
consumer (i.e., observer) of a notification assesses the
importance of the notification rather than an NSF as a
producer. The producer can include metadata in a notification
that supports the observer in assessing its importance (e.g.,
severity).
The freshness of the monitored information depends on the acquisition method.
Ideally, an I2NSF User is accessing every relevant information about the I2NSF
Component and is emitting I2NSF Events to an NSF data collector (e.g., Security
Controller) in a timely manner. Publication of events via
a pubsub/broker model, peer-2-peer meshes, or static defined channels are only a
few examples on how a solicited push of I2NSF Events can be facilitated. The actual
mechanism implemented by an I2NSF Component is out of the scope of this document.
Often, the corresponding management interfaces have to be queried in intervals or
on demand if required by an I2NSF Policy rule. In some cases, the collection of
information has to be conducted via a login mechanism provided by a system
entity. Accessing records of information via this kind of unsolicited polls can
introduce a significant latency in regard to the freshness of the monitored
information. The actual definition of intervals implemented by an I2NSF
Component is also out of scope of this document.
As explained in the above section, there is a wealth of data
available from the NSF that can be monitored. Firstly, there must be
some general information with each monitoring message sent from an NSF
that helps a consumer to identify meta data with that message, which
are listed as below:
message: The extra detail to give the context of the
information.
vendor-name: The name of the NSF vendor.
nsf-name: The name or IP address of the NSF generating the message.
If the given nsf-name is not an IP address, the name can be an
arbitrary string including FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name).
The name MUST be unique for different NSFs to identify the NSF that
generates the message.
severity: It indicates the severity level. There are total four
levels, i.e., critical, high, middle, and low.
timestamp: Indicates the time when the message is generated.
For the notification operations (i.e., System Alarms, System Events,
NSF Events, System Logs, and NSF Logs), this is represented by the
eventTime of NETCONF event notification
For other operations (i.e., System Counter and NSF Counter), the
timestamp MUST be provided separately.
This section covers the additional information associated with the
system messages. The extended information model is only for the
structured data such as events, record, and counters. Any unstructured data is
specified with the basic information model only.
Each information has characteristics as follows:
Acquisition method: The method to obtain the message.
It can be a "query" or a "subscription".
A "query" is a request-based method to acquire the solicited information.
A "subscription" is a subscribe-based method to acquire the unsolicited information.
Emission type: The cause type for the message to be emitted.
It can be "on-change" or "periodic".
An "on-change" message is emitted when an important event happens in the NSF.
A "periodic" message is emitted at a certain time interval.
The time to periodically emit the message is configurable.
Dampening type: The type of message dampening to stop the rapid
transmission of messages. The dampening types are "on-repetition" and "no-dampening".
The "on-repetition" type limits the transmitted "on-change" message to one message
at a certain interval. This interval is defined as dampening-period
in . The dampening-period is configurable.
The "no-dampening" type does not limit the transmission for the messages of the same type.
In short, "on-repetition" means that the dampening is active and
"no-dampening" is inactive. It is recommended to activate the
dampening for an "on-change" type of message to reduce the number of messages
generated.
System alarms have the following characteristics:acquisition-method: subscriptionemission-type: on-changedampening-type: on-repetition
The memory is the hardware to store information temporarily or
for a short period, i.e., Random Access Memory (RAM).
The memory-alarm is emitted when the RAM usage exceeds the
threshold.
The following information should be included in a Memory
Alarm:
event-name: memory-alarm.
usage: specifies the size of memory used.
threshold: The threshold triggering the alarm
severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, and low.
message: Simple information such as "The memory usage
exceeded the threshold" or with extra information.
CPU is the Central Processing Unit that executes basic operations
of the system.
The cpu-alarm is emitted when the CPU usage exceeds the threshold.
The following information should be included in a CPU Alarm:
event-name: cpu-alarm.
usage: Specifies the size of CPU used.
threshold: The threshold triggering the event.
severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, and low.
message: Simple information such as "The CPU usage
exceeded the threshold" or with extra information.
Disk is the hardware to store information for a long period, i.e.,
Hard Disk or Solid-State Drive.
The disk-alarm is emitted when the Disk usage exceeds the threshold.
The following information should be included in a Disk Alarm:
event-name: disk-alarm.
usage: Specifies the size of disk space used.
threshold: The threshold triggering the event.
severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, and low.
message: Simple information such as "The disk usage
exceeded the threshold" or with extra information.
The hardware-alarm is emitted when a hardware, e.g., CPU, memory,
disk, or interface, problem is detected.
The following information should be included in a Hardware
Alarm:
event-name: hardware-alarm.
component-name: It indicates the hardware component responsible for
generating this alarm.
severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, and low.
message: Simple information such as "The hardware component has
failed or degraded" or with extra information.
Interface is the network interface for connecting a device with
the network.
The interface-alarm is emitted when the state of the interface is changed.
The following information should be included in an Interface Alarm:
event-name: interface-alarm.
interface-name: The name of the interface.
interface-state: down, up (not congested), congested (up but congested).
severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, and low.
message: Simple information such as "The interface is 'interface-state'"
or with extra information.
System events (as alerts) have the following characteristics:
acquisition-method: subscriptionemission-type: on-changedampening-type: on-repetition
The access-violation system event is an event when a user tries
to access (read or write) any information above their
privilege. The following information should be included in this event:
event-name: access-denied.
user: Name of a user.
group: Group(s) to which a user belongs. A user can
belong to multiple groups.
ip-address: The IP address of the user that triggered
the event.
authentication: The method to verify the valid user,
i.e., pre-configured-key and certificate-authority.
message: The message to give the context of the event,
such as "Access is denied".
A configuration change is a system event when a new configuration
is added or an existing configuration is modified.
The following information should be included in this event:
event-name: config-change.
user: Name of a user.
group: Group(s) to which a user belongs. A user can
belong to multiple groups.
ip-address: The IP address of the user that triggered
the event.
authentication: The method to verify the valid user,
i.e., pre-configured-key and certificate-authority.
message: The message to give the context of the event,
such as "Configuration is modified" or
"New configuration is added".
The following information should be included in a Session Table
Event:
event-name: session-table.current-session: The number of concurrent sessions.maximum-session: The maximum number of sessions that the session table can support.threshold: The threshold triggering the event.message: The message to give the context of the event, such as
"The number of session table exceeded the threshold".
Traffic flows need to be monitored because they might be used for
security attacks to the network. The following information should be
included in this event:
src-ip: The source IPv4 or IPv6 address of the traffic flow.
dst-ip: The destination IPv4 or IPv6 address of the traffic flow.
src-port: The source port of the traffic flow.
dst-port: The destination port of the traffic flow.
protocol: The protocol of the traffic flow.
arrival-rate: Arrival rate of packets of the traffic flow.
NSF events have the following characteristics:acquisition-method: subscriptionemission-type: on-changedampening-type: on-repetitionThe following information should be included in a DDoS Event:
event-name: detection-ddos.
attack-type: Any one of SYN flood, ACK flood, SYN-ACK
flood, FIN/RST flood, TCP Connection flood, UDP flood, ICMP
flood, HTTPS flood, HTTP flood, DNS query flood, DNS reply
flood, SIP flood, SSL flood, and NTP amplification flood.
attack-src-ip: The IP address of the source of the DDoS attack.
attack-dst-ip: The network prefix with a network mask (for IPv4) or prefix length (for IPv6) of a victim under DDoS attack.
dst-port: The port number that the attack traffic aims at.
start-time: The time stamp indicating when the attack started.
end-time: The time stamp indicating when the attack ended. If
the attack is still undergoing when sending out the alarm, this
field can be empty.
attack-rate: The packets per second of attack traffic.
attack-speed: the bits per second of attack traffic.
rule-name: The name of the I2NSF Policy Rule being triggered.
Note that rule-name is used to match a detected NSF event with a policy
rule in , and
also that there is no rule-name in a system event.
The following information should be included in a Virus
Event:
event-name: detection-virus.
virus: Type of the virus. e.g., trojan, worm, macro
virus type.
virus-name: Name of the virus.
dst-ip: The destination IP address of the packet where the
virus is found.
src-ip: The source IP address of the packet where the virus
is found.
src-port: The source port of the packet where the virus is
found.
dst-port: The destination port of the packet where the virus
is found.
src-location: The source geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the virus.
dst-location: The destination geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the virus.
file-type: The type of the file where the virus is hided
within.
file-name: The name of the file where the virus is hided
within.
raw-info: The information describing the packet triggering
the event.
rule-name: The name of the rule being triggered.
The following information should be included in an Intrusion
Event:
event-name: The name of the event. e.g., detection-intrusion.attack-type: Attack type, e.g., brutal force and buffer overflow.src-ip: The source IP address of the flow.dst-ip: The destination IP address of the flow.src-port:The source port number of the flow.dst-port: The destination port number of the flowsrc-location: The source geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the flow.dst-location: The destination geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the flow.protocol: The employed transport layer protocol. e.g., TCP and UDP.app: The employed application layer protocol. e.g., HTTP and FTP.rule-name: The name of the I2NSF Policy Rule being triggered.raw-info: The information describing the flow triggering the event.The following information should be included in a Web Attack
Alarm:event-name: The name of event. e.g., detection-web-attack.attack-type: Concrete web attack type. e.g., SQL injection, command injection, XSS, CSRF.src-ip: The source IP address of the packet.dst-ip: The destination IP address of the packet.src-port: The source port number of the packet.dst-port: The destination port number of the packet.src-location: The source geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the packet.dst-location: The destination geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the packet.request-method: The method of requirement. For instance, "PUT" and "GET" in HTTP.req-uri: Requested URI.response-code: The HTTP Response code.req-user-agent: The HTTP request user agent header field.req-cookies: The HTTP Cookie previously sent by the server with Set-Cookie.req-host: The domain name of the requested host.uri-category: Matched URI category.filtering-type: URL filtering type. e.g., deny-list, allow-list, and unknown.rule-name: The name of the I2NSF Policy Rule being triggered.
The following information should be included in a VoIP/VoLTE
Event:
source-voice-id: The detected source voice Call ID for VoIP and
VoLTE that violates the policy.destination-voice-id: The destination voice Call ID
for VoIP and VoLTE that violates the policy.user-agent: The user agent for VoIP and VoLTE that violates
the policy.src-ip: The source IP address of the VoIP/VoLTE.dst-ip: The destination IP address of the VoIP/VoLTE.src-port: The source port number of the VoIP/VoLTE.dst-port: The destination port number of VoIP/VoLTE.src-location: The source geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the VoIP/VoLTE.dst-location: The destination geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the VoIP/VoLTE.rule-name: The name of the I2NSF Policy Rule being triggered.
System log is a record that is used to monitor the activity of the user on the NSF and the status of the NSF.
System logs have the following characteristics:
acquisition-method: subscriptionemission-type: on-change or periodicdampening-type: on-repetition
Access logs record administrators' login, logout, and operations
on a device. By analyzing them, security vulnerabilities can be
identified. The following information should be included in
an operation report:
username: The username that operates on the device.login-ip: IP address used by an administrator to log in.login-mode: Specifies the administrator logs in mode e.g. administrator, user, and guest.operation-type: The operation type that the administrator execute, e.g., login, logout, configuration, and other.input: The operation performed by a user after login. The operation is a command given by a user.output: The result after executing the input.
Running reports record the device system's running status, which
is useful for device monitoring. The following information should be
included in running report:
system-status: The current system's running status.cpu-usage: Specifies the aggregated CPU usage.memory-usage: Specifies the memory usage.disk-id: Specifies the disk ID to identify the storage disk.disk-usage: Specifies the disk usage of disk-id.disk-left: Specifies the available disk space left of disk-id.session-number: Specifies total concurrent sessions.process-number: Specifies total number of systems processes.interface-id: Specifies the interface ID to identify the network interface.in-traffic-rate: The total inbound traffic rate in packets per second.out-traffic-rate: The total outbound traffic rate in packets per second.in-traffic-speed: The total inbound traffic speed in bits per second.out-traffic-speed: The total outbound traffic speed in bits per second.
User activity logs provide visibility into users' online records
(such as login time, online/lockout duration, and login IP
addresses) and the actions that users perform. User activity reports are
helpful to identify exceptions during a user's login and network access
activities.
user: Name of a user.group: Group to which a user belongs.login-ip-addr: Login IP address of a user.
authentication: The method to verify the valid user,
i.e., pre-configured-key and certificate-authority.
online-duration: The duration of a user's activeness (stays in login) during a session.logout-duration: The duration of a user's inactiveness (not in login) from the last session.additional-info: Additional Information for login:
type: User activities. e.g., Successful User Login, Failed
Login attempts, User Logout, Successful User Password Change,
Failed User Password Change, User Lockout, and User Unlocking.
cause: Cause of a failed user activity.
NSF logs have the folowing characteristics:acquisition-method: subscriptionemission-type: on-changedampening-type: on-repetition
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Logs provide statistics on uploaded and downloaded files and
data, sent and received emails, and alert and blocking records on
websites. It is helpful to learn risky user behaviors and why access
to some URLs is blocked or allowed with an alert record.
attack-type: DPI action types. e.g., File Blocking, Data Filtering,
and Application Behavior Control.
src-user: User source who generates the policy.
policy-name: Security policy name that traffic matches.
action: Action defined in the file blocking rule, data
filtering rule, or application behavior control rule that
traffic matches.
System counter has the following characteristics:acquisition-method: subscription or queryemission-type: periodicdampening-type: none
Interface counters provide visibility into traffic into and out
of an NSF, and bandwidth usage. The statistics of the
interface counters should be computed from the start of the
service. When the service is reset, the computation of
statistics per counter should restart from 0.
interface-name: Network interface name configured in NSF.in-total-traffic-pkts: Total inbound packets.out-total-traffic-pkts: Total outbound packets.in-total-traffic-bytes: Total inbound bytes.out-total-traffic-bytes: Total outbound bytes.in-drop-traffic-pkts: Total inbound drop packets.out-drop-traffic-pkts: Total outbound drop packets.in-drop-traffic-bytes: Total inbound drop bytes.out-drop-traffic-bytes: Total outbound drop bytes.in-traffic-average-rate: Inbound traffic average rate in packets per second.in-traffic-peak-rate: Inbound traffic peak rate in packets per second.in-traffic-average-speed: Inbound traffic average speed in bits per second.in-traffic-peak-speed: Inbound traffic peak speed in bits per second.out-traffic-average-rate: Outbound traffic average rate in packets per second.out-traffic-peak-rate: Outbound traffic peak rate in packets per second.out-traffic-average-speed: Outbound traffic average speed in bits per second.out-traffic-peak-speed: Outbound traffic peak speed in bits per second.NSF counters have the following characteristics:acquisition-method: subscription or queryemission-type: periodicdampening-type: none
Firewall counters provide visibility into traffic signatures,
bandwidth usage, and how the configured security and bandwidth
policies have been applied.
src-ip: Source IP address of traffic.src-user: User who generates the policy.dst-ip: Destination IP address of traffic.src-port: Source port of traffic.dst-port: Destination port of traffic.protocol: Protocol type of traffic.app: Application type of traffic.policy-id: Security policy id that traffic matches.policy-name: Security policy name that traffic matches.in-interface: Inbound interface of traffic.out-interface: Outbound interface of traffic.total-traffic: Total traffic volume.in-traffic-average-rate: Inbound traffic average rate in packets per second.in-traffic-peak-rate: Inbound traffic peak rate in packets per second.in-traffic-average-speed: Inbound traffic average speed in bits per second.in-traffic-peak-speed: Inbound traffic peak speed in bits per second.out-traffic-average-rate: Outbound traffic average rate in packets per second.out-traffic-peak-rate: Outbound traffic peak rate in packets per second.out-traffic-average-speed: Outbound traffic average speed in bits per second.out-traffic-peak-speed: Outbound traffic peak speed in bits per second.
Policy Hit Counters record the security policy that traffic
matches and its hit count. It can check if policy configurations are
correct.
src-ip: Source IP address of traffic.src-user: User who generates the policy.dst-ip: Destination IP address of traffic.src-port: Source port of traffic.dst-port: Destination port of traffic.protocol: Protocol type of traffic.app: Application type of traffic.policy-id: Security policy id that traffic matches.policy-name: Security policy name that traffic matches.
hit-times: The hit times that the security policy matches the
specified traffic.
A standard model for monitoring data is required for an administrator to check
the monitoring data generated by an NSF. The administrator can check the monitoring
data through the following process. When the NSF monitoring data that is under
the standard format is generated, the NSF forwards it to an NSF data collector
via the I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface.
The NSF data collector delivers it to I2NSF Consumer or Developer's Management
System (DMS) so that the administrator can know the state of the I2NSF framework.
In order to communicate with other components, an I2NSF framework
requires the interfaces.
The three main interfaces in I2NSF framework are used for sending monitoring
data as follows:
I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface :
When an I2NSF User makes a security policy and forwards it to the Security
Controller via Consumer-Facing Interface, it can specify the threat-feed
for threat prevention, the custom list, the malicious code scan group, and
the event map group. They can be used as an event to be monitored by an NSF.
I2NSF Registration Interface :
The Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) architecture provides the lifecycle
management of a Virtual Network Function (VNF) via the Ve-Vnfm
interface. The role of Ve-Vnfm is to request VNF lifecycle management (e.g.,
the instantiation and de-instantiation of an NSF, and load balancing among NSFs),
exchange configuration information, and exchange status information for a network service.
In the I2NSF framework, the DMS manages data about resource states and network traffic
for the lifecycle management of an NSF. Therefore, the generated monitoring
data from NSFs are delivered from the NSF data collector to the DMS via either
Registration Interface or a new interface (e.g., NSF Monitoring Interface).
These data are delivered from the DMS to the VNF Manager in the Management and
Orchestration (MANO) in the NFV system .
I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface :
After a high-level security policy from I2NSF User is translated by security policy
translator in the Security Controller,
the translated security policy (i.e., low-level policy) is applied to an NSF via
NSF-Facing Interface. The monitoring interface data model for an NSF specifies the list of events that
can trigger Event-Condition-Action (ECA) policies via NSF Monitoring Interface.
The tree structure of the NSF monitoring YANG module is provided below:
This section describes a YANG module of I2NSF NSF Monitoring.
The data model provided in this document uses identities to be used to get information of the monitored of an NSF's monitoring data.
Every identity used in the document gives information or status about the current situation of an NSF.
This YANG module imports from , and
makes references to .
This section discusses the NETCONF event stream for I2NSF NSF Monitoring subscription.
The YANG module in this document supports "ietf-subscribed-notifications" YANG module for subscription.
The reserved event stream name for this document is "I2NSF-Monitoring". The NETCONF Server (e.g., an NSF) MUST support "I2NSF-Monitoring" event stream for an NSF data collector (e.g., Security Controller).
The "I2NSF-Monitoring" event stream contains all I2NSF events described in this document.
The following example shows the capabilities of the event
streams of an NSF (e.g., "NETCONF" and "I2NSF-Monitoring" event
streams) by the subscription of an NSF data collector; note
that this example XML file is delivered by an NSF to an NSF
data collector. The XML examples in this document follow the
line breaks as per .
This section shows the XML examples of I2NSF NSF Monitoring data delivered via Monitoring Interface from an NSF.
The following example shows an alarm triggered by Memory Usage of the server; note that this example XML file is delivered by an NSF to an NSF data collector:
The XML data above shows:
The NSF that sends the information is named "time_based_firewall".The memory usage of the NSF triggered the alarm.The monitoring information is received by subscription method.The monitoring information is emitted "on-change".The monitoring information is dampened "on-repetition".The memory usage of the NSF is 91 percent.The memory threshold to trigger the alarm is 90 percent.The severity level of the notification is high.
To get the I2NSF system interface counters information by query, NETCONF Client (e.g., NSF data collector) needs to initiate GET connection with NETCONF Server (e.g., NSF). The following XML file can be used to get the state data and filter the information.
The following XML file shows the reply from the NETCONF Server (e.g., NSF):
This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the
"IETF XML Registry" :
This document requests IANA to register the following YANG
module in the "YANG Module Names" registry :
YANG module described in this document defines a schema for data
that is designed to be accessed via network management protocols
such as NETCONF or RESTCONF .
The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the
mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH)
. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and
the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS .
The NETCONF access control model provides
the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF
users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or
RESTCONF protocol operations and content.
All data nodes defined in the YANG module which can be created, modified
and deleted (i.e., config true, which is the default) are considered sensitive
as they all could potentially impact security monitoring and mitigation activities.
Write operations (e.g., edit-config) applied to these data nodes without proper
protection could result in missed alarms or incorrect alarms information being
returned to the NSF data collector. There are threats that need to be considered and
mitigated:
It can send falsified information
to the NSF data collector to mislead detection or mitigation activities; and/or to
hide activity. Currently, there is no in-framework mechanism to mitigate this
and an issue for all monitoring infrastructures. It is important to keep the
enclosure of confidential information to unauthorized persons to mitigate
the possibility of compromising the NSF with this information.
It has visibility to all collected security alarms; entire detection and mitigation
infrastructure may be suspect. It is important to keep the
enclosure of confidential information to unauthorized persons to mitigate
the possibility of compromising the NSF with this information.
It is a system trying to send false information while imitating an NSF;
client authentication would help the NSF data collector to identify this invalid
NSF in the "push" model (NSF-to-collector), while the "pull" model (collector-to-NSF)
should already be addressed with the authentication.
It is a rogue NSF data collector with which a legitimate NSF is tricked into communicating;
for "push" model (NSF-to-collector), it is important to have valid credentials, without
it it should not work; for "pull" model (collector-to-NSF), mutual authentication
should be used to mitigate the threat.
In addition, to defend against the DDoS attack caused by a lot of
NSFs sending massive notifications to the NSF data collector,
the rate limiting or similar mechanisms should be considered in both an NSF and
NSF data collector, whether in advance or just in the process of DDoS
attack.
All of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
vulnerable in some network environments. Some data also may contain private information that is
highly sensitive to the user, such as the IP address of a user in the container "i2nsf-system-user-activity-log"
and the container "i2nsf-system-detection-event". It is important to control read access
(e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to the data nodes. If access control
is not properly configured, it can expose system internals to those who should not have
access to this information.
This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications
Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea
MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based
Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized Security
Service Provisioning).
This work was supported in part by the IITP (2020-0-00395, Standard
Development of Blockchain based Network Management Automation Technology).
This work was supported in part by the MSIT under the Information Technology
Research Center (ITRC) support program (IITP-2021-2017-0-01633) supervised
by the IITP.
This document is made by the group effort of I2NSF working group.
Many people actively contributed to this document.
The authors sincerely appreciate their contributions.
The following are co-authors of this document:
Chaehong Chung
Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419
Republic of Korea
EMail: darkhong@skku.edu
Jinyong (Tim) Kim
Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419
Republic of Korea
EMail: timkim@skku.edu
Dongjin Hong
Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419
Republic of Korea
EMail: dong.jin@skku.edu
Dacheng Zhang
Huawei
EMail: dacheng.zhang@huawei.com
Yi Wu
Aliababa Group
EMail: anren.wy@alibaba-inc.com
Rakesh Kumar
Juniper Networks
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
USA
EMail: rkkumar@juniper.net
Anil Lohiya
Juniper Networks
EMail: alohiya@juniper.net
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Status Code RegistryInternet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)Media TypesInternet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
The following changes are made from draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-09:
This version is revised following Tom Petch's, Martin
Bjorklund's, and Roman Danyliw's Comments.
This version is revised to synchronize with other I2NSF
documents.