Using Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network OAM
Futurewei Technologies Inc.2330 Central ExpySanta Clara95050USAtte+ietf@cs.fau.demichael.h.behringer@gmail.com
Operations and Management
ANIMAOAM (Operations, Administration and Maintenance - as per BCP161, )
processes for data networks are often subject to the problem of circular dependencies
when relying on connectivity provided by the network to be managed for the OAM purposes.
Provisioning during device/network bring up tends to be far less easy to automate than
service provisioning later on, changes in core network functions impacting reachability
may not be easy to be automated either because of ongoing connectivity requirements for
the OAM, and widely used OAM protocols are not secure enough to be carried across the network
without security concerns.This document describes how to integrate OAM with the
autonomic control plane (ACP) in Autonomic Networks (AN) to provide stable and secure
connectivity for conducting OAM. This connectivity is not subject to aforementioned
circular dependencies.
OAM (Operations, Administration and Maintenance - as per BCP161, ) for data networks is often
subject to the problem of circular dependencies when relying on the connectivity service provided by
the network to be managed. OAM can easily but unintentionally break the connectivity
required for its own operations. Avoiding these problems can lead to complexity in OAM.
This document describes this problem and how to use the Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) to solve it
without further OAM complexity: The ability to perform OAM on a network device requires first the execution
of OAM necessary to create network connectivity to that device in all
intervening devices. This typically leads to sequential, 'expanding ring
configuration' from a NOC (Network Operations Center). It also leads to tight dependencies between provisioning
tools and security enrollment of devices. Any process that wants to enroll multiple
devices along a newly deployed network topology needs to tightly interlock with the
provisioning process that creates connectivity before the enrollment can move on to
the next device. When performing change operations on a network, it likewise is necessary to understand
at any step of that process that there is no interruption of connectivity that could
lead to removal of connectivity to remote devices. This includes especially change
provisioning of routing, forwarding, security and addressing policies in the network that often
occur through mergers and acquisitions, the introduction of IPv6 or other mayor re-hauls
in the infrastructure design. Examples include change of an IGP or areas, PA (Provider
Aggregatabe) to PI (Provider Independent) addressing, or systematic topology changes (such as L2
to L3 changes).All these circular dependencies make OAM complex and potentially fragile. When
automation is being used, for example through provisioning systems,
this complexity extends into that automation software.In the late 1990'th and early 2000, IP networks became the method of choice to build separate
OAM networks for the communications infrastructure within Network Providers. This concept
was standardized in ITU-T G.7712/Y.1703
and called "Data Communications Networks" (DCN). These
where (and still are) physically separate IP(/MPLS) networks that provide access to OAM
interfaces of all equipment that had to be managed, from PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network)
switches over optical equipment
to nowadays Ethernet and IP/MPLS production network equipment.Such DCN provide stable connectivity not subject to aforementioned problems because
they are separate network entirely, so change configuration of the production IP network
is done via the DCN but never affects the DCN configuration. Of course, this approach
comes at a cost of buying and operating a separate network and this cost is not
feasible for many providers, most notably smaller providers, most enterprises and
typical IoT networks (Internet of Things).One of the goals of the Autonomic Networks Autonomic Control Plane (ACP as defined in
) is to provide similar
stable connectivity as a DCN, but without having to build a separate DCN. It is clear
that such 'in-band' approach can never achieve fully the same level of separation, but
the goal is to get as close to it as possible.This solution approach has several aspects. One aspect is designing the implementation
of the ACP in network devices to make it actually perform without interruption by
changes in what we will call in this document the "data-plane", a.k.a: the operator or
controller configured services planes of the network equipment. This aspect is not
currently covered in this document.Another aspect is how to leverage the stable IPv6 connectivity provided by the
ACP for OAM purposes. This is the current scope of this document.The ANI is the "Autonomic Networking Infrastructure" consisting of secure zero touch Bootstrap
(BRSKI - ), GeneRic Autonomic Signaling Protocol
(GRASP - ), and Autonomic Control Plane
(ACP - ). Refer to
for an overview of the ANI and how its
components interact and for
concepts and terminology of ANI and autonomic networks.This section describes stable connectivity for centralized OAM via ACP/ANI
starting by what we expect to be the most easy to deploy short-term option. It
then describes limitation and challenges of that approach and their solutions/workarounds to finish
with the preferred target option of autonomic NOC devices in .This order was chosen because it helps to explain how simple initial use of ACP can be,
how difficult workarounds can become (and therefore what to avoid), and finally because one very
promising long-term solution alternative is exactly like the most easy short-term solution only virtualized
and automated. In the most common case, OAM will be performed by one or more applications
running on a variety of centralized NOC systems that communicate with network devices.
We describe differently advanced approaches to leverage the ACP for stable connectivity.
There is a wide range of options, some of which are simple, some more complex. Three stages can be considered:There are simple options described in sections through
that we consider to be good starting points to operationalize
the use of the ACP for stable connectivity today. These options require only network and
OAN/NOC device configuration. The are workarounds to connect the ACP to non-IPv6 capable NOC devices through the use of IPv4/IPv6
NAT (Network Address Translation) as described in section . These workarounds
are not recommended but if such non-IPv6 capable NOC devices need to be used longer term, then this
is the only option to connect them to the ACP. Near to long term options can provide all the desired operational, zero touch and security benefits
of an autonomic network, but a range of details for this still have to be worked out and development
work on
NOC/OAM equipment is necessary. These options are discussed in sections
through .In the most simple candidate deployment case, the ACP extends all the way into the NOC via
one or more "ACP edge devices" as defined in section 6.1 of . These devices "leak" the (otherwise encrypted) ACP natively to NMS hosts.
They acts as the default router to those NMS hosts and provide them with
IPv6 connectivity into the ACP. NMS hosts with this setup need to support IPv6 (see e.g.
) but require no other modifications to leverage the ACP.Note that even though the ACP only uses IPv6, it can of course support OAM for any
type of network deployment as long as the network devices support the ACP: The Data Plane
can be IPv4 only, dual-stack or IPv6 only. It is always spearate from the ACP, therefore
there is no dependency between the ACP and the IP version(s) used in the Data Plane.This setup is sufficient for troubleshooting such as SSH into network
devices, NMS that performs SNMP read operations for status checking, software
downloads into autonomic devices, provisioning of devices via NETCONF and so on.
In conjunction with otherwise unmodified OAM via separate NMS hosts it can provide
a good subset of the stable connectivity goals. The limitations of this
approach are discussed in the next section.Because the ACP provides 'only' for IPv6 connectivity, and because addressing
provided by the ACP does not include any topological addressing structure that operations in
a NOC often relies on to recognize where devices are on the network, it is likely
highly desirable to set up DNS (Domain Name System - see )
so that the ACP IPv6 addresses of autonomic devices are known via domain names that
include the desired structure. For example, if DNS in the network was set up with names
for network devices as devicename.noc.example.com, and the well known structure of the
Data Plane IPv4 addresses space was used by operators to infer the region where a device
is located in, then the ACP address of that device could be set up as
devicename_<region>.acp.noc.example.com, and devicename.acp.noc.example.com could be a
CNAME to devicename_<region>.acp.noc.example.com. Note that many networks already use
names for network equipment where topological information is included, even without an ACP.This simple connectivity of non-autonomic NMS hosts suffers from a range of challenges (that is, operators may not be able to do it this way) or limitations (that is, operator cannot achieve desired goals with this setup). The following list summarizes these challenges and limitations. The following sections describe additional mechanisms to overcome them.Note that these challenges and limitations exist because ACP is primarily designed to
support distributed ASA in the most lightweight fashion, but not mandatorily require support
for additional mechanisms to best support centralized NOC operations. It is this document that
describes additional (short term) workarounds and (long term) extensions.(Limitation) NMS hosts cannot directly probe whether the desired so called 'data-plane'
network connectivity works because they do not directly have access to it. This
problem is similar to probing connectivity for other services (such as VPN
services) that they do not have direct access to, so the NOC may already employ
appropriate mechanisms to deal with this issue (probing proxies).
See for candidate solutions.(Challenge) NMS hosts need to support IPv6 which often is still not possible in enterprise networks.
See for some workarounds.(Limitation) Performance of the ACP will be limited versus normal 'data-plane' connectivity. The
setup of the ACP will often support only non-hardware accelerated forwarding.
Running a large amount of traffic through the ACP, especially for tasks where it
is not necessary will reduce its performance/effectiveness for those operations where
it is necessary or highly desirable. See for candidate solutions.(Limitation) Security of the ACP is reduced by exposing the ACP natively (and unencrypted)
into a LAN in the NOC where the NOC devices are attached to it.
See for candidate solutions.These four problems can be tackled independently of each other by solution
improvements. Combining some of these solutions improvements together can lead
towards a candiate long term solution.Simultaneous connectivity to both ACP and data-plane can be achieved in a variety
of ways. If the data-plane is IPv4-only, then any method for dual-stack attachment
of the NOC device/application will suffice: IPv6 connectivity from the NOC
provides access via the ACP, IPv4 will provide access via the data-plane. If as
explained above in the simple case, an autonomic device supports native attachment
to the ACP, and the existing NOC setup is IPv4 only, then it could be sufficient to
attach the ACP device(s) as the IPv6 default router to the NOC LANs and keep the
existing IPv4 default router setup unchanged.If the data-plane of the network is also supporting IPv6, then the NOC devices that
need access to the ACP should have a dual-homing IPv6 setup. One option is to make
the NOC devices multi-homed with one logical or physical IPv6 interface connecting
to the data-plane, and another into the ACP. The LAN that provides access to the
ACP should then be given an IPv6 prefix that shares a common prefix with the IPv6
ULA (see ) of the ACP so that the standard IPv6 interface selection rules on the NOC host
would result in the desired automatic selection of the right interface: towards
the ACP facing interface for connections to ACP addresses, and towards the data-plane
interface for anything else. If this cannot be achieved automatically, then it
needs to be done via IPv6 static routes in the NOC host.Providing two virtual (e.g. dot1q subnet) connections into NOC hosts may be
seen as an undesired complexity. In that case the routing policy to provide access
to both ACP and data-plane via IPv6 needs to happen in the NOC network itself:
The NMS host gets a single attachment interface but still with the
same two IPv6 addresses as in before - one for use towards the ACP, one towards
the data-plane. The first-hop router connecting to the NMS host would
then have separate interfaces: one towards the data-plane, one towards the ACP.
Routing of traffic from NMS hosts would then have to be based on the
source IPv6 address of the host: Traffic from the address designated for ACP use
would get routed towards the ACP, traffic from the designated data-plane address
towards the data-plane.In the simple case, we get the following topology: Existing NMS hosts
connect via an existing NOClan and existing first hop Rtr1 to the data-plane.
Rtr1 is not made autonomic, but instead the edge router of the Autonomic network
ANrtr is attached via a separate interface to Rtr1 and ANrtr provides access
to the ACP via ACPaccessLan. Rtr1 is configured with the above described IPv6
source routing policies and the NOC-app-devices are given the secondary IPv6
address for connectivity into the ACP.If Rtr1 was to be upgraded to also implement Autonomic Networking and the ACP,
the picture would change as follows:In this case, ANrtr1 would have to implement some more advanced routing such as
cross-VRF routing because the data-plane and ACP are most likely run via
separate VRFs. A workaround without additional software functionality could be a physical external loopback
cable into two ports of ANrtr1 to connect the data-plane and ACP VRF as shown in the picture. A (virtual)
software loopback between the ACP and data plane VRF would of course be the better solution.ACP does not support IPv4: Single stack IPv6
management of the network via ACP and (as needed) data plane. Independent of whether the
data plane is dual-stack, has IPv4 as a service or is single stack IPv6. Dual plane
management, IPv6 for ACP, IPv4 for the data plane is likewise an architecturally
simple option.The downside of this architectural decision is the potential need for short-term workarounds
when the operational practices in a network that cannot meet these target expectations.
This section motivates when and why these workarounds may be necessary and
describes them. All the workarounds described in this section are HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE.
The only recommended solution is to enable IPv6 on NMS hosts.Most network equipment today supports IPv6 but it is by far not ubiquitously supported
in NOC backend solutions (HW/SW), especially not in the product space for enterprises. Even when
it is supported, there are often additional limitations or issues using it in a dual stack setup
or the operator mandates for simplicity single stack for all operations. For these reasons an
IPv4 only management plane is still required and common practice in many enterprises. Without the
desire to leverage the ACP, this required and common practice is not a problem for those
enterprises even when they run dual stack in the network. We document these workarounds
here because it is a short term deployment challenge specific to the operations of the ACP.To bridge an IPv4 only management plane with the ACP, IPv4 to IPv6 NAT can be used.
This NAT setup could for example be done in Rt1r1 in above picture to also support IPv4 only
NMS hots connected to NOClan.To support connections initiated from IPv4 only NMS hosts towards the ACP
of network devices, it is necessary to create a static mapping of ACP IPv6 addresses
into an unused IPv4 address space and dynamic or static mapping of the IPv4 NOC
application device address (prefix) into IPv6 routed in the ACP. The main issue
in this setup is the mapping of all ACP IPv6 addresses to IPv4. Without further
network intelligence, this needs to be a 1:1 address mapping because the prefix used for
ACP IPv6 addresses is too long to be mapped directly into IPv4 on a prefix basis.One could implement in router software dynamic mappings by leveraging DNS, but it
seems highly undesirable to implement such complex technologies for something that
ultimately is a temporary problem (IPv4 only NMS hosts). With
today's operational directions it is likely more preferable to automate the setup
of 1:1 NAT mappings in that NAT router as part of the automation process of
network device enrollment into the ACP.The ACP can also be used for connections initiated by the network device into the
NMS hosts. For example, syslog from autonomic devices. In this case,
static mappings of the NMS hosts IPv4 addresses are required. This
can easily be done with a static prefix mapping into IPv6.Overall, the use of NAT is especially subject to the ROI (Return On Investment) considerations, but the
methods described here may not be too different from the same problems encountered
totally independent of AN/ACP when some parts of the network are to introduce IPv6 but
NMS hosts are not (yet) upgradeable.As mentioned above, the ACP is not expected to have high performance because its
primary goal is connectivity and security, and for existing network device platforms
this often means that it is a lot more effort to implement that additional connectivity
with hardware acceleration than without - especially because of the desire to support
full encryption across the ACP to achieve the desired security. Some of these issues may go away in the future with further adoption of the
ACP and network device designs that better tender to the needs of a separate OAM
plane, but it is wise to plan for even long-term designs of the solution that does
NOT depend on high-performance of the ACP. This is opposite to the expectation that
future NMS hosts will have IPv6, so that any considerations for IPv4/NAT
in this solution are temporary.To solve the expected performance limitations of the ACP, we do expect to have
the above describe dual-connectivity via both ACP and data-plane between NOC
application devices and AN devices with ACP. The ACP connectivity is expected to
always be there (as soon as a device is enrolled), but the data-plane connectivity
is only present under normal operations but will not be present during e.g.
early stages of device bootstrap, failures, provisioning mistakes or during network
configuration changes.The desired policy is therefore as follows: In the absence of further security
considerations (see below), traffic between NMS hosts and AN devices should
prefer data-plane connectivity and resort only to using the ACP when necessary,
unless it is an operation known to be so much tied to the cases where the ACP
is necessary that it makes no sense to try using the data plane. An example
here is of course the SSH connection from the NOC into a network device to troubleshoot
network connectivity. This could easily always rely on the ACP. Likewise, if an
NMS host is known to transmit large amounts of data, and it uses the ACP,
then its performance need to be controlled so that it will not overload the
ACP performance. Typical examples of this are software downloads.There is a wide range of methods to build up these policies. We describe a few:Ideally, a NOC system would learn and keep track of all addresses of a device
(ACP and the various data plane addresses). Every action of the NOC system would
indicate via a "path-policy" what type of connection it needs (e.g. only data-plane,
ACP-only, default to data-plane, fallback to ACP,...). A connection policy manager
would then build connection to the target using the right address(es). Shorter term,
a common practice is to identify different paths to a device via different names
(e.g. loopback vs. interface addresses). This approach can be expanded to ACP uses,
whether it uses NOC system local names or DNS. We describe example schemes using DNS:DNS can be used to set up names for the same network devices but with different
addresses assigned: One name (name.noc.example.com) with only the data-plane address(es)
(IPv4 and/or IPv6) to be used for probing connectivity or performing routine software
downloads that may stall/fail when there are connectivity issues. One name
(name-acp.noc.example.com) with only the ACP reachable address of the device for
troubleshooting and probing/discovery that is desired to always only use the ACP.
One name with data plane and ACP addresses (name-both.noc.example.com).Traffic policing and/or shaping of at the ACP edge in the NOC can be used to throttle
applications such as software download into the ACP.MPTCP (Multipath TCP -see ) is a very attractive candidate to automate the use of both data-plane and ACP
and minimize or fully avoid the need for the above mentioned logical names to
pre-set the desired connectivity (data-plane-only, ACP only, both). For example, a
set-up for non MPTCP aware applications would be as follows:DNS naming is set up to provide the ACP IPv6 address of network devices. Unbeknownst to
the application, MPTCP is used. MPTCP mutually discovers between the NOC and network
device the data-plane address and caries all traffic across it when that MPTCP
subflow across the data-plane can be built.In the Autonomic network devices where data-plane and ACP are in separate VRFs,
it is clear that this type of MPTCP subflow creation across different VRFs is
new/added functionality. Likewise, the policies of preferring a particular address
(NOC-device) or VRF (AN device) for the traffic is potentially also a policy not
provided as a standard.Setting up connectivity between the NOC and autonomic devices when the NOC device
itself is non-autonomic is as mentioned in the beginning a security issue. It also
results as shown in the previous paragraphs in a range of connectivity considerations,
some of which may be quite undesirable or complex to operationalize.Making NMS hosts autonomic and having them participate in the ACP
is therefore not only a highly desirable solution to the security issues, but can
also provide a likely easier operationalization of the ACP because it minimizes
NOC-special edge considerations - the ACP is simply built all the way automatically,
even inside the NOC and only authorized and authenticate NOC devices/applications
will have access to it.Supporting the ACP all the way into an application device requires implementing the
following aspects in it: AN bootstrap/enrollment mechanisms, the secure channel
for the ACP and at least the host side of IPv6 routing setup for the ACP. Minimally
this could all be implemented as an application and be made available to the host
OS via e.g. a tap driver to make the ACP show up as another IPv6 enabled interface.Having said this: If the structure of NMS hosts is transformed through
virtualization anyhow, then it may be considered equally secure and appropriate to construct
(physical) NMS host system by combining a virtual AN/ACP enabled router with
non-AN/ACP enabled NOC-application VMs via a hypervisor, leveraging the configuration
options described in the previous sections but just virtualizing them.When combining ACP and data-plane connectivity for availability and performance reasons,
this too has an impact on security: When using the ACP, the traffic will be mostly
encryption protected, especially when considering the above described use of
AN application devices. If instead the data-plane is used, then this is not the
case anymore unless it is done by the application.The simplest solution for this problem exists when using AN capable NMS hosts,
because in that case the communicating AN capable NMS host and the AN network device
have certificates through the AN enrollment process that they can mutually trust
(same AN domain). In result, data-plane connectivity that does support this can simply
leverage TLS/DTLS (/) with mutual AN-domain certificate authentication - and does not incur
new key management.If this automatic security benefit is seen as most important, but a "full" ACP
stack into the NMS host is unfeasible, then it would still be possible
to design a stripped down version of AN functionality for such NOC hosts that
only provides enrollment of the NOC host into the AN domain to the extent that
the host receives an AN domain certificate, but without directly participating in the
ACP afterwards. Instead, the host would just leverage TLS/DTLS using its AN certificate
via the data-plane with AN network devices as well as indirectly via the ACP with the
above mentioned in-NOC network edge connectivity into the ACP.When using the ACP itself, TLS/DTLS for the transport layer between NMS hosts
and network device is somewhat of a double price to pay (ACP also encrypts) and could
potentially be optimized away, but given the assumed lower performance of the ACP,
it seems that this is an unnecessary optimization.If we consider what potentially could be the most lightweight and autonomic
long term solution based on the technologies described above, we see the following
direction:NMS hosts should at least support IPv6. IPv4/IPv6 NAT in the network to
enable use of ACP is long term undesirable. Having IPv4 only applications automatically
leverage IPv6 connectivity via host-stack translation may be an option but the operational
viability of this approach is not well enough understood.Build the ACP as a lightweight application for NMS hosts so ACP
extends all the way into the actual NMS hosts.Leverage and as necessary enhance MPTCP with automatic dual-connectivity: If
an MPTCP unaware application is using ACP connectivity, the policies used should
add subflow(s) via the data-plane and prefer them.Consider how to best map NMS host desires to underlying transport mechanisms:
With the above mentioned 3 points, not all options are covered. Depending on the
OAM, one may still want only ACP, only data-plane, or automatically
prefer one over the other and/or use the ACP with low performance or high-performance
(for emergency OAM such as countering DDoS). It is as of today not clear
what the simplest set of tools is to enable explicitly the choice of desired
behavior of each OAM. The use of the above mentioned DNS and MPTCP
mechanisms is a start, but this will require additional thoughts. This is likely
a specific case of the more generic scope of TAPS.The ANI (ACP, Bootstrap, GRASP) can provide via the GRASP protocol common direct-neighbor
discovery and capability negotiation (GRASP via ACP and/or data-plane) and stable and secure
connectivity for functions running distributed in network devices (GRASP via ACP).
It can therefore eliminate the need to re-implement similar functions in each distributed
function in the network. Today, every distributed protocol does this with functional
elements usually called "Hello" mechanisms and with often protocol specific
security mechanisms.KARP (Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols, see )
has tried to start provide common directions and therefore reduce the re-invention
of at least some of the security aspects, but it only covers routing-protocols and it is
unclear how well it applicable to a potentially wider range of network distributed agents
such as those performing distributed OAM. The ACP can help in these cases.In this section, we discuss only security considerations not covered in the appropriate sub-sections of the solutions described.Even though ACPs are meant to be isolated, explicit operator
misconfiguration to connect to insecure OAM equipment and/or bugs in ACP
devices may cause leakage into places where it is not expected.
Mergers/Acquisitions and other complex network reconfigurations affecting
the NOC are typical examples.ULA addressing as proposed in this document is preferred over globally
reachable addresses because it is not routed in the global Internet and
will therefore be subject to more filtering even in places where specific ULA addresses
are being used.Random ULA addressing provides more than sufficient protection against address
collision even though there is no central assignment authority. This is helped
by the expectation, that ACPs are never expected to connect all together, but
only few ACPs may ever need to connect together, e.g. when mergers and aquisitions
occur.If packets with unexpected ULA addresses are seen and one expects them to be
from another networks ACP from which they leaked, then some form of ULA
prefix registration (not allocation) can be beneficial. Some voluntary
registries exist, for example https://www.sixxs.net/tools/grh/ula/, although
none of them is preferable because of being operated by some recognized
authority. If an operator would want to make its ULA prefix known, it might
need to register it with multiple existing registries.ULA Centrally assigned ULA addresses (ULA-C) was an attempt to introduce
centralized registration of randomly assigned addresses and potentially
even carve out a different ULA prefix for such addresses. This proposal is currently
not proceeding, and it is questionable whether the stable connectivity use
case provides sufficient motivation to revive this effort.Using current registration options implies that there will not be
reverse DNS mapping for ACP addresses. For that one will have to rely
on looking up the unknown/unexpected network prefix in the registry
to determine the owner of these addresses.Reverse DNS resolution may be beneficial for specific already deployed
insecure legacy protocols on NOC OAM systems that intend to communicate
via the ACP (e.g. TFTP) and leverages reverse-DNS for authentication. Given
how the ACP provides path security except potentially for the last-hop in the NOC,
the ACP does make it easier to extend the lifespan of such protocols in
a secure fashion as far to just the transport is concerned. The ACP does
not make reverse DNS lookup a secure authentication method though.
Any current and future protocols must rely on secure end-to-end communications
(TLS/DTLS) and identification and authentication via the certificates assigned
to both ends. This is enabled by the certificate mechanisms of the ACP.If DNS and especially reverse DNS are set up, then it should be set up
in an automated fashion, linked to the autonomic registrar backend so
that the DNS and reverse DNS records are actually derived from the
subject name elements of the ACP device certificates in the same way as the autonomic
devices themselves will derive their ULA addresses from their certificates
to ensure correct and consistent DNS entries.If an operator feels that reverse DNS records are beneficial to its
own operations but that they should not be made available publically
for "security" by concealment reasons, then the case of ACP DNS entries is probably
one of the least problematic use cases for split-DNS: The ACP DNS
names are only needed for the NMS hosts intending to use the ACP -
but not network wide across the enterprise.The ACP is targeted to be IPv6 only, and the prior explanations in this document show
that this can lead to some complexity when having to connect IPv4 only NOC solutions,
and that it will be impossible to leverage the ACP when the OAM agents
on an ACP network device do not support IPv6. Therefore, the question was raised
whether the ACP should optionally also support IPv4. The decision not to include IPv4 for ACP as something that is considered in the
use cases in this document is because of the following reasons:In SP networks that have started to support IPv6, often the next planned
step is to consider moving out IPv4 from a native transport as just a service
on the edge. There is no benefit/need for multiple parallel transport families
within the network, and standardizing on one reduces OPEX and improves reliability.
This evolution in the data plane makes it highly unlikely that investing
development cycles into IPv4 support for ACP will have a longer term benefit
or enough critical short-term use-cases. Support for IPv4-only for ACP is
purely a strategic choice to focus on the known important long term goals. In other type of networks as well, we think that efforts to support autonomic
networking is better spent in ensuring that one address family will be support
so all use cases will long-term work with it, instead of duplicating effort into
IPv4. Especially because auto-addressing for the ACP with IPv4 would be more
complex than in IPv6 due to the IPv4 addressing space.This document requests no action by IANA. This work originated from an Autonomic Networking project at cisco Systems, which started in early 2010 including customers involved in the design and early testing. Many people contributed to the aspects described in this document, including in alphabetical order: BL Balaji, Steinthor Bjarnason, Yves Herthoghs, Sebastian Meissner, Ravi Kumar Vadapalli. The author would also like to thank Michael Richardson, James Woodyatt and Brian Carpenter for their review and comments. Special thanks to Sheng Jiang and Mohamed Boucadair for their thorough review.04: Integrated fixes from Mohamed Boucadairs review. 03: Integrated fixes from Shepherd review (Sheng Jiang). 01: Refresh timeout. Stable document, change in author association.01: Refresh timeout. Stable document, no changes.00: Changed title/dates.individual-02: Updated references.individual-03: Modified ULA text to not suggest ULA-C as much better anymore, but still mention it.individual-02: Added explanation why no IPv4 for ACP.individual-01: Added security section discussing the role of address prefix selection and DNS for ACP. Title change to emphasize focus on OAM. Expanded abstract.individual-00: Initial version.Architecture and specification of data communication networkInternational Telecommunication Union