Internet Engineering Task Force T. Hardjono
Internet-Draft MIT
Intended status: Informational M. Hargreaves
Expires: October 23, 2021 Quant Network
N. Smith
Intel
April 21, 2021
An Interoperability Architecture for Blockchain/DLT Gateways
draft-hardjono-blockchain-interop-arch-02
Abstract
With the increasing interest in the potential use of blockchain
systems for virtual assets, there is a need for these assets to have
mobility across blockchain systems. An interoperability architecture
for blockchain systems is needed in order to permit the secure flow
of virtual assets between blockchain systems, satisfying the
properties of transfer atomicity, consistency and durability. The
architecture must recognize that there are different blockchain
systems, and that the interior constructs in these blockchains maybe
incompatible with one another. Gateway nodes perform the transfer of
virtual assets between blockchain systems while masking the
complexity of the interior constructs of the blockchain that they
represent.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 23, 2021.
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Assumptions and Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Design Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Operational Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Goal of Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Overview of Asset Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Desirable Properties of Asset Transfer . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. Event log-data, crash recovery and backup gateways . . . 9
4.5. Overview of the Phases in Asset Transfer . . . . . . . . 10
5. Pre-transfer Verification of Asset and Identities (Phase 1) . 11
6. Evidence of asset locking or escrow (Phase 2) . . . . . . . . 13
7. Transfer Commitment (Phase 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. Related Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.1. Global identification of blockchain systems and public-
keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.2. Discovery of gateways nodes within a blockchain system . 18
8.3. Remote gateway discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.4. Commitment protocols and forms of commitment evidence . . 19
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10. Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
1. Introduction
Currently there is little technical interoperability between
blockchain systems. This results in the difficulty in transferring
or migrating virtual assets associated with a public-key (address)
from one blockchain or DLT system to another directly.
The existing solutions involve a third party that mediates the
transfer. This mediating third party is typically an asset-exchange
entity (i.e. crypto-exchange) operating in a centralized hub-spoke
fashion. This reliance on a third party results not only delays in
transfers, but also in the need for asset owner to have a business
relationship (e.g. open accounts) at the mediating third party. Many
of these solutions centralize control at the hands of the mediating
party, thereby diminishing the autonomy of blockchains and DLT
systems, and limits their scalability.
This This document describes an architecture for gateways for
blockchains and DLT systems that permit a direct transfer of assets
without a mediating third party. A given blockchain or DLT system
may have one or more gateway nodes to perform a unidirectional direct
transfer of virtual assets to blockchain or DLT system possessing one
or more compatible gateway nodes. Similar to the notion of border
gateways in interdomain routing (e.g. running the BGPv4 protocol), a
blockchain gateway belonging to an origin blockchain or DLT system is
said to peer with another gateway is a destination blockchain or DLT
system. Both gateways must implement an asset transfer protocol that
must satisfy certain security, privacy and atomicity requirements.
The purpose of this architecture document is to provide technical
framework within which to discuss the various aspects of a transfer
between two gateways, including security aspects and transfer
atomicity aspects.
2. Terminology
There following are some terminology used in the current document:
o Blockchain system: Blockchains are distributed digital ledgers of
cryptographically signed transactions that are grouped into
blocks. Each block is cryptographically linked to the previous
one (making it tamper evident) after validation and undergoing a
consensus decision. As new blocks are added, older blocks become
more difficult to modify (creating tamper resistance). New blocks
are replicated across copies of the ledger within the network, and
any conflicts are resolved automatically using established rules
[NIST].
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
o Distributed ledger technology (DLT) system: Technology that
enables the operation and use of distributed ledgers, where the
ledger is shared (replicated) across a set of DLT nodes and
synchronized between the DLT nodes using a consensus mechanism
[ISO].
o Resource Domain: Resource Domain: The collection of resources and
entities participating within a blockchain or DLT system. The
domain denotes an boundary for permissible or authorized actions
on resources.
o Interior Resources: The various interior protocols, data
structures and cryptographic constructs that are a core part of a
blockchain or DLT system. Examples of interior resources include
the ledger (blocks of confirmed transaction data), public keys on
the ledger, consensus protocol, incentive mechanisms, transaction
propagation networks, etc.
o Exterior Resources: The various resources that are outside a
blockchain or DLT system, and are not part of the operations of
the system. Examples include data located at third parties such
as asset registries, ledgers of other blockchain/DLT systems, PKI
infrastructures, etc.
o Nodes: The nodes of the blockchain or DLT system which form the
peer-to-peer network, which collectively maintain the shared
ledger in the system by following a consensus algorithm.
o Gateway nodes: The nodes of the blockchain or DLT system that are
functionally capable of acting as a gateway in an asset transfer.
A gateway node implements the gateway-to-gateway asset transfer
protocol. Being a node on the blockchain/DLT system, a gateway
has read/write access to the interior resources (e.g. ledger) of
the blockchain. It participates in the consensus mechanism
deployed for the system. Depending on the blockchain/DLT system
implementation, some or all of the nodes may be gateway-capable.
o Blockchain address: This is the public-key of an entity as known
within a blockchain system, employed to transact on the blockchain
network and recorded on the ledger of the blockchain. Also
referred to as the transaction public key.
o Entity public-key pair: This the private-public key pairs of an
entity used for interactions outside the blockchain or DLT system
(e.g. TL1.3). The term is used to distinguish this public-key
from the blockchain address.
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
o Asset transfer protocol: The gateway-to-gateway technical protocol
used by two gateway nodes to perform a unidirectional transfer of
a virtual asset.
o Asset profile: The prospectus of a regulated asset that includes
information and resources describing the virtual asset. This
includes, among others, the asset name/code, issuing authority,
denomination, jurisdiction, and the URLs and mechanisms to
validate the information. The asset profile is independent from
the specific instantiation of the asset (on a blockchain or
otherwise) and independent from its instance-ownership
information.
o Virtual Asset: A virtual asset is a digital representation of
value that can be digitally traded, or transferred as defined by
the FATF [FATF].
o Virtual Asset Service Provider (VASP): Legal entity handling
virtual assets as defined by the FATF [FATF].
o Originator: Person or organization seeking the transfer of virtual
asset to a beneficiary
o Beneficiary: Person or organization receiving the transferred
virtual asset from an originator.
o Travel Rule information: Data regarding the VASPs, originators and
beneficiaries involved in an asset transfer, as defined by the
FATF [FATF] and as required by the jurisdiction of operations of
the VASPs.
o Gateway device identity: The identity of the device implementing
the gateway functions. The term is used in the sense of IDevID
(IEEE 802.1AR) or EK/AIK (in TPM1.2 and TPM2.0) [IDevID].
o Gateway owner: The VASP who legally owns and operates a gateway
node within a blockchain system.
o Passive transaction: A transaction aimed at recording some state
metadata information on the ledger that does not affect assets
recorded on the ledger. A passive transaction can be self-
addressed (or has null as destination address) and can be used to
signal implicitly to other nodes regarding an state-change of the
metadata pertaining to an entity or an asset on the ledger.
o Asset locking or escrow: The conditional mechanism used within a
blockchain or DLT system to make an asset temporarily unavailable
for use by its owner. The condition of the asset release can be
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
based on a duration of time (e.g. hash time locks) or other
parameters.
o Gateway crash recovery: The local process by which a crashed
gateway (i.e. device or system fault) is returned back into a
consistent and operational state, ready to resume the asset
transfer protocol with the peer gateway prior to the crash event.
Further terminology definitions can be found in [NIST] and [ISO].
The term 'blockchain' and 'distributed ledger technology' (DLT) are
used interchangeably in this document.
3. Assumptions and Principles
The following assumptions and principles underlie the design of the
current interoperability architecture, and correspond to the design
principles of the Internet architecture.
3.1. Design Principles
o Opaque blockchain resources: The interior resources of each
blockchain system is assumed to be opaque to (hidden from)
external entities. Any resources to be made accessible to an
external entity must be made explicitly accessible by a gateway
node with proper authorization.
o Externalization of value: The gateway protocol is agnostic
(oblivious) to the economic or monetary value of the virtual asset
being transferred.
The opaque resources principle permits the interoperability
architecture to be applied in cases where one (or both) blockchain
systems are permissioned (private). It is the analog of the
autonomous systems principle in IP networking [Clar88], where
interior routes in local subnets are not visible to other external
autonomous systems.
The value-externalization principle permits asset transfer protocols
to be designed for efficiency, speed and reliability - independent of
the changes in the perceived economic value of the virtual asset. It
is the analog of the end-to-end principle in the Internet
architecture [SRC84], where contextual information (economic value)
is placed at the endpoints of the transaction. In the case of a
transfer of virtual assets, the originator and beneficiary at the
respective blockchain systems are assumed to have a common agreement
regarding the economic value of the asset. This context of the
economic meaning of the value of the asset is assumed to exists at
the end-points, namely at the originator and beneficiary.
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
3.2. Operational Assumptions
The following conditions are assumed to have occurred, leading to the
invocation of the asset transfer protocol between two gateway nodes:
o Application layer transfer request: The transfer request from an
originator in the origin blockchain is assumed to have occurred
prior to the execution of the asset transfer protocol.
o Identification of originator and beneficiary: The originator and
beneficiary are assumed to have been identified and that consent
has been obtained from both parties regarding the asset transfer.
o Identification of origin and destination blockchain: The origin
and destination blockchain systems is assumed to have been
identified.
o Selection of gateway nodes: The two gateway nodes at the origin
and destination blockchain systems respectively is assumed to have
been identified and selected.
o Identification of gateway-node owners (VASP): The VASP operating
the gateway nodes are assumed to have been identified and their
legal status verified [FATF].
4. Architecture
4.1. Goal of Architecture
The goal of the interoperability architecture is to permit two (2)
gateway nodes belonging to distinct blockchain systems to conduct a
virtual asset transfer between them, in a secure and non-repudiable
manner while ensuring the asset does not exist simultaneously on both
blockchains (double-spend problem).
The virtual asset as understood by the two gateway nodes is a digital
representation of value, expressed in an standard digital format in a
way meaningful to the gateway nodes syntactically and semantically.
The syntactic representation of the virtual asset between the two
gateways need not bear any resemblance to the syntactic asset
representation within their respective blockchain systems.
The architecture recognizes that there are different blockchain
systems currently in operation and evolving, and that in many cases
the interior technical constructs in these blockchains maybe
incompatible with one another.
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
The architecture therefore assumes that certain types of nodes
(gateway nodes) will be equipped with an asset transfer protocol and
with other relevant resources that permits greater interoperability
across these incompatible blockchain systems.
The resources within a blockchain system (e.g. ledgers, public-keys,
consensus protocols, etc.) are assumed to be opaque to external
entities in order to permit a resilient and scalable protocol design
that is not dependent on the interior constructs of particular
blockchain systems. This ensures that the virtual asset transfer
protocol between gateways is not conditioned or dependent on these
local technical constructs. The role of a gateway therefore is also
to mask (hide) the complexity of the interior constructs of the
blockchain system that it represents. Overall this approach ensures
that a given blockchain system operates as a true autonomous system.
The current architecture focuses on unidirectional asset transfers,
although the building blocks in this architecture can be used to
support protocols for bidirectional transfers (conditional two
unidirectional transfers).
For simplicity the current architecture employs two (2) gateway nodes
in the respective blockchains, but collective multi-node transfers
(i.e. multiple nodes at each side) [HS2019] may be developed based on
the building blocks and constructs identified in the current
architecture.
4.2. Overview of Asset Transfer
An asset transfer between two blockchain systems is carried out by
two (2) gateway nodes in a direct interaction (unmediated), where the
gateway represents the two respective blockchain systems.
A successful transfer results in the asset being extinguished
(deleted) or marked on the origin ledger by the origin-gateway, and
for the asset to be introduced by the destination-gateway into the
destination ledger.
The mechanism to extinguish or introduce an asset from/into a ledger
is dependent on the specific blockchain system. The task of the
respective gateway is to implement the relevant mechanism to modify
the ledger of their corresponding blockchain system in such a way
that together the two blockchains maintain consistency from the asset
perspective, while observing the design principles of the
architecture.
An asset transfer protocol that can satisfy the properties of
atomicity and consistency in the case of two private blockchain
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
systems, should also satisfy the same properties in the case when one
or both are public blockchain systems.
4.3. Desirable Properties of Asset Transfer
The desirable features of asset transfers between two gateway nodes
include, but not limited, to the following:
o Atomicity: Transfer must either commit or entirely fail (failure
means no change to asset ownership).
o Consistency: Transfer (commit or fail) always leaves both
blockchains in a consistent state (asset located in the ledger of
one blockchain only).
o Isolation: While transfer occurring, asset ownership cannot be
modified (no double-spend).
o Durability: Once a transfer has been committed, must remain so
regardless of gateway crashes.
o Verifiable by authorized third parties: With proper authorization
to access relevant interior resources, third party entities must
be able at any time to perform audit-validation of the two
respective ledgers for asset transfers across the corresponding
blockchain systems.
o Containment of side-effects: Any effects due to errors or
security/integrity breaches in a blockchain system during an asset
transfer must be contained within that blockchain.
An implementation of the asset transfer protocol should satisfy these
properties, independent of whether the implementation employs
stateful messaging or stateless messaging between the two gateways.
4.4. Event log-data, crash recovery and backup gateways
Implementations of gateway nodes should maintain event logs and
checkpoints for the purpose of gateway crash recovery. The log-data
generated by a gateway should be considered as an interior resource
accessible to other authorized gateway nodes within the same
blockchain system
Mechanisms used to select or elect a gateway node in a blockchain
system for a given asset transfer could be extended to include the
selection of a backup gateway node. The primary gateway and the
backup gateway may or may not belong to the same owner (VASP).
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
Some blockchain systems may utilize the ledger itself as means to
retain the log-data, allowing other nodes in the blockchain to have
visibility and access to the gateway log-data. Other blockchain
systems may employ off-chain storage that is accessible to all
gateway nodes in the blockchain domain. In such cases, to provide
event-sequencing integrity the gateway may store a hash of the log-
data on the ledger of the blockchain (passive transaction) prior to
writing the log-data to the off-chain storage.
The mechanism used to provide gateway crash-recovery is dependent on
the blockchain system and the gateway implementation. For
interoperability purposes the information contained in the log and
the format of the log-data should be standardized, permitting vendors
of gateway products to reduce development costs over time.
Similarly, in order to ensure a high degree of interoperability
across crash-recovery protocol implementations [BCH21], a
standardized interface (e.g. REST APIs) should be defined for read/
write access to the log-storage. The interface should hide the
details of the log-storage from the gateway itself, and it should be
independent of the node recovery strategy (e.g. self-healing,
primary-backup node, etc.).
The resumption of an interrupted transfer (e.g. due to gateway crash,
network failure, etc.) should take into consideration the aspects of
secure channel establishment and the aspects of the transfer protocol
resumption. In some cases, a new secure channel (e.g. TLS session)
must be established netween the two gateways nodes, within which the
asset transfer protocol could be continued from the last checkpoint
prior to the interruption. However, in other cases both the secure
channel and the transfer protocol may need to be started completely
afresh (no resumption).
The log-data collected by a gateway node acts also as a checkpoint
mechanism to assist the recovered (or backup) gateway node in
continuing the transfer. The point at which to re-start the transfer
protocol flow is dependent on the implementation of the gateway
recovery strategy. Some owners (VASPs) of gateway nodes may choose
to start afresh the transfer of the asset, and not to resume
partially completed transfers (e.g. for easier legal audit purposes).
4.5. Overview of the Phases in Asset Transfer
The interaction between two gateways in an asset transfer is
summarized in Figure 1, where the origin blockchain is B1 and the
destination blockchain is B2. The gateways are denoted as G1 and G2
respectively.
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
Originator
|
+-------------+
| Client |
|(Application)|
+-------------+
|
| Phases
V
+-------------+ |<-----(1)----->| +-------------+
| Blockchain | +----+ +----+ | Blockchain |
| System B1 | |Gate| |Gate| | System B2 |
| |--|way |<-----(2)----->|way |--| |
| +---------+ | | G1 | | G2 | | +---------+ |
| |Ledger L1| | +----+ +----+ | |Ledger L2| |
| +---------+ | |<-----(3)----->| | +---------+ |
+-------------+ +-------------+
Figure 1
The three phases are summarized as follows.
o Phase 1: Pre-transfer Verification of Asset and Identities. In
this phase the gateways G1 and G2 must mutually identify
themselves and authenticate that both possess gateway-
capabilities. Gateway G1 must communicate to G2 the asset-profile
of the asset to be transferred, and that consent have been
obtained from the beneficiary regarding accepting the transfer.
o Phase 2: Evidence of asset locking or escrow. In this phase,
gateway G1 must provide gateway G2 with sufficient evidence that
the asset on blockchain B1 is in a locked state (or escrowed)
under the control of G1 on ledger L1, and safe from double-spend
by its current owner (the originator).
o Phase 3: Transfer commitment. In this phase gateways G1 and G2
commit to the unidirectional asset transfer.
These phases will be further discussed below.
5. Pre-transfer Verification of Asset and Identities (Phase 1)
The primary purpose of the first phase is to verify the various
information relating to the asset to be transferred, the identities
of the originator and beneficiary, the identity and legal status of
the entities (VASPs) who own and operate the gateways, the blockchain
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
or DLT system type and network parameters, and the device-identities
of the gateways.
Orig L1 G1 G2 L2 Benef
| | | | | |
|---request------->| | | |
| | | | | |
..|.....|............|....................|............|.....|..
| | | Phase 1 | | |
| | | | | |
| | (1.1)|<-----VASP id------>| | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | (1.2)|<--Asset Profile--->| | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | (1.3)|<--Orig/Benef id--->| | |
| | | | | |
..|.....|............|....................|............|.....|..
| | | | | |
Figure 2
This phase starts with the assumption that in blockchain B1 the
gateway to process the asset transfer to B2 has been selected (namely
gateway G1). It also assumes that the destination blockchain B2 has
been identified where the beneficiary address is located, and that
gateway G2 in blockchain B2 has been identified that will peer with
G1 to perform the transfer.
There are several steps that may occur in Phase 1 (see Figure 2):
o Secure channel establishment between G1 and G2: This includes the
mutual verification of the gateway device identities and the
exchange of the relevant parameters for secure channel
establishment. In cases where device attestation [RATS] is
required, the mutual attestation protocol must occur between G1
and G2 prior to proceeding to the next phase.
o Mutual device attestations: In cases where device attestation
[RATS] is required, each gateway must yield attestation evidence
to the other regarding its configuration. A gateway may take on
the role as a attestation verifier, or it may rely on an external
verifier to appraise the received evidence.
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
o Validation of the gateway ownership: There must be a means for
gateway G1 and G2 to verify their respective ownerships (i.e.
VASP1 owning G1 and VASP2 owning G2 respectively). Examples of
ownership verification mechanism include the chaining of the
gateway-device X.509 certificate up to the VASP entity
certificate, directories of gateways and VASPs, and others.
o Validation of VASP status: In some jurisdictions limitations may
be placed for regulated VASPs to transact only with other
similarly regulated VASPs. Examples of mechanisms used to
validate a VASP legal status include VASP directories, Extended
Validation (EV) X.509 certificates for VASPs, and others.
o Identification and validation of asset profile: Both gateways must
agree on the type of asset being transferred based on the profile
of the asset. Gateway G1 must communicate the asset-profile
identification to gateway G2, who in turn must validate both the
legal status of the asset as well as the technical capability of
the blockchain B2 to digitally represent the asset type within its
ledger L2. The policies governing blockchain B2 with regards to
permissible incoming assets must be enforced by G2.
o Exchange of Travel Rule information and validation: In
jurisdictions where the Travel Rule policies regarding originator
and beneficiary information is enforced [FATF], the owners of
gateways G1 and G2 must comply to the Travel Rule. Mechanisms
must be used to permit gateways G1 and G2 to make available
originator/beneficiary information to one another in such away
that the Travel Rule information can be logged as part of the
asset transfer history.
o Negotiation of asset transfer protocol parameters: Gateway G1 and
G2 must agree on the parameters to be employed within the asset
transfer protocol. Examples include endpoints definitions for
resources, type of commitment flows (e.g. 2PC or 3PC), lock-time
durations, and others [ODAP].
6. Evidence of asset locking or escrow (Phase 2)
The asset transfer protocol can commence when both gateways G1 and G2
have completed the verifications in Phase 1.
The steps of Phase 2 are summarized in Figure 3, and broadly consists
of the following:
o Commencement (2.1): Gateway G1 indicates the start of the asset
transfer protocol by sending a transfer-commence message to
gateway G2. Among others, the message must include a
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
cryptographic hash of the information agreed-upon in Phase 1 (e.g.
asset profile, gateway identities, originator/beneficiary public
keys, etc.).
o Acknowledgement (2.2): The gateway G2 must send an explicit
acknowledgement of the receipt of the commence message, which
should include a hash of commencement message (2.1) and other
relevant session parameters.
o G1 lock/escrow asset (2.3): Gateway G1 proceeds to lock or escrow
the asset belonging to the originator on ledger L1. The lock may
take the form of passive transaction that signals to other nodes
that the asset is temporarily inaccessible. This signals to other
nodes in the blockchain system to ignore other transactions
pertaining to the asset until such time the lock by G1 is
finalized or released. A time-lock or escrow may also be
employed. The mode of the escrow may depend on the fundamental
ledger architecture of the respective blockchains B1 and B2 in
question (e.g. account-based, UTXO, or other).
o G2 log incoming asset (2.4): Gateway G2 correspondingly writes a
non-committing log (passive transaction) on ledger L2 indicating
an imminent arrival of the asset to L2. This may act as a
notification for the beneficiary regarding the asset transfer.
o Lock Evidence (2.5): Gateway G1 sends a digitally signed evidence
regarding the lock (escrow) performed by G1 on the asset on ledger
L1. The signature by G1 is performed using its entity public-key
pair. This signifies that G1 (i.e. its owner VASP) is standing
behind the assertion regarding the lock/escrow on the asset
performed by G1.
o Evidence receipt (2.6): If gateway G2 accepts the evidence, G2
then responds with a digitally signed receipt message which
includes a hash of the previous lock-evidence message. Otherwise,
if G2 declines the evidence then G2 can ignore the transfer and
let it time-out (i.e. transfer failed). The signature by G2 is
performed using its entity public-key pair.
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
Orig L1 G1 G2 L2 Benef
| | | (Phase 1) | | |
| | | | | |
..|.....|............|....................|............|.....|..
| | | Phase 2 | | |
| | | | | |
| | (2.1)|-----Commence------>| | |
| | | | | |
| | |<-------ACK---------|(2.2) | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| |<---Lock----|(2.3) | | |
| | | (2.4)|----Log---->| |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | (2.5)|---Lock Evidence--->| | |
| | | | | |
| | |<-----Receipt-------|(2.6) | |
| | | | | |
..|.....|............|....................|............|.....|..
| | | | | |
Figure 3
The precise form of the evidence in step 2.5 is dependent on the
blockchain system in B1, and must be previously agreed upon between
G1 and G2 in Phase 1.
The purpose of this evidence is for dispute resolution between G1 and
G2 (i.e. the VASP entities who own and operate G1 and G2
respectively) in the case that double-spend is later detected.
The gateway G2 must return a digitally signed receipt to G1 of this
evidence in order to cover G1 (exculpatory proof) in the case of
later denial by G2.
7. Transfer Commitment (Phase 3)
In Phase 3 the gateways G1 and G2 finalizes to the asset transfer by
performing a commitment protocol (e.g. 2PC or 3PC) as a process (sub-
protocol) embedded within the overall asset transfer protocol.
Upon receiving the evidence-receipt message in the previous phase, G1
begins the commitment (see Figure 4):
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
o Commit-prepare (3.1): Gateway G1 indicates to G2 to prepare for
the commitment of the transfer. This message must include a hash
of the previous messages (message 2.5 and 2.6).
o Ack-prepare (3.2): Gateway G2 acknowledges the commit-prepare
message.
o Lock-final (3.3): Gateway G1 issues a lock-finalization
transaction (passive transaction) or escrow finalization on ledger
L1 that signals the permanent extinguishment of the asset
blockchain B1. This transaction must include a hash reference to
the lock transaction on L1 previously in step (2.3). This
indicates that the asset is no longer associated with the public-
key of its previous owner (originator) and that the asset instance
is no longer recognized on the ledger L1.
o Commit-final (3.4): Gateway G1 indicates to G2 that G1 has
performed a local lock/escrow finalization on L1. This message
must be digitally signed by G1 and should include the block number
and transaction number (of the confirmed block) on ledger L1.
o Asset-create (3.5): Gateway G2 issues a transaction on ledger L2
to create (re-generate) the asset, associated with the public-key
of the beneficiary. This transaction must include a hash of the
previous message (3.4) and hash reference to the log-incoming
transaction on L2 previously in step (2.4). These hash references
connects the newly re-generated asset with the overall transfer
event originating from gateway G1.
o Ack-final (3.6): Gateway G2 indicates to G1 that G2 has performed
an asset-regeneration transaction on L2. This message must be
digitally signed by G2 and should include the block number and
transaction number (of the confirmed block) on ledger L2.
o Location-record (3.7): Gateway G1 has the option to record the
block number and transaction number (as reported by G2 in the
previous step) to ledger L1, using a passive transaction. This
transaction should include a hash reference to the confirmed lock-
finalization transaction on L1 from step 3.3. This information
may aid in future search, audit and accountability purposes from a
legal perspective.
o Transfer complete (3.8): Gateway G1 must explicitly close the
asset transfer session with gateway G2. This allows both sides to
close down the secure channel established in Phase 1.
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
Orig L1 G1 G2 L2 Benef
| | | (Phase 2) | | |
| | | | | |
..|.....|............|....................|............|.....|..
| | | Phase 3 | | |
| | | | | |
| | (3.1)|--Commit Prepare--->| | |
| | | | | |
| | |<-----ACK-Prep------|(3.2) | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| |<--Final----|(3.3) | | |
| | | | | |
| | (3.4)|----Commit Final--->| | |
| | | | | |
| | | (3.5)|---Create-->| |
| | | | | |
| | |<-----ACK-Final-----|(3.6) | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| |<--Record---|(3.7) | | |
| | | | | |
| | (3.8)|---Complete/End---->| | |
| | | | | |
..|.....|............|....................|............|.....|..
| | | | | |
Figure 4
8. Related Open Issues
There are a number of open issues that are related to the asset
transfer protocol between gateway nodes. Some of the issues are due
to the fact that blockchain technology is relatively new, and that
technical constructs designed for interoperability have yet to be
addressed. Some of the issues are due to the nascency of the virtual
asset industry and lack of conventions, and therefore require
industry collaboration to determine the standard conventions.
8.1. Global identification of blockchain systems and public-keys
There is currently no standard nomenclature to identify blockchain
systems in a globally unique manner. The analog to this is the AS-
numbers associated with IP routing autonomous systems.
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
Furthermore, an address (public-key) may not be unique to one
blockchain system. An entity (e.g. user) may in fact employ the same
public-key at multiple distinct blockchain systems simultaneously.
Thus, there is no convention today with regards to the application of
a key within a given blockchain system (comparable to the principal/
domain convention in Internet host naming).
However, in order to perform an asset transfer from one blockchain
system to another, there needs to be mechanism that resolves the
beneficiary identifier (as known to the originator) to the correct
public-key and blockchain system as intended by the originator.
8.2. Discovery of gateways nodes within a blockchain system
A given blockchain system must possess the capability to select or
designate gateway nodes that will perform an asset transfer across
blockchain systems.
A number of blockchain systems already employ consensus mechanisms
that elect a node to perform the transaction processing (e.g. proof
of stake in Ethereum). The same consensus mechanisms may be used to
elect the gateway node.
However, there are some blockchain systems that do not elect a single
node and which employ a race-to-process strategy (e.g. proof of work
in Bitcoin). Since the winner of the proof of work can be any node
in the blockchain system, this implies that all the nodes in these
types of blockchains must be gateway-capable.
8.3. Remote gateway discovery
Related to the ability to discover other blockchain/DLT systems
globally is the ability to discover the remote gateways for these
other blockchain/DLT systems. A discovery mechanism for external
entities (e.g. for gateway G1) to look for gateway-capable nodes
(e.g. remote gateway G2) is required in order for gateways to quickly
and efficiently peer without human intervention. The discovery
mechanism may employ the available information at gateway G1, such as
the originator/beneficiary public keys, the VASPs (owners of the
gateways) and other parameters.
Other approaches may also be employed, such as incorporating the
gateway identities within a VASP's configuration file (e.g. at a
well-known location), and within a global directory of regulated
VASPs. Approaches similar to the DNS infrastructure may provide an
alternative architecture for solving this problem.
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
8.4. Commitment protocols and forms of commitment evidence
Within Phase 2, the gateway nodes must implement one (or more)
transactional commitment protocols that permit the coordination
between two gateways, and the final commitment of the asset transfer.
The choice of the commitment protocol (type/version) and the
corresponding commitment evidence must be negotiated between the
gateways during Phase 1.
For example, in Phase 2 and Phase 3 discussed above the gateways G1
and G2 may implement the classic 2 Phase Commit (2PC) protocol
[Gray81] as a means to ensure efficient and non-disputable
commitments to the asset transfer.
Historically, transactional commitment protocols employ locking
mechanisms to prevent update conflicts on the data item in question.
When used within the context of virtual asset transfers across
blockchain systems, the fact that an asset has been locked by G1 (as
the 2PC coordinator) must be communicated to G2 (as the 2PC
participant) in an indisputable manner.
The exact form of this evidence of asset-locking must be standardized
(for the given transactional commitment protocol) to eliminate any
ambiguity.
9. Security Considerations
Although the current interoperability architecture for blockchain
gateways assumes the externalization of the value of assets, as a
blockchain system holds an increasing number of virtual assets it
becomes attractive to attackers seeking to obtain cryptographic keys
of its nodes and its end-users.
Gateway nodes are of particular interest to attackers because they
enable the transferal of virtual assets to external blockchain
systems, which may or may not be regulated. As such, hardening
technologies and tamper-resistant crypto-processors (e.g. TPM, SGX)
should be used for implementations of gateways [HS19].
10. Policy Considerations
Virtual asset transfers must be policy-driven in the sense that it
must observe and enforce the policies defined for the blockchain
domain. Resources that make-up a blockchain systems are owned and
operated by entities (e.g. legal persons or organizations), and these
entities typically operate within regulatory jurisdictions [FATF].
It is the responsibility of these entities to translate regulatory
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
policies into functions on blockchain systems that comply to the
relevant regulatory policies.
At the application layer, asset transfers must take into
consideration the legal status of assets and incorporate relevant
asset-related policies into their business logic. These policies
must permeate down to the nodes that implement the functions of asset
transaction processing.
The smart contract abstraction, based on replicated shared code/state
on the ledger [Herl19], must additionally incorporate the notion of
policy into the abstraction.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[BCH21] Belchior, R., Correia, M., and T. Hardjono, "DLT Gateway
Crash Recovery Mechanism, IETF, draft-belchior-gateway-
recovery-01.", March 2021,
.
[FATF] FATF, "International Standards on Combating Money
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and
Proliferation - FATF Revision of Recommendation 15",
October 2018, .
[ISO] ISO, "Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies-
Vocabulary (ISO:22739:2020)", July 2020,
.
[NIST] Yaga, D., Mell, P., Roby, N., and K. Scarfone, "NIST
Blockchain Technology Overview (NISTR-8202)", October
2018, .
[ODAP] Hargreaves, M. and T. Hardjono, "Open Digital Asset
Protocol, IETF, draft-hargreaves-odap-01.", November 2020,
.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
.
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
11.2. Informative References
[ABCH20] Ankenbrand, T., Bieri, D., Cortivo, R., Hoehener, J., and
T. Hardjono, "Proposal for a Comprehensive Crypto Asset
Taxonomy", May 2020, .
[BVGC20] Belchior, R., Vasconcelos, A., Guerreiro, S., and M.
Correia, "A Survey on Blockchain Interoperability: Past,
Present, and Future Trends", May 2020,
.
[Clar88] Clark, D., "The Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet
Protocols, ACM Computer Communication Review, Proc SIGCOMM
88, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 106-114", August 1988.
[Gray81] Gray, J., "The Transaction Concept: Virtues and
Limitations, in VLDB Proceedings of the 7th International
Conference, Cannes, France, September 1981, pp. 144-154",
September 1981.
[Herl19] Herlihy, M., "Blockchains From a Distributed Computing
Perspective, Communications of the ACM, vol. 62, no. 2,
pp. 78-85", February 2019,
.
[HLP19] Hardjono, T., Lipton, A., and A. Pentland, "Towards and
Interoperability Architecture for Blockchain Autonomous
Systems, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management",
June 2019, .
[HS2019] Hardjono, T. and N. Smith, "Decentralized Trusted
Computing Base for Blockchain Infrastructure Security,
Frontiers Journal, Special Issue on Blockchain Technology,
Vol. 2, No. 24", December 2019,
.
[IDevID] Richardson, M. and J. Yang, "A Taxonomy of operational
security of manufacturer installed keys and anchors. IETF
draft-richardson-t2trg-idevid-considerations-01", August
2020, .
[SRC84] Saltzer, J., Reed, D., and D. Clark, "End-to-End Arguments
in System Design, ACM Transactions on Computer Systems,
vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 277-288", November 1984.
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft Blockchain/DLT Gateways April 2021
Authors' Addresses
Thomas Hardjono
MIT
Email: hardjono@mit.edu
Martin Hargreaves
Quant Network
Email: martin.hargreaves@quant.network
Ned Smith
Intel
Email: ned.smith@intel.com
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 23, 2021 [Page 22]