ID Message Exchange Format Working Group Glenn Mansfield INTERNET-DRAFT Cyber Solutions Inc. draft-glenn-id-notification-mib-00.txt August 25 1999 Intrusion Detection Message MIB Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its Areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. Abstract This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols in the Internet community. In particular, it defines the contents of messages that will be exchanged among intrusion detection systems when an intrusion is detetcted. It also allows the message exchange system to be configured. Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 1] Internet Draft August 25 1999 Table of Contents 1. The SNMP Network Management Framework ......................... 3 2. The Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Model ................ 4 3. MIB Model for ID Message Exchanges ............................ 4 4. MIB design .................................................... 5 5. The Intrusion Detection Message MIB ........................... 7 6. Intellectual Property .........................................17 7. Acknowledgements ..............................................17 8. References ....................................................18 Security Considerations ...........................................20 Authors' Addresses ................................................21 Full Copyright Statement ..........................................22 Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 2] Internet Draft August 25 1999 1. The SNMP Network Management Framework The SNMP Network Management Framework presently consists of five major components: o An overall architecture, described in RFC 2571 [1]. o Mechanisms for describing and naming objects and events for the purpose of management. The first version of this Structure of Management Information (SMI) is called SMIv1 and described in RFC 1155 [2], RFC 1212 [3] and RFC 1215 [4]. The second version, called SMIv2, is described in RFC 1902 [5], RFC 1903 [6] and RFC 1904 [7]. o Message protocols for transferring management information. The first version of the SNMP message protocol is called SNMPv1 and described in RFC 1157 [8]. A second version of the SNMP message protocol, which is not an Internet standards track protocol, is called SNMPv2c and described in RFC 1901 [9] and RFC 1906 [10]. The third version of the message protocol is called SNMPv3 and described in RFC 1906 [10], RFC 2572 [11] and RFC 2574 [12]. o Protocol operations for accessing management information. The first set of protocol operations and associated PDU formats is described in RFC 1157 [8]. A second set of protocol operations and associated PDU formats is described in RFC 1905 [13]. o A set of fundamental applications described in RFC 2573 [14] and the view-based access control mechanism described in RFC 2575 [15]. Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed the Management Information Base or MIB. Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the SMI. This memo specifies a MIB module that is compliant to the SMIv2. A MIB conforming to the SMIv1 can be produced through the appropriate translations. The resulting translated MIB must be semantically equivalent, except where objects or events are omitted because no translation is possible (use of Counter64). Some machine readable information in SMIv2 will be converted into textual descriptions in SMIv1 during the translation process. However, this loss of machine readable information is not considered to change the semantics of the MIB. Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 3] Internet Draft August 25 1999 2. The Intrusion detection model. An Intrusion Detection system (ID1) generally comprises an Analyzer which scans Data Sources for signs of intrusions. When it detects a sign or a signature an event occurs and the analyzer then sends a Message or Alert to the Manager(s). Managers in turn may exchange Messages or Alerts for cooperative or collaborative purposes. ID Message Exchange Model ========================= ............................................................. ID1 : : +------------+------------+ +----------------+ : | | | | | : | | |Message | | : | DataSource | Analyzer |---------->| Manager | : | | ..........|Alert | | : | | : Event | | | : +------------+------------+ +--------X-------+ : ID1 | : ................................................|.............. Message/| ID2 : Alert | : | : | : +--------X-------+ : | | : | | : | Manager | : | | : | | : +----------------+ : 3. MIB Model for ID Message Exchanges. In Intrusion detection and management, the communication between the Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 4] Internet Draft August 25 1999 different components of the system will essentially be event based. Presumably, some components (analysers or agents) will be assigned the tasks for watching some data-sources and looking out for signs of (attepmpted) intrusions or attacks. In case any such sign is detected it is brought to the notice of the Manager. The Manager will then take the appropriate action which may involve relaying the notification and/or carrying out further investigation by talking to peers, higher level managers and/or the entity that originated the notification. The investigation carried out by the manager will possibly involve getting o more information on some of the fields that are present in the messages from the agents. [ Maybe Http, ftp ] o more host-related information on the circumstances under which the intrusion/attack was detected - this may involve fetching further information from the various MIBs of the entity that originated the notification. o more network-related information on the circumstances under which the intrusion/attack was detected - this may involve fetching further information from the various MIBs of the relevant network entities in the network The notification to the manager will take the form of an inform- request. There may be several types of notifications. The constraint on a notification is its size. It is desirable that the packet carrying the notification is not fragmented at the IP level. The MIB defined in this document covers the portion which is specific to the Intrusion Detection Message itself. The other components of information that may be of relevance to the investigation will probably be found in the various MIBs defined. If they are absent then newer MIBs will have to be defined. 4. MIB design. The basic principle has been to keep the MIB as simple as possible. The generic requirements on the message are o ID messages should contain the minimum information required Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 5] Internet Draft August 25 1999 by the manager to assess the situation correctly and to take appropriate defensive or investigative steps. o ID messages, if carried in UDP datagrams, should not be too large as to require IP fragmentation. Moreover if the SNMP protocol is being used, some managers may not accept SNMP-PDUs that are larger than 484 bytes. Over other transports this problem may not be encountered. The MIB comprises of three parts, the idMesageObjects, idControlObjects idMessages described below. - The idMessageObjects subtree defines the objects that are used in the notifications - The idControlObjects subtree defines the objects that are used to configure the Message generation and despatch it contains the following tables o idMessageControlTable subtree defines the controls of the messages essentially whether the message of a particular type is to be generated (enabled) or not (disabled). o The idMessageDestinationTable defines the destinations for the messages, the enabled/disabled status of the message for a destination. - The idMessages subtree defines the actual messages. Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 6] Internet Draft August 25 1999 5. The Intrusion Detection Message MIB. INTRUSION-DETECTION-MESSAGE-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS MODULE-IDENTITY, Counter32, Gauge32, OBJECT-TYPE , experimental -- will need to be removed when it joins mib-2 FROM SNMPv2-SMI -- mib-2 FROM RFC1213-MIB -- will be added when it joins mib-2 DisplayString, DateAndTime, TimeStamp FROM SNMPv2-TC MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP FROM SNMPv2-CONF Ipv6Address -- draft-ietf-ipngwg-ipv6-mib-04.txt [16] FROM IPV6-TC Utf8String FROM SYSAPPL-MIB applIndex, DistinguishedName, URLString FROM NETWORK-SERVICES-MIB; idMIB MODULE-IDENTITY LAST-UPDATED "9908250000Z" -- 25th August 1999 ORGANIZATION "IETF Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format Working Group" CONTACT-INFO " Glenn Mansfield Postal: Cyber Solutions Inc. 6-6-3, Minami Yoshinari Aoba-ku, Sendai, Japan 989-3204. Tel: +81-22-303-4012 Fax: +81-22-303-4015 E-mail: glenn@cysols.com Working Group E-mail: ietf-madman@innosoft.com To subscribe: ietf-madman-request@innosoft.com" DESCRIPTION " The MIB for Intrusion Detection Messages." -- revision information REVISION "9908250000Z" -- 25th August 1999 ::= { experimental NN } -- to be assigned by IANA Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 7] Internet Draft August 25 1999 idMessageObjects OBJECT-IDENTITY STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This is the base object for the objects used in the notifications." ::= {idMIB 1} idControlObjects OBJECT-IDENTITY STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This is the base object for the objects used in controlling the notifications." ::= {idMIB 2} idMessages OBJECT-IDENTITY STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This is the base object for the objects defining the notifications." ::= {idMIB 3} idLocalAddress OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Ipv6Address MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "A local IP Address associated with the message" ::= {idMessageObjects 1} idMessageTimeStamp OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX DateAndTime MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " The Local date and time when this message was generated." ::= {idMessageObjects 2} -- the actions will probably be a comma separated list of action -- codes or a pointer to another MIB table from which the actions -- may be fetched. -- -- May be better to put this object as a secondary Object idMessageActionsTaken OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX DisplayString MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 8] Internet Draft August 25 1999 " The list of automatic actions taken by the originator" ::= {idMessageObjects 3} -- the potential impact taxonomy will need be carried out and then -- the MO will need to be enumerated. idMessagePotentialImpact OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX INTEGER { other(1), VerySerious(2), Serious(3), Others(4), etc(5) } MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " An indication of the potentiall impact of the detected attack/intrusion" ::= {idMessageObjects 4} -- Do the following need to be in the primary set ? -- Probably secondary will be better -- Utf8String is 256 characters max. idMessageSysManufacturer OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Utf8String MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " the Manufacturer of the tool that detected the event." ::= {idMessageObjects 5} idMessageSysProductName OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Utf8String MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " the name of the product that detected the event." ::= {idMessageObjects 6} idMessageSysVersion OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Utf8String MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " the version number of the tool that detected the event." ::= {idMessageObjects 7} idMessageAttackName OBJECT-TYPE Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 9] Internet Draft August 25 1999 SYNTAX Utf8String MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " the name of the atack, if known. If not known this field will be inaccessible." ::= {idMessageObjects 8} idMessageToolLocation OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Utf8String MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " the location of the tool that detected the event." ::= {idMessageObjects 9} idMessageMoreInfo OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX OBJECT IDENTIFIER ACCESS read-only STATUS mandatory DESCRIPTION "A reference to MIB definitions specific to this message. If this information is not present, its value should be set to the OBJECT IDENTIFIER { 0 0 }, which is a syntatically valid object identifier." ::= { idMessageObjects 10 } idMessageTargetSource OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Ipv6Address MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " One of the IP addresses of the entity from which the attack originated, if known. If not known this field will be inaccessible" ::= {idMessageObjects 11} idMessageTargetDestination OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Ipv6Address MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " One of the IP addresses of the entity to which the attack was destined, if known. If not known, this field will be inaccessible" ::= {idMessageObjects 12} Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 10] Internet Draft August 25 1999 -- Only one advisory is provisioned for idMessageAdvisory OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX URLString MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " URL of the related advisory, if any" ::= {idMessageObjects 12} -- semantics of "degree of confidence needs to be well defined -- what happens when the message is not generated - just relayed? idMessageDegreeOfConfidence OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX INTEGER MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " A measure of the degree of confidence the originator has on the report it is generating" ::= {idMessageObjects 13} -- Interaction table ? -- It may contain statistical data on the peer -- Managers with which the monitored Manager -- interacts or, attempts to interact. This table is -- It may provide a useful insight into the performance -- of the ID system on a large scale -- idMessageControlTable will contain rows for each type of message -- [ What are the types - taxonomy will need to be carried out by the -- implementors/deployers] -- Each row will carry the following columnns -- message/alert type -- enabled/disabled -- The associated idMessageDestinationTable will contain rows indexed -- by the message type and destination addresses. The rows will also -- contain a column showing whether the destination host is enabled for -- message sending. idMessageControlTable OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF IdMessageControlEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " Each row of this table contains control information for each notification type." ::= { idControlObjects 1 } idMessageControlEntry OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX IdMessageControlEntry Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 11] Internet Draft August 25 1999 MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " Entry containing control information pertaining to each message type." INDEX { idMessageIndex} ::= { idMessageControlTable 1 } IdMessageControlEntry ::= SEQUENCE { idMessageIndex INTEGER, idMessageEnable TruthValue, idMessageType INTEGER, idMessageDescription Utf8String } idMessageIndex OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX INTEGER (1..2147483647) MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This gives a unique key to identify the conceptual row which contains the control information pertaining to a message." ::= {idMessssageControlEntry 1} idMessageType OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX INTEGER (1..2147483647) MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " The type of the message.." ::= {idMessssageControlEntry 2} idMessageEnable OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX TruthValue MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION " Indicates whether the message is of this type should be generated." ::= {idMessageControlEntry 3} idMessageDescription OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Utf8String Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 12] Internet Draft August 25 1999 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION " A brief description of the message." ::= {idMessageControlEntry 4} idMessageDestinationTable OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF IdMessageDestinationEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " Each row of this table contains destination information for each notification type." ::= { idControlObjects 1 } idMessageControlEntry OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX IdMessageControlEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION " Entry containing control information pertaining to each message type." INDEX { idMessageIndex, idMessageDestination} ::= { idMessageDestinationTable 1 } IdMessageDestinationEntry ::= SEQUENCE { idMessageDestination Ipv6Address, idMessageDestinationEnable TruthValue, idMessageDestinationDescription Utf8String } idMessageDestination OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Ipv6Address MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION " The destination to which the message type defined by corresponding idMessageIndex is destined. Together with the idMessageIndex this MO forms a unique key which identifies the conceptual row which contains the control information pertaining to the destination of a message ." ::= {idMessssageDestinationlEntry 1} idDestinationMessageEnable OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX TruthValue MAX-ACCESS read-write Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 13] Internet Draft August 25 1999 STATUS current DESCRIPTION " Indicates whether the message is of this type should be sent to the destination defined in this row." ::= {idMessageDestinationEntry 2} idMessageDestinationDescription OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Utf8String MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION " A brief description of the destination." ::= {idMessageControlEntry 3} -- How many types of messages do we have - below there is only one idMessageGeneric NOTIFICATION-TYPE OBJECTS { idLocalAddress idMessageTimeStamp idMessageActionsTaken idMessagePotentialImpact idMessageSysManufacturer idMessageSysVersion idMessageAttackName idMessageToolLocation idMessageMoreInfo idMessageTargetSource idMessageTargetDestination idMessageAdvisory idMessageDegreeOfConfidence } STATUS current DESCRIPTION " This is the generic message that is sent when an intrusion is detected." ::= {idMessages 0 1} Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 14] Internet Draft August 25 1999 -- Conformance information idConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { idMIB 4 } idGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { idConformance 1 } idCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { idConformance 2 } -- Compliance statements idMessageCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The compliance statement for SNMP entities which implement the INTRUSION-DETECTION-MESSAGE-MIB." MODULE -- this module MANDATORY-GROUPS { idMessageGroup } ::= { idCompliances 1 } .bp -- Units of conformance idMessageGroup OBJECT-GROUP OBJECTS { idLocalAddress idMessageTimeStamp idMessageActionsTaken idMessagePotentialImpact idMessageSysManufacturer idMessageSysVersion idMessageAttackName idMessageToolLocation idMessageMoreInfo idMessageTargetSource idMessageTargetDestination idMessageAdvisory idMessageDegreeOfConfidence idMessageIndex idMessageEnable idMessageType idMessageDescription idMessageDestination Ipv6Address idMessageDestinationEnable idMessageDestinationDescription } Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 15] Internet Draft August 25 1999 STATUS current DESCRIPTION " A collection of objects for generation and despatch ofmessages pertaining to intrusions detected." ::= { idGroups 1 } END Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 16] Internet Draft August 25 1999 6. Intellectual Property The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive Director. 7. Acknowledgements This draft is the product of discussions and deliberations carried out in the IETF intrusion detection message exchange format working group (ietf-idwg-wg). Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 17] Internet Draft August 25 1999 References [1] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R. and B. Wijnen, "An Architecture for Describing SNMP Management Frameworks", RFC 2571, April 1999. [2] Rose, M. and K. McCloghrie, "Structure and Identification of Management Information for TCP/IP-based Internets", STD 16, RFC 1155, May 1990. [3] Rose, M. and K. McCloghrie, "Concise MIB Definitions", STD 16, RFC 1212, March 1991. [4] Rose, M., "A Convention for Defining Traps for use with the SNMP", RFC 1215, March 1991. [5] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Structure of Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578, April 1999. [6] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Textual Conventions for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999. [7] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Conformance Statements for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2580, April 1999. [8] Case, J., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M. and J. Davin, "Simple Network Management Protocol", STD 15, RFC 1157, May 1990. [9] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Introduction to Community-based SNMPv2", RFC 1901, January 1996. [10] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Transport Mappings for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1906, January 1996. [11] Case, J., Harrington D., Presuhn R. and B. Wijnen, "Message Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 2572, April 1999. [12] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3)", RFC 2574, April 1999. [13] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Protocol Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 18] Internet Draft August 25 1999 Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1905, January 1996. [14] Levi, D., Meyer, P. and B. Stewart, "SNMPv3 Applications", RFC 2573, April 1999. [15] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R. and K. McCloghrie, "View-based Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 2575, April 1999. [16] Haskin,, D., Onishi, S., draft-ietf-ipngwg-ipv6-mib-04.txt, work in progress, February 1998. Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 19] Internet Draft August 25 1999 Security Considerations There are management objects defined in this MIB that have a MAX- ACCESS clause of read-write and read-create. There is the risk that an intruder can alter or create any management objects of this MIB via direct SNMP SET operations. So, care must be taken to put in place the security provisions of SNMP for authentication and access control. Not all versions of SNMP provide features for such a secure environment. SNMPv1 by itself is such an insecure environment. Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec), even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is allowed to access and GET (read) and SET (write) the objects in this MIB. It is strongly recommended that the implementors consider the security features as provided by the SNMPv3 framework. Specifically, the use of the User-based Security Model RFC 2274 [12] and the View-based Access Control Model RFC 2275 [15] is recommended. It is then a customer/user responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an instance of this MIB, is properly configured to give access to those objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate rights to access them. Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 20] Internet Draft August 25 1999 Authors' Addresses Glenn Mansfield Cyber Solutions Inc. 6-6-3 Minami Yoshinari Aoba-ku, Sendai 989-3204 Japan Phone: +81-22-303-4012 EMail: glenn@cysols.com Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 21] Internet Draft August 25 1999 Full Copyright statement "Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date). All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." Expires: February 25, 2000 [Page 22]