Network Working Group J. Gould Internet-Draft S. Hollenbeck Obsoletes: 4310 (if approved) VeriSign, Inc. Intended status: Standards Track December 14, 2009 Expires: June 17, 2010 Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) draft-gould-rfc4310bis-01 Abstract This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) extension mapping for the provisioning and management of Domain Name System security extensions (DNSSEC) for domain names stored in a shared central repository. Specified in XML, this mapping extends the EPP domain name mapping to provide additional features required for the provisioning of DNS security extensions. This document incorporates feedback from early implementers on the PROVREG mail list and users. This document is intended to obsolete RFC 4310. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 17, 2010. Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 1] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the BSD License. Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 2] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Object Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Delegation Signer Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.1. Public Key Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Booleans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3. Maximum Signature Lifetime Values . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. DS Data Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Key Data Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. Example DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface . . . . . 6 4. EPP Command Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1. EPP Query Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1.1. EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1.2. EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1.3. EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2. EPP Transform Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2.1. EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2.2. EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2.3. EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.2.4. EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.2.5. EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 6. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Appendix A. Changes from RFC 4310 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 3] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 1. Introduction This document describes an extension mapping for version 1.0 of the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) described in RFC 5730 [1]. This mapping, an extension of the domain name mapping described in RFC 5731 [2], is specified using the Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 [3] and XML Schema notation ([4], [5]). The EPP core protocol specification [1] provides a complete description of EPP command and response structures. A thorough understanding of the base protocol specification is necessary to understand the mapping described in this document. Familiarity with the Domain Name System (DNS) described in RFC 1034 [11] and RFC 1035 [12] and with DNS security extensions described in RFC 4033 [13], RFC 4034 [6], and RFC 4035 [7] is required to understand the DNS security concepts described in this document. The EPP mapping described in this document specifies a mechanism for the provisioning and management of DNS security extensions in a shared central repository. Information exchanged via this mapping can be extracted from the repository and used to publish DNSSEC delegation signer (DS) resource records as described in RFC 4034 [6]. 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [8]. In examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client, and "S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. "////" is used to note element values that have been shortened to better fit page boundaries. Indentation and white space in examples is provided only to illustrate element relationships and is not a mandatory feature of this protocol. XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the character case presented in order to develop a conforming implementation. 2. Object Attributes This extension adds additional elements to the EPP domain name mapping [2]. Only new element descriptions are described here. Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 4] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 2.1. Delegation Signer Information Delegation signer (DS) information is published by a DNS server to indicate that a child zone is digitally signed and that the parent zone recognizes the indicated key as a valid zone key for the child zone. A DS resource record (RR) contains four fields: a key tag field, a key algorithm number octet, an octet identifying a digest algorithm, and a digest field. See RFC 4034 [6] for specific field formats. 2.1.1. Public Key Information Public key information provided by a client maps to the DNSKEY RR presentation field formats described in section 2.2 of RFC 4034 [6]. A DNSKEY RR contains four fields: flags, a protocol octet, an algorithm number octet, and a public key. 2.2. Booleans Boolean values MUST be represented in the XML Schema format described in Part 2 of the W3C XML Schema recommendation [5]. 2.3. Maximum Signature Lifetime Values Maximum signature lifetime values MUST be represented in seconds using an extended XML Schema "int" format. The base "int" format, which allows negative numbers, is described in Part 2 of the W3C XML Schema recommendation [5]. This format is further restricted to enforce a minimum value of one. 3. DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface This document describes operational scenarios in which a client can create, add, remove, and replace delegation signer (DS) information or key data information for a domain name. There are two different interfaces that a server can support. The first is called the "DS Data Interface," where the client is responsible for the creation of the DS information and is required to pass DS information when performing adds, removes, and replaces. The server is required to pass DS information for info responses. The second is the "Key Data Interface," where the client is responsible for passing the key data information when performing adds, removes, and replaces. The server is responsible to pass key data information for info responses. The server MUST support use of one specification form consistently. Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 5] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 3.1. DS Data Interface The DS Data Interface relies uses the element for creates, adds, removes, and replaces, as well as for info responses. The key data associated with the DS information MAY be provided by the client, but the server is not obligated to use the key data. The server operator MAY also issue out-of-band DNS queries to retrieve the key data from the registered domain's apex in order to evaluate the received DS information. It is RECOMMENDED that the child zone operator have this key data online in the DNS tree to allow the parent zone administrator to validate the data as necessary. The key data SHOULD have the Secure Entry Point (SEP) bit set as described in RFC 3757 [9]. The element contains the following child elements: A element that contains a key tag value as described in section 5.1.1 of RFC 4034 [6]. A element that contains an algorithm value as described in section 5.1.2 of RFC 4034 [6]. A element that contains a digest type value as described in section 5.1.3 of RFC 4034 [6]. A element that contains a digest value as described in section 5.1.4 of RFC 4034 [6]. An OPTIONAL element that indicates a child's preference for the number of seconds after signature generation when the parent's signature on the DS information provided by the child will expire. A client SHOULD specify the same value for all elements associated with a domain. If the is not present, or if multiple values are requested, the default signature expiration policy of the server operator (as determined using an out-of-band mechanism) applies. An OPTIONAL element that describes the key data used as input in the DS hash calculation for use in server validation. The element contains the following child elements defined in Section 3.2. The use of the child element of MUST NOT be used for servers supporting the DS Data Interface. Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 6] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 3.2. Key Data Interface The Key Data Interface relies on the use of the element for creates, adds, removes, and replaces, as well as for info responses. The DS information is not provided by the client but is generated by the server. The attributes used for DS generation is based on server policy, where only key data is passed between the client and the server. The element contains the following child elements: A element that contains a flags field value as described in section 2.1.1 of RFC 4034 [6]. A element that contains a protocol field value as described in section 2.1.2 of RFC 4034 [6]. A element that contains an algorithm number field value as described in sections 2.1.3 of RFC 4034 [6]. A element that contains an encoded public key field value as described in sections 2.1.4 of RFC 4034 [6]. An OPTIONAL element that indicates a child's preference for the number of seconds after signature generation when the parent's signature on the DS information provided by the child will expire. A client SHOULD specify the same value for all elements associated with a domain. If the is not present, or if multiple values are requested, the default signature expiration policy of the server operator (as determined using an out-of-band mechanism) applies. 3.3. Example DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface Example use of DS Data Interface for a create: 12345 3 1 49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 7] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Example use of DS Data Interface with option key data for a create: 12345 3 1 49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC 256 3 1 AQPJ////4Q== Example use of Key Data Interface for a create: 256 3 1 AQPJ////4Q== 4. EPP Command Mapping A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found in the EPP core protocol specification [1]. The command mappings described here are specifically for use in provisioning and managing DNS security extensions via EPP. 4.1. EPP Query Commands EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: to determine if an object is known to the server, to retrieve detailed information associated with an object, and to retrieve object transfer status information. 4.1.1. EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command or response described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 8] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 4.1.2. EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. However, additional elements are defined for the response. When an command has been processed successfully, the EPP element MUST contain child elements as described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. In addition, the EPP element MUST contain a child element that identifies the extension namespace. The element contains the following child elements: One or more elements that describe the delegation signer data provided by the client for the domain or one or more elements that describe the key data provided by the client for the domain. Child elements of the element are described in Section 3.1. Child elements of the are described in Section 3.2. Example Response for a Secure Delegation using the DS Data Interface: S: S: S: S: S: Command completed successfully S: S: S: S: example.com S: EXAMPLE1-REP S: S: jd1234 S: sh8013 S: sh8013 S: S: ns1.example.com S: ns2.example.com S: S: ns1.example.com S: ns2.example.com S: ClientX S: ClientY Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 9] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 S: 1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: ClientX S: 1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z S: 2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: 2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z S: S: 2fooBAR S: S: S: S: S: S: S: 12345 S: 3 S: 1 S: 49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC S: S: S: S: S: ABC-12345 S: 54322-XYZ S: S: S: Example Response for a Secure Delegation using the DS Data Interface with OPTIONAL Key Data: S: S: S: S: S: Command completed successfully S: S: S: S: example.com S: EXAMPLE1-REP S: S: jd1234 S: sh8013 S: sh8013 S: Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 10] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 S: ns1.example.com S: ns2.example.com S: S: ns1.example.com S: ns2.example.com S: ClientX S: ClientY S: 1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: ClientX S: 1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z S: 2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: 2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z S: S: 2fooBAR S: S: S: S: S: S: S: 12345 S: 3 S: 1 S: 49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC S: 604800 S: S: 256 S: 3 S: 1 S: AQPJ////4Q== S: S: S: S: S: S: ABC-12345 S: 54322-XYZ S: S: S: Example Response for a Secure Delegation using the Key Data Interface: S: S: Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 11] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 S: S: S: Command completed successfully S: S: S: S: example.com S: EXAMPLE1-REP S: S: jd1234 S: sh8013 S: sh8013 S: S: ns1.example.com S: ns2.example.com S: S: ns1.example.com S: ns2.example.com S: ClientX S: ClientY S: 1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: ClientX S: 1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z S: 2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: 2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z S: S: 2fooBAR S: S: S: S: S: S: S: 256 S: 3 S: 1 S: AQPJ////4Q== S: S: S: S: S: ABC-12345 S: 54322-XYZ S: S: S: Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 12] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 An EPP error response MUST be returned if an command can not be processed for any reason. 4.1.3. EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command or response described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. 4.2. EPP Transform Commands EPP provides five commands to transform objects: to create an instance of an object, to delete an instance of an object, to extend the validity period of an object, to manage object sponsorship changes, and to change information associated with an object. 4.2.1. EPP Command This extension defines additional elements for the EPP command described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. No additional elements are defined for the EPP response. The EPP command provides a transform operation that allows a client to create a domain object. In addition to the EPP command elements described in the EPP domain mapping [2], the command MUST contain an element. The element MUST contain a child element that identifies the extension namespace. The element MUST contain one or more elements or elements. Child elements of the element are described in Section 3.1. Child elements of the are described in Section 3.2. The element and the element contains an OPTIONAL element. The server MUST abort command processing and respond with an appropriate EPP error if the values provided by the client can not be accepted for syntax or policy reasons. Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 13] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Example Command for a Secure Delegation using the DS Data Interface: C: C: C: C: C: C: example.com C: 2 C: C: ns1.example.com C: ns2.example.com C: C: jd1234 C: sh8013 C: sh8013 C: C: 2fooBAR C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 12345 C: 3 C: 1 C: 49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC C: 604800 C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 14] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Example Command for a Secure Delegation using the DS Data Interface with OPTIONAL key data: C: C: C: C: C: C: example.com C: 2 C: C: ns1.example.com C: ns2.example.com C: C: jd1234 C: sh8013 C: sh8013 C: C: 2fooBAR C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 12345 C: 3 C: 1 C: 49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC C: 604800 C: C: 256 C: 3 C: 1 C: AQPJ////4Q== C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 15] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Example Command for a Secure Delegation using the Key Data Interface: C: C: C: C: C: C: example.com C: 2 C: C: ns1.example.com C: ns2.example.com C: C: jd1234 C: sh8013 C: sh8013 C: C: 2fooBAR C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 256 C: 3 C: 1 C: AQPJ////4Q== C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: When a command has been processed successfully, the EPP response is as described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. 4.2.2. EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command or response described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 16] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 4.2.3. EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command or response described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. 4.2.4. EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command or response described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. 4.2.5. EPP Command This extension defines additional elements for the EPP command described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. No additional elements are defined for the EPP response. The EPP command provides a transform operation that allows a client to modify the attributes of a domain object. In addition to the EPP command elements described in the EPP domain mapping, the command MUST contain an element. The element MUST contain a child element that identifies the extension namespace and the location of the extension schema. The element contains a element to add security information to a delegation, a element to remove security information from a delegation, or a element to replace all security information with new security information. The and can be used together to add and remove security information at the same time. can not be used with either or The element also contains an OPTIONAL "urgent" attribute that a client can use to ask the server operator to complete and implement the update request with high priority. This attribute accepts boolean values as described in Section 2.2; the default value is boolean false. "High priority" is relative to standard server operator policies that are determined using an out- of-band mechanism. The element is used to add security information to an existing set. The element MUST contain one or more or elements. Child elements of the element are described in Section 3.1. Child elements of the are described in Section 3.2. The element and the element contains an OPTIONAL element. Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 17] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 The element contains one or more , , or elements that are used to remove security data from a delegation. and are part of the DS Data Interface and is part of the Key Data Interface. element MUST contain a key tag value as described in section 5.1.1 of RFC 4034 [6]. Removing all DS information can remove the ability of the parent to secure the delegation to the child zone. The server SHOULD return an EPP error result code of 2305 if more then one DS record matches the . should be used by the client if there is more then one DS record with the same . element is used to uniquely define the DS record to remove by using all four elements , , , and that is guaranteed to be unique. element is used to uniquely define the key data to remove along with the associated DS data. There can be more then one DS record created for each key, so removing a key could remove more then one DS record. The element is used to replace all existing security information with new security information. The element MUST contain zero or more or elements. Child elements of the element are described in Section 3.1. Child elements of the are described in Section 3.2 The data in these elements is used to replace whatever other data is currently archived for the delegation. The element contains an OPTIONAL "urgent" attribute. The element contains OPTIONAL and elements. In addition the element contains an OPTIONAL element. The server MUST abort command processing and respond with an appropriate EPP error if the values provided by the client can not be accepted for syntax or policy reasons. Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 18] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Example Command, Adding and Removing DS Data using the DS Data Interface: C: C: C: C: C: C: example.com C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 12346 C: 3 C: 1 C: 38EC35D5B3A34B44C39B C: C: C: C: 12345 C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 19] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Example Command, Adding and Removing Key Data using the Key Data Interface: C: C: C: C: C: C: example.com C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 256 C: 3 C: 1 C: AQPJ////4Q== C: 604800 C: C: C: C: C: 256 C: 3 C: 1 C: APPJ////1R== C: 604800 C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 20] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Example Command, Removing DS Data with using the DS Data Interface: C: C: C: C: C: C: example.com C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 12346 C: 3 C: 1 C: 38EC35D5B3A34B44C39B C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 21] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Example Command, Removing DS Data with using the DS Data Interface: C: C: C: C: C: C: example.com C: C: C: C: C: C: 12345 C: 12346 C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Example Command, Removing all DS or Key Data using : C: C: C: C: C: C: example.com C: C: C: C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 22] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Example Urgent Command, Changing DS Data using the DS Data Interface: C: C: C: C: C: C: example.com C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 12345 C: 3 C: 1 C: 49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 23] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Example Command, Changing DS Data with OPTIONAL Key Data using the DS Data Interface: C: C: C: C: C: C: example.com C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 12345 C: 3 C: 1 C: 49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC C: 604800 C: C: 256 C: 3 C: 1 C: AQPJ////4Q== C: C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 24] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Example Command, Changing Key Data using the Key Data Interface: C: C: C: C: C: C: example.com C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 256 C: 3 C: 1 C: AQPJ////4Q== C: 604800 C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: When an extended command has been processed successfully, the EPP response is as described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. A server operator MUST return an EPP error result code of 2306 if an urgent update (noted with an "urgent" attribute value of boolean true) can not be completed with high priority. 5. Formal Syntax An EPP object mapping is specified in XML Schema notation. The formal syntax presented here is a complete schema representation of the object mapping suitable for automated validation of EPP XML instances. The BEGIN and END tags are not part of the schema; they are used to note the beginning and ending of the schema for URI registration purposes. Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 25] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 of the code. All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: o Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. o Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. o Neither the name of Internet Society, IETF or IETF Trust, nor the names of specific contributors, may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior written permission. THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. BEGIN Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0 domain name extension schema for provisioning DNS security (DNSSEC) extensions. Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 26] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 27] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 28] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 END 6. Internationalization Considerations EPP is represented in XML, which provides native support for encoding information using the Unicode character set and its more compact representations including UTF-8 [14]. Conformant XML processors recognize both UTF-8 and UTF-16 [15]. Though XML includes provisions to identify and use other character encodings through use of an "encoding" attribute in an declaration, use of UTF-8 is RECOMMENDED in environments where parser encoding support incompatibility exists. As an extension of the EPP domain mapping [2], the elements, element content, attributes, and attribute values described in this document MUST inherit the internationalization conventions used to represent higher-layer domain and core protocol structures present in an XML instance that includes this extension. 7. IANA Considerations This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas conforming to a registry mechanism described in RFC 3688 [10]. Two URI assignments have been completed by the IANA. Registration request for the extension namespace: URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0 Registrant Contact: IESG XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification. Registration request for the extension XML schema: URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:secDNS-1.0 Registrant Contact: IESG Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 29] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document. 8. Security Considerations The mapping extensions described in this document do not provide any security services beyond those described by EPP [1], the EPP domain name mapping [2], and protocol layers used by EPP. The security considerations described in these other specifications apply to this specification as well. As with other domain object transforms, the EPP transform operations described in this document MUST be restricted to the sponsoring client as authenticated using the mechanisms described in sections 2.9.1.1 and 7 of RFC 5730 [1]. Any attempt to perform a transform operation on a domain object by any client other than the sponsoring client MUST be rejected with an appropriate EPP authorization error. The provisioning service described in this document involves the exchange of information that can have an operational impact on the DNS. A trust relationship MUST exist between the EPP client and server, and provisioning of public key information MUST only be done after the identities of both parties have been confirmed using a strong authentication mechanism. An EPP client might be acting as an agent for a zone administrator who wants to send delegation information to be signed and published by the server operator. Man-in-the-middle attacks are thus possible as a result of direct client activity or inadvertent client data manipulation. Acceptance of a false key by a server operator can produce significant operational consequences. The child and parent zones MUST be consistent to secure the delegation properly. In the absence of consistent signatures, the delegation will not appear in the secure name space, yielding untrustworthy query responses. If a key is compromised, a client can either remove the compromised information or update the delegation information via EPP commands using the "urgent" attribute. Operational scenarios requiring quick removal of a secure domain delegation can be implemented using a two-step process. First, security credentials can be removed using an "urgent" update as just described. The domain can then be removed from the parent zone by changing the status of the domain to either of the EPP "clientHold" or "serverHold" domain status values. The domain can also be removed from the zone using the EPP command, but this is a more drastic step that needs to be considered carefully before use. Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 30] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Data validity checking at the server requires computational resources. A purposeful or inadvertent denial-of-service attack is possible if a client requests some number of update operations that exceed a server's processing capabilities. Server operators SHOULD take steps to manage command load and command processing requirements to minimize the risk of a denial-of-service attack. The signature lifetime values provided by clients are requests that can be rejected. Blind acceptance by a server operator can have an adverse impact on a server's processing capabilities. Server operators SHOULD seriously consider adopting implementation rules to limit the range of acceptable signature lifetime values to counter potential adverse situations. 9. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the following people who have provided significant contributions to the development of this document: David Blacka, Howard Eland, Patrik Faltstrom, Ed Lewis, Klaus Malorny, Patrick Mevzek, David Smith, Andrew Sullivan. 10. References 10.1. Normative References [1] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", STD 69, RFC 5730, August 2009. [2] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731, August 2009. [3] Bray, T., Sperberg-McQueen, C., Paoli, J., and E. Maler, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Second Edition)", World Wide Web Consortium FirstEdition REC-xml-20001006, October 2000, . [4] Mendelsohn, N., Thompson, H., Maloney, M., and D. Beech, "XML Schema Part 1: Structures", World Wide Web Consortium FirstEdition REC-xmlschema-1-20010502, May 2001, . [5] Malhotra, A. and P. Biron, "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes", World Wide Web Consortium FirstEdition REC-xmlschema-2- 20010502, May 2001, . Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 31] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 [6] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034, March 2005. [7] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005. [8] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [9] Kolkman, O., Schlyter, J., and E. Lewis, "Domain Name System KEY (DNSKEY) Resource Record (RR) Secure Entry Point (SEP) Flag", RFC 3757, April 2004. [10] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, January 2004. 10.2. Informative References [11] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. [12] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. [13] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, March 2005. [14] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003. [15] Hoffman, P. and F. Yergeau, "UTF-16, an encoding of ISO 10646", RFC 2781, February 2000. Appendix A. Changes from RFC 4310 1. Added "This document incorporates feedback from early implementers on the PROVREG mail list and users." as well as "This document is intended to obsolete RFC 4310" in the Abstract 2. Removed all references to xsi:schemaLocation to be consistent with the other EPP RFCs. 3. Added "DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface" section. 4. Moved the "create, add, remove, and replace delegation signer (DS) information" paragraph from the "Object Attributes" section to the "DS Data Interface" section. Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 32] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 5. Replaced the element descriptions in the "EPP Command" section with a reference to the and elements described in the "DS Data Interface" and "Key Data Interface" sections, respectively. 6. Updated the "EPP Command" section examples to include both the DS Data Interface and the Key Data Interface. 7. Updated the "EPP Command" section to refer to both the use of and described in the "DS Data Interface" and "Key Data Interface" sections, respectively. 8. Updated the "EPP Command" section to describe the use of for both and . 9. Updated the "EPP Command" section examples to include both the DS Data Interface and the Key Data Interface. 10. Updated the "EPP Command" section to describe the use of and together but not with element to replace security information with new security information" to " element to replace all security information with new security information" in the "EPP Command" section. 12. Added that the server SHOULD return an EPP error result of 2305 if more than one DS record matches" when using the with a . 13. Updated the "EPP Command" section examples to include both the DS Data Interface and the Key Data Interface. Also included additional examples of adding and removing DS data or key data. 14. Updated the "Formal Syntax" section with the updated XML schema. 15. Updated the Acknowledgements section with a new list of contributors. 16. Replaced references to RFC 3730 with references to RFC 5730. 17. Replaced references to RFC 3731 with references to RFC 5731. 18. Changed "The element MUST contain one or more " to ""The element MUST contain zero or more ". 19. Added example of removing all DS or Key Data using . Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 33] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping December 2009 Authors' Addresses James Gould VeriSign, Inc. 21345 Ridgetop Circle Dulles, VA 20166-6503 US EMail: jgould@verisign.com Scott Hollenbeck VeriSign, Inc. 21345 Ridgetop Circle Dulles, VA 20166-6503 US EMail: shollenbeck@verisign.com Gould & Hollenbeck Expires June 17, 2010 [Page 34]