Network Working Group F. Fieau Internet-Draft E. Stephan Intended status: Standards Track Orange Expires: 5 November 2023 G. Guillaume C. Christoph Broadpeak 4 May 2023 CDNI Metadata for Delegated Credentials draft-ietf-cdni-https-delegation-subcerts-03 Abstract The delivery of content over HTTPS involving multiple CDNs raises credential management issues. This document defines metadata in CDNI Control and Metadata interface to setup HTTPS delegation using Delegated Credentials from an Upstream CDN (uCDN) to a Downstream CDN (dCDN). Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 November 2023. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Fieau, et al. Expires 5 November 2023 [Page 1] Internet-Draft RFC XML Examples May 2023 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. CDNI Footprint and Capabilities Advertisement interface (FCI) for delegated credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. FCI.DelegatedCredentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.2. Expected usage of FCI.DelegatedCredentials . . . . . . . 4 4. CDNI Metadata interface (MI) for delegated credentials . . . 5 5. Delegated credentials call flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.1. CDNI MI DelegatedCredentials Payload Type . . . . . . . . 8 6.2. CDNI FCI DelegatedCredentials Payload Type . . . . . . . 8 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1. Introduction Content delivery over HTTPS using one or more CDNs along the path requires credential management. This specifically applies when an entity delegates to another trusted entity delivery of content via HTTPS. examples of the documents. This document defines the CDNI Metadata interface to setup HTTPS delegation using Delegated Credentials between an upstream CDN (uCDN) and downstream CDN (dCDN). Furthermore, it includes a proposal of IANA registry to enable adding of new methods. Section 2 is about terminology used in this document. Section 3 specifies the CDNI Footprint and Capabilities Advertisement interface (FCI) for delegated credentials. Section 4 specifies the CDNI Metadata interface (MI) for delegated credentials. Section 5 provides overall call-flows for delegated credentials. Section 6 addresses IANA registry for delegation methods. Section 7 discusses Security Considerations. Section 8 discusses Privacy Considerations. Fieau, et al. Expires 5 November 2023 [Page 2] Internet-Draft RFC XML Examples May 2023 2. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. This document uses terminology from CDNI framework documents: CDNI framework document [RFC7336], CDNI requirements [RFC7337] and CDNI interface specifications documents: CDNI Metadata interface [RFC8006] and CDNI Control interface / Triggers [RFC8007]. 3. CDNI Footprint and Capabilities Advertisement interface (FCI) for delegated credentials A dCDN should advertise its supported delegation methods using the Footprint and Capabilities interface (FCI) as defined in RFC8008. The FCI.Metadata object allows a dCDN to advertise its capabilities and the MI objects supported by the dCDN. Accordingly, to announce the support for delegated credentials, the dCDN should announce the support of MI.DelegatedCredentials as shown in below example. { "capabilities": [ { "capability-type": "FCI.Metadata", "capability-value": { "metadata": [ "MI.DelegatedCredentials", "... other supported MI objects ..." ] }, "footprints": [ "Footprint objects" ] } ] } There is also a need to announce additional parameters related to the number of credentials supported by the dCDN. For that purpose we introduce the FCI object FCI.DelegationCredentials. 3.1. FCI.DelegatedCredentials The FCI.DelegationCredentials object enables advertising the maximum number of delegated credentials supported by the dCDN. This number is typically (but not necessarily) linked with the number of servers in the dCDN. Fieau, et al. Expires 5 November 2023 [Page 3] Internet-Draft RFC XML Examples May 2023 Property: number-delegated-certs-supported Description: Number of delegated credentials supported by the dCDN. Type: integer Mandatory-to-Specify: Yes The following is an example of the FCI.DelegatedCredentials. { "capabilities": [ { "capability-type": "FCI.DelegatedCredentials", "capability-value": { "number-delegated-certs-supported": 10 } "footprints": [ ] } ] } 3.2. Expected usage of FCI.DelegatedCredentials The dCDN uses the FCI.DelegatedCredentials object to announce the number of endpoints as the number of supported delegated credentials. When the uCDN receives the FCI.DelegatedCredentials object it can provide the supported number of delegated credentials to the dCDN. When configuring the dCDN, the uCDN may decide to provide less than the maximum supported delegated credentials of the dCDN. Note that, within a dCDN, different deployment possibilities of the delegated credentials on the endpoints exist. The dCDN may use one single delegated credential and deploy it on multiple endpoints. Alternatively, the dCDN may deploy a different delegated credential for each endpoint (provided that the uCDN delivers enough different delegated credentials). This choice is at the discretion of the dCDN and depends on the number of delegated credentials provided by the uCDN. Fieau, et al. Expires 5 November 2023 [Page 4] Internet-Draft RFC XML Examples May 2023 The FCI.DelegationCredentials object does not address expiry and renewal of delegated credentials. Once the uCDN has provided delegated credentials via the MI, uCDN SHOULD remember and keep track of the provided credentials and their expiry times. The uCDN SHOULD refresh and provision on time the dCDN with new credentials through MI according to the dCDN capability. 4. CDNI Metadata interface (MI) for delegated credentials As expressed in [draft-ietf-tls-subcerts], when an origin has set a delegation to a downstream entity such as a downstream CDN (i.e., dCDN), the dCDN presents the "delegated_credential" during the TLS handshake [RFC8446] to the end-user client application, instead of its own certificate. This implies that the dCDN is also in the possession of the private key corresponding to the public key in DelegatedCredential.cred [draft-ietf-tls-subcerts]. This allows the end user client to verify the signature in CertificateVerify message sent and signed by the dCDN. This section defines the MI.DelegatedCredentials object containing an array of delegated credentials and optionally the corresponding private keys. The CDNI Metadata Interface [RFC8006] describes the CDNI metadata distribution mechanisms according to which a dCDN can retrieve the MI.DelegatedCredentials object from the uCDN. The properties of the MI.DelegatedCredentials object are as follows. Property: delegated-credentials Description: Array of delegated credentials Type: Array of DelegatedCredentialObject objects Mandatory-to-Specify: Yes The DelegatedCredentialObject object is composed of the following two properties: Property: delegated-credential Description: Base64-encoded delegated credential structure DelegatedCredential as defined in [draft-ietf-tls-subcerts] Type: string Mandatory-to-Specify: Yes Property: private-key Fieau, et al. Expires 5 November 2023 [Page 5] Internet-Draft RFC XML Examples May 2023 Description: Base64-encoded private key corresponding to the public key contained in the DelegatedCredential Type: string Mandatory-to-Specify: No The private-key property is not mandatory. If not specified, it is assumed that the dCDN generated the public-private key pair for the delegated credential itself and provided the public key information with an out of band mechanism to the uCDN. Find below an example MI.DelegatedCredential object. { "generic-metadata-type": "MI.DelegatedCredentials", "generic-metadata-value": { "delegated-credentials": [ {"delegated-credential": "cBBfm8KK6pPz/tdgKyedwA... iXCCIAmzMM0R8FLI3Ba0UQ=="}, {"delegated-credential": "4pyIGtjFdys1+9y/4sS/Fg... J+h9lnRY/xgmi65RLGKoRw=="}, {"delegated-credential": "6PWFO0g2AXvUaULXLObcVA... HXoldT/qaYCCNEyCc8JM2A=="} ] } } 5. Delegated credentials call flows An example call-flow using delegated credentials in CDNI is depicted in Figure 1. 1. It is assumed that the uCDN has been provisioned and configured with a certificate. Note that it is out of scope of CDNI and the present document how and from where (e.g., CSP) the uCDN acquired its certificate. 2. The uCDN generates a set of delegated credentials (here it is assumed that public keys of the dCDN are known). Note, that the uCDN may generate this material at different points in time, e.g., in advance to have a pool of delegated credentials or on-pupose when dCDN announces its maximum number of required delegated crednetials. Fieau, et al. Expires 5 November 2023 [Page 6] Internet-Draft RFC XML Examples May 2023 3. Using CDNI Footprint and Capabilities interface [RFC8008], the dCDN advertises MI.DelegatedCredentials capabilities to the uCDN. The dCDN further uses FCI.DelegatedCredentials to inform on the maximum number of supported delegated credentials. 4. Using CDNI the Metadata interface [RFC8006], the dCDN acquires the MI.DelegatedCredentials, therefore retrieving an array of delegated credentials. 5. The client establishes a TLS connection with an endpoint of the dCDN according to [draft-ietf-tls-subcerts] using the delegated credentials retrieved in step 4. 6. Some delegated credentials are about to expire. The uCDN uses CDNI the MI [RFC8006] to provide new, valid delegated credentials. Client dCDN uCDN | | | | | [1.uCDN acquires its certificate | | out of scope of CDNI] | | | | | [2.generation of | | delegated credentials] | | | | 3. CDNI FCI interface used to | advertise support of MI.DelegatedCredentials | and announce number of delegated credentials | supported using FCI.DelegatedCredentials | |-------------------->+ | | | | 4. CDNI Metadata interface used to | provide the MI.DelegatedCredential object | |<--------------------+ | | | | | | [5. TLS handshake according | to [I-D.ietf-tls-subcerts]] | |<------------------->| | | | | | 6.Some delegated credentials about to expire. | CDNI Metadata interface used to | provide new MI.DelegatedCredential object | |<--------------------+ | | | Figure 1: Example call-flow of Delegated credentials in CDNI Fieau, et al. Expires 5 November 2023 [Page 7] Internet-Draft RFC XML Examples May 2023 6. IANA Considerations This document requests the registration of the following entries under the "CDNI Payload Types" registry hosted by IANA regarding "CDNI delegation": +--------------------------+---------------+ | Payload Type | Specification | +--------------------------+---------------+ | MI.DelegatedCredentials | RFCthis | +--------------------------+---------------+ | FCI.DelegatedCredentials | RFCthis | +--------------------------+---------------+ Table 1 [RFC Editor: Please replace RFCthis with the published RFC number for this document.] 6.1. CDNI MI DelegatedCredentials Payload Type Purpose: The purpose of this Payload Type is to distinguish Delegated Credentials MI objects (and any associated capability advertisement) Interface: MI/FCI Encoding: see Section 4 6.2. CDNI FCI DelegatedCredentials Payload Type Purpose: The purpose of this Payload Type is to advertise the number of delegated credentials needed (and any associated capability advertisement) Interface: FCI Encoding: see see Section 3.1 7. Security Considerations The extensions defined in the present document enable providing delegated credentials to dCDNs. A delegated credentials can only be used by a dCDN if it is in the possession of the associated private key. Similarly, an attacker requires access to the private key in order to exploit delegated credential and impersonate dCDN nodes. Thus, leakage of only the delegated credential without the private key represents a limited security risk. Fieau, et al. Expires 5 November 2023 [Page 8] Internet-Draft RFC XML Examples May 2023 The delegated credentials and associated private keys are short-lived and as such a single leaked delegated credential with its private key represents a limited security risk. Still, it is recommended not to send private keys through the MI as it further limits the possibility by attacker to exploit the delegated credential. It is also important to ensure that an attacker is not able to systematically retrieve a more important number of delegated credentials and associated private keys. Such an attack would allow the attacker to systematically impersonate dCDN nodes. The FCI and MI objects defined in the present document are transferred via the interfaces defined in CDNI [RFC8006]. [RFC8006] describes how to secure these interfaces, protecting the integrity, confidentiality and ensuring the authenticity of the dCDN and uCDN, which should prevent an attacker to systematically retrieve delegated credential and associated private keys. 8. Security Considerations The information, FCI and MI objects defined in the present document do not contain any personally identifiable information (PII). As such this document does not change or alter the Confidentiality and Privacy Consideration outlined in the CDNI Metadata and Footprint and Capabilities RFCs [RFC8006]. 9. References 9.1. Normative References [draft-ietf-tls-subcerts] Barnes, R., Iyengar, S., Sullivan, N., and E. Rescorla, "Delegated Credentials for (D)TLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-15, 30 June 2022, . [RFC8006] Niven-Jenkins, B., Murray, R., Caulfield, M., and K. Ma, "Content Delivery Network Interconnection (CDNI) Metadata", RFC 8006, DOI 10.17487/RFC8006, December 2016, . [RFC8007] Murray, R. and B. Niven-Jenkins, "Content Delivery Network Interconnection (CDNI) Control Interface / Triggers", RFC 8007, DOI 10.17487/RFC8007, December 2016, . Fieau, et al. Expires 5 November 2023 [Page 9] Internet-Draft RFC XML Examples May 2023 [RFC8008] Seedorf, J., Peterson, J., Previdi, S., van Brandenburg, R., and K. Ma, "Content Delivery Network Interconnection (CDNI) Request Routing: Footprint and Capabilities Semantics", RFC 8008, DOI 10.17487/RFC8008, December 2016, . [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, . 9.2. Informative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC7336] Peterson, L., Davie, B., and R. van Brandenburg, Ed., "Framework for Content Distribution Network Interconnection (CDNI)", RFC 7336, DOI 10.17487/RFC7336, August 2014, . [RFC7337] Leung, K., Ed. and Y. Lee, Ed., "Content Distribution Network Interconnection (CDNI) Requirements", RFC 7337, DOI 10.17487/RFC7337, August 2014, . Authors' Addresses Frederic Fieau Orange 40-48, avenue de la Republique 92320 Chatillon France Email: frederic.fieau@orange.com Emile Stephan Orange 2, avenue Pierre Marzin 22300 Lannion France Email: emile.stephan@orange.com Fieau, et al. Expires 5 November 2023 [Page 10] Internet-Draft RFC XML Examples May 2023 Guillaume Bichot Broadpeak 15, rue Claude Chappe 35510 Cesson-Sevigne France Email: guillaume.bichot@broadpeak.tv Christoph Neumann Broadpeak 15, rue Claude Chappe 35510 Cesson-Sevigne France Email: christoph.neumann@broadpeak.tv Fieau, et al. Expires 5 November 2023 [Page 11]