Network Working Group P. M. Hallam-Baker Internet-Draft ThresholdSecrets.com Intended status: Informational 13 January 2021 Expires: 17 July 2021 Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part IV: Schema Reference draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-07 Abstract The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and credential data between multiple user devices. The core protocols of the Mesh are described with examples of common use cases and reference data. [Note to Readers] Discussion of this draft takes place on the MATHMESH mailing list (mathmesh@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=mathmesh. This document is also available online at http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema.html. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 July 2021. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Related Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.4. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2.1. Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.3. Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. Catalogs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.1. Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.2. Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2.1. Mesh Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2.2. SSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2.3. Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.3. Bookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.4. Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.5. Credential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.6. Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.7. Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.8. Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.9. Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5. Spools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.1. Outbound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.2. Inbound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.3. Local . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 6. Cryptographic Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6.1. Key Derivation from Seed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6.2. Message Envelope and Response Identifiers. . . . . . . . 23 6.3. Proof of Knowledge of PIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 6.4. EARL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 6.5. Key Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6.6. Service Cryptographic Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 7. Mesh Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 7.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 7.2. Mesh Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7.3. Mesh Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 8.1. Mesh Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8.1.1. Account Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8.2. Device Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 8.2.1. The Device Catalog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 8.2.2. Mesh Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 8.3. Mesh Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 8.4. Mesh Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 8.4.1. Message Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 8.4.2. Four Corner Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 8.4.3. Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 9. Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 9.1. Contact Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 9.2. Device Preconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 9.3. Device Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 10. Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 10.1. Shared Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 10.1.1. Classes describing keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 10.1.2. Structure: KeyData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 10.1.3. Structure: CompositePrivate . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 10.2. Assertion classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 10.2.1. Structure: Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 10.2.2. Structure: Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 10.2.3. Base Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 10.2.4. Structure: Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 10.2.5. Structure: Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 10.2.6. Structure: ActivationEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 10.2.7. Mesh Profile Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 10.2.8. Structure: Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 10.2.9. Structure: ProfileDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 10.2.10. Structure: ProfileAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 10.2.11. Structure: ProfileUser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 10.2.12. Structure: ProfileGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 10.2.13. Structure: ProfileService . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 10.2.14. Structure: ProfileHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 10.2.15. Connection Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 10.2.16. Structure: ConnectionDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 10.2.17. Structure: ConnectionApplication . . . . . . . . . . 46 10.2.18. Structure: ConnectionGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 10.2.19. Structure: ConnectionService . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 10.2.20. Structure: ConnectionHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 10.2.21. Activation Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 10.2.22. Structure: ActivationDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 10.2.23. Structure: ActivationAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 10.2.24. Structure: ActivationApplication . . . . . . . . . . 47 10.3. Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 10.3.1. Structure: Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 10.3.2. Structure: Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 10.3.3. Structure: TaggedSource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 10.3.4. Structure: ContactGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 10.3.5. Structure: ContactPerson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 10.3.6. Structure: ContactOrganization . . . . . . . . . . . 49 10.3.7. Structure: OrganizationName . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 10.3.8. Structure: PersonName . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 10.3.9. Structure: NetworkAddress . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 10.3.10. Structure: NetworkProtocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 10.3.11. Structure: Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 10.3.12. Structure: Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 10.3.13. Structure: Bookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 10.3.14. Structure: Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 10.3.15. Structure: Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 10.4. Catalog Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 10.4.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 10.4.2. Structure: CatalogedDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 10.4.3. Structure: CatalogedPublication . . . . . . . . . . 53 10.4.4. Structure: CatalogedCredential . . . . . . . . . . . 53 10.4.5. Structure: CatalogedNetwork . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 10.4.6. Structure: CatalogedContact . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 10.4.7. Structure: CatalogedAccess . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 10.4.8. Structure: CryptographicCapability . . . . . . . . . 54 10.4.9. Structure: CapabilityDecrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 10.4.10. Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial . . . . . . . . 54 10.4.11. Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced . . . . . . . . 55 10.4.12. Structure: CapabilitySign . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 10.4.13. Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate . . . . . . . . . . 55 10.4.14. Structure: CapabilityFairExchange . . . . . . . . . 55 10.4.15. Structure: CatalogedBookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 10.4.16. Structure: CatalogedTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 10.4.17. Structure: CatalogedApplication . . . . . . . . . . 56 10.4.18. Structure: CatalogedMember . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 10.4.19. Structure: CatalogedGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 10.4.20. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH . . . . . . . . . 56 10.4.21. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail . . . . . . . . 56 10.4.22. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork . . . . . . . 57 10.5. Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 10.5.1. Structure: DevicePreconfiguration . . . . . . . . . 57 10.6. Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 10.6.1. Structure: Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 10.6.2. Structure: MessageError . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 10.6.3. Structure: MessageComplete . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 10.6.4. Structure: MessagePinValidated . . . . . . . . . . . 58 10.6.5. Structure: MessagePin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 10.6.6. Structure: RequestConnection . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 10.6.7. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection . . . . . . . . . . 58 10.6.8. Structure: RespondConnection . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 10.6.9. Structure: MessageContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 10.6.10. Structure: GroupInvitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 10.6.11. Structure: RequestConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . . 59 10.6.12. Structure: ResponseConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . 60 10.6.13. Structure: RequestTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 10.6.14. Structure: MessageClaim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 10.6.15. Structure: ProcessResult . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 14. Appendix A: Example Container Organization (not normative) . 61 14.1. Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 14.1.1. Creating a new Mesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 14.1.2. Adding an Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 14.1.3. Adding a Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 14.2. Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 14.2.1. Creating a Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 14.2.2. Adding an Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 15. Appendix B: Collected Authentication and Encryption Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 15.1. Mesh Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 16. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 17. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 1. Introduction This document describes the data structures of the Mathematical Mesh with illustrative examples. For an overview of the Mesh objectives and architecture, consult the accompanying _Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. For information on the implementation of the Mesh Service protocol, consult the accompanying _Protocol Reference_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol] This document has two main sections. The first section presents examples of the Mesh assertions, catalog entry and messages in use. The second section contains the schema reference. All the material in both sections is generated from the Mesh reference implementation [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]. Although some of the services described in this document could be used to replace existing Internet protocols including FTP and SMTP, the principal value of any communication protocol lies in the size of the audience it allows them to communicate with. Thus, while the Mesh Messaging service is designed to support efficient and reliable transfer of messages ranging in size from a few bytes to multiple terabytes, the near-term applications of these services will be to applications that are not adequately supported by existing protocols if at all. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 2. Definitions This section presents the related specifications and standard, the terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the terms used as requirements language. 2.1. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 2.2. Defined Terms The terms of art used in this document are described in the _Mesh Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. 2.3. Related Specifications The architecture of the Mathematical Mesh is described in the _Mesh Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. The Mesh documentation set and related specifications are described in this document. 2.4. Implementation Status The implementation status of the reference code base is described in the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]. 3. Actors The Mesh mediates interactions between three principal actors: *Accounts*, *Devices*, and *Services*. Currently two account types are specified, *user accounts* which belong to an individual user and *group accounts* that are used to share access to confidential information between a group of users. It may prove useful to define new types of account over time or to eliminate the distinction entirely. When active a Mesh account is bound to a Mesh Service. The service to which an account is bound MAY be changed over time but an account can only be bound to a single service at a time. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 A Mesh account is an abstract construct that (when active) is instantiated across one or more physical machines called a device. Each device that is connected to an account has a separate set of cryptographic keys that are used to interact with other devices connected to the account and MAY be provisioned with access to the account private keys which MAY or MAY NOT be mediated by the current Mesh Service. A Mesh Service is an abstract construct that is provided by one or more physical machines called Hosts. A Mesh Host is a device that is attached to a service rather than an account. 3.1. Accounts A Mesh Account is described by a Profile descended from Profile Account and contains a set of Mesh stores. Currently two account profiles are defined: ProfileUser Describes a user account. ProfileGroup Describes a group account used to share confidential information between a group of users. Both types of profile specify the following fields: ProfileSignature The public signature key used to authenticate the profile itself AccountAddress The account name to which the account is currently bound. (e.g. "alice@example.com", "@alice"). ServiceUdf If the account is active, specifies the fingerprint of the service profile to which the account is currently bound. AdministratorSignature The public signature key used to verify administrative actions on the account. In particular addition of devices to a user account or members to a group account. AccountEncryption The public encryption key for the account. All messages sent to the account MUST be encrypted under this key. By definition, all data encrypted under this account is encrypted under this key. User accounts specify two additional public keys, "AccountSignature" and "AccountAuthentication" which allow signature and authentication operations under the account context. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 Every account contains a set of catalogs and spools that are managed by the service as directed by the contents of the associated "Access" catalog. For example, the personal account profile Alice created is: { "ProfileUser":{ "ProfileSignature":{ "Udf":"MAMU-5QXP-TWCD-7PKI-S4FC-IB76-XASH", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"Ed448", "Public":"c3l96hFNVbXzQa7dohgp_X9YIIzaR4U0dPCfyocquFWnZ uiFdu9vl9UIgtYv-tjFVpmk6qRDj7mA"}}}, "AccountAddress":"alice@example.com", "ServiceUdf":"MA36-TUJL-QRZJ-3M3L-SRBQ-BRYQ-W2YM", "AccountEncryption":{ "Udf":"MDLO-JJ4B-RBY5-VYD7-LJZY-S3RK-DBM2", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"X448", "Public":"4Mi9X8mXI9mGh_7sjGZP0aFPRXJNSFexPBnIAK1BN__SX RxtWQTsXsgz1fl5Jc38ZYx7MVe2X9wA"}}}, "AdministratorSignature":{ "Udf":"MCCK-F2WZ-QAAC-C3NA-EVAW-SBL7-IHEQ", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"Ed448", "Public":"8TSZ7DNTM7FugJqAFft4FJD4WdjA9omHUDa7tntnJBkQ4 kNW_tyS6QMGMYly4wHR1WFnUZvI5QmA"}}}, "AccountAuthentication":{ "Udf":"MBB3-723K-DJKQ-G4HH-7PTN-5JXK-ZV6A", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"X448", "Public":"l674_n9ihg91rjgPisb3XuA78E_8hWzsHtYfoFQvGB2kZ 3O1xSBFE2ppFjhS4hslA45yz7WpBzgA"}}}, "AccountSignature":{ "Udf":"MDA6-ELE2-T2AM-52RT-AN3R-LUDS-GJGX", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"Ed448", "Public":"AHStW8KGpbroZt5ez-wvbC_FMr9AjqI8gLigC5p3whHcE Q4jP9dW1xDwZ34j77qXNIfFEvOEWJMA"}}}}} Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 3.2. Device Every Mesh device has a set of private keys that are unique to that device. These keys MAY be installed during manufacture, installed from an external source after manufacture or generated on the device. If the platform capabilities allow, device private keys SHOULD be bound to the device so that they cannot be extracted or exported without substantial effort. The public keys corresponding to the device private keys are specified in a ProfileDevice. This MUST contain at least the following fields: ProfileSignature The public signature key used to authenticate the profile itself. BaseEncryption Public encryption key used as a share contribution to generation of device encryption keys to be used in the context of an account and to decrypt data during the process of connecting to an account. BaseAuthentication Public authentication key used as a share contribution to generation of device authentication keys to be used in the context of an account and to authenticate the device to a service during the process of connecting to an account. BaseSignature Public signature key used as a share contribution to generation of device authentication keys to be used in the context of an account. For example, the device profile corresponding to Alice's coffee pot device is: Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 { "ProfileDevice":{ "ProfileSignature":{ "Udf":"MAQO-2SJC-PGX4-KVHC-TEQ3-I2NP-GYBA", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"Ed448", "Public":"s9IdDH2a_dArdBA8thg41Ctwc0qVo6w67bRrEI1LZgSlG pUSlXWZN8W-VY7hm40Xoq7TU5KEsQSA"}}}, "BaseEncryption":{ "Udf":"MD5F-Q3O6-KRGL-IS4V-IWVC-5SIN-S63R", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"X448", "Public":"aJSPUdraCO0yv2YXVKkQ4i1XUKVau-Apb7-OxXNb06Y-w 9I420kkRzXhSfsifKPegX7kJMHDKZkA"}}}, "BaseAuthentication":{ "Udf":"MDQC-JYXP-KZ3I-ETIO-KMWA-XIAP-3JRD", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"X448", "Public":"KABXGv_VuvLPRhfVpHd5qykjJDUNRiwhh5u3CJpwuAZXf vmeM0KXit5b6wNvYYsSoLeNfKy337IA"}}}, "BaseSignature":{ "Udf":"MDL3-Q7RU-USJR-QF3O-CJEF-6TPW-EVAN", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"Ed448", "Public":"2wXyHGACnTq5ee8mgXM_jADlpeRV7gcN3jTQc9LP3LP1Y zii2iSkUMgUTP8yF_KmibXs5pXvv0oA"}}}}} 3.2.1. Activation The device private keys are only used to perform cryptographic operations during the process of connecting a device to an account. During that connection process, a threshold key generation scheme is used to generate a second set of device keys bound to the account by combining the base key held by the device with a second device private key provided by the administration device approving the connection of the device to the account. The resulting key is referred to as the device key. The process of combining the base keys with the contributions to form the device keys is called Activation. The activation record for Alice's coffee pot device is: Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 { "ActivationDevice":{ "ActivationKey":"ZAAQ-HHIF-DKIU-F5UI-VEFB-G4XO-SZY6-JF4J-7QLL-2 RFQ-QGUO-AJI7-I2FQ-CXO6", "AccountUdf":"MAQO-2SJC-PGX4-KVHC-TEQ3-I2NP-GYBA"}} The Mesh protocols are designed so that there is never a need to export or escrow private keys of any type associated with a device, neither the base key, nor the device key nor the contribution from the administration device. This approach to device configuration ensures that the keys that are used by the device when operating within the context of the account are entirely separate from those originally provided by the device manufacturer or generated on the device, provided only that the key contributions from the administration device are sufficiently random and unguessable. The public keys corresponding to the composite keys generated during the connection process are described in a "ConnectionUser" assertion signed by the administration key of the corresponding account. The connection record for Alice's coffee pot device is: { "ConnectionDevice":{ "DeviceSignature":{ "Udf":"MCEL-HWST-PNFX-ENF4-ROL5-INQF-P2TK", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"Ed448", "Public":"4DHBHjQ8X2CadyazPhOx_kSM1IFwgkZEWwW6BK18UBsrr wURQg5QVOGbZl4hvQqu7dULB4tDjAIA"}}}, "DeviceEncryption":{ "Udf":"MDPR-ZBW2-AERR-PQIZ-2J3Z-5DLN-ALBM", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"X448", "Public":"Q7UKXQoRCr4eqDLi1WgyyO9JNtDmZ4AaFl6iaGB5IRGrF eMpv7LanAKnTNZUQP0fbnmpdoGvjG-A"}}}, "DeviceAuthentication":{ "Udf":"MDS4-XJNU-HVTT-VR27-I4W3-DYDC-AFEK", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"X448", "Public":"F2Bv14NA0Qw_f2B1ktqMGUzAMKbiUNF8etfElLVN-FGYw V0PN9PMdE55ELOt0Y0YkKxP3CR0Kp4A"}}}}} Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 The "ConnectionUser" assertion MAY be used in the same fashion as an X.509v3/PKIX certificate to mediate interactions between devices connected to the same account without the need for interaction with the Mesh service. Thus, a coffee pot device connected to the account can receive and authenticate instructions issued by a voice recognition device connected to that account. While the "ConnectionUser" assertion MAY be used to mediate external interactions, this approach is typically undesirable as it provides the external parties with visibility to the internal configuration of the account, in particular which connected devices are being used on which occasions. Furthermore, the lack of the need to interact with the service means that the service is necessarily unable to mediate the exchange and enforce authorization policy on the interactions. Device keys are intended to be used to secure communications between devices connected to the same account. All communication between Mesh accounts SHOULD be mediated by a Mesh service. This enables abuse mitigation by applying access control to every outbound and every inbound message. Since Alice's coffee pot does not require the external communication right, the activation record for the coffee pot does not provide access to the account keys required to perform external communications. Alice's watch device does require access to the account keys so it can receive messages and task updates. But since it is a device that Alice has to carry on her person to use, it is a device that might easily be lost or stolen. Accordingly, the activation record for Alice's watch provides access to the account decryption and signature keys but in the form of threshold key shares mediated by the Mesh service. Thus, Alice's watch can sign and read message sent to the account but only under the control of the Mesh service. 3.3. Service Mesh services are described by a "ProfileService". This specifies the encryption, and signature authentication keys used to interact with the abstract service. Since Mesh accounts and services are both abstract constructs, they cannot interact directly. A device connected to an account can only interact with a service by interacted with a device authorized to provide services on behalf of one or more accounts connected to the service. Such a device is called a Mesh Host. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 Mesh hosts MAY be managed using the same ProfileDevice and device connection mechanism provided for management of user devices or by whatever other management protocols prove convenient. The only part of the Service/Host interaction that is visible to devices connected to a profile and to hosts connected to other services is the ConnectionHost structure that describes the set of device keys to use in interactions with that specific host. 4. Catalogs Catalogs track sets of persistent objects associated with a Mesh Service Account. The Mesh Service has no access to the entries in any Mesh catalog except for the Device and Contacts catalog which are used in device authentication and authorization of inbound messages. Each Mesh Catalog managed by a Mesh Account has a name of the form: "_" Where "" is the IANA assigned service name. The assigned service name for the Mathematical Mesh is mmm. Thus, all catalogs specified by the Mesh schema have names prefixed with the sequence "mmm_". The following catalogs are currently specified within the Mathematical Mesh. Access: mmm_Access Describes access control policy for performing operations on the account. The Access catalog is the only Mesh catalog whose contents are readable by the Mesh Service under normal circumstances. Application: "mmm_Application" Describes configuration information for applications including mail (SMTP, IMAP, OpenPGP, S/MIME, etc) and SSH and for the MeshAccount application itself. Bookmark: "mmm_Bookmark" Describes Web bookmarks and other citations allowing them to be shared between devices connected to the profile. Contact: "mmm_Contact" Describes logical and physical contact information for people and organizations. Credential: "mmm_Credential" Describes credentials used to access network resources. Device: "mmm_Device" Describes the set of devices connected to the account and the permissions assigned to them Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 Network: "mmm_Network" Describes network settings such as WiFi access points, IPSEC and TLS VPN configurations, etc. Member: mmm_Member Describes the set of members connected to a group account. Publication: mmm_Publication Describes data published under the account context. The data MAY be stored in the publication catalog itself or on a separate service (e.g. a Web server). Task: "mmm_CatalogTask" Describes tasks assigned to the user including calendar entries and to do lists. The Access, Publication, Device and Member catalogs are involved in Mesh Service Protocol interactions. These interactions are further described in the Protocol Reference [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]. In many cases, the Mesh Catalog offers capabilities that represent a superset of the capabilities of an existing application. For example, the task catalog supports the appointment tracking functions of a traditional calendar application and the task tracking function of the traditional 'to do list' application. Combining these functions allows tasks to be triggered by other events other than the passage of time such as completion of other tasks, geographical presence, etc. In such cases, the Mesh Catalog entries are designed to provide a superset of the data representation capabilities of the legacy formats and (where available) recent extensions. Where a catalog entry is derived from input presented in a legacy format, the original data representation MAY be attached verbatim to facilitate interoperability. 4.1. Access The access catalog "mmm_Access" contains a list of access control entries granting a party authenticated using a particular cryptographic credential a specific privilege such as: * Accept Mesh Messages of particular types * Perform an operation on a private key known to the service. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 As with the publication catalog, the access catalog provides information that is necessary for the Mesh Service to act on behalf of the user. It is therefore necessary to grant a decryption capability for this catalog during the process of binding the account to a service. 4.2. Application The application catalog "mmm"_"Application" contains "CatalogEntryApplication" entries which describe the use of specific applications under the Mesh Service Account. Multiple application accounts for a single application MAY be connected to a single Mesh Service Account. Each account being specified in a separate entry. The "CatalogEntryApplication" entries only contain configuration information for the application as it applies to the account as a whole. If the application requires separate configuration for individual devices, this is specified in separate activation records specified in the corresponding "ConnectionDevice". 4.2.1. Mesh Account Mesh Accounts are described by "CatalogEntryAccount" entries. The corresponding activation records for the connected devices contain the contributions used to derive the private keys for use of the account. The "CatalogEntryAccount" entry is described in the section describing Mesh accounts above. 4.2.2. SSH SSH configuration profiles are described by "CatalogEntryApplicationSSH" entries. The corresponding activation records for the connected devices contain the contributions used to derive the private keys. A user may have separate SSH configurations for separate purposes within a single Mesh Account. This allows a system administrator servicing multiple clients to maintain separate SSH profiles for each of her customers allowing credentials to be easily (and verifiably) revoked at contract termination. The SSH profile contains the information that is stored in the "known_hosts" and "authorized_keys" files of SSH clients and servers. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 4.2.3. Mail Mail configuration profiles are described by one or more "CatalogEntryApplicationMail" entries, one for each email account connected to the Mesh profile. The corresponding activation records for the connected devices contain information used to provide the device with the necessary decryption information. Entries specify the email account address(es), the inbound and outbound server configuration and the cryptographic keys to be used for S/MIME and OpenPGP encryption. 4.3. Bookmark The bookmark catalog "mmm_bookmark" contains "CatalogEntryBookmark" entries which describe Web bookmarks and other citations allowing them to be shared between devices connected to the profile. The fields currently supported by the Bookmarks catalog are currently limited to the fields required for tracking Web bookmarks. Specification of additional fields to track full academic citations is a work in progress. { "CatalogedBookmark":{ "Uri":"http://www.site1.com", "Title":"site1", "Path":"Sites.1"}} 4.4. Contact The contact catalog "mmm_contact" contains "CatalogEntryContact" entries which describe { "CatalogedContact":{ "Key":"MAMU-5QXP-TWCD-7PKI-S4FC-IB76-XASH", "Self":true, "Contact":{ "ContactPerson":{ "Id":"MAMU-5QXP-TWCD-7PKI-S4FC-IB76-XASH", "Anchors":[{ "Udf":"MAMU-5QXP-TWCD-7PKI-S4FC-IB76-XASH", "Validation":"Self"} ], "NetworkAddresses":[{ "Address":"alice@example.com", "EnvelopedProfileAccount":[{ Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 "EnvelopeId":"MAMU-5QXP-TWCD-7PKI-S4FC-IB76-XASH", "dig":"S512", "ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJNQU1VLT VRWFAtVFdDRC03UEtJLVM0RkMtSUI3Ni1YQVNIIiwKICAiTWVzc2FnZVR5cGUiOiA iUHJvZmlsZVVzZXIiLAogICJjdHkiOiAiYXBwbGljYXRpb24vbW1tL29iamVjdCIs CiAgIkNyZWF0ZWQiOiAiMjAyMS0wMS0xM1QxNjozODoxOVoifQ"}, "ewogICJQcm9maWxlVXNlciI6IHsKICAgICJQcm9maWxlU2lnbm F0dXJlIjogewogICAgICAiVWRmIjogIk1BTVUtNVFYUC1UV0NELTdQS0ktUzRGQy1 JQjc2LVhBU0giLAogICAgICAiUHVibGljUGFyYW1ldGVycyI6IHsKICAgICAgICAi 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"kid":"MDA6-ELE2-T2AM-52RT-AN3R-LUDS-GJGX", "signature":"TNxwW6yniJfw_8hNE_6bssF6HiT_Ian7 y755E1N-X9t88aU2FzbsOHvILoehWLnSUYd8FSWnRw4AwOkXeNnSOC0vP_ORtgCVF tNjqyjvTSVqlH2qUa5u_ad8cTe9iEEc8Kw34jIjJ3vGG5T-zoEhpCcA"} ], "PayloadDigest":"unXsJJuUAUZ6Sd8nfRYOnUvFQjsevfU9 8Dj6NJn3ul30f6mwwaHcsWojEr2F1lfeHbkA4vksAX2seekIjNH7Ww"} ]} ]}}}} The fields of the contact catalog provide a superset of the capabilities of vCard [RFC2426]. The Contact catalog is typically used by the MeshService as a source of authorization information to perform access control on inbound and outbound message requests. For this reason, Mesh Service SHOULD be granted read access to the contacts catalog by providing a decryption entry for the service. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 4.5. Credential The credential catalog "mmm_credential" contains "CatalogEntryCredential" entries which describe credentials used to access network resources. { "CatalogedCredential":{ "Service":"ftp.example.com", "Username":"alice1", "Password":"password"}} Only username/password credentials are stored in the credential catalog. If public key credentials are to be used, these SHOULD be managed as an application profile allowing separate credentials to be created for each device. 4.6. Device The device catalog "mmm_Device" contains "CatalogEntryDevice" entries which describe the devices connected to the account and the permissions assigned to them. Each device connected to a Mesh Account has an associated CatalogEntryDevice entry that includes the activation and connection records for the account. These records are described in further detail in section REF _Ref54628559 \r \h 0. 4.7. Network The network catalog contains "CatalogEntryNetwork" entries which describe network settings, IPSEC and TLS VPN configurations, etc. { "CatalogedNetwork":{ "Service":"myWiFi", "Password":"securePassword"}} 4.8. Publication The publication catalog "mmm_Publication" contains "CatalogEntryPublication" entries which describe content published through the account. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 4.9. Task The Task catalog "mmm_Task" contains "CatalogEntryTask" entries which describe tasks assigned to the user including calendar entries and to do lists. The fields of the task catalog currently reflect those offered by the iCalendar specification [RFC5545]. Specification of additional fields to allow task triggering on geographic location and/or completion of other tasks is a work in progress. { "CatalogedTask":{ "Title":"SomeItem", "Key":"NC44-73RX-SL65-EFN4-E6ZD-JL47-CZ3A"}} 5. Spools Spools are DARE Containers containing an append only list of messages sent or received by an account. Three spools are currently defined: Inbound Messages sent to the account. These are encrypted under the account encryption keys of the sender and receiver that were current at the time the message was sent. Outbound Messages sent from the account. These are encrypted under the account encryption keys of the sender and receiver that were current at the time the message was sent. Local Messages sent from the account for internal use. These are encrypted under the encryption key of the intended recipient alone. This is either the account administration encryption key or a device encryption key. Every Mesh Message has a unique message identifier. Messages created at the beginning of a new messaging protocol interaction are assigned a random message identifier. Responses to previous messages are assigned message identifiers formed from the message identifier to which they respond by means of a message digest function. Every Mesh Message stored in a spool is encapsulated in an envelope which bears a unique identifier that is formed by applying a message digest function to the message identifier. Each stored message has an associated state which is initially set to the state "Initial" and MAY be subsequently altered by one or more "MessageComplete" messages subsequently appended to the spool. The allowable message states depending upon the spool in question. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 5.1. Outbound The outbound spool stores messages that are to be or have been sent and "MessageComplete" messages reporting changes to the status of the messages stored on the spool. Messages posted to the outbound spool have the state Initial, Sent, Received or Refused: Initial The initial state of a message posted to the spool. Sent The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to the Mesh Service of the recipient which accepted it. Received The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to the Mesh Service of the recipient and the recipient has acknowledged receipt. Refused The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to the Mesh Service of the recipient which refused to accept it. "MessageComplete" messages are only valid when posted to the spool by the service. 5.2. Inbound The inbound spool stores messages that have been received by the Mesh service servicing the account and MessageComplete messages reporting changes to the status of the messages stored on the spool. Messages posted to the outbound spool have the state Initial, Read: Initial The initial state of a message posted to the spool. Read The message has been read. A message previously marked as read MAY be returned to the unread state by marking it as being in the Initial state. 5.3. Local The local spool stores messages that are used for administrative functions. In normal circumstances, only administrator devices and the Mesh Service require access to the local spool. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 The local spool is used to store MessagePin messages used to notify administration devices that a PIN code has been registered for some purpose and RespondConnection messages used to inform a device of the result of a connection request. The local spool is used in a device connection operation to provide a device with the activation and connection records required to access the service as an authorized client. Servicing these requests requires that the service be able to access messages stored in the spool by envelope id. Messages posted to the outbound spool have the states Initial, Closed: Initial The initial state of a message posted to the spool. Closed The action associated with the message has been completed. 6. Cryptographic Operations The Mesh makes use of various cryptographic operations including threshold operations. For convenience, these are gathered here and specified as functions that are referenced by other parts of the specification. 6.1. Key Derivation from Seed Mesh Keys that derived from a seed value use the mechanism described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf]. Use of the "keyname" parameter allows multiple keys for different uses to be derived from a single key. Thus escrow of a single seed value permits recovery of all the private keys associated with the profile. The keyname parameter is a string formed by concatenating identifiers specifying the key type, the actor that will use the key and the key operation: 6.2. Message Envelope and Response Identifiers. Every Mesh message has a unique Message Identifier "MessageId". The "MakeID()" function is used to calculate the value of Envelope Identifier and Response identifier from the message identifier as follows: Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 static string MakeID(string udf, string content) { var (code, bds) = UDF.Parse(udf); return code switch { UdfTypeIdentifier.Digest_SHA_3_512 => UDF.ContentDigestOfDataString( bds, content, cryptoAlgorithmId: CryptoAlgorithmId.SHA_3_512), _ => UDF.ContentDigestOfDataString( bds, content, cryptoAlgorithmId: CryptoAlgorithmId.SHA_2_512), }; Where the values of content are given as follows: String String For example: MessageID = NBPS-TE2K-5BQZ-3HWA-PJNU-WYOX-DAMW EnvelopeID = MAD4-DQE5-PU4Y-QCTJ-D5U2-ZZVS-WBYC ResponseID = MDDB-CUZ4-QYCA-BEZB-3BPQ-PYOM-GPUM 6.3. Proof of Knowledge of PIN Mesh Message classes that are subclasses of "MessagePinValidated" MAY be authenticated by means of a PIN. Currently two such messages are defined: "MessageContact" used in contact exchange and "RequestConnection" message used in device connection. The PIN codes used to authenticate "MessagePinValidated" messages are UDF Authenticator strings. The type code of the identifier specifies the algorithm to be used to authenticate the PIN code and the Binary Data Sequence value specifies the key. The inputs to the PIN proof of knowledge functions are: PIN: string A UDF Authenticator. The type code of the identifier specifies the algorithm to be used to authenticate the PIN code and the Binary Data Sequence value specifies the key. Action: string A code determining the specific action that the PIN Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 code MAY be used to authenticate. By convention this is the name of the Mesh message type used to perform the action. Account: string The account for which the PIN code is issued. ClientNonce: binary Nonce value generated by the client using the PIN code to authenticate its message. PayloadDigest: binary The PayloadDigest of a DARE Envelope that contains the message to be authenticated. Note that if the envelope is encrypted, this value is calculated over the ciphertext and does not provide proof of knowledge of the plaintext. The following values of Action are currently defined: String String These inputs are used to derive values as follows: alg = UdfAlg (PIN) pinData = UdfBDS (PIN) saltedPINData = MAC (Action, pinData) saltedPIN = UDFPresent (HMAC_SHA_2_512 + saltedPINData) PinId = UDFPresent (MAC (Account, saltedPINData)) The issuer of the PIN code stores the value saltedPIN for retrieval using the key PinId. The witness value for a Dare Envelope with payload digest PayloadDigest authenticated by a PIN code whose salted value is saltedPINData, issued by account Account is given by PinWitness() as follows: witnessData = Account.ToUTF8() + ClientNonce + PayloadDigest witnessValue = MAC (witnessData , saltedPINData) For example, to generate saltedPIN for the pin AB23-ZBOI-CEIZ-MTD4-VQ used to authenticate a an action of type Device: Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 pin = AB23-ZBOI-CEIZ-MTD4-VQ action = message. alg = UdfAlg (PIN) = Authenticator_HMAC_SHA_2_512 hashalg = default (alg, HMAC_SHA_2_512) pinData = UdfBDS (PIN) = System.Byte[] saltedPINData = hashalg(pinData, hashalg); = System.Byte[] saltedPIN = UDFPresent (hashalg + saltedPINData) = AANT-HAQW-KDUY-GUMW-YFY2-YWB5-23YC The PinId binding the pin to the account alice@example.com is Account = alice@example.com PinId = UDFPresent (MAC (Account, saltedPINData)) = ABVQ-HJHJ-UUIJ-SLQE-KMK4-XUVP-DTVG Where "MAC(data, key)" is the message authentication code algorithm specified by the value of "alg". When an administrative device issues a PIN code, a Message PIN is appended to the local spool. This has the MessageId PinId and specifies the value "saltedPIN" in the field of that name. When PIN code authentication is used, a message of type "MessagePinValidated" specifies the values "ClientNonce", "PinWitness" and "PinId" in the fields of those names. These values are used to authenticate the inner message data specified by the "AuthenticatedData" field. 6.4. EARL The UDF Encrypted Authenticated Resource Locator mechanism is used to publish data and provide means of authentication and access through a static identifier such as a QR code. This mechanism is used to allow contact exchange by means of a QR code printed on a business card and to connect a device to an account using a static identifier printed on the device in the form of a QR code. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 In both cases, the information is passed using the EARL format described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf]. 6.5. Key Agreement All Mesh Protocol requests except for the HelloRequest and every response MUST be authenticated under the device key of the host or device making the request. Initial authentication is achieved by performing a Key agreement under the "DeviceAuthentication" key of each of the hosts and combining the result with nonce values provided by the requestor and respondent using a KDF function as follows: Two bindings are currently planned. DARE Envelope over HTTPS The request or response is encapsulated in a DARE Envelope that is exchanged by means of a HTTP POST method over a TLS transport. The shared secret is used as the key on Message Authentication Code that authenticates the request payload. UDP Transport Presents the same information as for the DARE Envelope over HTTPS case but in a compact encoding using the shared secret and an authenticated encryption scheme to pass the required information. Once authentication has been performed, the same pair of devices MAY re-authenticate using the previously agreed key. To facilitate stateless implementation, a host specifies an opaque identifier to be used to identify the shared secret on subsequent uses which MAY be used to recover the shared secret from the opaque identifier. [To be specified] 6.6. Service Cryptographic Operations A Mesh Service acts as the counterparty for threshold operations allowing mitigation of the risk of compromise of an individual device connected to a user account or an insider threat from an individual member of a group account. When acting in this role, the Mesh service controls the use of the cryptographic function but does not have the ability to perform the action either by itself or by collaborating with other services to which the account has been bound in the past. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 Note that this approach limits rather than eliminates trust in the service. As with services presenting themselves as 'zero trust', a Mesh service becomes a trusted service after a sufficient number of breaches in other parts of the system have occurred. And the user trusts the service to provide availability of the service. Three service cryptographic operations are currently specified: Threshold Key Share A private key share _s_, held by the service is split into key shares _x_, _y_ such that _a_ = _x_ + _y_. One key share is encrypted under a decryption key held by the service. The other is encrypted under a public key specified by the party making the request. Threshold Key Agreement A private key share s, held by the service is used to calculate the value (_sl_+ _c_)._P_ where _l_, _c_ are integers specified by the requestor and _P_ is a point on the curve. Threshold Signature A private key share s, held by the service is used to calculate a contribution to a threshold signature scheme. The implementation of the cryptographic operations described above is described in [draft-hallambaker-threshold] and [draft-hallambaker-threshold-sigs]. 7. Mesh Assertions Mesh Assertions are signed DARE Envelopes that contain one of more claims. Mesh Assertions provide the basis for trust in the Mathematical Mesh. Mesh Assertions are divided into two classes. Mesh Profiles are self-signed assertions. Assertions that are not self-signed are called declarations. The only type of declaration currently defined is a Connection Declaration describing the connection of a device to an account. (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-07.html for artwork.) Figure 1: Profiles And Connections 7.1. Encoding The payload of a Mesh Assertion is a JSON encoded object that is a subclass of the Assertion class which defines the following fields: Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 Identifier An identifier for the assertion. Updated The date and time at which the assertion was issued or last updated NotaryToken An assertion may optionally contain one or more notary tokens issued by a Mesh Notary service. These establish a proof that the assertion was signed after the date the notary token was created. Conditions A list of conditions that MAY be used to verify the status of the assertion if the relying party requires. The implementation of the NotaryToken and Conditions mechanisms is to be specified in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-notary] at a future date. Note that the implementation of Conditions differs significantly from that of SAML. Relying parties are required to process condition clauses in a SAML assertion to determine validity. Mesh Relying parties MAY verify the conditions clauses or rely on the trustworthiness of the provider. The reason for weakening the processing of conditions clauses in the Mesh is that it is only ever possible to validate a conditions clause of any type relative to a ground truth. In SAML applications, the relying party almost invariably has access to an independent source of ground truth. A Mesh device connected to a Mesh Service does not. Thus the types of verification that can be achieved in practice are limited to verifying the consistency of current and previous statements from the Mesh Service. 7.2. Mesh Profiles Mesh Profiles perform a similar role to X.509v3 certificates but with important differences: * Profiles describe credentials, they do not make identity statements * Profiles do not expire, there is therefore no need to support renewal processing. * Profiles may be modified over time, the current and past status of a profile being recorded in an append only log. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 Profiles provide the axioms of trust for the Mesh PKI. Unlike in the PKIX model in which all trust flows from axioms of trust held by a small number of Certificate Authorities, every part in the Mesh contributes their own axiom of trust. It should be noted however that the role of Certificate Authorities is redefined rather than eliminated. Rather than making assertions whose subject is represented by identities which are inherently mutable and subjective, Certificate Authorities can now make assertions about immutable cryptographic keys. Every Profile MUST contain a "SignatureKey" field and MUST be signed by the key specified in that field. A Profile is valid if and only if: * There is a "SignatureKey" field. * The profile is signed under the key specified in the "SignatureKey" field. A profile has the status "current" if and only if: * The Profile is valid * Every Conditions clause in the profile is understood by the relying party and evaluates to "true". 7.3. Mesh Connections A Mesh connection is an assertion describing the connection of a device or a member to an account. Mesh connections provide similar functionality to 'end-entity' certificates in PKIX but with the important proviso that they are only used to provide trust between a device connected to an account and the service to which that account is bound and between the devices connected to an account. A connection is valid with respect to an account with profile _P_ if and only if: * The profile _P_ is valid * The "AuthorityUdf" field of the connection is consistent with the UDF of _P_ Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 * The profile is signed under the key specified in the "AdministrationKey" field of _P_. * Any conditions specified in the profile are met A connection has the status current with respect to an account with profile if and only if: * The connection is valid with respect to the account with profile _P_. * The profile "P" is current. A device is authenticated with respect to an account with profile P if and only if: * The connection is valid with respect to the account with profile _P_. * The device has presented an appropriate proof of knowledge of the "DeviceAuthentication" key specified in the connection. 8. Architecture The Mesh architecture has four principal components: Mesh Account A collection of information (contacts, calendar entries, inbound and outbound messages, etc.) belonging to a user who uses the Mesh to management. Mesh Device Management The various functions that manage binding of devices to a Mesh to grant access to information and services bound to that account. Mesh Service Provides network services through which devices and other Mesh users may interact with a Mesh Account. Mesh Messaging An end to end secure messaging service that allows short messages (less than 32KB) to be exchanged between Mesh Accounts and between the Mesh devices connected to a particular account. The separation of accounts and services as separate components is a key distinction between the Mesh and earlier Internet applications. A Mesh account belongs to the owner of the Mesh and not the Mesh Service Provider which the user may change at any time of their choosing. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 A Mesh Account May be active or inactive. By definition, an active Mesh account is serviced by exactly one Mesh Service, an inactive Mesh account is not serviced by a Mesh Service. A Mesh Service Provider MAY offer a backup service for accounts hosted by other providers. In this case the backup provider is connected to the account as a Mesh device, thus allowing the backup provider to maintain a copy of the stores contained in the account and facilitating a rapid transfer of responsibility for servicing the account should that be desired. The use of backup providers is described further in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery]. 8.1. Mesh Account Mesh Accounts contains all the stateful information (contacts, calendar entries, inbound and outbound messages, etc.) related to a particular persona used by the owner. By definition a Mesh Account is active if it is serviced by a Mesh Service and inactive otherwise. A Mesh user MAY change their service provider at any time. An active Mesh Account is serviced by exactly one Mesh Service at once but a user MAY register a 'backup' service provider to their account in the same manner as adding an advice. This ensures that the backup service is pre-populated with all the information required to allow the user to switch to the new provider without interruption of service. Each Mesh account is described by an Account Profile. Currently separate profile Account Profile are defined for user accounts and group accounts. It is not clear if this distinction is a useful one. 8.1.1. Account Profile A Mesh account profile provides the axiom of trust for a mesh user. It contains a Master Signature Key and one or more Administration Signature Keys. The unique identifier of the master profile is the UDF of the Master Signature Key. An Account Profile MUST specify an "EscrowEncryption" key. This key MAY be used to escrow private keys used for encryption of stored data. They SHOULD NOT be used to escrow authentication keys and MUST NOT be used to escrow signature keys. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 A user should not need to replace their account profile unless they intend to establish a separate identity. To minimize the risk of disclosure, the Profile Signature Key is only ever used to sign updates to the account profile itself. This allows the user to secure their Profile Signature Key by either keeping it on hardware token or device dedicated to that purpose or by using the escrow mechanism and paper recovery keys as described in this document. 8.1.1.1. Creating a ProfileMaster Creating a "ProfileMaster" comprises the steps of: 0. Creating a Master Signature key. 1. Creating an Online Signing Key 2. Signing the "ProfileMaster" using the Master Signature Key 3. Persisting the "ProfileMaster" on the administration device to the "CatalogHost". 4. (Optional) Connecting at least one Administration Device and granting it the "ActivationAdministration" activation. 8.1.1.2. Updating a ProfileMaster Updating a "ProfileMaster" comprises the steps of: 0. Making the necessary changes. 1. Signing the ProfileMaster using the Master Signature Key 2. Persisting the ProfileMaster on the administration device to the CatalogHost. 8.2. Device Management Device management allows a collection of devices belonging to a user to function as a single personal Mesh. The device management functions are principally concerned with the catalog containing the entries describing the connected devices. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 8.2.1. The Device Catalog Each Mesh Account has a Device Catalog "CatalogDevice" associated with it. The Device Catalog is used to manage the connection of devices to the Personal Mesh and has a "CatalogEntryDevice" for each device currently connected to the catalog. Each Administration Device MUST have access to an up-to-date copy of the Device Catalog in order to manage the devices connected to the Mesh. The Mesh Service protocol MAY be used to synchronize the Device Catalog between administration devices in the case that there is more than one administration device. The "CatalogEntryDevice" contains fields for the device profile, device private and device connection. 8.2.2. Mesh Devices The principle of radical distrust requires us to consider the possibility that a device might be compromised during manufacture. Once consequence of this possibility is that when an administration device connects a new device to a user's personal Mesh, we cannot put our full trust in either the device being connected or the administration device connecting it. This concern is resolved by (at minimum) combining keying material generated from both sources to create the keys to be used in the context of the user's personal Mesh with the process being fully verified by both parties. Additional keying material sources could be added if protection against the possibility of compromise at both devices was required but this is not supported by the current specifications. A device profile provides the axiom of trust and the key contributions of the device. When bound to an account, the base keys specified in the Device Profile are combined with the key data provided in the Activation device to construct the keys the device will use in the context of the account. (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-07.html for artwork.) Figure 2: Mapping of Device Profile and Device Private to Device Connection Keys. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 34] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 Unless exceptional circumstances require, a device should not require more than one Device profile even if the device supports use by multiple users under different accounts. But a device MAY have multiple profiles if this approach is more convenient for implementation. { "ProfileDevice":{ "ProfileSignature":{ "Udf":"MAQO-2SJC-PGX4-KVHC-TEQ3-I2NP-GYBA", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"Ed448", "Public":"s9IdDH2a_dArdBA8thg41Ctwc0qVo6w67bRrEI1LZgSlG pUSlXWZN8W-VY7hm40Xoq7TU5KEsQSA"}}}, "BaseEncryption":{ "Udf":"MD5F-Q3O6-KRGL-IS4V-IWVC-5SIN-S63R", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"X448", "Public":"aJSPUdraCO0yv2YXVKkQ4i1XUKVau-Apb7-OxXNb06Y-w 9I420kkRzXhSfsifKPegX7kJMHDKZkA"}}}, "BaseAuthentication":{ "Udf":"MDQC-JYXP-KZ3I-ETIO-KMWA-XIAP-3JRD", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"X448", "Public":"KABXGv_VuvLPRhfVpHd5qykjJDUNRiwhh5u3CJpwuAZXf vmeM0KXit5b6wNvYYsSoLeNfKy337IA"}}}, "BaseSignature":{ "Udf":"MDL3-Q7RU-USJR-QF3O-CJEF-6TPW-EVAN", "PublicParameters":{ "PublicKeyECDH":{ "crv":"Ed448", "Public":"2wXyHGACnTq5ee8mgXM_jADlpeRV7gcN3jTQc9LP3LP1Y zii2iSkUMgUTP8yF_KmibXs5pXvv0oA"}}}}} The derivation of the Connection encryption and signature keys from the Profile and Private contributions in this example is shown in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography]. 8.2.2.1. Creating a ProfileDevice Creating a "ProfileDevice" comprises the steps of: 0. Creating the necessary key 1. Signing the "ProfileDevice" using the Master Signature Key Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 35] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 2. Once created, a "ProfileDevice" is never changed. In the unlikely event that any modification is required, a completely new "ProfileDevice" MUST be created. 8.2.2.2. Connection to a Personal Mesh Devices are only connected to a personal Mesh by an administration device. This comprises the steps of: 0. Generating the PrivateDevice keys. 1. Creating the ConnectionDevice data from the public components of the ProfileDevice and PrivateDevice keys and signing it using the administration key. 2. Creating the Activations for the device and signing them using the administration key. 3. Creating the "CatalogEntryDevice" for the device and adding it to the "CatalogDevice" of the Personal Mesh. 4. If the Personal Mesh has accounts that are connected to a Mesh Service, synchronizing the "CatalogEntryDevice" to those services. These steps are usually performed through use of the Mesh Protocol Connection mechanism. However, Mesh clients MAY support additional mechanisms as circumstances require provided that the appropriate authentication and private key protection controls are provided. 8.3. Mesh Services A Mesh Service provides one or more Mesh Hosts that support Mesh Accounts through the Mesh Web Service Protocol. Mesh Services and Hosts are described by Service Profiles and Host Profiles. The means by which services manage the hosts through which they provide service is outside the scope of this document. As with a Device connected to a Mesh Account, a the binding of a Host to the service it supports is described by a connection record: (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-07.html for artwork.) Figure 3: Service Profile and Delegated Host Assertion. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 36] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 The credentials provided by the ProfileService and ProfileHost are distinct from those provided by the WebPKI that typically services TLS requests. WebPKI credentials provide service introduction and authentication while a Mesh ProfileHost only provides authentication. Unless exceptional circumstances require, a service should not need to revise its Service Profile unless it is intended to change its identity. Service Profiles MAY be countersigned by Trusted Third Parties to establish accountability. 8.4. Mesh Messaging Mesh Messaging is an end-to-end secure messaging system used to exchange short (32KB) messages between Mesh devices and services. In cases where exchange of longer messages is required, Mesh Messaging MAY be used to provide a control plane to advise the intended message recipient(s) of the type of data being offered and the means of retrieval (e.g an EARL). All communications between Mesh accounts takes the form of a Mesh Message carried in a Dare Envelope. Mesh Messages are stored in two spools associated with the account, the SpoolOutbound and the SpoolInbound containing the messages sent and received respectively. This document only describes the representation of the messages within the message spool. The Mesh Service protocol by which the messages are exchanged between devices and services and between services is described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]. 8.4.1. Message Status As previously described in section ###, every message stored in a spool has a specified state. The range of allowable states is defined by the message type. New message states MAY be defined for new message types as they are defined. By default, messages are appended to a spool in the "Initial" state, but a spool entry MAY specify any state that is valid for that message type. The state of a message is changed by appending a completion message to the spool as described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]. Services MAY erase or redact messages in accordance with local site policy. Since messages are not removed from the spool on being marked deleted, they may be undeleted by marking them as read or unread. Marking a message deleted MAY make it more likely that the message will be removed if the sequence is subsequently purged. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 37] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 8.4.2. Four Corner Model A four-corner messaging model is enforced. Mesh Services only accept outbound messages from devices connected to accounts that it services. Inbound messages are only accepted from other Mesh Services. This model enables access control at both the outbound and inbound services (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-07.html for artwork.) Figure 4: Four Corner Messaging Model The outbound Mesh Service checks to see that the request to send a message does not violate its acceptable use policy. Accounts that make a large number of message requests that result in complaints SHOULD be subject to consequences ranging from restriction of the number and type of messages sent to suspending or terminating messaging privileges. Services that fail to implement appropriate controls are likely to be subject to sanctions from either their users or from other services. (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-07.html for artwork.) Figure 5: Performing Access Control on Outbound Messages The inbound Mesh Service also checks to see that messages received are consistent with the service Acceptable Use Policy and the user's personal access control settings. Mesh Services that fail to police abuse by their account holders SHOULD be subject to consequences in the same fashion as account holders. (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-07.html for artwork.) Figure 6: Performing Access Control on Inbound Messages 8.4.3. Traffic Analysis The Mesh Messaging protocol as currently specified provides only limited protection against traffic analysis attacks. The use of TLS to encrypt communication between Mesh Services limits the effectiveness of na?ve traffic analysis mechanisms but does not prevent timing attacks unless dummy traffic is introduced to obfuscate traffic flows. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 38] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 The limitation of the message size is in part intended to facilitate use of mechanisms capable of providing high levels of traffic analysis such as mixmaster and onion routing but the current Mesh Service Protocol does not provide support for such approaches and there are no immediate plans to do so. 9. Publications Static QR codes MAY be used to allow contact exchange or device connection. In either case, the QR code contains an EARL providing the means of locating, decrypting and authenticating the published data. The use of EARLs as a means of publishing encrypted data and the use of EARLs for location, decryption and authentication is discussed in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare] . 9.1. Contact Exchange When used for contact exchange, the envelope payload is a CatalogedContact record. Besides allowing for exchange of contact information on a business card, a user might have their contact information printed on personal property to facilitate return of lost property. 9.2. Device Preconfiguration The static QR code device connection interaction allows a device with no keyboard, display or other user affordances to be connected to a Mesh account. The information necessary to establish communication with the device and to complete a device connection workflow is provided by means of a DevicePreconfiguration record accessed by means of an EARL. For example, Alice's coffee pot was preconfigured for connection to a Mesh account at the factory and the following DevicePreconfiguration record created: { "DevicePreconfiguration":{ "EnvelopedProfileDevice":[{ "EnvelopeId":"MAQO-2SJC-PGX4-KVHC-TEQ3-I2NP-GYBA", "dig":"S512", "ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJNQVFPLTJTSkMtUE dYNC1LVkhDLVRFUTMtSTJOUC1HWUJBIiwKICAiTWVzc2FnZVR5cGUiOiAiUHJvZml sZURldmljZSIsCiAgImN0eSI6ICJhcHBsaWNhdGlvbi9tbW0vb2JqZWN0IiwKICAi Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 39] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 Q3JlYXRlZCI6ICIyMDIxLTAxLTEzVDE2OjM4OjM5WiJ9"}, "ewogICJQcm9maWxlRGV2aWNlIjogewogICAgIlByb2ZpbGVTaWduYXR1cm UiOiB7CiAgICAgICJVZGYiOiAiTUFRTy0yU0pDLVBHWDQtS1ZIQy1URVEzLUkyTlA tR1lCQSIsCiAgICAgICJQdWJsaWNQYXJhbWV0ZXJzIjogewogICAgICAgICJQdWJs aWNLZXlFQ0RIIjogewogICAgICAgICAgImNydiI6ICJFZDQ0OCIsCiAgICAgICAgI CAiUHVibGljIjogInM5SWRESDJhX2RBcmRCQTh0aGc0MUN0d2MwcVZvNnc2N2JSck VJMUxaZ1NsR3BVU2xYV1oKICBOOFctVlk3aG00MFhvcTdUVTVLRXNRU0EifX19LAo gICAgIkJhc2VFbmNyeXB0aW9uIjogewogICAgICAiVWRmIjogIk1ENUYtUTNPNi1L UkdMLUlTNFYtSVdWQy01U0lOLVM2M1IiLAogICAgICAiUHVibGljUGFyYW1ldGVyc yI6IHsKICAgICAgICAiUHVibGljS2V5RUNESCI6IHsKICAgICAgICAgICJjcnYiOi AiWDQ0OCIsCiAgICAgICAgICAiUHVibGljIjogImFKU1BVZHJhQ08weXYyWVhWS2t RNGkxWFVLVmF1LUFwYjctT3hYTmIwNlktdzlJNDIwa2sKICBSelhoU2ZzaWZLUGVn WDdrSk1IREtaa0EifX19LAogICAgIkJhc2VBdXRoZW50aWNhdGlvbiI6IHsKICAgI CAgIlVkZiI6ICJNRFFDLUpZWFAtS1ozSS1FVElPLUtNV0EtWElBUC0zSlJEIiwKIC AgICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY0tleUVDREg iOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3J2IjogIlg0NDgiLAogICAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpYyI6 ICJLQUJYR3ZfVnV2TFBSaGZWcEhkNXF5a2pKRFVOUml3aGg1dTNDSnB3dUFaWGZ2b WVNMEtYCiAgaXQ1YjZ3TnZZWXNTb0xlTmZLeTMzN0lBIn19fSwKICAgICJCYXNlU2 lnbmF0dXJlIjogewogICAgICAiVWRmIjogIk1ETDMtUTdSVS1VU0pSLVFGM08tQ0p FRi02VFBXLUVWQU4iLAogICAgICAiUHVibGljUGFyYW1ldGVycyI6IHsKICAgICAg ICAiUHVibGljS2V5RUNESCI6IHsKICAgICAgICAgICJjcnYiOiAiRWQ0NDgiLAogI CAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpYyI6ICIyd1h5SEdBQ25UcTVlZThtZ1hNX2pBRGxwZVJWN2 djTjNqVFFjOUxQM0xQMVl6aWkyaVNrCiAgVU1nVVRQOHlGX0ttaWJYczVwWHZ2MG9 BIn19fX19", { "signatures":[{ "alg":"S512", "kid":"MAQO-2SJC-PGX4-KVHC-TEQ3-I2NP-GYBA", "signature":"Rk-jBj3zvSUIYSTkVcq1BL134IBOKSFw0exQnv1Y 26U42dKutmhV5HahY40oJ3qlnaj6ZNuW0OSAKeoNbCJH--_3IggojgroQT_YHR3xe G2nr5QcKNdrM9MenLukm4vj9Kk-CiQIsr4LE8rXnx-ICAIA"} ], "PayloadDigest":"cdJ8Gs61LhDMaKD_H4s-4BLas3GVu5ktraeMhbgZ AcKpYK-WOslevSZZ1B73P_gwHsMoltGo8hIL6CBQydwyuw"} ], "EnvelopedConnectionDevice":[{ "dig":"S512", "ContentMetaData":"ewogICJNZXNzYWdlVHlwZSI6ICJDb25uZWN0aW 9uRGV2aWNlIiwKICAiY3R5IjogImFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL21tbS9vYmplY3QiLAogICJ DcmVhdGVkIjogIjIwMjEtMDEtMTNUMTY6Mzg6NDBaIn0"}, "ewogICJDb25uZWN0aW9uRGV2aWNlIjogewogICAgIkRldmljZVNpZ25hdH VyZSI6IHsKICAgICAgIlVkZiI6ICJNREwzLVE3UlUtVVNKUi1RRjNPLUNKRUYtNlR QVy1FVkFOIiwKICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1 YmxpY0tleUVDREgiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3J2IjogIkVkNDQ4IiwKICAgICAgI CAgICJQdWJsaWMiOiAiMndYeUhHQUNuVHE1ZWU4bWdYTV9qQURscGVSVjdnY04zal RRYzlMUDNMUDFZemlpMmlTawogIFVNZ1VUUDh5Rl9LbWliWHM1cFh2djBvQSJ9fX0 sCiAgICAiRGV2aWNlRW5jcnlwdGlvbiI6IHsKICAgICAgIlVkZiI6ICJNRDVGLVEz TzYtS1JHTC1JUzRWLUlXVkMtNVNJTi1TNjNSIiwKICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZ Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 40] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 XRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY0tleUVDREgiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3 J2IjogIlg0NDgiLAogICAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpYyI6ICJhSlNQVWRyYUNPMHl2Mll YVktrUTRpMVhVS1ZhdS1BcGI3LU94WE5iMDZZLXc5STQyMGtrCiAgUnpYaFNmc2lm S1BlZ1g3a0pNSERLWmtBIn19fSwKICAgICJEZXZpY2VBdXRoZW50aWNhdGlvbiI6I HsKICAgICAgIlVkZiI6ICJNRDVGLVEzTzYtS1JHTC1JUzRWLUlXVkMtNVNJTi1TNj NSIiwKICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY0t leUVDREgiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3J2IjogIlg0NDgiLAogICAgICAgICAgIlB1 YmxpYyI6ICJhSlNQVWRyYUNPMHl2MllYVktrUTRpMVhVS1ZhdS1BcGI3LU94WE5iM DZZLXc5STQyMGtrCiAgUnpYaFNmc2lmS1BlZ1g3a0pNSERLWmtBIn19fX19", { "signatures":[{ "alg":"S512", "kid":"MC3W-C4WT-J4SR-F6W7-HOZN-ATJT-DNJZ", "signature":"7PK0VTzj2A-WQsV2rJB13o4GERF2RsAS0lvE_dEo gSU9ntXlphGKq2_HG1mRl_ST384i_850aeMASEBUeNmpAC7Int1Dhd6SIWIlPV0ro xGnfqWQz-0Q44yxoyb10peN8sXApzotLOIcub3tN4q5vS8A"} ], "PayloadDigest":"kDW0uaxyl9h89xhwA62Yj0SNOCfdpScINyvRrehg -kFMn6NCEA69AFtawZ2gwKPRZfV30dAi-cQ47ACH0b3V-g"} ], "PrivateKey":{ "PrivateKeyUDF":{ "PrivateValue":"ZAAQ-AQWW-7FV6-RK7V-XWUH-5LCF-DMRU-GHAT-5FD P-PABH-3SD5-3UNJ-I6NO-BYFB", "KeyType":"MeshProfileDevice"}}, "ConnectUri":"mcu://maker@example.com/EAQN-I5LT-6YG6-RR5F-57CG- B755-RFUR-JVQQ-IW5N-X5FR-57BA-SJS6-X2PF-A"}} To connect to the coffee pot, Alice first scans the QR code with her administrative device which uses the PIN code and service to retrieve, decrypt and authenticate the DevicePreconfiguration record. Future versions of the specification will allow this record to specify means by which the administration device can establish direct peer-to-peer communication to complete the connection process by any communication modality supported by both devices (e.g. IR, Bluetooth, WiFi-Direct, etc.) The use of the publication mechanism in device connection is discussed further in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]. 9.3. Device Description The device description publication is a JSON Record that describes a device that is available for connection. [Not yet implemented.] Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 41] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 10. Schema 10.1. Shared Classes The following classes are used as common elements in Mesh profile specifications. 10.1.1. Classes describing keys 10.1.2. Structure: KeyData The KeyData class is used to describe public key pairs and trust assertions associated with a public key. Udf: String (Optional) UDF fingerprint of the public key parameters X509Certificate: Binary (Optional) List of X.509 Certificates X509Chain: Binary [0..Many] X.509 Certificate chain. X509CSR: Binary (Optional) X.509 Certificate Signing Request. NotBefore: DateTime (Optional) If present specifies a time instant that use of the private key is not valid before. NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional) If present specifies a time instant that use of the private key is not valid on or after. 10.1.3. Structure: CompositePrivate Inherits: Key DeviceKeyUdf: String (Optional) UDF fingerprint of the bound device key (if used). 10.2. Assertion classes Classes that are derived from an assertion. 10.2.1. Structure: Assertion Parent class from which all assertion classes are derived Names: String [0..Many] Fingerprints of index terms for profile retrieval. The use of the fingerprint of the name rather than the name itself is a precaution against enumeration attacks and other forms of abuse. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 42] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 Updated: DateTime (Optional) The time instant the profile was last modified. NotaryToken: String (Optional) A Uniform Notary Token providing evidence that a signature was performed after the notary token was created. 10.2.2. Structure: Condition Parent class from which all condition classes are derived. [No fields] 10.2.3. Base Classes Abstract classes from which the Profile, Activation and Connection classes are derrived. 10.2.4. Structure: Connection Inherits: Assertion SubjectUdf: String (Optional) UDF of the connection target. AuthorityUdf: String (Optional) UDF of the connection source. 10.2.5. Structure: Activation Inherits: Assertion Contains the private activation information for a Mesh application running on a specific device ActivationKey: String (Optional) Secret seed used to derive keys that are not explicitly specified. Entries: ActivationEntry [0..Many] Activation of named resources. 10.2.6. Structure: ActivationEntry Resource: String (Optional) Name of the activated resource Key: KeyData (Optional) The activation key or key share 10.2.7. Mesh Profile Classes Classes describing Mesh Profiles. All Profiles are Assertions derrived from Assertion. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 43] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 10.2.8. Structure: Profile Inherits: Assertion Parent class from which all profile classes are derived ProfileSignature: KeyData (Optional) The permanent signature key used to sign the profile itself. The UDF of the key is used as the permanent object identifier of the profile. Thus, by definition, the KeySignature value of a Profile does not change under any circumstance. 10.2.9. Structure: ProfileDevice Inherits: Profile Describes a mesh device. Description: String (Optional) Description of the device BaseEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Base key contribution for encryption keys. Also used to decrypt activation data sent to the device during connection to an account. BaseAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Base key contribution for authentication keys. Also used to authenticate the device during connection to an account. BaseSignature: KeyData (Optional) Base key contribution for signature keys. 10.2.10. Structure: ProfileAccount Base class for the account profiles ProfileUser and ProfileGroup. These subclasses may be merged at some future date. Inherits: Profile AccountAddress: String (Optional) The account address. This is either a DNS service address (e.g. alice@example.com) or a Mesh Name (@alice). ServiceUdf: String (Optional) The fingerprint of the service profile to which the account is currently bound. EscrowEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Escrow key associated with the account. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 44] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 AccountEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key currently used to encrypt data under this profile AdministratorSignature: KeyData (Optional) Key used to sign connection assertions to the account. 10.2.11. Structure: ProfileUser Inherits: ProfileAccount Account assertion. This is signed by the service hosting the account. AccountAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate requests made under this user account. AccountSignature: KeyData (Optional) Key used to sign data under the account. 10.2.12. Structure: ProfileGroup Inherits: ProfileAccount Describes a group. Note that while a group is created by one person who becomes its first administrator, control of the group may pass to other administrators over time. [No fields] 10.2.13. Structure: ProfileService Inherits: Profile Profile of a Mesh Service ServiceAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate service connections. ServiceEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key used to encrypt data under this profile ServiceSignature: KeyData (Optional) Key used to sign data under the account. 10.2.14. Structure: ProfileHost Inherits: Profile Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 45] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate service connections. KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key used to pass encrypted data to the device such as a 10.2.15. Connection Assertions Connection assertions are used to authenticate and authorize interactions between devices and the service currently servicing the account. They SHOULD NOT be visible to external parties. 10.2.16. Structure: ConnectionDevice Inherits: Connection Connection assertion used to authenticate service requests made by a device. AccountAddress: String (Optional) The account address DeviceSignature: KeyData (Optional) The signature key for use of the device under the profile DeviceEncryption: KeyData (Optional) The encryption key for use of the device under the profile DeviceAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) The authentication key for use of the device under the profile 10.2.17. Structure: ConnectionApplication Inherits: Connection Connection assertion stating that a particular device is [No fields] 10.2.18. Structure: ConnectionGroup Describes the connection of a member to a group. Inherits: Connection [No fields] Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 46] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 10.2.19. Structure: ConnectionService Inherits: Connection [No fields] 10.2.20. Structure: ConnectionHost Inherits: Connection [No fields] 10.2.21. Activation Assertions 10.2.22. Structure: ActivationDevice Contains activation data for device specific keys used in the context of a Mesh account. Inherits: Activation AccountUdf: String (Optional) The UDF of the account 10.2.23. Structure: ActivationAccount Inherits: Activation ProfileSignature: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to profile online signing key used to sign updates to the profile. AdministratorSignature: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to Profile administration key used to make changes to administrator catalogs. AccountEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to ProfileUser account encryption key AccountAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to ProfileUser account authentication key AccountSignature: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to ProfileUser account signature key 10.2.24. Structure: ActivationApplication Inherits: Activation [No fields] Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 47] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 10.3. Data Structures Classes describing data used in cataloged data. 10.3.1. Structure: Contact Inherits: Assertion Base class for contact entries. Id: String (Optional) The globally unique contact identifier. Anchors: Anchor [0..Many] Mesh fingerprints associated with the contact. NetworkAddresses: NetworkAddress [0..Many] Network address entries Locations: Location [0..Many] The physical locations the contact is associated with. Roles: Role [0..Many] The roles of the contact Bookmark: Bookmark [0..Many] The Web sites and other online presences of the contact Sources: TaggedSource [0..Many] Source(s) from which this contact was constructed. 10.3.2. Structure: Anchor Trust anchor Udf: String (Optional) The trust anchor. Validation: String (Optional) The means of validation. 10.3.3. Structure: TaggedSource Source from which contact information was obtained. LocalName: String (Optional) Short name for the contact information. Validation: String (Optional) The means of validation. BinarySource: Binary (Optional) The contact data in binary form. EnvelopedSource: Enveloped (Optional) The contact data in enveloped form. If present, the BinarySource property is ignored. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 48] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 10.3.4. Structure: ContactGroup Inherits: Contact Contact for a group, including encryption groups. [No fields] 10.3.5. Structure: ContactPerson Inherits: Contact CommonNames: PersonName [0..Many] List of person names in order of preference 10.3.6. Structure: ContactOrganization Inherits: Contact CommonNames: OrganizationName [0..Many] List of person names in order of preference 10.3.7. Structure: OrganizationName The name of an organization Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current use. RegisteredName: String (Optional) The registered name. DBA: String (Optional) Names that the organization uses including trading names and doing business as names. 10.3.8. Structure: PersonName The name of a natural person Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current use. FullName: String (Optional) The preferred presentation of the full name. Prefix: String (Optional) Honorific or title, E.g. Sir, Lord, Dr., Mr. First: String (Optional) First name. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 49] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 Middle: String [0..Many] Middle names or initials. Last: String (Optional) Last name. Suffix: String (Optional) Nominal suffix, e.g. Jr., III, etc. PostNominal: String (Optional) Post nominal letters (if used). 10.3.9. Structure: NetworkAddress Provides all means of contacting the individual according to a particular network address Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current use. Address: String (Optional) The network address, e.g. alice@example.com NetworkCapability: String [0..Many] The capabilities bound to this address. EnvelopedProfileAccount: Enveloped (Optional) The account profile Protocols: NetworkProtocol [0..Many] Public keys associated with the network address 10.3.10. Structure: NetworkProtocol Protocol: String (Optional) The IANA protocol|identifier of the network protocols by which the contact may be reached using the specified Address. 10.3.11. Structure: Role OrganizationName: String (Optional) The organization at which the role is held Titles: String [0..Many] The titles held with respect to that organization. Locations: Location [0..Many] Postal or physical addresses associated with the role. 10.3.12. Structure: Location Appartment: String (Optional) Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 50] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 Street: String (Optional) District: String (Optional) Locality: String (Optional) County: String (Optional) Postcode: String (Optional) Country: String (Optional) 10.3.13. Structure: Bookmark Uri: String (Optional) Title: String (Optional) Role: String [0..Many] 10.3.14. Structure: Reference MessageId: String (Optional) The received message to which this is a response ResponseId: String (Optional) Message that was generated in response to the original (optional). Relationship: String (Optional) The relationship type. This can be Read, Unread, Accept, Reject. 10.3.15. Structure: Task Key: String (Optional) Unique key. Start: DateTime (Optional) Finish: DateTime (Optional) StartTravel: String (Optional) FinishTravel: String (Optional) TimeZone: String (Optional) Title: String (Optional) Description: String (Optional) Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 51] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 Location: String (Optional) Trigger: String [0..Many] Conference: String [0..Many] Repeat: String (Optional) Busy: Boolean (Optional) 10.4. Catalog Entries 10.4.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry Base class for cataloged Mesh data. Labels: String [0..Many] The set of labels describing the entry 10.4.2. Structure: CatalogedDevice Inherits: CatalogedEntry Public device entry, indexed under the device ID Hello Udf: String (Optional) UDF of the signature key of the device in the Mesh DeviceUdf: String (Optional) UDF of the offline signature key of the device SignatureUdf: String (Optional) UDF of the account online signature key EnvelopedProfileUser: Enveloped (Optional) The Mesh profile EnvelopedProfileDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The device profile EnvelopedConnectionUser: Enveloped (Optional) The public assertion demonstrating connection of the Device to the Mesh EnvelopedActivationDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The activation of the device within the Mesh account EnvelopedActivationAccount: Enveloped (Optional) The activation of the device within the Mesh account EnvelopedActivationApplication: Enveloped [0..Many] Application activations granted to the device. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 52] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 10.4.3. Structure: CatalogedPublication Inherits: CatalogedEntry A publication. Id: String (Optional) Unique identifier code Authenticator: String (Optional) The witness key value to use to request access to the record. EnvelopedData: DareEnvelope (Optional) Dare Envelope containing the entry data. The data type is specified by the envelope metadata. NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional) Epiration time (inclusive) 10.4.4. Structure: CatalogedCredential Inherits: CatalogedEntry Protocol: String (Optional) Service: String (Optional) Username: String (Optional) Password: String (Optional) 10.4.5. Structure: CatalogedNetwork Inherits: CatalogedEntry Protocol: String (Optional) Service: String (Optional) Username: String (Optional) Password: String (Optional) 10.4.6. Structure: CatalogedContact Inherits: CatalogedEntry Key: String (Optional) Unique key. Self: Boolean (Optional) If true, this catalog entry is for the user who created the catalog. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 53] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 10.4.7. Structure: CatalogedAccess Inherits: CatalogedEntry [No fields] 10.4.8. Structure: CryptographicCapability Id: String (Optional) The identifier of the capability. If this is a user capability, MUST match the KeyData identifier. If this is a serviced capability, MUST match the value of ServiceId on the corresponding service capability. KeyData: KeyData (Optional) The key that enables the capability EnvelopedKeyShares: Enveloped [0..Many] One or more enveloped key shares. SubjectId: String (Optional) The identifier of the resource that is controlled using the key. SubjectAddress: String (Optional) The address of the resource that is controlled using the key. 10.4.9. Structure: CapabilityDecrypt Inherits: CryptographicCapability The corresponding key is a decryption key [No fields] 10.4.10. Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt The corresponding key is an encryption key ServiceId: String (Optional) The identifier used to claim the capability from the service.[Only present for a partial capability.] ServiceAddress: String (Optional) The service account that supports a serviced capability. [Only present for a partial capability.] Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 54] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 10.4.11. Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt The corresponding key is an encryption key AuthenticationId: String (Optional) UDF of trust root under which request to use a serviced capability must be authorized. [Only present for a serviced capability] 10.4.12. Structure: CapabilitySign Inherits: CryptographicCapability The corresponding key is an administration key [No fields] 10.4.13. Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate Inherits: CryptographicCapability The corresponding key is a key that may be used to generate key shares. [No fields] 10.4.14. Structure: CapabilityFairExchange Inherits: CryptographicCapability The corresponding key is a decryption key to be used in accordance with the Micali Fair Electronic Exchange with Invisible Trusted Parties protocol. [No fields] 10.4.15. Structure: CatalogedBookmark Inherits: CatalogedEntry Uri: String (Optional) Title: String (Optional) Path: String (Optional) Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 55] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 10.4.16. Structure: CatalogedTask Inherits: CatalogedEntry EnvelopedTask: Enveloped (Optional) Title: String (Optional) Key: String (Optional) Unique key. 10.4.17. Structure: CatalogedApplication Inherits: CatalogedEntry Key: String (Optional) EnvelopedCapabilities: DareEnvelope [0..Many] Enveloped keys for use with Application 10.4.18. Structure: CatalogedMember ContactAddress: String (Optional) MemberCapabilityId: String (Optional) ServiceCapabilityId: String (Optional) Inherits: CatalogedEntry 10.4.19. Structure: CatalogedGroup Inherits: CatalogedApplication EnvelopedProfileGroup: Enveloped (Optional) The Mesh profile EnvelopedActivationAccount: Enveloped (Optional) The activation of the device within the Mesh account 10.4.20. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH Inherits: CatalogedApplication [No fields] 10.4.21. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail Inherits: CatalogedApplication Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 56] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 [No fields] 10.4.22. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork Inherits: CatalogedApplication [No fields] 10.5. Publications 10.5.1. Structure: DevicePreconfiguration A data structure that is passed EnvelopedProfileDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The device profile EnvelopedConnectionDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The device connection ConnectUri: String (Optional) The connection URI. This would normally be printed on the device as a QR code. 10.6. Messages 10.6.1. Structure: Message MessageId: String (Optional) Unique per-message ID. When encapsulating a Mesh Message in a DARE envelope, the envelope EnvelopeID field MUST be a UDF fingerprint of the MessageId value. Sender: String (Optional) Recipient: String (Optional) 10.6.2. Structure: MessageError Inherits: Message ErrorCode: String (Optional) 10.6.3. Structure: MessageComplete Inherits: Message References: Reference [0..Many] Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 57] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 10.6.4. Structure: MessagePinValidated Inherits: Message AuthenticatedData: DareEnvelope (Optional) Enveloped data that is authenticated by means of the PIN ClientNonce: Binary (Optional) Nonce provided by the client to validate the PIN PinId: String (Optional) Pin identifier value calculated from the PIN code, action and account address. PinWitness: Binary (Optional) Witness value calculated as KDF (Device.Udf + AccountAddress, ClientNonce) 10.6.5. Structure: MessagePin Account: String (Optional) Inherits: Message Expires: DateTime (Optional) Automatic: Boolean (Optional) If true, authentication against the PIN code is sufficient to complete the associated action without further authorization. SaltedPin: String (Optional) PIN code bound to the specified action. Action: String (Optional) The action to which this PIN code is bound. 10.6.6. Structure: RequestConnection Connection request message. This message contains the information Inherits: MessagePinValidated AccountAddress: String (Optional) 10.6.7. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection Connection request message generated by a service on receipt of a valid MessageConnectionRequestClient Inherits: Message Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 58] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 EnvelopedRequestConnection: Enveloped (Optional) The client connection request. ServerNonce: Binary (Optional) Witness: String (Optional) 10.6.8. Structure: RespondConnection Respond to RequestConnection message to grant or refuse the connection request. Inherits: Message Result: String (Optional) The response to the request. One of "Accept", "Reject" or "Pending". CatalogedDevice: CatalogedDevice (Optional) The device information. MUST be present if the value of Result is "Accept". MUST be absent or null otherwise. 10.6.9. Structure: MessageContact Inherits: MessagePinValidated Reply: Boolean (Optional) If true, requests that the recipient return their own contact information in reply. Subject: String (Optional) Optional explanation of the reason for the request. PIN: String (Optional) One time authentication code supplied to a recipient to allow authentication of the response. 10.6.10. Structure: GroupInvitation Inherits: Message Text: String (Optional) 10.6.11. Structure: RequestConfirmation Inherits: Message Text: String (Optional) Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 59] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 10.6.12. Structure: ResponseConfirmation Inherits: Message Request: Enveloped (Optional) Accept: Boolean (Optional) 10.6.13. Structure: RequestTask Inherits: Message [No fields] 10.6.14. Structure: MessageClaim Inherits: Message PublicationId: String (Optional) ServiceAuthenticate: String (Optional) DeviceAuthenticate: String (Optional) Expires: DateTime (Optional) 10.6.15. Structure: ProcessResult For future use, allows logging of operations and results Inherits: Message Success: Boolean (Optional) ErrorReport: String (Optional) The error report code. 11. Security Considerations The security considerations for use and implementation of Mesh services and applications are described in the Mesh Security Considerations guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security]. 12. IANA Considerations All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in this document Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 60] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 13. Acknowledgements A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. 14. Appendix A: Example Container Organization (not normative) The means by which profiles are stored on devices is outside the scope of the specification. Only catalogs that are required to be shared between machines by means of accounts need to be standardized. 14.1. Device Host Catalog: Host.dare Catalog of all the Mesh Profiles that the user has registered with the device and the latest version of the device profile for this device. MeshCatalog: [UDF-Mesh].dcat Catalog containing the Account Entries for the Mesh [UDF-Mesh]. Account Catalogs: [UDF-Account]/mmm_Device.dcat The device catalog associated with the specified account Account Catalogs: [UDF-Account]/[Catalog name].dcat The set of account catalogs that are shared verbatim between the devices connected to the account. 14.1.1. Creating a new Mesh Create new Mesh Profile, Device Profile, Add to Host Catalog Create MeshCatalog 14.1.2. Adding an Account Create new Account Profile, Add to MeshCatalog Create new Account Device Catalog For each device to be added to the account: Create Account Connection Assertion, add to Account Device Catalog. 14.1.3. Adding a Device Create a Device Connection Assertion. For each account the device is to be added to: Create Account Connection Assertion, add to Account Device Catalog. Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 61] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 14.2. Service Master Catalog Catalog of all services on machine Service Catalog Catalog of accounts in the service. 14.2.1. Creating a Service Create a Service Description, add to Master Catalog 14.2.2. Adding an Account Create the account entry, add to Service Catalog Create the Account Directory 15. Appendix B: Collected Authentication and Encryption Requirements 15.1. Mesh Messaging +=======================+=========+==================+ | Message | Signer | Recipients | +=======================+=========+==================+ | RequestConnection | Device | Service | +-----------------------+---------+------------------+ | AcknowledgeConnection | Service | Device, Receiver | +-----------------------+---------+------------------+ | OfferGroup | Sender | Receiver | +-----------------------+---------+------------------+ | RequestContact | Sender | Receiver | +-----------------------+---------+------------------+ | ReplyContact | Sender | Receiver | +-----------------------+---------+------------------+ | RequestConfirmation | Sender | Receiver | +-----------------------+---------+------------------+ | ResponseConfirmation | Sender | Receiver | +-----------------------+---------+------------------+ | RequestTask | Sender | Receiver | +-----------------------+---------+------------------+ | ResponseTask | Sender | Receiver | +-----------------------+---------+------------------+ Table 1 Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 62] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 16. Normative References [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture] Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I: Architecture Guide", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15, 2 November 2020, . [draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography] Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VIII: Cryptographic Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography-07, 2 November 2020, . [draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare] Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part III : Data At Rest Encryption (DARE)", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare-10, 2 November 2020, . [draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery] Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VI: Mesh Discovery Service", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery-00, 2 November 2020, . [draft-hallambaker-mesh-notary] "[Reference Not Found!]". [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol] Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part V: Protocol Reference", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- hallambaker-mesh-protocol-07, 2 November 2020, . [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security] Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII: Security Considerations", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-06, 2 November 2020, . Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 63] Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference January 2021 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf] Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part II: Uniform Data Fingerprint.", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf-11, 2 November 2020, . [draft-hallambaker-threshold] Hallam-Baker, P., "Threshold Modes in Elliptic Curves", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker- threshold-04, 2 November 2020, . [draft-hallambaker-threshold-sigs] Hallam-Baker, P., "Threshold Signatures in Elliptic Curves", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- hallambaker-threshold-sigs-05, 2 November 2020, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . 17. Informative References [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer] Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference Implementation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- hallambaker-mesh-developer-10, 27 July 2020, . [RFC2426] Dawson, F. and T. Howes, "vCard MIME Directory Profile", RFC 2426, DOI 10.17487/RFC2426, September 1998, . [RFC5545] Desruisseaux, B., "Internet Calendaring and Scheduling Core Object Specification (iCalendar)", RFC 5545, DOI 10.17487/RFC5545, September 2009, . Hallam-Baker Expires 17 July 2021 [Page 64]