DNS PRIVate Exchange (dprive) Working Group S. Bortzmeyer
Internet-Draft AFNIC
Intended status: Informational February 19, 2015
Expires: August 23, 2015
DNS privacy considerations
draft-ietf-dprive-problem-statement-02
Abstract
This document describes the privacy issues associated with the use of
the DNS by Internet users. It is intended to be an analysis of the
present situation and does not prescribe solutions.
Discussions of the document should take place on the DPRIVE working
group mailing list [dprive].
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 23, 2015.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. The alleged public nature of DNS data . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Data in the DNS request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Cache snooping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. On the wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5. In the servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.5.1. In the recursive resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.5.2. In the authoritative name servers . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.5.3. Rogue servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Actual "attacks" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Legalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
This document is an analysis of the DNS privacy issues, in the spirit
of section 8 of [RFC6973].
The Domain Name System is specified in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035]. It
is one of the most important infrastructure components of the
Internet and often ignored or misunderstood. Almost every activity
on the Internet starts with a DNS query (and often several). Its use
has many privacy implications and this is an attempt at a
comprehensive and accurate list.
Let us begin with a simplified reminder of how the DNS works.
(REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION: We hope that the document
[I-D.hoffman-dns-terminology] will be published as a RFC so most of
this section could be replaced by a reference to it.) A client, the
stub resolver, issues a DNS query to a server, called the recursive
resolver (also called caching resolver or full resolver or recursive
name server). Let's use the query "What are the AAAA records for
www.example.com?" as an example. AAAA is the qtype (Query Type), and
www.example.com is the qname (Query Name). The recursive resolver
will first query the root nameservers. In most cases, the root
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nameservers will send a referral. In this example, the referral will
be to the .com nameservers. The resolver repeats the query to one of
the .com nameservers. The .com nameservers, in turn, will refer to
the example.com nameservers. The example.com nameserver will then
return the answer. The root name servers, the name servers of .com
and the name servers of example.com are called authoritative name
servers. It is important, when analyzing the privacy issues, to
remember that the question asked to all these name servers is always
the original question, not a derived question. The question sent to
the root name servers is "What are the AAAA records for
www.example.com?", not "What are the name servers of .com?". By
repeating the full question, instead of just the relevant part of the
question to the next in line, the DNS provides more information than
necessary to the nameserver.
Because DNS relies on caching heavily, not all questions are sent to
the authoritative name servers. If a few seconds later the stub
resolver asks to the recursive resolver, "What are the SRV records of
_xmpp-server._tcp.example.com?", the recursive resolver will remember
that it knows the name servers of example.com and will just query
them, bypassing the root and .com. Because there is typically no
caching in the stub resolver, the recursive resolver, unlike the
authoritative servers, sees all the DNS traffic. (Applications, like
Web browsers, may have some form of caching, which do not follow DNS
rules. So, the recursive resolver does not see all the name
resolution activity.)
It should be noted that DNS recursive resolvers sometimes forward
requests to other recursive resolvers, typically bigger machines,
with a larger and more shared cache (and the query hierarchy can be
even deeper, with more than two levels of recursive resolvers). From
the point of view of privacy, these forwarders are like resolvers,
except that they do not see all of the requests being made (due to
caching in the first resolver).
All this DNS traffic is currently sent in clear (unencryted), except
a few cases when the IP traffic is protected, for instance in an
IPsec VPN.
Today, almost all DNS queries are sent over UDP. This has practical
consequences when considering encryption of the traffic as a possible
privacy technique. Some encryption solutions are only designed for
TCP, not UDP.
Another important point to keep in mind when analyzing the privacy
issues of DNS is the mix of many sort of DNS requests received by a
server. Let's assume an eavesdropper wants to know which Web page is
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viewed by an user. For a typical Web page, there are three sorts of
DNS requests being issued:
Primary request: this is the domain name in the URL that the user
typed, selected from a bookmark or chose by clicking on an
hyperlink. Presumably, this is what is of interest for the
eavesdropper.
Secondary requests: these are the additional requests performed by
the user agent (here, the Web browser) without any direct
involvement or knowledge of the user. For the Web, they are
triggered by embedded content, CSS sheets, JavaScript code,
embedded images, etc. In some cases, there can be dozens of
domain names in different contexts on a single Web page.
Tertiary requests: these are the additional requests performed by
the DNS system itself. For instance, if the answer to a query is
a referral to a set of name servers, and the glue records are not
returned, the resolver will have to do additional requests to turn
name servers' names into IP addresses. Similarly, even if glue
records are returned, a careful recursive server will do tertiary
requests to verify the IP addresses of those records.
It can be noted also that, in the case of a typical Web browser, more
DNS requests are sent, for instance to prefetch resources that the
user may query later, or when autocompleting the URL in the address
bar (which obviously is a big privacy concern).
For privacy-related terms, we will use here the terminology of
[RFC6973].
2. Risks
This document focuses mostly on the study of privacy risks for the
end-user (the one performing DNS requests). We consider the risks of
pervasive surveillance ([RFC7258]) as well as risks coming from a
more focused surveillance. Privacy risks for the holder of a zone
(the risk that someone gets the data) are discussed in [RFC5936] and
[RFC5155]. Non-privacy risks (such as cache poisoning) are out of
scope.
2.1. The alleged public nature of DNS data
It has long been claimed that "the data in the DNS is public". While
this sentence makes sense for an Internet-wide lookup system, there
are multiple facets to the data and metadata involved that deserve a
more detailed look. First, access control lists and private
namespaces nonwithstanding, the DNS operates under the assumption
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that public facing authoritative name servers will respond to "usual"
DNS queries for any zone they are authoritative for without further
authentication or authorization of the client (resolver). Due to the
lack of search capabilities, only a given qname will reveal the
resource records associated with that name (or that name's non-
existence). In other words: one needs to know what to ask for, in
order to receive a response. The zone transfer qtype [RFC5936] is
often blocked or restricted to authenticated/authorized access to
enforce this difference (and maybe for other, more dubious reasons).
Another differentiation to be considered is between the DNS data
itself and a particular transaction (i.e., a DNS name lookup). DNS
data and the results of a DNS query are public, within the boundaries
described above, and may not have any confidentiality requirements.
However, the same is not true of a single transaction or sequence of
transactions; that transaction is not/should not be public. A
typical example from outside the DNS world is: the Web site of
Alcoholics Anonymous is public; the fact that you visit it should not
be.
2.2. Data in the DNS request
The DNS request includes many fields but two of them seem
particularly relevant for the privacy issues: the qname and the
source IP address. "source IP address" is used in a loose sense of
"source IP address + maybe source port", because the port is also in
the request and can be used to sort out several users sharing an IP
address (behind a CGN for instance [RFC6269]).
The qname is the full name sent by the user. It gives information
about what the user does ("What are the MX records of example.net?"
means he probably wants to send email to someone at example.net,
which may be a domain used by only a few persons and therefore very
revealing about communication relationships). Some qnames are more
sensitive than others. For instance, querying the A record of
google-analytics.com reveals very little (everybody visits Web sites
which use Google Analytics) but querying the A record of
www.verybad.example where verybad.example is the domain of an illegal
or very offensive organization may create more problems for the user.
Also, sometimes, the qname embeds the software one uses, which could
be a privacy issue. For instance, _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-
Name._sites.gc._msdcs.example.org. There are also some BitTorrent
clients that query a SRV record for _bittorrent-
tracker._tcp.domain.example.
Another important thing about the privacy of the qname is the future
usages. Today, the lack of privacy is an obstacle to putting
potentially sensitive or personally identifiable data in the DNS. At
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the moment your DNS traffic might reveal that you are doing email but
not with whom. If your MUA starts looking up PGP keys in the DNS
[I-D.wouters-dane-openpgp] then privacy becomes a lot more important.
And email is just an example; there would be other really interesting
uses for a more privacy-friendly DNS.
For the communication between the stub resolver and the recursive
resolver, the source IP address is the address of the user's machine.
Therefore, all the issues and warnings about collection of IP
addresses apply here. For the communication between the recursive
resolver and the authoritative name servers, the source IP address
has a different meaning; it does not have the same status as the
source address in a HTTP connection. It is now the IP address of the
recursive resolver which, in a way "hides" the real user. However,
hiding does not always work. Sometimes
[I-D.ietf-dnsop-edns-client-subnet] is used (see its privacy analysis
in [denis-edns-client-subnet]). Sometimes the end user has a
personal recursive resolver on her machine. In both cases, the IP
address is as sensitive as it is for HTTP.
A note about IP addresses: there is currently no IETF document which
describes in detail all the privacy issues around IP addressing. In
the meantime, the discussion here is intended to include both IPv4
and IPv6 source addresses. For a number of reasons their assignment
and utilization characteristics are different, which may have
implications for details of information leakage associated with the
collection of source addresses. (For example, a specific IPv6 source
address seen on the public Internet is less likely than an IPv4
address to originate behind a CGN or other NAT.) However, for both
IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, it's important to note that source addresses
are propagated with queries and comprise metadata about the host,
user, or application that originated them.
2.3. Cache snooping
The content of recursive resolvers' caches can reveal data about the
clients using it (the privacy risks depend on the number of clients).
This information can sometimes be examined by sending DNS queries
with RD=0 to inspect cache content, particularly looking at the DNS
TTLs. Since this also is a reconnaissance technique for subsequent
cache poisoning attacks, some counter measures have already been
developed and deployed.
2.4. On the wire
DNS traffic can be seen by an eavesdropper like any other traffic.
It is typically not encrypted. (DNSSEC, specified in [RFC4033]
explicitly excludes confidentiality from its goals.) So, if an
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initiator starts a HTTPS communication with a recipient, while the
HTTP traffic will be encrypted, the DNS exchange prior to it will not
be. When other protocols will become more and more privacy-aware and
secured against surveillance, the DNS risks to become "the weakest
link" in privacy.
An important specificity of the DNS traffic is that it may take a
different path than the communication between the initiator and the
recipient. For instance, an eavesdropper may be unable to tap the
wire between the initiator and the recipient but may have access to
the wire going to the recursive resolver, or to the authoritative
name servers.
The best place to tap, from an eavesdropper's point of view, is
clearly between the stub resolvers and the recursive resolvers,
because traffic is not limited by DNS caching.
The attack surface between the stub resolver and the rest of the
world can vary widely depending upon how the end user's computer is
configured. By order of increasing attack surface:
The recursive resolver can be on the end user's computer. In
(currently) a small number of cases, individuals may choose to
operate their own DNS resolver on their local machine. In this case
the attack surface for the connection between the stub resolver and
the caching resolver is limited to that single machine.
The recursive resolver may be at the local network edge. For many/
most enterprise networks and for some residential users the caching
resolver may exist on a server at the edge of the local network. In
this case the attack surface is the local network. Note that in
large enterprise networks the DNS resolver may not be located at the
edge of the local network but rather at the edge of the overall
enterprise network. In this case the enterprise network could be
thought of as similar to the IAP network referenced below.
The recursive resolver can be in the IAP (Internet Access Provider)
premises. For most residential users and potentially other networks
the typical case is for the end user's computer to be configured
(typically automatically through DHCP) with the addresses of the DNS
recursive resolvers at the IAP. The attack surface for on-the-wire
attacks is therefore from the end user system across the local
network and across the IAP network to the IAP's recursive resolvers.
The recursive resolver can be a public DNS service. Some machines
may be configured to use public DNS resolvers such as those operated
by Google Public DNS or OpenDNS. The end user may have configured
their machine to use these DNS recursive resolvers themselves - or
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their IAP may have chosen to use the public DNS resolvers rather than
operating their own resolvers. In this case the attack surface is
the entire public Internet between the end user's connection and the
public DNS service.
2.5. In the servers
Using the terminology of [RFC6973], the DNS servers (recursive
resolvers and authoritative servers) are enablers: they facilitate
communication between an initiator and a recipient without being
directly in the communications path. As a result, they are often
forgotten in risk analysis. But, to quote again [RFC6973], "Although
[...] enablers may not generally be considered as attackers, they may
all pose privacy threats (depending on the context) because they are
able to observe, collect, process, and transfer privacy-relevant
data." In [RFC6973] parlance, enablers become observers when they
start collecting data.
Many programs exist to collect and analyze DNS data at the servers.
From the "query log" of some programs like BIND, to tcpdump and more
sophisticated programs like PacketQ [packetq] and DNSmezzo
[dnsmezzo]. The organization managing the DNS server can use these
data itself or it can be part of a surveillance program like PRISM
[prism] and pass data to an outside observer.
Sometimes, these data are kept for a long time and/or distributed to
third parties, for research purposes [ditl] [day-at-root], for
security analysis, or for surveillance tasks. These uses are
sometimes under some sort of contract, with various limitations, for
instance on redistribution, giving the sensitive nature of the data.
Also, there are observation points in the network which gather DNS
data and then make it accessible to third-parties for research or
security purposes ("passive DNS [passive-dns]").
2.5.1. In the recursive resolvers
Recursive Resolvers see all the traffic since there is typically no
caching before them. To summarize: your recursive resolver knows a
lot about you. The resolver of a large IAP, or a large public
resolver can collect data from many users. You may get an idea of
the data collected by reading the privacy policy of a big public
resolver [1].
2.5.2. In the authoritative name servers
Unlike what happens for recursive resolvers, observation capabilities
of authoritative name servers are limited by caching; they see only
the requests for which the answer was not in the cache. For
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aggregated statistics ("What is the percentage of LOC queries?"),
this is sufficient; but it prevents an observer from seeing
everything. Still, the authoritative name servers see a part of the
traffic, and this subset may be sufficient to violate some privacy
expectations.
Also, the end user has typically some legal/contractual link with the
recursive resolver (he has chosen the IAP, or he has chosen to use a
given public resolver), while having no control and perhaps no
awareness of the role of the authoritative name servers and their
observation abilities.
As noted before, using a local resolver or a resolver close to the
machine decreases the attack surface for an on-the-wire eavesdropper.
But it may decrease privacy against an observer located on an
authoritative name server. This authoritative name server will see
the IP address of the end client, instead of the address of a big
recursive resolver shared by many users.
This "protection", when using a large resolver with many clients, is
no longer present if [I-D.ietf-dnsop-edns-client-subnet] is used
because, in this case, the authoritative name server sees the
original IP address (or prefix, depending on the setup).
As of today, all the instances of one root name server, L-root,
receive together around 20,000 queries per second. While most of it
is junk (errors on the TLD name), it gives an idea of the amount of
big data which pours into name servers.
Many domains, including TLDs, are partially hosted by third-party
servers, sometimes in a different country. The contracts between the
domain manager and these servers may or may not take privacy into
account. Whatever the contract, the third-party hoster may be honest
or not but, in any case, it will have to follow its local laws. It
may be surprising for an end-user that requests to a given ccTLD may
go to servers managed by organisations outside of the country.
Also, it seems [aeris-dns] that there is a strong concentration of
authoritative name servers among "popular" domains (such as the Alexa
Top N list). For instance, among the Alexa Top 100k, one DNS
provider hosts today 10 % of the domains. The ten most important DNS
providers host together one third of the domains. With the control
(or the ability to sniff the traffic) of a few name servers, you can
gather a lot of information.
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2.5.3. Rogue servers
A rogue DHCP server, or a trusted DHCP server that has had its
configuration altered by malicious parties, can direct you to a rogue
recursive resolver. Most of the time, it seems to be done to divert
traffic, by providing lies for some domain names. But it could be
used just to capture the traffic and gather information about you.
Same thing for malware like DNSchanger[dnschanger] which changes the
recursive resolver in the machine's configuration, or with
transparent DNS proxies in the network that will divert the traffic
intended for a legitimate DNS server (for instance
[turkey-googledns]).
3. Actual "attacks"
A very quick examination of DNS traffic may lead to the false
conclusion that extracting the needle from the haystack is difficult.
"Interesting" primary DNS requests are mixed with useless (for the
eavesdropper) secondary and tertiary requests (see the terminology in
Section 1). But, in this time of "big data" processing, powerful
techniques now exist to get from the raw data to what the
eavesdropper is actually interested in.
Many research papers about malware detection use DNS traffic to
detect "abnormal" behaviour that can be traced back to the activity
of malware on infected machines. Yes, this research was done for the
good; but, technically, it is a privacy attack and it demonstrates
the power of the observation of DNS traffic. See [dns-footprint],
[dagon-malware] and [darkreading-dns].
Passive DNS systems [passive-dns] allow reconstruction of the data of
sometimes an entire zone. They are used for many reasons, some good,
some bad. Well-known passive DNS systems keep only the DNS
responses, and not the source IP address of the client, precisely for
privacy reasons. Other passive DNS systems may not be so careful.
And there is still the potential problems with revealing qnames.
The revelations (from the Edward Snowden documents, leaked from the
NSA) of the MORECOWBELL surveillance program [morecowbell], which
uses the DNS, both passively and actively, to gather surreptitiously
information about the users, is another good example that the lack of
privacy protections in the DNS is actively exploited.
4. Legalities
To our knowledge, there are no specific privacy laws for DNS data.
Interpreting general privacy laws like [data-protection-directive]
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(European Union) in the context of DNS traffic data is not an easy
task and it seems there is no court precedent here.
5. Security considerations
This document is entirely about security, more precisely privacy. It
just lays out the problem, it does not try to set requirments (with
the choices and compromises they imply), much less to define
solutions. A possible document on requirments for DNS privacy is
[I-D.hallambaker-dnse]. Possible solutions to the issues described
here are discussed in other documents (currently too many to all be
mentioned), see for instance [I-D.ietf-dnsop-qname-minimisation] for
the minimisation of data, or [I-D.hzhwm-start-tls-for-dns] about
encryption.
6. Acknowledgments
Thanks to Nathalie Boulvard and to the CENTR members for the original
work which leaded to this document. Thanks to Ondrej Sury for the
interesting discussions. Thanks to Mohsen Souissi and John Heidemann
for proofreading, to Paul Hoffman, Marcos Sanz, Tim Wicinski, Allison
Mankin and Warren Kumari for proofreading, technical remarks, and
many readability improvements. Thanks to Dan York, Suzanne Woolf,
Tony Finch, Peter Koch and Frank Denis for good written
contributions.
7. IANA considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, July
2013.
[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, May 2014.
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8.2. Informative References
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
4033, March 2005.
[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.
[RFC5936] Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol
(AXFR)", RFC 5936, June 2010.
[RFC6269] Ford, M., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and P.
Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269, June
2011.
[I-D.ietf-dnsop-edns-client-subnet]
Contavalli, C., Gaast, W., Lawrence, D., and W. Kumari,
"Client Subnet in DNS Requests", draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-
client-subnet-00 (work in progress), November 2014.
[I-D.hallambaker-dnse]
Hallam-Baker, P., "DNS Privacy and Censorship: Use Cases
and Requirements.", draft-hallambaker-dnse-02 (work in
progress), November 2014.
[I-D.wouters-dane-openpgp]
Wouters, P., "Using DANE to Associate OpenPGP public keys
with email addresses", draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02 (work
in progress), February 2014.
[I-D.hzhwm-start-tls-for-dns]
Zi, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., and D.
Wessels, "Starting TLS over DNS", draft-hzhwm-start-tls-
for-dns-01 (work in progress), July 2014.
[I-D.ietf-dnsop-qname-minimisation]
Bortzmeyer, S., "DNS query name minimisation to improve
privacy", draft-ietf-dnsop-qname-minimisation-01 (work in
progress), February 2015.
[I-D.hoffman-dns-terminology]
Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", draft-hoffman-dns-terminology-01 (work in
progress), January 2015.
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[dprive] IETF, DPRIVE., "The DPRIVE working group", March 2014,
.
[denis-edns-client-subnet]
Denis, F., "Security and privacy issues of edns-client-
subnet", August 2013, .
[dagon-malware]
Dagon, D., "Corrupted DNS Resolution Paths: The Rise of a
Malicious Resolution Authority", 2007, .
[dns-footprint]
Stoner, E., "DNS footprint of malware", October 2010,
.
[morecowbell]
Grothoff, C., Wachs, M., Ermert, M., and J. Appelbaum,
"NSA's MORECOWBELL: Knell for DNS", January 2015,
.
[darkreading-dns]
Lemos, R., "Got Malware? Three Signs Revealed In DNS
Traffic", May 2013,
.
[dnschanger]
Wikipedia, , "DNSchanger", November 2011,
.
[packetq] Dot SE, , "PacketQ, a simple tool to make SQL-queries
against PCAP-files", 2011,
.
[dnsmezzo]
Bortzmeyer, S., "DNSmezzo", 2009,
.
[prism] NSA, , "PRISM", 2007, .
[ditl] CAIDA, , "A Day in the Life of the Internet (DITL)", 2002,
.
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Internet-Draft DNS privacy February 2015
[day-at-root]
Castro, S., Wessels, D., Fomenkov, M., and K. Claffy, "A
Day at the Root of the Internet", 2008,
.
[turkey-googledns]
Bortzmeyer, S., "Hijacking of public DNS servers in
Turkey, through routing", 2014,
.
[data-protection-directive]
Europe, , "European directive 95/46/EC on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data", November
1995, .
[passive-dns]
Weimer, F., "Passive DNS Replication", April 2005,
.
[tor-leak]
Tor, , "DNS leaks in Tor", 2013,
.
[yanbin-tsudik]
Yanbin, L. and G. Tsudik, "Towards Plugging Privacy Leaks
in the Domain Name System", 2009,
.
[castillo-garcia]
Castillo-Perez, S. and J. Garcia-Alfaro, "Anonymous
Resolution of DNS Queries", 2008,
.
[fangming-hori-sakurai]
Fangming, , Hori, Y., and K. Sakurai, "Analysis of Privacy
Disclosure in DNS Query", 2007,
.
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Internet-Draft DNS privacy February 2015
[federrath-fuchs-herrmann-piosecny]
Federrath, H., Fuchs, K., Herrmann, D., and C. Piosecny,
"Privacy-Preserving DNS: Analysis of Broadcast, Range
Queries and Mix-Based Protection Methods", 2011,
.
[aeris-dns]
Vinot, N., "[In French] Vie privee : et le DNS alors ?",
2015, .
8.3. URIs
[1] https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/privacy
Author's Address
Stephane Bortzmeyer
AFNIC
1, rue Stephenson
Montigny-le-Bretonneux 78180
France
Phone: +33 1 39 30 83 46
Email: bortzmeyer+ietf@nic.fr
URI: http://www.afnic.fr/
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