drip S. Card Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize Expires: 26 January 2022 R. Moskowitz HTT Consulting S. Zhao (Editor) Tencent A. Gurtov Linköping University 25 July 2021 Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture draft-ietf-drip-arch-15 Abstract This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID), plus RID-related communications. This architecture adheres to the requirements listed in the DRIP Requirements document. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 January 2022. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 1] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Remote ID (RID) and Standardization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Overview of Types of UAS Remote ID . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2.1. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2.2. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.4. Overview of DRIP Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.1. Architecture Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.3. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates . . . . . 10 4. HHIT as the DRIP Entity Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. UAS Remote Identifiers Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.2. HIT as A Trustworthy DRIP Entity Identifier . . . . . . . 11 4.3. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Registration and Lookup . . . . 13 4.4. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Cryptographic . . . . . . . . . 13 5. DRIP Identifier Registration and Registries . . . . . . . . . 13 5.1. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.1.2. DNS as the Public DRIP Identifier Registry . . . . . 14 5.2. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.2.2. EPP and RDAP as the Private DRIP Identifier Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.2.3. Alternative Private DRIP Registry methods . . . . . . 15 6. Harvesting Broadcast Remote ID messages for UTM Inclusion . . 15 6.1. The CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.2. The CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. IANA Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9. Privacy & Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 A.1. Operation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 2] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 Appendix B. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 1. Introduction This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID), plus RID-related communications. The architecture takes into account both current (including proposed) regulations and non- IETF technical standards. The architecture adheres to the requirements listed in the DRIP Requirements document [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. 1.1. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Remote ID (RID) and Standardization CAAs currently promulgate performance-based regulations that do not specify techniques, but rather cite industry consensus technical standards as acceptable means of compliance. UAS Remote Identification (RID) is an application enabler for a UAS to be identified by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM) and UAS Service Supplier (USS) (Appendix A) or third parties entities such as law enforcement. Many considerations (e.g., safety) dictate that UAS be remotely identifiable. Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide are mandating UAS RID. For example, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has published [Delegated] and [Implementing] Regulations. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) The FAA published a Notice of Proposed Rule Making [NPRM] in 2019 and whereafter published the "Final Rule" in 2021 [FAA_RID]. In FAA's final rule, it is clearly stated that Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out and transponders can not be used to serve the purpose of an remote identification. More details about ADS-B can be found in Appendix B. American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed the ASTM [F3411-19] Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking. Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 3] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 ASTM defines one set of RID information and two means, MAC-layer broadcast and IP-layer network, of communicating it. If an UAS uses both communication methods, the same information must be provided via both means. [F3411-19] is cited by FAA in its RID final rule [FAA_RID] as "a potential means of compliance" to a Remote ID rule. The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) With release 16, the 3GPP completed the UAS RID requirement study [TS-22.825] and proposed a set of use cases in the mobile network and the services that can be offered based on RID. Release 17 specification focuses on enhanced UAS service requirements and provides the protocol and application architecture support that will be applicable for both 4G and 5G networks. 1.2. Overview of Types of UAS Remote ID 1.2.1. Broadcast RID A set of RID messages are defined for direct, one-way, broadcast transmissions from the UA over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi. These are currently defined as MAC-Layer messages. Internet (or other Wide Area Network) connectivity is only needed for UAS registry information lookup by Observers using the directly received UAS ID. Broadcast RID should be functionally usable in situations with no Internet connectivity. The minimum Broadcast RID data flow is illustrated in Figure 1. x x UA xxxxx | | | app messages directly over | one-way RF data link (no IP) | | + x xxxxx x x x x Observer's device (e.g. smartphone) x x Figure 1 Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 4] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 With queries sent over the Internet using harvested RID (see Section 6), the Observer may gain more information about those visible UAS" is only true if the locally observed UAS is (or very recently was) observed somewhere else; harvesting RID is not so much about learning more about directly observed nearby UAS as it is about surveillance of areas too large for local direct visual observation & direct RF link based ID (e.g., an entire air force base, or even larger, a national forest) 1.2.2. Network RID A RID data dictionary and data flow for Network RID are defined in [F3411-19]. This data flow is emitted from an UAS via unspecified means (but at least in part over the Internet) to a Network Remote ID Service Provider (Net-RID SP). A Net-RID SP provides the RID data to Network Remote ID Display Providers (Net-RID DP). It is the Net-RID DP that responds to queries from Network Remote ID Observers (expected typically, but not specified exclusively, to be web-based) specifying airspace volumes of interest. Network RID depends upon internet connectivity to fulfill Observers the RID data query to the NET-RID DP. The summary of network RID data flows work as follows: * The UA's RID data is generated from a UAS which consists of UAs and GCSs. * The RID data is transferred from the UA to the GCS via a RF (Radio Frequency) link. * The GCS or UA (e.g. BVLOS and autonomous operation) provides the UA's RID data to a NET_RID_SP via a secure internet connection. * NET_RID_DP as a NET_RID_SP subscriber and satisfies the Observer's query request also via a secure internet connection. The mimunum Network RID data flow is illustrated in Figure 2: Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 5] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 x x UA xxxxx ******************** | \ * ------*---+------------+ | \ * / * | NET_RID_SP | | \ * ------------/ +---*--+------------+ | RF \ */ | * | * INTERNET | * +------------+ | /* +---*--| NET_RID_DP | | / * +---*--+------------+ + / * | * x / *****************|*** x xxxxx | xxxxx x +------- x x x x x Operator (GCS) Observer x x x x x x Figure 2 Command and Control (C2) must flow from the GCS to the UA via some path, currently (in the year of 2021) typically a direct RF link, but with increasing beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations expected often to be wireless links at either end with the Internet between. Telemetry (at least UA's position and heading) flows from the UA to the GCS via some path, typically the reverse of the C2 path. Thus, RID information pertaining to both the GCS and the UA can be sent, by whichever has Internet connectivity, to the Net-RID SP, typically the USS managing the UAS operation. The Net-RID SP forwards RID information via the Internet to subscribed Net-RID DP, typically USS. Subscribed Net-RID DP forward RID information via the Internet to subscribed Observer devices. Regulations require and [F3411-19] describes RID data elements that must be transported end-to-end from the UAS to the subscribed Observer devices. [F3411-19] prescribes the protocols only between the Net-RID SP, Net- RID DP, and the Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS). DRIP can address standardization of protocols between the UA and GCS, between the UAS and the Net-RID SP, and/or between the Net-RID DP and Observer devices. Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 6] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 [F3411-19] prescribes the protocols between the Net-RID SP, Net-RID DP, and the Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS). It also prescribes data elements (in JSON) between Observer and DSS. DRIP addresses standardization of secure protocols between the UA and GCS (over direct wireless and Internet connection), between the UAS and the Net-RID SP, and/or between the Net-RID DP and Observer devices. Informative note: Neither link layer protocols nor the use of links (e.g., the link often existing between the GCS and the UA) for any purpose other than carriage of RID information is in the scope of [F3411-19] Network RID. 1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability With Net-RID, there is direct communication between the UAS and its USS. With Broadcast-RID, the UAS Operator has either pre-filed a 4D space volume for USS operational knowledge and/or Observers can be providing information about observed UA to a USS. USS exchange information via a Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS) so all USS collectively have knowledge about all activities in a 4D airspace. The interactions among Observer, UA, and USS are shown in Figure 3. +----------+ | Observer | +----------+ / \ / \ +-----+ +-----+ | UAS1 | | UAS2 | +-----+ +-----+ \ / \ / +----------+ | Internet | +----------+ / \ / \ +-------+ +-------+ | USS1 | <-------> | USS2 | +-------+ +-------+ \ / \ / +------+ | DSS | +------+ Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 7] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 Figure 3 1.4. Overview of DRIP Architecture The requirements document [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs] provides an extended introduction to the problem space and use cases. Only a brief summary of that introduction is restated here as context, with reference to the general UAS RID usage scenarios shown in Figure 4. General x x Public Public xxxxx xxxxx Safety Observer x x Observer x x x x ---------+ +---------- x x x x | | x x | | UA1 x x | | +------------ x x UA2 xxxxx | | | xxxxx | + + + | | xxxxxxxxxx | | x x | +----------+x Internet x+------------+ UA1 | x x | UA1 Pilot x | xxxxxxxxxx | x Pilot Operator xxxxx + + + xxxxx Operator GCS1 x | | | x GCS2 x | | | x x x | | | x x x x | | | x x | | | +----------+ | | | +----------+ | |------+ | +-------| | | Public | | | Private | | Registry | +-----+ | Registry | | | | DNS | | | +----------+ +-----+ +----------+ Figure 4 DRIP is meant to leverage existing Internet resources (standard protocols, services, infrastructures, and business models) to meet UAS RID and closely related needs. DRIP will specify how to apply IETF standards, complementing [F3411-19] and other external standards, to satisfy UAS RID requirements. Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 8] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 This document outlines the UAS RID architecture. This includes presenting the gaps between the CAAs' Concepts of Operations and [F3411-19] as it relates to the use of Internet technologies and UA direct RF communications. Issues include, but are not limited to: - Design of trustworthy remote ID and trust in RID messages (Section 4) - Mechanisms to leverage Domain Name System (including DNS: [RFC1034]), Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP [RFC5731]) and Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) ([RFC7482]) for publishing public and private information (see Section 5.1 and Section 5.2). - Harvesting broadcast RID messages for UTM inclusion (Section 6). - Privacy in RID messages (PII protection) (Section 9). 2. Terms and Definitions 2.1. Architecture Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown above. 2.2. Abbreviations ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast DSS: Discovery & Synchronization Service EdDSA: Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm GCS: Ground Control Station HHIT: Hierarchical HIT Registries HIP: Host Identity Protocol HIT: Host Identity Tag RID: Remote ID Net-RID SP: Network RID Service Provider Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 9] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 Net-RID DP: Network RID Display Provider. PII: Personally Identifiable Information RF: Radio Frequency SDSP: Supplemental Data Service Provider UA: Unmanned Aircraft UAS: Unmanned Aircraft System USS: UAS Service Supplier UTM: UAS Traffic Management 2.3. Additional Definitions This document uses terms defined in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. 3. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates This section introduces the terms "Claims", "Assertions", "Attestations", and "Certificates" as used in DRIP. DRIP certificate has a different context compared with security certificates and Public Key Infrastructure used in X.509. Claims: A claim in DRIP is a predicate (e.g., "X is Y", "X has property Y", and most importantly "X owns Y" or "X is owned by Y"). Assertions: An assertion in DRIP is a set of claims. This definition is borrowed from JWT [RFC7519] and CWT [RFC8392]. Attestations: An attestation in DRIP is a signed assertion. The signer may be a claimant or a third party. Under DRIP this is normally used when an entity asserts a relationship with another entity, along with other information, and the asserting entity signs the assertion, thereby making it an attestation. Certificates: Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 10] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 A certificate in DRIP is an attestation, strictly over identity information, signed by a third party. 4. HHIT as the DRIP Entity Identifier This section describes the DRIP architectural approach to meeting the basic requirements of a DRIP entity identifier within external technical standard ASTM [F3411-19] and regulatory constraints. It justifies and explains the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags (HHITs) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses suitable as a UAS ID type and more generally as trustworthy multipurpose remote identifiers. Self-asserting in this usage is given the Host Identity (HI), the HHIT ORCHID construction and a signature of the HHIT by the HI can both be validated. The explicit registration hierarchy within the HHIT provides registry discovery (managed by a Registrar) to either yield the HI for 3rd-party (who is looking for ID attestation) validation or prove the HHIT and HI have uniquely been registered. 4.1. UAS Remote Identifiers Problem Space A DRIP entity identifier needs to be "Trustworthy" (See DRIP Requirement about GEN-1, ID-4 and ID-5 in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]). This means that within the framework of the RID messages, an Observer can establish that the DRIP identifier uniquely belong to the UAS. That the only way for any other UAS to assert this DRIP identifier would be to steal something from within the UAS. The DRIP identifier is self-generated by the UAS (either UA or GCS) and registered with the USS. The Broadcast RID data exchange faces extreme challenges due to the limitation of the demanding support for Bluetooth. The ASTM [F3411-19] defines the basic RID message which is expected to contain certain RID data and the Authentication message. The Basic RID message has a maximum payload of 25 bytes and the maximum size allocated by ASTM for the RID is 20 bytes. currently, the authentication maximum payload is defined to be 201 bytes (9 paged Bluetooth 4 messages). 4.2. HIT as A Trustworthy DRIP Entity Identifier A Remote ID that can be trustworthily used in the RID Broadcast mode can be built from an asymmetric keypair. Rather than using a key signing operation to claim ownership of an ID that does not guarantee name uniqueness, in this method the ID is cryptographically derived directly from the public key. The proof of ID ownership (verifiable attestation, versus mere claim) is guaranteed by signing this cryptographic ID with the associated private key. The association Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 11] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 between the ID and the private key is ensured by cryptographically binding the public key with the ID, more specifically the ID results from the hash of the public key. It is statistically hard for another entity to create a public key that would generate (spoof) the ID. The HITs is designed statistically unique through the cryptographic hash feature of second-preimage resistance. The cryptographically- bound addition of the Hierarchy and an HHIT registration process (e.g. based on Extensible Provisioning Protocol, [RFC5730]) provide complete, global HHIT uniqueness. This registration forces the attacker to generate the same public key rather than a public key that generates the same HHIT. This is in contrast to general IDs (e.g. a UUID or device serial number) as the subject in an X.509 certificate. A DRIP identifier can be assigned to a UAS as a static HHIT by its manufacturer, such as a single HI and derived HHIT encoded as a hardware serial number per [CTA2063A]. Such a static HHIT can only be used to bind one-time use DRIP identifiers to the unique UA. Depending upon implementation, this may leave a HI private key in the possession of the manufacturer (more details in Section 8). In another case, a UAS equipped for Broadcast RID can be provisioned not only with its HHIT but also with the HI public key from which the HHIT was derived and the corresponding private key, to enable message signature. A UAS equipped for Network RID can be provisioned likewise; the private key resides only in the ultimate source of Network RID messages (i.e. on the UA itself if the GCS is merely relaying rather than sourcing Network RID messages). Each Observer device can be provisioned either with public keys of the DRIP identifier root registries or certificates for subordinate registries. HHITs can also be used throughout the USS/UTM system. The Operators, Private Information Registries, as well as other UTM entities, can use HHITs for their IDs. Such HHITs can facilitate DRIP security functions such as used with HIP to strongly mutually authenticate and encrypt communications. A self-attestation of the HHIT RID can be done in as little as 84 bytes, by avoiding an explicit encoding technology like ASN.1 or Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR [RFC8949]). This attestation consists of only the HHIT, a timestamp, and the EdDSA signature on them. Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 12] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 An Observer would need Internet access to validate a self- attestations claim. A third-party Certificate can be validated via a small credential cache in a disconnected environment. This third- party Certificate is possible when the third-party also uses HHITs for its identity and the UA has the public key and the Certificate for that HHIT. 4.3. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Registration and Lookup Remote ID needs a deterministic lookup mechanism that rapidly provides actionable information about the identified UA. Given the size constraints imposed by the Bluetooth 4 broadcast media, the Remote ID itself needs to be a non-spoofable inquiry input into the lookup. A DRIP registration process based on the explicit hierarchy within a HHIT provides manageable uniqueness of the HI for the HHIT (defense against a cryptographic hash second pre-image attack on the HHIT; e.g. multiple HIs yielding the same HHIT). A lookup of the HHIT into this registration data provides the registered HI for HHIT proof. A first-come-first-serve registration for a HHIT provides deterministic access to any other needed actionable information based on inquiry access authority (more details in Section 5.2). 4.4. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Cryptographic The only (known to the authors of this document at the time of its writing) extant fixed-length ID cryptographically derived from a public key are the Host Identity Tag [RFC7401], HITs, and Cryptographically Generated Addresses [RFC3972], CGAs. However, both HITs and CGAs lack registration/retrieval capability. HHIT, on the other hand, is capable of providing a cryptographic hashing function, along with a registration process to mitigate the probability of a hash collision (first registered, first allowed). 5. DRIP Identifier Registration and Registries DRIP registries hold both public and private UAS information resulting from the DRIP identifier registration process. Given these different uses, and to improve scalability, security, and simplicity of administration, the public and private information can be stored in different registries. This section introduces the public and private information registries for DRIP identifiers. 5.1. Public Information Registry Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 13] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 5.1.1. Background The public registry provides trustable information such as attestations of RID ownership and registration with the HDA (Hierarchical HIT Domain Authority). Optionally, pointers to the repositories for the HDA and RAA (Registered Assigning Authority)implicit in the RID can be included (e.g., for HDA and RAA HHIT|HI used in attestation signing operations). This public information will be principally used by Observers of Broadcast RID messages. Data on UAS that only use Network RID, is available via an Observer's Net-RID DP that would tend to directly provide all public registry information. The Observer may visually "see" these Net-RID UAS, but they may be silent to the Observer. The Net-RID DP is the only source of information based on a query for an airspace volume. 5.1.2. DNS as the Public DRIP Identifier Registry A DRIP identifier is amenable to handling as an Internet domain name (at an arbitrary level in the hierarchy, e.g. in .ip6.arpa). Thus DNS can provide all the needed public DRIP information. A standardized HHIT FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) can deliver the HI via a HIP RR (Resource Record) [RFC8005] and other public information (e.g., RRA and HDA ptrs, and HIP RVS (Rendezvous Servers) [RFC8004]). These public information registries can use secure DNS transport (e.g. DNS over TLS) to deliver public information that is not inherently trustable (e.g. everything other than attestations). 5.2. Private Information Registry 5.2.1. Background The private information required for DRIP identifiers is similar to that required for Internet domain name registration. A DRIP identifier solution can leverage existing Internet resources: registration protocols, infrastructure, and business models, by fitting into an ID structure compatible with DNS names. The HHIT hierarchy can provide the needed scalability and management structure. It is expected that the private registry function will be provided by the same organizations that run a USS, and likely integrated with a USS. The lookup function may be implemented by the Net-RID DPs. Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 14] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 5.2.2. EPP and RDAP as the Private DRIP Identifier Registry A DRIP private information registry supports essential registry operations (e.g. add, delete, update, query) using interoperable open standard protocols. It can accomplish this by using the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP [RFC5730]) and the Registry Data Access Protocol (RDAP RFC7480] [RFC7482] [RFC7483]). The DRIP private information registry in which a given UAS is registered needs to be findable, starting from the UAS ID, using the methods specified in [RFC7484]. 5.2.3. Alternative Private DRIP Registry methods A DRIP private information registry might be an access controlled DNS (e.g. via DNS over TLS). Additionally, WebFinger [RFC7033] can be deployed. These alternative methods may be used by Net-RID DP with specific customers. 6. Harvesting Broadcast Remote ID messages for UTM Inclusion ASTM anticipated that regulators would require both Broadcast RID and Network RID for large UAS, but allow RID requirements for small UAS to be satisfied with the operator's choice of either Broadcast RID or Network RID. The EASA initially specified Broadcast RID for UAS of essentially all UAS and is now also considering Network RID. The FAA RID Final Rules [FAA_RID] only specify Broadcast RID for UAS, however, still encourages Network RID for complementary functionality, especially in support of UTM. One obvious opportunity is to enhance the architecture with gateways from Broadcast RID to Network RID. This provides the best of both and gives regulators and operators flexibility. It offers considerable enhancement over some Network RID options such as only reporting planned 4D operation space by the operator. These gateways could be pre-positioned (e.g. around airports, public gatherings, and other sensitive areas) and/or crowd-sourced (as nothing more than a smartphone with a suitable app is needed). As Broadcast RID media have limited range, gateways receiving messages claiming locations far from the gateway can alert authorities or a SDSP to the failed sanity check possibly indicating intent to deceive. Surveillance SDSPs can use messages with precise date/time/ position stamps from the gateways to multilaterate UA location, independent of the locations claimed in the messages (which may have a natural time lag as it is), which are entirely operator self- reported in UAS RID and UTM, and thus are subject not only to natural time lag and error but also operator misconfiguration or intentional deception. Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 15] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 Further, gateways with additional sensors (e.g. smartphones with cameras) can provide independent information on the UA type and size, confirming or refuting those claims made in the RID messages. This Crowd Sourced Remote ID (CS-RID) would be a significant enhancement, beyond baseline DRIP functionality; if implemented, it adds two more entity types. 6.1. The CS-RID Finder A CS-RID Finder is the gateway for Broadcast Remote ID Messages into the UTM. It performs this gateway function via a CS-RID SDSP. A CS- RID Finder could implement, integrate, or accept outputs from, a Broadcast RID receiver. However, it should not depend upon a direct interface with a GCS, Net-RID SP, Net-RID DP or Network RID client. It would present a TBD interface to a CS-RID SDSP; this interface should be based upon but readily distinguishable from that between a GCS and a Net-RID SP. 6.2. The CS-RID SDSP A CS-RID SDSP would present a TBD interface to a CS-RID Finder; this interface should be based upon but readily distinguishable from that between a GCS and a Net-RID SP. A CS-RID SDSP should appear (i.e. present the same interface) to a Net-RID SP as a Net-RID DP. 7. IANA Consideration This document does not make any IANA request. 8. Security Considerations The security provided by asymmetric cryptographic techniques depends upon protection of the private keys. A manufacturer that embeds a private key in an UA may have retained a copy. A manufacturer whose UA are configured by a closed source application on the GCS which communicates over the Internet with the factory may be sending a copy of a UA or GCS self-generated key back to the factory. Keys may be extracted from a GCS or UA. The RID sender of a small harmless UA (or the entire UA) could be carried by a larger dangerous UA as a "false flag." Compromise of a registry private key could do widespread harm. Key revocation procedures are as yet to be determined. These risks are in addition to those involving Operator key management practices. Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 16] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 9. Privacy & Transparency Considerations Broadcast RID messages can contain PII. A viable architecture for PII protection would be symmetric encryption of the PII using a session key known to the UAS and its USS. An authorized Observer could send the encrypted PII along with the UAS ID (to the USS in which the UAS ID is registered if that can be determined, e.g., from received Broadcast RID information such as the UAS ID itself, or to the Observer's USS, or to a Public Safety USS) to get the plaintext. Alternatively, the authorized Observer can receive the key to directly decrypt all PII content sent by that UA during that session (UAS operation). An authorized Observer can instruct a UAS via the USS that conditions have changed mandating no PII protection or land the UA (abort the operation). PII can be protected unless the UAS is informed otherwise. This could come as part of UTM operation authorization. It can be special instructions at the start or during an operation. PII protection can not be used if the UAS loses connectivity to the USS. The UAS always has the option to abort the operation if PII protection is disallowed. 10. References 10.1. Normative References [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs] Card, S. W., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A. Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- ietf-drip-reqs-17, 7 July 2021, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . 10.2. Informative References Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 17] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 [CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers", 2019. [Delegated] European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators of unmanned aircraft systems", 2019. [F3411-19] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking", 2019. [FAA_RID] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft", 2021, . [FAA_UAS_Concept_Of_Ops] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) Concept of Operations (V2.0)", 2020, . [Implementing] European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft", 2019. [LAANC] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability", n.d., . [NPRM] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", 2019. [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987, . [RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005, . Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 18] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 [RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009, . [RFC5731] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731, DOI 10.17487/RFC5731, August 2009, . [RFC7033] Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., Jones, M., and J. Smarr, "WebFinger", RFC 7033, DOI 10.17487/RFC7033, September 2013, . [RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015, . [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015, . [RFC7483] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7483, DOI 10.17487/RFC7483, March 2015, . [RFC7484] Blanchet, M., "Finding the Authoritative Registration Data (RDAP) Service", RFC 7484, DOI 10.17487/RFC7484, March 2015, . [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, . [RFC8004] Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Rendezvous Extension", RFC 8004, DOI 10.17487/RFC8004, October 2016, . [RFC8005] Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name System (DNS) Extension", RFC 8005, DOI 10.17487/RFC8005, October 2016, . [RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392, May 2018, . Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 19] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 [RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020, . [TS-22.825] 3GPP, "Study on Remote Identification of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)", n.d., . [U-Space] European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL), "U-space Concept of Operations", 2019, . Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) A.1. Operation Concept The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and FAA's effort of integrating UAS's operation into the national airspace system (NAS) led to the development of the concept of UTM and the ecosystem around it. The UTM concept was initially presented in 2013 and version 2.0 was published in 2020 [FAA_UAS_Concept_Of_Ops]. The eventual concept refinement, initial prototype implementation and testing were conducted by the UTM research transition team which is the joint workforce by FAA and NASA. World efforts took place afterward. The Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) started the CORUS project to research its UTM counterpart concept, namely [U-Space]. This effort is led by the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol). Both NASA and SESAR have published the UTM concept of operations to guide the development of their future air traffic management (ATM) system and ensure safe and efficient integrations of manned and unmanned aircraft into the national airspace. The UTM comprises UAS operation infrastructure, procedures and local regulation compliance policies to guarantee safe UAS integration and operation. The main functionality of a UTM includes, but is not limited to, providing means of communication between UAS operators and service providers and a platform to facilitate communication among UAS service providers. Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 20] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) A USS plays an important role to fulfill the key performance indicators (KPIs) that a UTM has to offer. Such Entity acts as a proxy between UAS operators and UTM service providers. It provides services like real-time UAS traffic monitoring and planning, aeronautical data archiving, airspace and violation control, interacting with other third-party control entities, etc. A USS can coexist with other USS to build a large service coverage map which can load-balance, relay and share UAS traffic information. The FAA works with UAS industry shareholders and promotes the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability [LAANC] program which is the first system to realize some of the UTM envisioned functionality. The LAANC program can automate the UAS's flight plan application and approval process for airspace authorization in real- time by checking against multiple aeronautical databases such as airspace classification and fly rules associated with it, FAA UAS facility map, special use airspace, Notice to Airman (NOTAM), and Temporary Flight Rule (TFR). A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations This section illustrates a couple of use case scenarios where UAS participation in UTM has significant safety improvement. 1. For a UAS participating in UTM and taking off or landing in a controlled airspace (e.g., Class Bravo, Charlie, Delta and Echo in the United States), the USS under which the UAS is operating is responsible for verifying UA registration, authenticating the UAS operational intent (flight plan) by checking against designated UAS fly map database, obtaining the air traffic control (ATC) authorization and monitor the UAS flight path in order to maintain safe margins and follow the pre-authorized sequence of authorized 4-D volumes (route). 2. For a UAS participating in UTM and taking off or landing in an uncontrolled airspace (ex. Class Golf in the United States), pre-flight authorization must be obtained from a USS when operating beyond-visual-of-sight (BVLOS). The USS either accepts or rejects received operational intent (flight plan) from the UAS. Accepted UAS operation may share its current flight data such as GPS position and altitude to USS. The USS may keep the UAS operation status near real-time and may keep it as a record for overall airspace air traffic monitoring. Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 21] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 Appendix B. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) The ADS-B is the de jure technology used in manned aviation for sharing location information, from the aircraft to ground and satellite-based systems, designed in the early 2000s. Broadcast RID is conceptually similar to ADS-B, but with the receiver target being the general public on generally available devices (e.g. smartphones). For numerous technical reasons, ADS-B itself is not suitable for low- flying small UA. Technical reasons include but not limited to the following: 1. Lack of support for the 1090 MHz ADS-B channel on any consumer handheld devices 2. Weight and cost of ADS-B transponders on CSWaP constrained UA 3. Limited bandwidth of both uplink and downlink, which would likely be saturated by large numbers of UAS, endangering manned aviation Understanding these technical shortcomings, regulators worldwide have ruled out the use of ADS-B for the small UAS for which UAS RID and DRIP are intended. Acknowledgements The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM and proposed IETF DRIP WG efforts. The work of ASTM F38.02 in balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the necessary rapid and widespread deployment of UAS RID. IETF volunteers who have contributed to this draft include Amelia Andersdotter and Mohamed Boucadair. Authors' Addresses Stuart W. Card AX Enterprize 4947 Commercial Drive Yorkville, NY, 13495 United States of America Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com Adam Wiethuechter AX Enterprize 4947 Commercial Drive Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 22] Internet-Draft DRIP Architecture July 2021 Yorkville, NY, 13495 United States of America Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com Robert Moskowitz HTT Consulting Oak Park, MI, 48237 United States of America Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com Shuai Zhao Tencent 2747 Park Blvd Palo Alto, 94588 United States of America Email: shuai.zhao@ieee.org Andrei Gurtov Linköping University IDA SE-58183 Linköping Linköping Sweden Email: gurtov@acm.org Card, et al. Expires 26 January 2022 [Page 23]