Working Group Name I. Hajjeh Internet Draft INEOVATION M. Badra LIMOS Laboratory Intended status: Experimental December 13, 2007 Expires: June 2008 Credential Protection Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security draft-hajjeh-tls-identity-protection-02.txt Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html This Internet-Draft will expire on June 13, 2007. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). Abstract TLS defines several ciphersuites providing authentication, data protection and session key exchange between two communicating entities. Some of these ciphersuites are used for completely anonymous key exchange, in which neither party is authenticated. Hajjeh & Badra Expires June 2008 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Credential Protection Ciphersuites for TLS December 2007 However, they are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and are therefore deprecated. This document defines a set of ciphersuites to add client credential protection to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Table of Contents 1. Introduction................................................2 2. TLS credential protection overview..........................3 3. CP_RSA Key Exchange Algorithm...............................5 4. CP_DHE and CP_DH Key Exchange Algorithms....................6 5. CP_ECDH and CP_ECDHE Key Exchange Algorithm.................6 6. Security Considerations.....................................7 7. IANA Considerations.........................................7 8. References..................................................9 8.1. Normative References...................................9 8.2. Informative References.................................9 Author's Addresses............................................10 Intellectual Property Statement...............................10 Disclaimer of Validity........................................10 1. Introduction TLS is the most deployed security protocol for securing exchanges. It provides end-to-end secure communications between two entities with authentication and data protection. TLS supports three authentication modes: authentication of both parties, only server-side authentication, and anonymous key exchange. For each mode, TLS specifies a set of ciphersuites. However, anonymous ciphersuites are strongly discouraged because they cannot prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Client credential protection may be established by changing the order of the messages that the client sends after receiving ServerHelloDone [CORELLA]. This is done by sending the ChangeCipherSpec message before the Certificate and the CertificateVerify messages and after the ClientKeyExchange message. However, it requires a major change to TLS machine state as long as a new TLS version. Client credential protection may also be done through a DHE exchange before establishing an ordinary handshake with identity information [SSLTLS]. This wouldn't however be secure enough against active attackers, which will be able to disclose the client's credentials Hajjeh & Badra Expires June 2008 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Credential Protection Ciphersuites for TLS December 2007 and wouldn't be favorable for some environments (e.g. mobile), due to the additional cryptographic computations. Client credential protection may also be possible, assuming that the client permits renegotiation after the first server authentication [TLS]. However, this requires more cryptographic computations and augments significantly the number of rounds trips. In fact, renegotiation refers back to an asymmetric encryption/decryption and to a full previously certificate chain verified public key, whose chain was verified properly during the first handshake and stored in the client session context. In addition, computation overhead increases due to all second handshake messages encryption/decryption. Where for round trips, their number increases dramatically when small data packets are used to convey TLS messages. Furthermore, it is mandatory for the server to complete a first TLS handshake before it becomes able to confirm if the client has a certificate or not. Client credential protection may as well be realized by exchanging a TLS extension that negotiates the symmetric encryption algorithm to be used for client certificate encrypting/decrypting [EAPIP]. This solution may suffer from interoperability issues related to TLS Extensions, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 implementations, as described in [INTEROP]. This document defines a set of ciphersuites to add client credential protection to TLS protocol. Client credential protection is provided by symmetrically encrypting the client certificate with a key derived from the SecurityParameters.master_secret, SecurityParameters.server_random and SecurityParameters.client_random. The symmetric encryption algorithm is set to the cipher algorithm of the ServerHello.cipher_suite. 1.1. Conventions used in this document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119]. 2. TLS credential protection overview This document specifies a set of ciphersuites for TLS. These ciphersuites reuse existing key exchange algorithms that require based-certificates authentication, and reuse also existing MAC, and bloc ciphers algorithms from [TLS] and [TLSCTR], [TLSECC], [TLSAES] and [TLSCAM]. Their names include the text "CP" to refer to the client credential protection. An example is shown below. Hajjeh & Badra Expires June 2008 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Credential Protection Ciphersuites for TLS December 2007 CipherSuite Key Exchange Cipher Hash TLS_CP_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 RSA RC4_40 MD5 TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE AES_128_CBC SHA If the client has not a certificate with a type appropriate for one of the supported cipher key exchange algorithms or if the client will not be able to send such a certificate, the client MUST NOT include any credential protection ciphersuite in the ClientHello.cipher_suites. If the server selects a ciphersuite with client credential protection, the server MUST request a certificate from the client. If the server selects one of the ciphersuites defined in this document, the client MUST encrypt the Certificate and the CertificateVerify messages using the symmetric algorithm selected by the server from the list in ClientHello.cipher_suites and a key derived from the SecurityParameters.master_secret. This key is the same key used to encrypt data written by the client. If a stream cipher encryption algorithm has been selected, the client symmetrically encrypts Certificate and CertificateVerify messages without any padding byte. If a block cipher encryption algorithm has been selected, the client uses an explicit IV and adds padding value to force the length of the plaintext to be an integral multiple of the block cipher's block length, as it is described in section 6.2.3.2 of [TLS]. For DHE key exchange algorithm, the client always sends the ClientKeyExchange message conveying its ephemeral DH public key Yc. For ECDHE key exchange algorithm, the client always sends the ClientKeyExchange message conveying its ephemeral ECDH public key Yc. Current TLS specifications note that if the client certificate already contains a suitable DH or ECDH public key, then Yc is implicit and does not need to be sent again and consequently, the client key exchange message will be sent, but it MUST be empty. Implementations of this document MUST send ClientKeyExchange message but always carrying the client Yc, whatever the PublicValueEncoding is implicit or explicit. Note that it is possible to correlate sessions by the same client when DH or ECDH are in use. Hajjeh & Badra Expires June 2008 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Credential Protection Ciphersuites for TLS December 2007 Client Server ClientHello --------> ServerHello Certificate ServerKeyExchange* <-------- CertificateRequest {Certificate} ClientKeyExchange {CertificateVerify} ChangeCipherSpec Finished --------> ChangeCipherSpec <-------- Finished Application Data <-------> Application Data * Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent. {} Indicates messages that are symmetrically encrypted. The ciphersuites in Section 3 (CP_RSA Key Exchange Algorithm) use RSA based certificates to mutually authenticate a RSA exchange with the client credential protection. The ciphersuites in Section 4 (CP_DHE and CP_DH Key Exchange Algorithm) use DHE_RSA, DH_RSA, DHE_DSS or DH_DSS to mutually authenticate a (Ephemeral) Diffie-Hellman exchange. The ciphersuites in Section 5 (CP_ECDH and CP_ECDHE Key Exchange Algorithms) use ECDH_ECDSA, ECDHE_ECDSA, ECDH_RSA or ECDHE_RSA to mutually authenticate a (Ephemeral) EC Diffie-Hellman exchange. 3. CP_RSA Key Exchange Algorithm This section defines additional ciphersuites that use RSA based certificates to authenticate a RSA exchange. These ciphersuites give client credential protection. CipherSuite Key Exchange Cipher Hash TLS_CP_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 RSA RC4_40 MD5 TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 RSA RC4_128 MD5 TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA RSA RC4_128 SHA TLS_CP_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 RSA RC2_CBC_40 MD5 TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA RSA IDEA_CBC SHA TLS_CP_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA RSA DES40_CBC SHA Hajjeh & Badra Expires June 2008 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Credential Protection Ciphersuites for TLS December 2007 TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA RSA DES_CBC SHA TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA RSA 3DES_EDE SHA TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA RSA AES_128_CBC SHA TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA RSA AES_256_CBC SHA TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CTR_SHA RSA AES_128_CTR SHA TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA RSA CAMELLIA_128_CBC SHA TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CTR_SHA RSA AES_256_CTR SHA TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA RSA CAMELLIA_256_CBC SHA 4. CP_DHE and CP_DH Key Exchange Algorithms This section defines additional ciphersuites that use DH and DHE as key exchange algorithms, with RSA or DSS based certificates to authenticate a (Ephemeral) Diffie-Hellman exchange. These ciphersuites give client credential protection. CipherSuite Key Exchange Cipher Hash TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DHE DES_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DHE 3DES_EDE_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DHE DES_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DHE 3DES_EDE_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE AES_128_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE AES_128_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE AES_256_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE AES_256_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA DHE CAMELLIA_128_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA DHE CAMELLIA_128_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA DHE CAMELLIA_256_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA DHE CAMELLIA_256_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CTR_SHA DHE AES_128_CTR SHA TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CTR_SHA DHE AES_128_CTR SHA TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CTR_SHA DHE AES_256_CTR SHA TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CTR_SHA DHE AES_256_CTR SHA TLS_CP_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DH DES_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DH 3DES_EDE_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DH DES_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DH 3DES_EDE_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DH AES_128_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DH AES_128_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DH AES_256_CBC SHA TLS_CP_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DH AES_256_CBC SHA 5. CP_ECDH and CP_ECDHE Key Exchange Algorithm This section defines additional ciphersuites that use ECDH and ECDHE as key exchange algorithms, with RSA or ECDSA based certificates to Hajjeh & Badra Expires June 2008 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Credential Protection Ciphersuites for TLS December 2007 authenticate a (Ephemeral) ECDH exchange. These ciphersuites give client credential protection. CipherSuite Key Exchange Cipher Hash TLS_CP_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDH RC4_128 SHA TLS_CP_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDH 3DES_EDE_CBC SHA TLS_CP_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH AES_128_CBC SHA TLS_CP_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDHE AES_256_CBC SHA TLS_CP_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDHE RC4_128 SHA TLS_CP_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDHE 3DES_EDE_CBC SHA TLS_CP_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDHE AES_128_CBC SHA TLS_CP_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDHE AES_256_CBC SHA TLS_CP_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDH RC4_128 SHA TLS_CP_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDH 3DES_EDE_CBC SHA TLS_CP_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH AES_256_CBC SHA TLS_CP_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDH AES_256_CBC SHA TLS_CP_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDHE RC4_128 SHA TLS_CP_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDHE 3DES_EDE_CBC SHA TLS_CP_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDHE AES_256_CBC SHA TLS_CP_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDHE AES_256_CBC SHA 6. Security Considerations The security considerations described throughout [TLS], [DTLS], [TLSAES], [TLSECC] and [TLSAES] apply here as well. 7. IANA Considerations This section provides guidance to the IANA regarding registration of values related to the credential protection ciphersuites. CipherSuite TLS_CP_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CTR_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CTR_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; Hajjeh & Badra Expires June 2008 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Credential Protection Ciphersuites for TLS December 2007 CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CTR_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CTR_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CTR_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CTR_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; CipherSuite TLS_CP_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ={ 0xXX,0xXX }; Note: For implementation and deployment facilities, it is helpful to reserve a specific registry sub-range (minor, major) for credential protection ciphersuites. Hajjeh & Badra Expires June 2008 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Credential Protection Ciphersuites for TLS December 2007 8. References 8.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [TLS] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2005. [DTLS] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer Security", RFC 4347, April 2006. [TLSCAM] Moriai, S., Kato, A., Kanda M., "Addition of Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4132, July 2005. [TLSAES] Chown, P., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 3268, June 2002. [TLSECC] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., Moeller, B., "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006 [TLSCTR] Modadugu, N. and E. Rescorla, "AES Counter Mode Cipher Suites for TLS and DTLS", draft-ietf-tls-ctr-01.txt (expired), June 2006. 8.2. Informative References [SSLTLS] Rescorla, E., "SSL and TLS: Designing and Building Secure Systems", Addison-Wesley, March 2001. [CORELLA] Corella, F., "adding client identity protection to TLS", message on ietf-tls@lists.certicom.com mailing list, http://www.imc.org/ietf-tls/mail-archive/msg02004.html, August 2000. [INTEROP] Pettersen, Y., "Clientside interoperability experiences for the SSL and TLS protocols",draft-ietf-tls-interoperability- 00 (expired), October 2006. [EAPIP] Urien, P. and M. Badra, "Identity Protection within EAP- TLS", draft-urien-badra-eap-tls-identity-protection-01.txt (expired), October 2006. Hajjeh & Badra Expires June 2008 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Credential Protection Ciphersuites for TLS December 2007 Author's Addresses Ibrahim Hajjeh INEOVATION France Email: hajjeh@ineovation.com Mohamad Badra LIMOS Laboratory - UMR6158, CNRS France Email: badra@isima.fr Intellectual Property Statement The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. Disclaimer of Validity This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF Hajjeh & Badra Expires June 2008 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Credential Protection Ciphersuites for TLS December 2007 THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. Acknowledgment Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society. Hajjeh & Badra Expires June 2008 [Page 11]