Verifiable Mandates for Agents Acting Across Administrative Domains

1.1. Goals

1. Interoperable mandate semantics. Independent implementations understand and check the same things: the structure of the mandate, the semantics of its limits, the delegation chain, the binding to a key, and revocation status (Section 4, Section 4.5).¶

2. Validation separate from authorization. Given the same inputs, including the same validation profile, two conforming Validators produce the same Validation Result. The relying party then applies its own policy (Section 9, Section 10.1).¶

3. Attribution of claims to issuers. The delegator's authority, the grant of the mandate, the operator's statement about the agent instance, and the state of the runtime come from different issuers. A relying party can tell exactly who asserted what (Section 11).¶

4. A clear boundary with the trust framework. This document defines how evidence is expressed and verified. Which issuers are accepted, what assurance levels mean, and which obligations issuers assume belong to a trust framework (Section 12).¶

1.2. Non-Goals

This document does not:¶

• determine whether an agent's reasoning or output is correct, or whether an action reflects the principal's present intent;¶

• define a trust framework, assurance levels, or the legal effect of a mandate;¶

• define how a delegator is shown a mandate or consents to it;¶

• replace the relying party's authorization policy.¶

4.1. Claims

iss:

REQUIRED. Identifier of the Mandate Issuer, or, for a sub-delegated mandate, the workload identifier of the delegating agent instance.¶

sub:

REQUIRED. Workload identifier of the agent instance that holds the mandate.¶

jti:

REQUIRED. Unique identifier of the assertion.¶

iat, nbf, exp:

REQUIRED. As defined in [RFC7519].¶

cnf:

REQUIRED. Confirmation claim [RFC7800] containing a jkt member, the JWK SHA-256 thumbprint [RFC7638] of the holder's public key.¶

principal:

REQUIRED. A Party Identifier (Section 4.2) for the principal.¶

delegator:

REQUIRED. A Party Identifier for the delegator. In a sub-delegated mandate, a Party Identifier for the delegating agent instance.¶

authority:

In a root mandate, REQUIRED unless delegator equals principal; an array of Artifact References (Section 4.3) to Authority Assertions. MUST NOT appear in a sub-delegated mandate.¶

perms:

REQUIRED. A non-empty array of Permission objects (Section 4.4).¶

parent:

REQUIRED in a sub-delegated mandate; MUST NOT appear in a root mandate. An Artifact Reference to the parent Mandate Assertion.¶

max_depth:

OPTIONAL. Non-negative integer: the number of further sub-delegations permitted below this mandate. Default 0.¶

aud:

OPTIONAL. Array of RP identifiers to which the mandate may be presented.¶

status:

OPTIONAL. Status reference as defined in [I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list]. The Validation Profile states when it is required.¶

tf:

REQUIRED. URI of the Trust Framework under which the assertion was issued.¶

loa:

OPTIONAL. Assurance level asserted by the issuer. Its meaning is defined by the Trust Framework; the Validator reports it and does not interpret it.¶

4.2. Party Identifiers

A Party Identifier is a JSON object with two REQUIRED string members: id, and scheme, a URI naming the identifier scheme. Two Party Identifiers are equal if and only if both members are equal as sequences of Unicode code points.¶

4.3. Artifact References

An Artifact Reference is a JSON object with a REQUIRED member dig, the base64url-encoded SHA-256 digest of the ASCII bytes of the referenced artifact's compact JWS serialization. For an SD-JWT, the digest is computed over the issuer-signed JWT only. The OPTIONAL members iss and jti are hints for locating the artifact; they play no part in matching. A reference matches an artifact if and only if the digests are equal.¶

4.4. Permissions

A Permission object has the structure of an authorization details object [RFC9396]: a REQUIRED type member and type-specific members, including the common members locations, actions, datatypes, identifier, and privileges. It MAY also contain constraints, an array of Constraint objects (Section 4.5).¶

[RFC9396] does not define a general way to compare two authorization details objects, because the meaning of their members depends on the API. This document therefore applies its matching and attenuation rules only to types listed in the Validation Profile, each with a Type Profile (Section 8.1). A request of an unlisted type does not match.¶

Let the constrained members of P be the first reference tokens of the ptr values of P's constraints. A requested authorization detail R matches a Permission P at validation time T if and only if:¶

1. R.type equals P.type, and the type is listed in the Validation Profile.¶

2. For each of locations, actions, datatypes, and privileges present in P, R contains the member and every element of R's array is identical (Section 4.6) to an element of P's array.¶

3. Every other member of P except constraints is present in R with an identical value.¶

4. Every top-level member of R is admitted by P: type, one of locations, actions, datatypes, and privileges, a member of P, a constrained member of P, or an admitted member of the Type Profile (Section 8.1).¶

5. Every stateless constraint in P is satisfied by R at time T.¶

6. For every stateful constraint in P, the pointer resolves in R to a value of the type the predicate requires.¶

A Permission without one of locations, actions, datatypes, and privileges places no restriction on that dimension. Likewise, an admitted member of the Type Profile that P neither contains nor constrains may take any value. Rule 4 prevents a request from carrying any other member, which the mandate did not anticipate and which could change the meaning of the action.¶

These rules, and those in Section 4.7, are fixed by this document. A Type Profile chooses which members are admitted; it cannot replace the comparison rules. Identity comparison and a registered set of predicates keep the result the same across implementations.¶

4.5. Constraints

A Constraint object has the members pred (REQUIRED), ptr (a JSON Pointer [RFC6901] evaluated against the requested authorization detail; REQUIRED except for window), and value (REQUIRED). The sum_max predicate also has the REQUIRED members period and budget.¶

Amounts are decimal strings matching the ABNF below, compared as exact decimal numbers. JSON numbers MUST NOT be used for amounts.¶

decimal     = ["-"] nonneg
nonneg      = ("0" / (%x31-39 *DIGIT)) ["." 1*DIGIT]

period is an integer number of seconds, at least 1 and at most the maximum set by the Validation Profile. budget is a string.¶

If a pointer does not resolve, or resolves to a value of the wrong type, the constraint is not satisfied.¶

For sum_max, value MUST match nonneg, and a negative resolved value does not satisfy the constraint. All sum_max constraints with the same budget in one Permission MUST have the same ptr, so that an action contributes a single, well-defined amount to each budget; a Permission that violates this makes its artifact malformed. Several sum_max constraints may still share a budget and pointer with different periods, for example a daily and a monthly limit on the same amount. Refunds, reversals, and other negative contributions are outside the scope of sum_max and need a separately defined predicate.¶

A predicate not listed as supported in the Validation Profile makes the Permission not match.¶

4.6. JSON Identity

Two JSON values are identical if they have the same type and: strings are equal as sequences of Unicode code points; booleans are identical only if both are true or both are false; null is identical to null; arrays have the same length and identical elements in order; objects have the same member names and identical member values. JSON numbers SHOULD NOT be used in Permission members or constraint values; when used, they are identical only if their textual representations are identical.¶

4.7. Attenuation

Attenuation is used for sub-delegation (Section 4.8) and for checking a root mandate against the delegator's powers (Section 9.4). A child Permission C is attenuated with respect to a parent Permission P if and only if:¶

1. C.type equals P.type.¶

2. For each of locations, actions, datatypes, and privileges present in P, C contains the member and C's array contains only elements identical to elements of P's array.¶

3. Every other member of P except constraints is present in C with an identical value.¶

4. Every top-level member of C other than type and constraints is admitted by P, in the sense of rule 4 of Section 4.4.¶

5. Every constrained member of C is admitted by P. A constraint in C can therefore only narrow the values of a member that P already admits; it cannot admit a member that P rejects.¶

6. For every constraint in P, C contains a constraint with the same ptr that is at least as strict, per Table 2.¶

Together these rules ensure that every request matching C also matches P.¶

The sum_max rule is sound because contributions are non-negative and the budget is shared (Section 9.5): the sum over the parent's period is at most the sum over the longer child period, which the child's constraint keeps at or below a value no greater than the parent's.¶

A set of child Permissions is attenuated with respect to a set of parent Permissions if every child Permission is attenuated with respect to at least one parent Permission.¶

4.8. Sub-Delegation

An agent instance whose mandate has max_depth of at least 1 MAY issue a sub-delegated Mandate Assertion. The sub-delegated assertion:¶

• is signed with the private key whose thumbprint is the parent's cnf.jkt, and carries the corresponding public key in the jwk member of its protected JOSE header;¶

• has iss equal to the parent's sub;¶

• has principal and tf equal to the parent's;¶

• has exp not later than the parent's;¶

• has max_depth at most the parent's max_depth minus 1;¶

• has aud, if the parent has aud, containing only elements of the parent's aud;¶

• has perms attenuated with respect to the parent's perms.¶

The key in the jwk header is not a trust anchor. It is accepted only because the already verified parent mandate binds its thumbprint.¶

6.1. Workload Identity Token

The agent instance presents a WIT [I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds] issued by its operator. Under this profile the WIT MUST contain iss. The WIT sub MUST equal the leaf mandate's sub, and the JWK SHA-256 thumbprint of the WIT's cnf.jwk MUST equal the leaf mandate's cnf.jkt. The WIT is referenced by digest; it carries no tf, and its issuer is checked against operator anchors accepted for the framework context (Section 9).¶

The WIT asserts that the operator runs an agent instance with this identifier and key. It asserts nothing about the model, configuration, or behavior of the instance.¶

6.2. Attestation Result

An agent instance MAY present an attestation result from a RATS Verifier [RFC9334], encoded as a JWT-based EAT [RFC9711] with typ value eat+jwt and the claims iss, iat, exp, eat_profile, and cnf with a jkt member. The eat_profile value MUST be one accepted by the Validation Profile, which also fixes the meaning of the result. The cnf.jkt MUST equal the leaf mandate's cnf.jkt.¶

An attestation result describes the Verifier's appraisal of evidence at the time the evidence was produced, not the state of the instance afterwards [RFC9334]. When the instance obtains model output from a remote service, the result covers the remote model only if the appraised evidence covered it.¶

6.3. Exposure Statement

An agent instance MAY present an Exposure Statement: a JWT with typ value agent-exposure+jwt, signed by a control component that observes the instance's session (the observer), not by the agent instance. It contains:¶

• iss, jti, iat, exp, and sub (the agent instance);¶

• aud: the identifier of the single RP to which the statement may be presented;¶

• cnf with a jkt member equal to the leaf mandate's cnf.jkt;¶

• sid: an identifier, assigned by the observer, of the session it observed;¶

• nonce: the value of the nonce parameter of the HTTP Message Signature of the request it accompanies (Section 7.2);¶

• ad_hash: the base64url-encoded SHA-256 digest of the bytes of the authorization_details parameter value of that request, as sent;¶

• exposure: an array of exposure event types from Section 15.6 that the observer recorded in session sid up to iat, sorted by code point, without duplicates.¶

The agent instance obtains the statement from the observer for one specific request to one RP, supplying the RP identifier and the signature nonce it will use. The statement is single-use:¶

• aud restricts it to one RP, so the same statement cannot be presented at a second RP;¶

• the RP's authorization server consumes it, as described below, only after the Validator has accepted it for this presentation.¶

The authorization server proceeds in this order:¶

1. It verifies the HTTP Message Signature and runs the Validator.¶

2. If the outcome is invalid, it rejects the request. No Exposure Statement is consumed.¶

3. Otherwise, it takes the deduplicated set of pairs (iss, jti) of the Exposure Statements listed in the result's evidence, and only those. In one atomic operation, if any pair in the set is already recorded, it rejects the request and records none of them; otherwise it records all of them, each with the statement's verified exp.¶

4. It then applies its policy and continues with authorization.¶

A presentation that is invalid, and a statement the Validator rejected, therefore never change the record. A forged statement that copies a legitimate iss and jti, or an authentic statement presented with another key or nonce, cannot consume the legitimate one. Each record MUST be kept until the recorded exp plus max_clock_skew, independently of how long signature nonces are kept. A statement is consumed once recorded, even if the RP's policy later refuses the action. Consumption is tracked outside the Validator, which remains a deterministic function of its inputs. The statement describes the session the observer attributes to that request. exp minus iat MUST NOT exceed the Validation Profile's maximum for Exposure Statements. An empty exposure array means that no registered event was observed, not that the session was free of manipulation.¶

The observer MAY be run by the operator, but its signing key MUST NOT be accessible to the agent instance. Each exposure_observer trust anchor lists the WIT issuers whose sessions it may observe.¶

7.1. Token Exchange Request

The request contains:¶

• subject_token: the leaf Mandate Assertion;¶

• subject_token_type: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:agent-mandate;¶

• actor_token: the agent instance's WIT;¶

• actor_token_type: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt;¶

• authorization_details: an array containing exactly one authorization details object [RFC9396], the requested action. This version authorizes one action per request and per token;¶

• mandate_evidence: a JSON array of strings, each the compact serialization of a parent Mandate Assertion, an Authority Assertion, an attestation result, or an Exposure Statement. REQUIRED when the leaf is sub-delegated or references an Authority Assertion.¶

7.2. Proof of Possession

The client MUST sign the request with HTTP Message Signatures [RFC9421] as profiled for workloads by [I-D.ietf-wimse-http-signature], using the key confirmed by the WIT. The signature MUST cover at least @method, @target-uri, the Content-Digest header field [RFC9530], and the Workload-Identity-Token header field, and MUST carry the created, expires, and nonce parameters. The Workload-Identity-Token header field MUST carry the same WIT as actor_token. expires minus created MUST NOT exceed the Validation Profile's max_pop_window.¶

Because the request body carries the mandate, the evidence, and the requested authorization details, and Content-Digest covers the body, the signature binds the key, the RP endpoint, the mandate, and the requested action, and its parameters give freshness. The authorization server MUST reject a nonce it has already accepted within the signature's validity period. The Workload Proof Token [I-D.ietf-wimse-wpt] is not used because it does not cover the request body.¶

The PoP outcome given to the Validator (Section 9.1) is ok if and only if all of these checks succeed; the verified nonce value is also given to the Validator.¶

8.1. Type Profiles

A Type Profile is part of the Validation Profile document, so the profile's digest fixes it; it MUST NOT refer to external content that influences validation. For an authorization details type it states:¶

1. a JSON Schema for requested authorization details of the type, included in full;¶

2. its admitted members: top-level members a request may carry without the Permission mentioning them, each of which is unrestricted unless a Permission contains or constrains it;¶

3. the meaning of each admitted member, so that "unrestricted" has a defined effect.¶

The schema applies to the requested authorization detail; a request that does not conform gives request_malformed. Permissions are not validated against it, because they may omit members a request needs. A Permission member the schema forbids simply cannot be matched, since matching requires the conforming request to carry it.¶

Schemas MUST use JSON Schema draft 2020-12 [JSON-SCHEMA-CORE] [JSON-SCHEMA-VALIDATION] and MUST declare it with the $schema keyword value https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema. A schema MAY use only the Core, Applicator, and Validation vocabularies and the Format-Annotation vocabulary; format is an annotation and never causes a request to fail validation. $ref MUST resolve within the same schema. A Validation Profile containing a schema that violates these rules, or a keyword outside those vocabularies, is unusable: a Validator MUST refuse to load it and MUST NOT validate under it.¶

9.1. Inputs

The procedure takes exactly these inputs:¶

1. the Mandate Presentation;¶

2. the bytes of the authorization_details parameter and its parsed value;¶

3. the validation time T;¶

4. the Validation Profile and its digest;¶

5. a Trust Anchor Set partitioned by role: mandate_issuer, authority_source, operator, verifier, exposure_observer, and status_issuer; each anchor lists its keys and the Trust Framework URIs for which it is accepted; each exposure_observer anchor also lists the WIT issuers it may observe, and each status_issuer anchor lists the artifact issuers for which it may publish status;¶

6. a set of Status List Tokens [I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list];¶

7. the RP identifier;¶

8. the PoP outcome and the verified signature nonce (Section 7.2).¶

Two conforming Validators given identical inputs MUST produce identical Validation Results. A Validator MUST NOT consult any other input and MUST NOT apply local authorization policy. Status List Tokens are fetched before validation.¶

9.2. Required and Optional Evidence

Required evidence is the leaf Mandate Assertion, its ancestors, the Authority Assertions referenced by the root, and the WIT. Optional evidence is attestation results and Exposure Statements. A problem with required evidence is an error. A problem with optional evidence, and the reason a Permission did not match a request, is a diagnostic. Only errors affect the outcome.¶

9.3. Procedure

The Validator performs every step that can be performed and records every applicable code (Section 15.5); it does not stop at the first failure.¶

1. Chain and context. Starting from the leaf, follow parent references through the artifacts in mandate_evidence. A reference without a matching artifact gives chain_broken; more than max_chain_length mandates gives chain_too_long. If a root is reached, the framework context is the root's tf; if that URI is not in the Validation Profile, framework_not_accepted. If no root is reached, the framework context is undetermined, steps that need it are skipped, the authority check is not evaluated, and chain in the result lists the mandates that were recovered, starting with the highest recovered ancestor.¶

2. Structure. Each required artifact parses, has the expected typ, and contains its REQUIRED claims. Otherwise malformed.¶

3. Profile conformance. Under the framework context: algorithms are permitted (alg_not_allowed); Party Identifier schemes are accepted (scheme_not_accepted); exp minus iat does not exceed the maximum for the artifact type (lifetime_exceeded); and every artifact of a type in status_required carries status (status_missing).¶

4. Signatures and keys. The root verifies under a mandate_issuer anchor accepted for the framework context. Each sub-delegated mandate carries a jwk header (key_missing), whose thumbprint equals the parent's cnf.jkt (key_mismatch), and verifies with it. Each Authority Assertion verifies under an authority_source anchor accepted for the assertion's own tf. The WIT verifies under an operator anchor accepted for the framework context. A failed verification gives signature_invalid; a key trusted only for another role gives role_mismatch.¶

5. Framework compatibility. Every mandate's tf equals the framework context, and every Authority Assertion's tf is in the context framework's authority_frameworks. Otherwise framework_mismatch.¶

6. Time. For each required artifact, nbf (when present) is at most T + max_clock_skew, and T is less than exp + max_clock_skew. Otherwise not_yet_valid or expired.¶

7. Status. The applicable framework of an artifact is its own tf for an Authority Assertion and the framework context for every other artifact. For each required artifact with status, the eligible Status List Tokens are those in the inputs whose subject is the referenced status list URI, that verify under a status_issuer anchor listing the artifact's issuer and accepted for the artifact's applicable framework, and whose iat is at most T + max_clock_skew, whose exp (when present) is later than T, and for which T minus iat does not exceed max_status_age. If no token is eligible, the code is status_unavailable. Otherwise, let the candidates be the eligible tokens with the greatest iat. If they give different status values for the index, the code is status_unavailable. Otherwise the Validator selects one candidate: the one with the latest exp, a token without exp counting as latest, and among those the one whose digest is first in code point order. The selection does not depend on the order of the inputs and is reported in status_evidence. The selected status value gives nothing if it is VALID (0x00), revoked if INVALID (0x01), and suspended if SUSPENDED (0x02). Any other value, including application-specific values, gives status_unavailable, unless the Validation Profile's status_values maps it to one of these three. A later token showing reactivation prevails over an earlier suspension.¶

8. Links. Each sub-delegated mandate satisfies Section 4.8. Otherwise depth_exceeded or not_attenuated.¶

9. Authority. See Section 9.4.¶

10. Binding. The WIT matches the leaf (Section 6.1) and the PoP outcome is ok. Otherwise binding_mismatch or pop_failed.¶

11. Audience. For each mandate in the chain with aud, the RP identifier is an element of aud. Otherwise audience_mismatch.¶

12. Action match. The authorization_details array contains exactly one object, which conforms to its Type Profile schema. Otherwise request_malformed. The alternatives are all Permissions of the leaf that match it at time T (Section 4.4). If there are none, action_not_permitted. For each Permission that does not match, the diagnostic perm_not_matching is recorded with the Permission's index.¶

13. Optional evidence. Each attestation result and Exposure Statement is checked as required evidence would be in steps 2 to 4, 6, and 7, and against Section 6.2 or Section 6.3. An Exposure Statement also needs aud equal to the RP identifier, nonce equal to the verified signature nonce, ad_hash equal to the digest of the authorization_details bytes, and an anchor listing the WIT's issuer. Failures are diagnostics (evidence_rejected), and the artifact is listed under rejected rather than evidence.¶

The outcome is invalid if any error other than status_unavailable was recorded; otherwise indeterminate if status_unavailable was recorded; otherwise valid.¶

9.4. Authority Check

If the root's delegator equals its principal, the authority basis is self and no Authority Assertion is required.¶

Otherwise, a referenced Authority Assertion supports the root if it passed steps 2 to 6, its principal and delegator equal those of the root, the root's perms are attenuated with respect to its powers (Section 4.7), and the root's max_depth does not exceed its max_depth. The authority check then has one of three results:¶

• Established, if some supporting assertion also passed step 7 with no code recorded. No authority code is added.¶

• Unknown, if no supporting assertion is established but some supporting assertion's only status code is status_unavailable. No authority code is added; status_unavailable is already recorded, so the outcome is indeterminate, not invalid.¶

• Refuted, otherwise. The Validator adds authority_missing if no referenced assertion was presented, authority_mismatch if none has matching parties, and authority_insufficient in all other cases.¶

9.5. Obligations

Each alternative carries the Obligations of its Permission's stateful constraints, in the order of the constraints. An Obligation is a JSON object:¶

• sum_max: members type ("sum_max"), constraint (index in the Permission), root (the root mandate jti), budget, period, value, and amount (the resolved value of this request). Let A be the authorization time (Section 10.2). The sum of the contributions recorded under the same root and budget with a recording time t such that A minus period < t <= A, plus amount, MUST NOT exceed value. The contribution is recorded with time A.¶

• cosign_above: members type ("cosign_above"), constraint, value, and amount. If amount exceeds value, a second party designated by the RP's policy MUST approve the specific action.¶

Alternatives are independent. Constraints in different Permissions share accounting only when they name the same budget, which lets a mandate issuer impose one limit across several Permissions. Because sub-delegated sum_max constraints keep the parent's budget (Table 2), actions taken under any mandate in a chain count against the same budget.¶

The RP performs the check and records the contribution as one atomic operation at time A, so that concurrent requests cannot both pass against the same remaining budget, and a request validated earlier cannot use a window anchored at its validation time. Because each token authorizes one action, each token records exactly one contribution per budget. If the token expires unused, the RP MAY remove the contribution.¶

9.6. Validation Result

The Validation Result is a JSON object with the members:¶

• outcome: valid, invalid, or indeterminate;¶

• profile: the Validation Profile URI and digest;¶

• time: T;¶

• tf: the framework context, or null if undetermined;¶

• chain: Artifact References for the mandates, root first;¶

• errors and diagnostics: arrays of objects with the member code and, where applicable, artifact (an Artifact Reference) and perm (index);¶

• authority: self, established, unknown, refuted, or not_evaluated when no root was reached;¶

• claims: attributed claims (Section 11), each with claim, value, artifact, and role;¶

• alternatives: an array of objects with perm (the leaf Permission index) and obligations, sorted by perm;¶

• evidence and rejected: Artifact References for the optional evidence that was accepted or rejected;¶

• status_evidence: for each artifact whose status was read from a selected Status List Token, an object with artifact (an Artifact Reference), token (the base64url-encoded SHA-256 digest of the selected token), and required (true for required evidence, false for optional evidence), sorted by artifact.dig.¶

claims contains only authenticated claims: claims of artifacts whose signature and role verification in step 4, or step 13 for optional evidence, succeeded. Claims of an artifact that failed verification are omitted; the artifact remains identified through chain, errors, or rejected. Subject to that rule, claims contains exactly the following, and nothing else:¶

• for each mandate in chain, in order: iss, sub, principal, delegator, perms, and loa if present;¶

• for each Authority Assertion that supports the root, in the order of the root's authority array: iss, principal, delegator, powers, max_depth, and loa if present;¶

• for the WIT: iss and sub;¶

• for each accepted attestation result, in evidence order: iss, eat_profile, and iat;¶

• for each accepted Exposure Statement, in evidence order: iss, sid, exposure, and iat.¶

Within an artifact, claims appear in the order listed. errors and diagnostics are sorted by code, then artifact.dig, then perm, comparing strings by code point and placing absent members first; duplicates are removed. evidence and rejected are sorted by dig.¶

10.1. Authorization Decision

The RP decides by applying its own policy to the Validation Result and the request. That policy may, for example, accept only certain Trust Frameworks or loa values, require an attestation result for high-value actions, or react to exposure events. The RP:¶

• MUST NOT allow an action when the outcome is invalid;¶

• MUST treat indeterminate as a denial, unless its policy explicitly permits it for that type of action;¶

• MUST select one alternative, discharge all of its Obligations at the authorization time A before issuing an access token, and record which alternative it relied on;¶

• MUST deny the request if no alternative's Obligations can be discharged;¶

• SHOULD retain the Validation Result, its decision, and the confirmation produced by the system that executed the action.¶

10.2. Access Token

The authorization time A is read from the RP's clock inside the atomic operation that discharges Obligations and issues the token. A is not earlier than T. At A, the RP MUST check again that A is earlier than the exp of every mandate in the chain and of the supporting Authority Assertion, plus max_clock_skew, and that every window constraint of the selected alternative is satisfied at A; otherwise it denies.¶

At A, the RP also checks whether each token listed in status_evidence is still eligible: A minus its iat does not exceed max_status_age, and its exp, when present, is later than A. The treatment keeps the distinction between required and optional evidence:¶

• If a token for required evidence is no longer eligible, the RP MUST either obtain fresh Status List Tokens and run the Mandate Validation Procedure again with T = A, or treat the outcome as indeterminate and apply its policy for that outcome.¶

• If a token for optional evidence is no longer eligible, that evidence MUST NOT be relied on at A, and the RP applies its policy again without it. If the policy requires that evidence for the action, the RP denies or obtains fresh evidence and validates again.¶

The Validation Result computed at T is kept unchanged as a record of that validation; the checks at A are recorded with the authorization decision. A Validation Result therefore cannot carry a revocation check past the freshness the Validation Profile allows, however long the RP takes to decide, for example while waiting for a co-signature.¶

An access token issued under this profile:¶

• MUST be sender-constrained to the key with the leaf's cnf.jkt;¶

• MUST carry only the single authorization details object that was allowed;¶

• MUST carry an act claim identifying the agent instance, and the jti of the leaf and root mandates;¶

• MUST have an exp no later than the earliest of: the exp of every mandate in the chain and of the supporting Authority Assertion, the exp of any window constraint in the selected alternative, and A plus max_token_lifetime;¶

• MUST authorize a single execution of the action; the resource server MUST reject a second use of the same token.¶

The bound on the token's exp ensures that the action cannot be executed after a time window or a mandate has ended. A revocation after issuance takes effect at the latest when the token expires; an RP that needs it to take effect sooner validates again at execution.¶

12.1. Provided by This Protocol

• the formats of Mandate Assertions, Authority Assertions, and Exposure Statements, and the profiles of WIT and EAT;¶

• the semantics of Permissions, constraint predicates, and attenuation;¶

• the Validation Profile structure and the Mandate Validation Procedure, its codes, and its result;¶

• the proof-of-possession profile and the rules for access tokens.¶

12.2. Defined by a Trust Framework

A Trust Framework is identified by the URI in tf. It MUST define:¶

1. the entities accepted for each role and how their anchors are distributed;¶

2. the Party Identifier schemes accepted;¶

3. the meaning of each loa value and the evidence it requires;¶

4. the permitted algorithms;¶

5. maximum lifetimes and when status is required;¶

6. values or bounds for the Validation Profile parameters;¶

7. requirements on Authority Sources, including the records they rely on, and which other frameworks' Authority Assertions are accepted;¶

8. the obligations and liability of issuers, including revocation and incident timelines;¶

9. retention of Validation Results and handling of disputes;¶

10. the authorization details types and their Type Profiles;¶

11. how a Mandate Issuer establishes that the instruction to issue a mandate came from the delegator named in it, for example by requiring the delegator's signature over the mandate content;¶

12. whether and how RPs share accounting for budgets.¶

The machine-checkable part of items 2 to 7 and 10 is expressed in the Validation Profile. The protocol verifies that the delegator holds authority and that the Mandate Issuer states that the delegator granted the mandate. It cannot verify the link between the two inside the delegator's organization; that link rests on the Mandate Issuer, under item 11.¶

A Trust Framework can be a bilateral agreement, a sector scheme, or a regulated scheme. This document takes no position on which.¶

12.3. Configured by the Relying Party

• the Trust Frameworks and loa values it accepts per action;¶

• the optional evidence it requires;¶

• its treatment of indeterminate outcomes and exposure events;¶

• its choice among alternatives and its discharge of Obligations.¶

15.1. Media Types

This document requests registration of application/mandate+jwt, application/authority+jwt, application/authority+sd-jwt, and application/agent-exposure+jwt. Templates to be provided.¶

15.2. JSON Web Token Claims

This document requests registration of the claims principal, delegator, authority, perms, parent, max_depth, tf, loa, powers, ad_hash, and exposure in the "JSON Web Token Claims" registry. The Exposure Statement reuses the registered sid and nonce claims with the meaning defined in Section 6.3.¶

15.3. OAuth Registrations

This document requests registration of the token type URI urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:agent-mandate in the "OAuth URI" registry and of the parameter mandate_evidence in the "OAuth Parameters" registry.¶

15.4. Agent Mandate Constraint Predicates

This document requests a new registry, "Agent Mandate Constraint Predicates", with Specification Required policy. Each entry contains the predicate name, its kind, its satisfaction rule, its attenuation rule, the value types it accepts, and a reference. Initial contents are given in Table 1 and Table 2.¶

15.5. Agent Mandate Validation Codes

This document requests a new registry, "Agent Mandate Validation Codes", with Specification Required policy. Each entry has a code and a class, error or diagnostic. Initial errors: malformed, chain_broken, chain_too_long, framework_not_accepted, alg_not_allowed, scheme_not_accepted, lifetime_exceeded, status_missing, key_missing, key_mismatch, signature_invalid, role_mismatch, framework_mismatch, not_yet_valid, expired, revoked, suspended, status_unavailable, depth_exceeded, not_attenuated, authority_missing, authority_mismatch, authority_insufficient, binding_mismatch, pop_failed, audience_mismatch, request_malformed, action_not_permitted. Initial diagnostics: perm_not_matching, evidence_rejected.¶

15.6. Agent Exposure Event Types

This document requests a new registry, "Agent Exposure Event Types", with Specification Required policy. Initial values:¶

• external_content: the session processed content retrieved from outside the operator's domain that was not on an allow list;¶

• unauthenticated_tool: the session invoked a tool or service whose identity was not authenticated;¶

• untrusted_agent_input: the session processed output from an agent instance whose mandate was not validated.¶

16.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list]

Looker, T., Bastian, P., and C. Bormann, "Token Status List (TSL)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21, 21 June 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21>.

[I-D.ietf-wimse-http-signature]

Salowey, J. A. and Y. Sheffer, "WIMSE Workload-to-Workload Authentication with HTTP Signatures", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08, 20 October 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08>.

[I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds]

Campbell, B., Salowey, J. A., Schwenkschuster, A., Sheffer, Y., and Y. Rosomakho, "WIMSE Workload Credentials", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-02, 2 July 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-02>.

[JSON-SCHEMA-CORE]

JSON Schema, "JSON Schema: A Media Type for Describing JSON Documents, Draft 2020-12", June 2022, <https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/json-schema-core>.

[JSON-SCHEMA-VALIDATION]

JSON Schema, "JSON Schema Validation: A Vocabulary for Structural Validation of JSON, Draft 2020-12", June 2022, <https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/json-schema-validation>.

[RFC2119]

Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

[RFC6901]

Bryan, P., Ed., Zyp, K., and M. Nottingham, Ed., "JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Pointer", RFC 6901, DOI 10.17487/RFC6901, April 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6901>.

[RFC7515]

Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.

[RFC7519]

Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.

[RFC7638]

Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7638>.

[RFC7800]

Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)", RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7800>.

[RFC8174]

Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

[RFC8693]

Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.

[RFC8725]

Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725, DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, February 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8725>.

[RFC9396]

Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396, DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, May 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9396>.

[RFC9421]

Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421, February 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421>.

[RFC9530]

Polli, R. and L. Pardue, "Digest Fields", RFC 9530, DOI 10.17487/RFC9530, February 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9530>.

[RFC9711]

Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C. Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", RFC 9711, DOI 10.17487/RFC9711, April 2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9711>.

[RFC9901]

Fett, D., Yasuda, K., and B. Campbell, "Selective Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens", RFC 9901, DOI 10.17487/RFC9901, November 2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9901>.

16.2. Informative References

[COSAI-AIAM]

Coalition for Secure AI (CoSAI), "Agentic Identity and Access Management, Version 1.0", 20 March 2026, <https://www.coalitionforsecureai.org/announcements/cosai-unveils-agentic-identity-and-security-research-following-high-profile-sessions-at-rsac-2026/>.

[EIDAS2]

European Parliament and Council of the European Union, "Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework", 11 April 2024, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1183/oj>.

[I-D.asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain]

Asor, R., "Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent Chains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-02, 15 October 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-02>.

[I-D.hamr-oauth-agent-delegation]

Hassan, A., "An Attenuated Delegation Profile for Automated Agents", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hamr-oauth-agent-delegation-03, 22 October 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hamr-oauth-agent-delegation-03>.

[I-D.ietf-wimse-aims]

Kasselman, P., Lombardo, J., Rosomakho, Y., Campbell, B., Steele, N., and A. Parecki, "AI Identity Management System", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-aims-00, 15 September 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-aims-00>.

[I-D.ietf-wimse-arch]

Salowey, J. A., Rosomakho, Y., and H. Tschofenig, "Workload Identity in a Multi System Environment (WIMSE) Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-arch-08, 6 July 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-arch-08>.

[I-D.ietf-wimse-wpt]

Campbell, B. and A. Schwenkschuster, "WIMSE Workload Proof Token", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-wpt-02, 27 August 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-wpt-02>.

[I-D.reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation]

Reece, M., "Cross-Organizational Delegation for Workload and Agent Identity: Problem Statement and Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation-02, 31 August 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation-02>.

[I-D.yossif-agent-mandate-problem]

Yossif, M. K., "Problem Statement: Verifiable Human Mandates for Autonomous Agent Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-yossif-agent-mandate-problem-00, 22 July 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-yossif-agent-mandate-problem-00>.

[OIDF-AGENTIC]

OpenID Foundation, "Identity Management for Agentic AI", October 2025, <https://openid.net/new-whitepaper-tackles-ai-agent-identity-challenges/>.

[RFC4998]

Gondrom, T., Brandner, R., and U. Pordesch, "Evidence Record Syntax (ERS)", RFC 4998, DOI 10.17487/RFC4998, August 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4998>.

[RFC9162]

Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162, December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9162>.

[RFC9334]

Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334>.