| Network Working Group | W. Kumari |
| Internet-Draft | |
| Intended status: Standards Track | E. Hunt |
| Expires: November 6, 2020 | ISC |
| R. Arends | |
| ICANN | |
| W. Hardaker | |
| USC/ISI | |
| D. Lawrence | |
| Oracle + Dyn | |
| May 05, 2020 |
Extended DNS Errors
draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error-16
This document defines an extensible method to return additional information about the cause of DNS errors. Though created primarily to extend SERVFAIL to provide additional information about the cause of DNS and DNSSEC failures, the Extended DNS Errors option defined in this document allows all response types to contain extended error information. Extended DNS Error information does not change the processing of RCODEs.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 6, 2020.
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
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There are many reasons that a DNS query may fail, some of them transient, some permanent; some can be resolved by querying another server, some are likely best handled by stopping resolution. Unfortunately, the error signals that a DNS server can return are very limited, and are not very expressive. This means that applications and resolvers often have to "guess" at what the issue is - e.g. was the answer marked REFUSED because of a lame delegation, or because the nameserver is still starting up and loading zones? Is a SERVFAIL a DNSSEC validation issue, or is the nameserver experiencing some other failure? What error messages should be presented to the user or logged under these conditions?
A good example of issues that would benefit from additional error information are errors caused by DNSSEC validation issues. When a stub resolver queries a name which is DNSSEC bogus [RFC8499] (using a validating resolver), the stub resolver receives only a SERVFAIL in response. Unfortunately, the SERVFAIL Response Code (RCODE) is used to signal many sorts of DNS errors, and so the stub resolver's only option is to ask the next configured DNS resolver. The result of trying the next resolver is one of two outcomes: either the next resolver also validates, and a SERVFAIL is returned again, or the next resolver is not a validating resolver, and the user is returned a potentially harmful result. With an Extended DNS Error (EDE) option enclosed in the response message, the resolver is able to return a more descriptive reason as to why any failures happened, or add additional context to a message containing a NOERROR RCODE.
This document specifies a mechanism to extend DNS errors to provide additional information about the cause of an error. These extended DNS error codes are described in this document can be used by any system that sends DNS queries and receives a response containing an EDE option. Different codes are useful in different circumstances, and thus different systems (stub resolvers, recursive resolvers, and authoritative resolvers) might receive and use them.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
This draft uses an EDNS0 ([RFC6891]) option to include Extended DNS Error (EDE) information in DNS messages. The option is structured as follows:
1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
0: | OPTION-CODE |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
2: | OPTION-LENGTH |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
4: | INFO-CODE |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
6: / EXTRA-TEXT ... /
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Field definition details:
The Extended DNS Error (EDE) option can be included in any response (SERVFAIL, NXDOMAIN, REFUSED, and even NOERROR, etc) to a query that includes OPT Pseudo-RR [RFC6891]. This document includes a set of initial codepoints, but is extensible via the IANA registry defined and created in Section 5.2.
When the response grows beyond the requestor's UDP payload size [RFC6891], servers SHOULD truncate messages by dropping EDE options before dropping other data from packets. Implementations SHOULD set the truncation bit when dropping EDE options. Because long EXTRA-TEXT fields may trigger truncation (which is undesirable given the supplemental nature of EDE) implementers and operators creating EDE options SHOULD avoid lengthy EXTRA-TEXT contents.
When a resolver or forwarder receives an EDE option, whether or not (and how) to pass along EDE information on to their original client is implementation dependent. Implementations MAY choose to not forward information, or they MAY choose to create a new EDE option(s) that conveys the information encoded in the received EDE. When doing so, the source of the error SHOULD be attributed in the EXTRA-TEXT field, since an EDNS0 option received by the original client will appear to have come from the resolver or forwarder sending it.
This document does not allow or prohibit any particular extended error codes and information to be matched with any particular RCODEs. Some combinations of extended error codes and RCODEs may seem nonsensical (such as resolver-specific extended error codes in responses from authoritative servers), so systems interpreting the extended error codes MUST NOT assume that a combination will make sense. Receivers MUST be able to accept EDE codes and EXTRA-TEXT in all messages, including those with a NOERROR RCODE, but need not act on them. Applications MUST continue to follow requirements from applicable specifications on how to process RCODEs no matter what EDE values are also received. Senders MAY include more than one EDE option and receivers MUST be able to accept (but not necessarily process or act on) multiple EDE options in a DNS message.
This document defines some initial EDE codes. The mechanism is intended to be extensible, and additional code-points can be registered in the "Extended DNS Errors" registry Section 5.2. The INFO-CODE from the EDE EDNS option is used to serve as an index into the "Extended DNS Error" IANA registry, the initial values for which are defined in the following sub-sections.
The error in question falls into a category that does not match known extended error codes. Implementations SHOULD include an EXTRA-TEXT value to augment this error code with additional information.
The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but a DNSKEY RRSET contained only unsupported DNSSEC algorithms.
The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but a DS RRSET contained only unsupported Digest Types.
The resolver was unable to resolve the answer within its time limits and decided to answer with previously cached data instead of answering with an error. This is typically caused by problems communicating with an authoritative server, possibly as result of a denial of service (DoS) attack against another network. (See also Code 19.)
For policy reasons (legal obligation, or malware filtering, for instance), an answer was forged. Note that this should be used when an answer is still provided, not when failure codes are returned instead. See Blocked(15), Censored (16), and Filtered (17) for use when returning other response codes.
The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but validation ended in the Indeterminate state [RFC4035].
The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but validation ended in the Bogus state.
The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but no signatures are presently valid and some (often all) are expired.
The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but but no signatures are presently valid and at least some are not yet valid.
A DS record existed at a parent, but no supported matching DNSKEY record could be found for the child.
The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but no RRSIGs could be found for at least one RRset where RRSIGs were expected.
The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but no Zone Key Bit was set in a DNSKEY.
The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but the requested data was missing and a covering NSEC or NSEC3 was not provided.
The resolver is returning the SERVFAIL RCODE from its cache.
The server is unable to answer the query as it was not fully functional when the query was received.
The server is unable to respond to the request because the domain is blacklisted due to an internal security policy imposed by the operator of the server resolving or forwarding the query.
The server is unable to respond to the request because the domain is blacklisted due to an external requirement imposed by an entity other than the operator of the server resolving or forwarding the query. Note that how the imposed policy is applied is irrelevant (in-band DNS filtering, court order, etc).
The server is unable to respond to the request because the domain is blacklisted as requested by the client. Functionally, this amounts to "you requested that we filter domains like this one."
An authoritative server or recursive resolver that receives a query from an "unauthorized" client can annotate its REFUSED message with this code. Examples of "unauthorized" clients are recursive queries from IP addresses outside the network, blacklisted IP addresses, local policy, etc.
The resolver was unable to resolve an answer within its configured time limits and decided to answer with a previously cached NXDOMAIN answer instead of answering with an error. This may be caused, for example, by problems communicating with an authoritative server, possibly as result of a denial of service (DoS) attack against another network. (See also Code 3.)
An authoritative server that receives a query with the RD bit clear, or when it is not configured for recursion for a domain for which it is not authoritative SHOULD include this EDE code in the REFUSED response. A resolver that receives a query with the RD bit clear SHOULD include this EDE code in the REFUSED response.
The requested operation or query is not supported.
The resolver could not reach any of the authoritative name servers (or they potentially refused to reply).
An unrecoverable error occurred while communicating with another server.
The authoritative server cannot answer with data for a zone it is otherwise configured to support. Examples of this include its most recent zone being too old, or having expired.
This document defines a new EDNS(0) option, entitled "Extended DNS Error", assigned a value of TBD from the "DNS EDNS0 Option Codes (OPT)" registry [to be removed upon publication: [http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters/dns-parameters.xhtml#dns-parameters-11]
Value Name Status Reference ----- ---------------- ------ ------------------ TBD Extended DNS Error Standard [ This document ]
IANA is requested to create and maintain a new registry table called "Extended DNS Error Codes" on the "Domain Name System (DNS) Parameters" web page as follows:
Registry Name: Extended DNS Error Codes
Registration Procedures:
Reference: [this document]
The Extended DNS Error Codes registry is a table with three columns: INFO-CODE, Purpose, and Reference. The initial contents is as below with [this document] added to each reference given.
Though DNSSEC continues to be deployed, unfortunately a significant number of clients (~11% according to [GeoffValidation]) that receive a SERVFAIL from a validating resolver because of a DNSSEC validation issue will simply ask the next (potentially non-validating) resolver in their list, and thus don't get the protections which DNSSEC should provide.
EDE information is unauthenticated information, unless secured by a form of secured DNS transaction such as [RFC2845], [RFC2931], [RFC8094] or [RFC8484]. An attacker (e.g a MITM or malicious recursive server) could insert an extended error response into untrusted data — although ideally clients and resolvers would not trust any unauthenticated information. As such, EDE content should be treated only as diagnostic information and MUST NOT alter DNS protocol processing. Until all DNS answers are authenticated via DNSSEC or the other mechanisms mentioned above, there are some tradeoffs. As an example, an attacker who is able to insert the DNSSEC Bogus Extended Error into a DNS message could instead simply reply with a fictitious address (A or AAAA) record. Note that DNS Response Codes (RCODEs) also contain no authentication and can be just as easily manipulated.
By design, EDE potentially exposes additional information DNS resolution processes that may leak information. An example of this is the Prohibited EDE code (18), which may leak the fact that the name is on a blacklist.
The authors wish to thank Joe Abley, Mark Andrews, Tim April, Vittorio Bertola, Stephane Bortzmeyer, Vladimir Cunat, Ralph Dolmans, Peter DeVries, Peter van Dijk, Mats Dufberg, Donald Eastlake, Bob Harold, Paul Hoffman, Geoff Huston, Shane Kerr, Edward Lewis, Carlos M. Martinez, George Michelson, Eric Orth, Michael Sheldon, Puneet Sood, Petr Spacek, Ondrej Sury, John Todd, Loganaden Velvindron, and Paul Vixie. They also vaguely remember discussing this with a number of people over the years, but have forgotten who all they were -- if you were one of them, and are not listed, please let us know and we'll acknowledge you.
One author also wants to thank the band "Infected Mushroom" for providing a good background soundtrack (and to see if he can get away with this in an RFC!). Another author would like to thank the band "Mushroom Infectors". This was funny at the time we wrote it, but we cannot remember why...
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC4035] | Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D. and S. Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005. |
| [RFC5198] | Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008. |
| [RFC6891] | Damas, J., Graff, M. and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75, RFC 6891, DOI 10.17487/RFC6891, April 2013. |
| [RFC8174] | Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017. |
| [RFC8499] | Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A. and K. Fujiwara, "DNS Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499, January 2019. |
| [RFC8767] | Lawrence, D., Kumari, W. and P. Sood, "Serving Stale Data to Improve DNS Resiliency", RFC 8767, DOI 10.17487/RFC8767, March 2020. |
| [GeoffValidation] | APNIC, G. H., "A quick review of DNSSEC Validation in today’s Internet", June 2016. |
| [RFC2845] | Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D. and B. Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000. |
| [RFC2931] | Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures ( SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, DOI 10.17487/RFC2931, September 2000. |
| [RFC8094] | Reddy, T., Wing, D. and P. Patil, "DNS over Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 8094, DOI 10.17487/RFC8094, February 2017. |
| [RFC8484] | Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018. |