GEOPRIV R. Barnes
Internet-Draft BBN Technologies
Intended status: Standards Track M. Thomson
Expires: May 31, 2012 J. Winterbottom
Andrew Corporation
H. Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
November 28, 2011
Location Configuration Extensions for Policy Management
draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-uri-04.txt
Abstract
Current location configuration protocols are capable of provisioning
an Internet host with a location URI that refers to the host's
location. These protocols lack a mechanism for the target host to
inspect or set the privacy rules that are applied to the URIs they
distribute. This document extends the current location configuration
protocols to provide hosts with a reference to the rules that are
applied to a URI, so that the host can view or set these rules.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 31, 2012.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Policy URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Policy URI Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Policy URI Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Location Configuration Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. HELD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. DHCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Client Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. HELD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. DHCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3. Basic Access Control Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy . . . . . . . . 12
6.2. XML Schema Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.3. DHCP LuriType Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. Integrity and Confidentiality for Authorization Policy
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. Access Control for Authorization Policy . . . . . . . . . 14
7.3. Location URI Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Introduction
A critical step in enabling Internet hosts to access location-based
services is to provision those hosts with information about their own
location. This is accomplished via a Location Configuration Protocol
(LCP) [RFC5687], which allows a location provider (e.g., a local
access network) to inform a host about its location.
There are two basic patterns for location configuration, namely
configuration "by value" and "by reference" [RFC5808]. Configuration
by value provisions a host directly with its location, by providing
it location information that is directly usable (e.g., coordinates or
a civic address). Configuration by reference provides a host with a
URI that references the host's location, i.e., one that can be
dereferenced to obtain the location (by value) of the host.
In some cases, location by reference offers a few benefits over
location by value. From a privacy perspective, the required
dereference transaction provides a policy enforcement point, so that
the opaque URI itself can be safely conveyed over untrusted media
(e.g., SIP through untrusted proxies [RFC5606]). If the target host
is mobile, an application provider can use a single reference to
obtain the location of the host multiple times, saving bandwidth to
the host. For some configuration protocols, the location object
referenced by a location URI provides a much more expressive syntax
for location values than the configuration protocol itself (e.g.,
DHCP geodetic location [RFC6225] versus GML in a PIDF-LO [RFC4119]).
From a privacy perspective, however, current LCPs are limited in
their flexibility, in that they do not provide hosts (the clients in
an LCP) with a way to inform the Location Server with policy for how
his location information should be handled. This document addresses
this gap by defining a simple mechanism for referring to and
manipulating policy, and by extending current LCPs to carry policy
references. Using the mechanisms defined in this document, an LCP
server (acting for the Location Server (LS) or Location Information
Server (LIS)) can inform a host as to which policy document controls
a given location resource, and the host (in its Rule Maker role) can
inspect this document and modify it as necessary.
In the following figure, adapted from RFC 5808, this document extends
the Location Configuration Protocols (1) and defines a simple
protocol for policy exchange (4).
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+---------+---------+ Location +-----------+
| | | Dereference | Location |
| LIS/LS +---------------+ Recipient |
| | | Protocol | |
+----+----+----+----+ (3) +-----+-----+
| | |
| | |
Policy| |Location |Location
Exchange| |Configuration |Conveyance
(4)| |Protocol |Protocol
| |(1) |(2)
| | |
+------+----+----+----+ |
| Rule | Target/ | |
| Maker | Host +---------------------+
| | |
+-----------+---------+
The remainder of this document is structured as follows: After
introducing a few relevant terms, we define policy URIs as a channel
for referencing, inspecting, and updating policy documents. We then
define extensions to the HELD protocol and the DHCP option for
location by reference to allow these protocols to carry policy URIs.
Examples are given that demonstrate how policy URIs are carried in
these protocols and how they can be used by clients.
2. Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Policy URIs
A policy URI is an HTTP [RFC2616] or HTTPS [RFC2818]URI that
identifies a policy resource that contains the authorization policy
for a linked location resource. Access to the location resource is
governed by the contents of the authorization policy.
A policy URI identifies an HTTP resource that a Rule Maker can use to
inspect and install policy documents that tell a Location Server how
it should protect the associated location resource. A policy URI
always identifies a resource that can be represented as a common-
policy document [RFC4745] (possibly including some extensions; e.g.,
for geolocation policy [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy]).
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Note: RFC 3693 [RFC3693] identified the Rule Holder role as the one
that stores policy information. In this document, the Location
Server is also a Rule Holder.
3.1. Policy URI Usage
A Location Server that is the authority for policy URIs MUST support
GET, PUT, and DELETE requests to these URIs, in order to allow
clients to inspect, replace, and delete policy documents. Clients
support the three request methods as they desire to perform these
operations.
Knowledge of the policy URI can be considered adequate evidence of
authorization; a policy URI functions as a shared secret between the
client and the server (see Section 7). A Location Server SHOULD
allow all requests, but it MAY deny certain requests based on local
policy. For instance, a Location Server might allow clients to
inspect policy (GET), but not to update it (PUT).
A GET request to a policy URI is a request for the referenced policy
information. If the request is authorized, then the Location Server
sends an HTTP 200 response containing the complete policy identified
by the URI.
A PUT request to a policy URI is a request to replace the current
policy. The entity-body of a PUT request includes a complete policy
document. When a Location Server receives a PUT request, it MUST
validate the policy document included in the body of the request. If
the request is valid and authorized, then the Location Server MUST
replace the current policy with the policy provided in the request.
A DELETE request to a policy URI is a request to delete the
referenced policy document. If the request is authorized, then the
Location Server MUST delete the policy referenced by the URI and
disallow access to the location URIs it governs until a new policy
document has been put in place via a PUT request.
A policy URI is only valid while the corresponding location URI set
is valid. A location server MUST NOT respond to any requests to a
policy URIs once the corresponding location URI set has expired.
This expiry time is specified by the 'expires' attribute in the HELD
locationResponse or the 'Valid-For' LuriType in DHCP.
A location URI can thus become invalid in three ways: By the
expiration of a validity interval in policy, by the removal of a
policy document with a DELETE request, or by the expiry of the
LCP-specified validity interval. The former two are temporary,
since the policy URI can be used to update the policy. The latter
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one is permanent, since the expiry causes the policy URI to be
invalidated as well.
The Location Server MUST support policy documents in the common-
policy format [RFC4745], as identified by the MIME media type of
"application/auth-policy+xml". The common-policy format MUST be
provided as the default format in response to GET requests that do
not include specific "Accept" headers, but content negotiation MAY be
used to allow for other formats.
This usage of HTTP is generally compatible with the use of XCAP
[RFC4825] or WebDAV [RFC4918] to manage policy documents, but this
document does not define or require the use of these protocols.
3.2. Policy URI Allocation
A Location Server creates a policy URI for a specific location
resource at the time that the location resource is created; that is,
a policy URI is created at the same time as the location URI that it
controls. The URI of the policy resource MUST be different from the
location URI.
A policy URI is provided in response to location configuration
requests. A policy URI MUST NOT be provided to an entity that is not
authorized to view or set policy. This document does not describe
how policy might be provided to entities other than for location
configuration, for example, in responses to dereferencing requests
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol] or requests from third parties
[RFC6155].
Each location URI has either one policy URI or no policy URI. The
initial policy that is referenced by a policy URI MUST be identical
to the policy that would be applied in the absence of a policy URI.
A client that does not support policy URIs can continue to use the
location URI as they would have if no policy URI were provided.
For DHCP and HELD, the client assumes that the default policy
grants any requester access to location information, as long as
the request possesses the location URI. To ensure that the
authorization policy is less permissive, a client updates the
policy prior to distributing the location URI.
A Location Server chooses whether or not to provide a policy URI
based on local policy. A HELD-specific extension also allows a
requester to specifically ask for a policy URI.
A policy URI is effectively a shared secret between Location Server
and its clients. Knowledge of a policy URI is all that is required
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to perform any operations allowed on the policy. Thus, a policy URI
should be constructed so that it is hard to predict and
confidentiality-protected when transmitted (see Section 7). To avoid
re-using these shared secrets, the Location Server MUST generate a
new policy URI whenever it generates a new location URI set.
4. Location Configuration Extensions
Location configuration protocols can provision hosts with location
URIs that refer to the host's location. If the target host is to
control policy on these URIs, it needs a way to access the policy
that the Location Server uses to guide how it serves location URIs.
This section defines extensions to LCPs to carry policy URIs that the
target can use to control access to location resources.
4.1. HELD
The HELD protocol [RFC5985] defines a "locationUriSet" element, which
contain a set of one or more location URIs that reference the same
resource and share a common access control policy. The schema in
Figure 1 defines two extension elements for HELD: an empty
"requestPolicyUri" element that is added to a location request to
indicate that a Device desires that a policy URI be allocated; and a
"policyUri" element that is included in the location response.
Figure 1
The URI carried in a "policyUri" element refers to the common access
control policy for location URIs in the location response. The URI
MUST be a policy URI as described in Section 3. A policy URI MUST
use the "http:" or "https:" scheme, and the Location Server MUST
support the specified operations on the URI.
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A HELD request MAY contain an explicit request for a policy URI. The
presence of the "requestPolicyUri" element in a location request
indicates that a policy URI is desired.
4.2. DHCP
The DHCP location by reference option
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option] provides location URIs in
sub-options called LuriElements. This document defines a new
LuriElement type for policy URIs.
LuriType=TBD Policy-URI - This is a policy URI that refers to the
access control policy for the location URIs.
[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please replace TBD above with the assigned
LuriType value and remove this note]
A Policy-URI LuriElement uses a UTF-8 character encoding.
A Policy-URI LuriElement identifies the policy resource for all
location URIs included in the location URI option. The URI MUST be a
policy URI as described in Section 3: It MUST use either the "http:"
or "https:" scheme, and the Location Server MUST support the
specified operations on the URI.
4.3. Client Processing
It is possible that this document will be updated to allow the use of
policy URIs that use protocols other than the HTTP-based protocol
described above. To ensure that they fail safely when presented with
such a URI, clients implementing this specification MUST verify that
a policy URI received from either HELD or DHCP uses either the
"http:" or "https:" scheme. If the URI does not match those schemes,
then the client MUST discard the URI and behave as if no policy URI
was provided.
5. Examples
In this section, we provide some brief illustrations of how policy
URIs are delivered to target hosts and used by those hosts to manage
policy.
5.1. HELD
A HELD request that explicitly requests the creation of a policy URI
has the following form:
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locationURI
A HELD response providing a single "locationUriSet", containing two
URIs under a common policy, would have the following form:
https://ls.example.com:9768/357yc6s64ceyoiuy5ax3o
sip:9769+357yc6s64ceyoiuy5ax3o@ls.example.com:
https://ls.example.com:9768/policy/357lp6f64prlbvhl5nk3b
5.2. DHCP
A DHCP option providing one of the location URIs and the
corresponding policy URI from the previous example would have the
following form:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| option-code | 110 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 49 | 'h' |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| 't' | 't' | 'p' | 's' |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| ':' | '/' | '/' | 'l' |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| 's' | '.' | ... |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| TBD | 56 | 'h' 't' |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| 't' | 'p' | 's' | ':' |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| '/' | '/' | ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please replace TBD above with the assigned
LuriType value and remove this note]
5.3. Basic Access Control Policy
Consider a client that gets the policy URI
, as in the
above LCP example. The first thing this allows the client to do is
inspect the default policy that the LS has assigned to this URI:
GET /policy/357lp6f64prlbvhl5nk3b HTTP/1.1
Host: ls.example.com:9768
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-type: application/auth-policy+xml
Content-length: 388
2011-01-01T13:00:00.0Z
false
0
This policy allows any requester to obtain location information, as
long as they know the location URI. If the user disagrees with this
policy, and prefers for example, to only provide location to one
friend, at a city level of granularity, then the client can install
this policy on the Location Server:
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PUT /policy/357lp6f64prlbvhl5nk3b HTTP/1.1
Host: ls.example.com:9768
Content-type: application/auth-policy+xml
Content-length: 462
2011-01-01T13:00:00.0Z
city
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Finally, after using the URI for a period, the user wishes to
permanently invalidate the URI.
DELETE /policy/357lp6f64prlbvhl5nk3b HTTP/1.1
Host: ls.example.com:9768
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
6. IANA Considerations
This document requires several IANA registrations, detailed below.
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6.1. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy
This section registers a new XML namespace,
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy", per the guidelines in
[RFC3688].
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy
Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group,
(geopriv@ietf.org), Richard Barnes (rbarnes@bbn.com).
XML:
BEGIN
HELD Policy URI Extension
Namespace for HELD Policy URI Extension
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy
[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please replace XXXX
with the RFC number for this specification.]
See RFCXXXX
END
6.2. XML Schema Registration
This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in
[RFC3688].
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:geopriv:held:policy
Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group (geopriv@ietf.org),
Richard Barnes (rbarnes@bbn.com)
Schema: The XML for this schema can be found in Section Section 4.1.
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6.3. DHCP LuriType Registration
IANA is requested to add a value to the LuriTypes registry, as
follows:
+------------+----------------------------------------+-----------+
| LuriType | Name | Reference |
+------------+----------------------------------------+-----------+
| TBD* | Policy-URI | RFC XXXX**|
+------------+----------------------------------------+-----------+
* TBD is to be replaced with the assigned value
** RFC XXXX is to be replaced with this document's RFC number.
7. Security Considerations
There are two main classes of risks associated with access control
policy management: The risk of unauthorized grants or denial of
access to the protected resource via manipulation of the policy
management process, and the risk of disclosure of policy information
itself.
Protecting the policy management process from manipulation entails
two primary requirements: First, the policy URI has to be faithfully
and confidentially transmitted to the client, and second, the policy
document has to be faithfully and confidentially transmitted to the
Location Server. The mechanism also needs to ensure that only
authorized entities are able to acquire or alter policy.
7.1. Integrity and Confidentiality for Authorization Policy Data
Each LCP ensures integrity and confidentiality through different
means (see [RFC5985] and [I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option]).
These measures ensure that a policy URI is conveyed to the client
without modification or interception.
To protect the integrity and confidentiality of policy data during
management, the Location Server SHOULD provide policy URIs with the
"https:" scheme and require the use of HTTP over TLS [RFC2818]. The
cipher suites required by TLS [RFC5246] provide both integrity
protection and confidentiality. If other means of protection are
available, an "http:" URI MAY be used, but location servers SHOULD
reject PUT and DELETE requests for policy URIs that use the "http:"
URI scheme.
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7.2. Access Control for Authorization Policy
Access control for the policy resource is based on knowledge of its
URI. The URI of a policy resource operates under the same
constraints as a possession model location URI [RFC5808] and is
subject to the same constraints:
o Knowledge of a policy URI MUST be restricted to authorized Rule
Makers. ConfideConfidentiality and integrity protections SHOULD
be used when policy URIs are conveyed in a location configuration
protocol, and in the requests that are used to inspect, change or
delete the policy resource. Note that in some protocols (such as
DHCP), these protections may arise from limiting the use of the
protocol to the local network, thus relying on lower-layer
security mechanisms. When neither application-layer or network-
layer security is provided, location servers MUST reject requests
using the PUT and DELETE methods.
o The Location Server MUST ensure that the URI cannot be easily
predicted. The policy URI MUST NOT be derived solely from
information that might be public, including the Target identity or
any location URI. The addition of 32 bits or more of random
entropy is RECOMMENDED to make it infeasible for a third party to
guess a policy URI.
o Servers SHOULD apply rate limits in order to make brute-force
guessing infeasible. If a server allocates policy URIs that
include N bits of entropy with a default lifetime of T seconds,
then the server should limit clients to 2^(N/2)/T queries per
second.
7.3. Location URI Allocation
A policy URI enables the authorization by access control lists model
[RFC5808] for associated location URIs. Under this model, it might
be possible to more widely distribute a location URI, relying on the
authorization policy to constrain access to location information.
To allow for wider distribution, authorization by access control
lists places additional constraints on the construction of location
URIs.
If multiple Targets share a location URI, an unauthorized location
recipient that acquires location URIs for the Targets can determine
that the Targets are at the same location by comparing location URIs.
With shared policy URIs, Targets are able to see and modify
authorization policy for other Targets.
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To allow for the creation of Target-specific authorization policies
that are adequately privacy-protected, each location URI and policy
URI that is issued to a different Target MUST be different from other
location URIs and policy URIs. That is, two clients MUST NOT receive
the same location URI or the same policy URI.
In some deployments, it is not always apparent to a LCP server that
two clients are different. In particular, where a middlebox
[RFC3234] exists two or more clients might appear as a single client.
An example of a deployment scenario of this nature is described in
[RFC5687]. An LCP server MUST create a different location URI and
policy URI for every request, unless the requests can be reliably
identified as being from the same client.
8. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Mary Barnes and Alissa Cooper for providing critical
commentary and input on the ideas described in this document, and to
Ted Hardie and Adam Roach for helping clarify the relationships
between policy URIs, policy documents, and location resources.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option]
Polk, J., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) IPv4
and IPv6 Option for a Location Uniform Resource Identifier
(URI)", draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option-12 (work
in progress), October 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004.
[RFC4745] Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J.,
Polk, J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document
Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745,
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February 2007.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5985] Barnes, M., "HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD)",
RFC 5985, September 2010.
9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol]
Winterbottom, J., Tschofenig, H., Schulzrinne, H.,
Thomson, M., and M. Dawson, "A Location Dereferencing
Protocol Using HELD", draft-ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol-04
(work in progress), October 2011.
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy]
Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Cuellar, J., Polk, J.,
Morris, J., and M. Thomson, "Geolocation Policy: A
Document Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences for
Location Information", draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-25 (work
in progress), October 2011.
[RFC3234] Carpenter, B. and S. Brim, "Middleboxes: Taxonomy and
Issues", RFC 3234, February 2002.
[RFC3693] Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, J., and
J. Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004.
[RFC4119] Peterson, J., "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object
Format", RFC 4119, December 2005.
[RFC4825] Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)", RFC 4825, May 2007.
[RFC4918] Dusseault, L., "HTTP Extensions for Web Distributed
Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV)", RFC 4918, June 2007.
[RFC5606] Peterson, J., Hardie, T., and J. Morris, "Implications of
'retransmission-allowed' for SIP Location Conveyance",
RFC 5606, August 2009.
[RFC5687] Tschofenig, H. and H. Schulzrinne, "GEOPRIV Layer 7
Location Configuration Protocol: Problem Statement and
Requirements", RFC 5687, March 2010.
[RFC5808] Marshall, R., "Requirements for a Location-by-Reference
Mechanism", RFC 5808, May 2010.
Barnes, et al. Expires May 31, 2012 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft LCP Policy URIs November 2011
[RFC6155] Winterbottom, J., Thomson, M., Tschofenig, H., and R.
Barnes, "Use of Device Identity in HTTP-Enabled Location
Delivery (HELD)", RFC 6155, March 2011.
[RFC6225] Polk, J., Linsner, M., Thomson, M., and B. Aboba, "Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol Options for Coordinate-Based
Location Configuration Information", RFC 6225, July 2011.
Authors' Addresses
Richard Barnes
BBN Technologies
9861 Broken Land Parkway
Columbia, MD 21046
US
Phone: +1 410 290 6169
Email: rbarnes@bbn.com
Martin Thomson
Andrew Corporation
Andrew Building (39)
Wollongong University Campus
Northfields Avenue
Wollongong, NSW 2522
AU
Phone: +61 2 4221 2915
Email: martin.thomson@andrew.com
James Winterbottom
Andrew Corporation
Andrew Building (39)
Wollongong University Campus
Northfields Avenue
Wollongong, NSW 2522
AU
Phone: +61 242 212938
Email: james.winterbottom@andrew.com
Barnes, et al. Expires May 31, 2012 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft LCP Policy URIs November 2011
Hannes Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
Linnoitustie 6
Espoo 02600
Finland
Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Barnes, et al. Expires May 31, 2012 [Page 18]