Internet-Draft | Publishing End-Site Prefix Lengths | October 2024 |
Gasser, et al. | Expires 19 April 2025 | [Page] |
This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL) inetnum: class to refer specifically to prefixlen comma-separated values (CSV) data files and describes an optional scheme that uses the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to authenticate the prefixlen data files.¶
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Internet service providers (ISPs) delegate IP addresses or entire IP prefixes to their users. Similarly, cloud providers assign customers who use their services such as virtual machines a prefix of a specific size. Therefore, there are countless variations of different end-site prefix length present in the Internet. Currently, there is no easy way for content providers to know the end-site prefix size of someone accessing their service. Knowing the correct end-site's prefix size has multiple implications such as:¶
This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC2725] inetnum: class to refer specifically to prefixlen data files and how to use them. In all places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be assumed [RFC4012].¶
The reader may find [INETNUM] and [INET6NUM] informative, and certainly more verbose, descriptions of the inetnum: database classes.¶
An optional means for authenticating prefixlen data is also defined in Section 6.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
prefixlen files are CSV (Comma Separated Values) files in UTF-8 text format; not HTML, richtext, or other formats. The first field specifies the prefix in question and the second field the end-site prefix length within that prefix as an integer.¶
If an ISP delegates /56 IPv6 prefixes and /32 IPv4 prefixes (i.e. a single IPv4 address) to its customers, it would create a prefix length file containing the following example entries:¶
2001:db8::/32,56 192.0.2.0/24,32¶
If a cloud provider assigns /120 IPv6 prefixes to each customer VM and a /64 prefix to premium customers, it would create a prefix length file containing the following example entries:¶
2001:db8::/32,120 2001:db8:abcd::/48,64¶
Note that the second entry in the above example is a subprefix of the first entry. Therefore, longest prefix matching has to be taken into account when parsing prefixlen files.¶
Content providers and other parties who wish to differentiate services based on end site prefixes need to find the relevant prefixlen data. In Section 4, this document specifies how to find the relevant prefixlen file given an IP address.¶
prefixlen data for large providers with significant horizontal scale and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be even larger if an unsigned prefixlen file combines data for many prefixes, if dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces are represented, etc.¶
This document also suggests an optional signature to strongly authenticate the data in the prefixlen files.¶
The original RPSL specifications starting with [RIPE81], [RIPE181], and a trail of subsequent documents were written by the RIPE community. The IETF standardized RPSL in [RFC2622] and [RFC4012]. Since then, it has been modified and extensively enhanced in the Regional Internet Registry (RIR) community, mostly by RIPE [RIPE-DB]. At the time of publishing this document, change control of RPSL effectively lies in the operator community.¶
The RPSL, and [RFC2725] and [RFC4012] used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), specify the inetnum: database class. Each of these objects describes an IP address range and its attributes. The inetnum: objects form a hierarchy ordered on the address space.¶
Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL prefixlen: attribute in the inetnum: class. Absent implementation of the prefixlen: attribute in a particular RIR database, this document defines the syntax of a prefixlen remarks: attribute, which contains an HTTPS URL of a prefixlen file. The format of the inetnum: prefixlen remarks: attribute MUST be as in this example, "remarks: Prefixlen ", where the token "prefixlen" MUST be case sensitive, followed by a URL that will vary, but it MUST refer only to a single prefixlen file.¶
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example remarks: Prefixlen https://example.com/prefixlen¶
While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant parties, we specify that a proper prefixlen: attribute in the inetnum: class MUST be "prefixlen:" and MUST be followed by a single URL that will vary, but it MUST refer only to a single prefixlen file.¶
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example prefixlen: https://example.com/prefixlen¶
The URL uses HTTPS, so the WebPKI provides authentication, integrity, and confidentiality for the fetched prefixlen file. However, the WebPKI can not provide authentication of IP address space assignment. In contrast, the RPKI (see [RFC6481]) can be used to authenticate IP space assignment; see optional authentication in Section 6.¶
Until all producers of inetnum: objects, i.e., the RIRs, state that they have migrated to supporting a prefixlen: attribute, consumers looking at inetnum: objects to find prefixlen URLs MUST be able to consume both the remarks: and prefixlen: forms.¶
The migration not only implies that the RIRs support the prefixlen: attribute, but that all registrants have migrated any inetnum: objects from remarks: to prefixlen: attributes.¶
Any particular inetnum: object SHOULD have, at most, one prefixlen reference, whether a remarks: or a proper prefixlen: attribute when it is implemented. As the remarks: form can not be formally checked by the RIR, this can not be formally enforced. A prefixlen: attribute is preferred, of course, if the RIR supports it. If there is more than one type of attribute in the inetnum: object, the prefixlen: attribute MUST be used.¶
For inetnum:s covering the same address range, a signed prefixlen file MUST be preferred over an unsigned file. If none are signed, or more than one is signed, the (signed) inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute MUST be preferred.¶
If a prefixlen file describes multiple disjoint ranges of IP address space, there are likely to be prefixlen references from multiple inetnum: objects. Files with prefixlen references from multiple inetnum: objects are not compatible with the signing procedure in Section 6.¶
An unsigned, and only an unsigned, prefixlen file MAY be referenced by multiple inetnum:s and MAY contain prefixes from more than one registry.¶
When fetching, the most specific inetnum: object with a prefixlen reference MUST be used.¶
It is significant that prefixlen data may have finer granularity than the inetnum: that refers to them. For example, an inetnum: object for an address range P could refer to a prefixlen file in which P has been subdivided into one or more longer prefixes.¶
This document is to provides a guideline for how interested parties should fetch and read prefixlen files.¶
To minimize the load on RIRs' WHOIS [RFC3912] services, the RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be used for large-scale access to gather inetnum:s with prefixlen references. This uses efficient bulk access instead of fetching via brute-force search through the IP space.¶
On the other hand, RIRs are converging on RDAP support which includes geofeed data, see [I-D.ietf-regext-rdap-geofeed]. It is hoped that this wil be extended, or generalized, to support prefixlen data.¶
When reading data from an unsigned prefixlen file, one MUST ignore data outside the referring inetnum: object's address range. This is to avoid importing data about ranges not under the control of the operator. Note that signed files MUST only contain prefixes within the referring inetnum:'s range as mandated in Section 6.¶
If prefixlen files are fetched, other prefix length information from the inetnum: MUST be ignored.¶
Given an address range of interest, the most specific inetnum: object with a prefixlen reference MUST be used to fetch the prefixlen file. For example, if the fetching party finds the following inetnum: objects:¶
inetnum: 192.0.0.0/22 # example remarks: Prefixlen https://example.com/prefixlen_1 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example remarks: Prefixlen https://example.com/prefixlen_2¶
An application looking for prefixlen data for 192.0.2.0/29, MUST ignore data in prefixlen_1 because 192.0.2.0/29 is within the more specific 192.0.2.0/24 inetnum: covering that address range and that inetnum: does have a prefixlen reference.¶
The question arises whether a particular prefixlen [RFC8805] data set is valid, i.e., is authorized by the "owner" of the IP address space and is authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: that points to the prefixlen [RFC8805] file provides some assurance. Unfortunately, the RPSL in some repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An approach where RPSL was signed per [RFC7909] would be good, except it would have to be deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a fair number of them.¶
The remainder of this section specifies an optional authenticator for the prefixlen data set that follows the Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6488].¶
A single optional authenticator MAY be appended to a prefixlen [RFC8805] file. It is a digest of the main body of the file signed by the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for a covering address range. The following format bundles the relevant RPKI certificate with a signature over the prefixlen text.¶
The canonicalization procedure converts the data from their internal character representation to the UTF-8 [RFC3629] character encoding, and the <CRLF> sequence MUST be used to denote the end of each line of text. A blank line is represented solely by the <CRLF> sequence. For robustness, any non-printable characters MUST NOT be changed by canonicalization. Trailing blank lines MUST NOT appear at the end of the file. That is, the file must not end with multiple consecutive <CRLF> sequences. Any end-of-file marker used by an operating system is not considered to be part of the file content. When present, such end-of-file markers MUST NOT be covered by the digital signature.¶
If the authenticator is not in the canonical form described above, then, the authenticator is invalid.¶
Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after file canonicalization, the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to create a detached DER-encoded signature that is then Base64 encoded with padding (as defined in Section 4 of [RFC4648]) and line wrapped to 72 or fewer characters. The same digest algorithm MUST be used for calculating the message digest of the content being signed, which is the prefixlen file, and for calculating the message digest on the SignerInfo SignedAttributes [RFC8933]. The message digest algorithm identifier MUST appear in both the CMS SignedData DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers and the SignerInfo DigestAlgorithmIdentifier [RFC5652]. The RPKI certificate covering the prefixlen inetnum: object's address range is included in the CMS SignedData certificates field [RFC5652].¶
The address range of the signing certificate MUST cover all prefixes in the signed prefixlen file. If not, the authenticator is invalid.¶
The signing certificate MUST NOT include the Autonomous System Identifier Delegation certificate extension [RFC3779]. If it is present, the authenticator is invalid.¶
As with many other RPKI signed objects, the IP Address Delegation certificate extension MUST NOT use the "inherit" capability defined in Section 2.2.3.5 of [RFC3779]. If "inherit" is used, the authenticator is invalid.¶
An IP Address Delegation extension using "inherit" would complicate processing. The implementation would have to build the certification path from the end-entity to the trust anchor, then validate the path from the trust anchor to the end-entity, and then the parameter would have to be remembered when the validated public key was used to validate a signature on a CMS object. Having to remember things from certification path validation for use with CMS object processing would be quite complex and error prone. And, the certificates do not get that much bigger by repeating the information.¶
An address range A "covers" address range B if the range of B is identical to or a subset of A. "Address range" is used here because inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) [RFC4632] prefix boundaries, while those of the lines in a prefixlen file do align.¶
The Certification Authority (CA) SHOULD sign only one prefixlen file with each generated private key and SHOULD generate a new key pair for each new version of a perticular prefixlen file. The CA MUST generate a new End Entity (EE) certificate for each signing of a particular prefixlen file. An associated EE certificate used in this fashion is termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate (see Section 3 of [RFC6487]).¶
Identifying the private key associated with the certificate and getting the department that controls the private key (which might be stored in a Hardware Security Module (HSM)) to generate the CMS signature is left as an exercise for the implementor. On the other hand, verifying the signature has no similar complexity; the certificate, which is validated in the RPKI, contains the needed public key. The RPKI trust anchors for the RIRs are available to the party performing signature validation. Validation of the CMS signature over the prefixlen file involves:¶
All of the above steps MUST be successful to consider the prefixlen file signature as valid.¶
The authenticator MUST be hidden as a series of "#" comments at the end of the prefixlen file. The following simple example is cryptographically incorrect:¶
# RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu ... # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= # End Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255¶
A correct and full example is in Appendix A.¶
The CMS signature does not cover the signature lines.¶
The bracketing "# RPKI Signature:" and "# End Signature:" MUST be present as shown in the example. The RPKI Signature's IP address range MUST match that of the prefixlen URL in the inetnum: that points to the prefixlen file.¶
To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to register the location of their prefixlen file needs to coordinate with their Regional Internet Registry (RIR) or National Internet Registry (NIR) and/or any provider Local Internet Registry (LIR) that has assigned address ranges to them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain inetnum: objects. They also provide means of assigning or sub-assigning IP address resources and allowing the assignee to create WHOIS data, including inetnum: objects, thereby referring to prefixlen files.¶
The prefixlen files MUST be published via and fetched using HTTPS [RFC9110].¶
When using data from a prefixlen file, one MUST ignore data outside the referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range.¶
If and only if the prefixlen file is not signed per Section 6, then multiple inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same prefixlen file, and the consumer MUST use only lines in the prefixlen file where the prefix is covered by the address range of the inetnum: object's URL it has followed.¶
If the prefixlen file is signed, and the signer's certificate changes, the signature in the prefixlen file MUST be updated.¶
It is good key hygiene to use a given key for only one purpose. To dedicate a signing private key for signing a prefixlen file, an RPKI Certification Authority (CA) may issue a subordinate certificate exclusively for the purpose shown in Appendix A.¶
Harvesting and publishing aggregated prefixlen data outside of the RPSL model should be avoided as it can have the effect that more specifics from one aggregatee could undesirably affect the less specifics of a different aggregatee. Moreover, publishing aggregated prefixlen data prevents the reader of the data to perform the checks described in Section 5 and Section 6.¶
An anonymized version of bulk WHOIS data is openly available for all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for users without such authorization, the same result can be achieved with extra RDAP effort. There is open-source code to pass over such data across all RIRs, collect all prefixlen references, and process them [PREFIXLEN-FINDER].¶
To prevent undue load on RPSL and prefixlen servers, entity-fetching prefixlen data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do frequent real-time lookups. prefixlen servers SHOULD send an HTTP Expires header [RFC7234] to signal when prefixlen data should be refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of such an HTTP Header signal, collectors SHOULD NOT fetch more frequently than weekly. It would be polite not to fetch at magic times such as midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too many others are likely to do the same.¶
At the time of publishing this document, the prefixlen: attribute in inetnum objects has not yet been implemented by any RIR database.¶
Registrants in databases which do not yet support the prefixlen: attribute are using the remarks:, or equivalent, attribute.¶
At the time of publishing this document, the registry data published by ARIN are not the same RPSL as that of the other registries (see [RFC7485] for a survey of the WHOIS Tower of Babel); therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP [RFC0959], WHOIS [RFC3912], the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) [RFC9082], etc., the "NetRange" attribute/key must be treated as "inetnum", and the "Comment" attribute must be treated as "remarks".¶
[rpki-client] can be used to authenticate a signed prefixlen file.¶
The consumer of prefixlen data SHOULD fetch and process the data themselves. Importing datasets produced and/or processed by a third-party places significant trust in the third-party.¶
As mentioned in Section 6, some RPSL repositories have weak, if any, authentication. This allows spoofing of inetnum: objects pointing to malicious prefixlen files. Section 6 suggests an unfortunately complex method for stronger authentication based on the RPKI.¶
For example, if an inetnum: for a wide address range (e.g., a /16) points to an RPKI-signed prefixlen file, a customer or attacker could publish an unsigned equal or narrower (e.g., a /24) inetnum: in a WHOIS registry that has weak authorization, abusing the rule that the most-specific inetnum: object with a prefixlen reference MUST be used.¶
If signatures were mandatory, the above attack would be stymied, but of course that is not happening anytime soon.¶
The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers due to too-frequent queries. Usually, they throttle by the querying IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be deployed by prefixlen file servers.¶
As prefixlen files disclose which parts of a prefix belong to an end site, attackers could better focus DDoS traffic towards a website hosted by a cloud provider by overwhelming only IP addresses from that specific end site. Furthermore, information collected from prefixlen files could allow for more targeted IPv6 scanning/reconnaisance, where scanners (be it benevolent or malicious ones) can target specific sub-prefixes which they deem more interesting.¶
IANA is asked to register object identifiers for one content type in the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows:¶
Description OID Specification ----------------------------------------------------------------- id-ct-prefixlenCSVwithCRLF 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47 [RFC-TBD]¶
In the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) in the Structure of Management Information (SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations) registry group located at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/ there is no existing registration for prefixlen files yet. On publication of this document, that reference needs to be changed to the new [ RFC-to-be ].¶
The main building blocks of this document are inspired by [RFC8805] and [RFC9092]. We thank the authors of these RFCs.¶
This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) signed by the trust anchor, a CA certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, a CRL signed by the CA, an end-entity certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the prefixlen, and a detached signature.¶
The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all Autonomous Systam (AS) numbers.¶
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEQTCCAymgAwIBAgIUEggycNoFVRjAuN/Fw7URu0DEZNAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMzA5MTkyMDMzMzlaFw0zMzA5 MTYyMDMzMzlaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDQprR+g/i4JyObVURTp1JpGM23vGPyE5fDKFPqV7rw M1Amm7cnew66U02IzV0X5oiv5nSGfRX5UxsbR+vwPBMceQyDgS5lexFiv4fB/Vjf DT2qX/UjsLL9QOeaSOh7ToJSLjmtpa0D9iz7ful3hdxRjpMMZiE/reX9/ymdpW/E dg0F6+T9WGZE1miPeIjl5OZwnmLHCftkN/aaYk1iPNjNniHYIOjC1jSpABmoZyTj sgrwLE2F1fIRkVkwASqToq/D5v9voXaYYaXUNJb4H/5wenRuvT5O/n6PXh70rMQy F5yzLs96ytxqg5gGX9kabVnvxFU8nHfPa0rhlwfTJnljAgMBAAGjggGHMIIBgzAd BgNVHQ4EFgQUwL1SXb7SeLIW7LOjQ5XSBguZCDIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUwL1SXb7S eLIW7LOjQ5XSBguZCDIwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4 YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4 YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwIQYIKwYBBQUHAQgBAf8EEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA//// /zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAa9eLY9QAmnlZOIyOzbpta5wqcOUQV/yR7o/0 1zkEZaSavKBt19lMK6AXZurx1T5jyjIwG7bEtZZThjtH2m80V5kc2tsFjSq/yp7N JBclMHVd3tXse9If3nXYF4bxRIcir1lXlAbYN+Eo1U3i5qJO+fxouzt7Merk2Dih nsenTeXKzN7tfmuCYZZHCC8viCoJWdH+o1uRM4TiQApZsUJ8sF4TABrrRJmA/Ed5 v0CTBbgqTx7yg0+VarFLPdnjYgtpoCJqwE2C1UpX15rZSaLVuGXtbwXd/cHEg5vF W6QTsMeMQFEUa6hkicDGtxLTUdhckBgmCGoF2nlZii5f1BTWAg== -----END CERTIFICATE-----¶
The CRL issued by the trust anchor.¶
-----BEGIN X509 CRL----- MIIBjjB4AgEBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEX DTIzMDkyMzE1NTUzOFoXDTIzMTAyMzE1NTUzOFqgLzAtMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFMC9 Ul2+0niyFuyzo0OV0gYLmQgyMAoGA1UdFAQDAgEEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IB AQCngOu+Nq3WC4y/pHtLoheAOtNg32WWsKPNiEyL+QalmOtURUsWMzOq41bmoPzQ NDQoRmXe9mvohAVRe0CnM7A07HOtSfjw5aoouPXGTtfwEomHG2CYk+2U1bvxgZyA E1c5TvyhkabFMO0+857wqxRP+ht9NV0lMX6kUFlEOCw3ELVd9oNNRBwKQtXj1huM 6Sf26va2a1tnC5zP01hN+EY3S9T5T1gcgPGBcqRWKoXJEbRzCrLsb/TMj5cMpIje AHZoBojVAmvL1AIH/BnGAQj0+XqaJ0axHvlqJa8iX8QwKqhp+o6sv/atY2QDDRmE Yjq/VrBVKu5VsDY2Lr29HszA -----END X509 CRL-----¶
The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two AS numbers (64496 and 64497).¶
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIE7DCCA9SgAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDLkwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0yNDA5 MjIxNTU1MzhaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7 6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIUMIICEDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R 4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUwL1SXb7SeLIW7LOjQ5XSBguZCDIwDwYD VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr BgEFBQcOAjBDBgNVHR8EPDA6MDigNqA0hjJyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS9leGFtcGxlLXRhLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYI KwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4 YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5BggrBgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5 bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQw NQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBzOi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRp b24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAFhiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVw b3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUHAQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwIQYIKwYB BQUHAQgBAf8EEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA+/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEA arIrZWb22wFmP+hVjhdg3IsKHB6fQdMuUR0u2DyZTVvbL6C+HyGAH32pi5mR/QLX FAfdqALaB7r68tQTGLIW6bGljT+BqUPJmZcj56x3cBLJlltxwFatTloypjFt3cls xFCuuD9J2iBxc6odTKi6u0mhQjD+C9m4xkbe8XXWWx85IHm1s6rYbpGgiMWxBC80 qqAzmBHGROWKUEvh00EYIYdiAvyFcrj7QtDiRJL5TDOySVd9pWJkerDzhqwE1IaZ rpHck+lkYTS7jTD++6v32HG62GdsmryOQUk3aU1rLb3kS8vzaGbrgHpGPid0Hd0x ZSl1AoIMpp5mZ7/h9aW5+A== -----END CERTIFICATE-----¶
The CRL issued by the CA.¶
-----BEGIN X509 CRL----- MIIBrTCBlgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAzMTEwLwYDVQQDEygzQUNFMkNFRjRG QjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0y MzEwMjMxNTU1MzhaoC8wLTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQ6zizvT7IbfRHj4YTvweKXs3eG QjAKBgNVHRQEAwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEACwCNzcAoqbMcUL1kBY65 YhL95OnBqAcuc99pD4i9c1BmVOl7bXU3cJqLaOZ6Z8CmN0kBbcHyqlHBJ9oA/aYD ByhxsjzKk7jxtM2IlTpEvCEqvnGLSVihgS3h0NA+sgWqHGL3Rhcj6hVsi+j9GENc T6F9np1mxbI3i2xhgeDJG1pryvH0hWXh7yJiYS8ItNEaIIXDT3szK/J9wnPjukTR 5MITiK9P3TCFujawb3O7rIT5PPgkM6eiCdwDgt6gjmw6cow5+rMjNHSRa+GOviSd gXljVDfJvF4tKHmw59Jc2aFnSGfX1/ITDNiNfXYpUYFOcsqxkYf8F0uO7AtbRmTF 2w== -----END X509 CRL-----¶
The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24). Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for prefixlen data signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the end-entity certificate.¶
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEVjCCAz6gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZvAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0yNDA3MTkxNTU1MzhaMDMxMTAvBgNV BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB AAGjggFgMIIBXDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBgGA1Ud IAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIwYQYDVR0fBFowWDBWoFSgUoZQcnN5bmM6Ly9y cGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNF MTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0Mi5jcmwwbAYIKwYBBQUHAQEEYDBeMFwGCCsGAQUF BzAChlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNlcjAfBggrBgEFBQcB BwEB/wQQMA4wDAQCAAEwBgMEAMAAAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAlxt25FUe e0+uCidTH+4p7At3u2ncgHcGTsag3UcoPjcE/I1JgQJRu9TiM4iNB1C7Lbdd131g MdliL5GQ3P4QfKnfkuPR6S1V8suq6ZT1KQRyLJx+EPgDN2rb/iji0TOK6RKPNBdG lXVLjth4x/uu1O4V54GLEhDAPQC8IUm5intL/Hx1M1x2ptN/+j5HD3XUXd3x13yi s6u758nbA7ND40JNhGG5JNGQgDchL4IQzIhylMNC+bKUiyyMHz3MqoVAklIB86IW Ucv72Mekq+i46T/w3RnaGn4x7RAJctVJWw3e5YMrFnQcuuaGOs0QcoxW7Bi4W7Eg 8fK1fd/f6fjZ9w== -----END CERTIFICATE-----¶
The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For brevity, the other two certificates are not.¶
0 1110: SEQUENCE { 4 830: SEQUENCE { 8 3: [0] { 10 1: INTEGER 2 : } 13 20: INTEGER : 27 AD 39 40 83 D7 F2 B5 B9 9B 86 70 C7 75 B2 B9 : 6E E1 66 F0 35 13: SEQUENCE { 37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 48 0: NULL : } 50 51: SEQUENCE { 52 49: SET { 54 47: SEQUENCE { 56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 61 40: PrintableString : '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642' : } : } : } 103 30: SEQUENCE { 105 13: UTCTime 23/09/2023 15:55:38 GMT 120 13: UTCTime 19/07/2024 15:55:38 GMT : } 135 51: SEQUENCE { 137 49: SET { 139 47: SEQUENCE { 141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 146 40: PrintableString : '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187' : } : } : } 188 290: SEQUENCE { 192 13: SEQUENCE { 194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 205 0: NULL : } 207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates { 212 266: SEQUENCE { 216 257: INTEGER : 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8 : 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65 : B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE : 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13 : 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37 : 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE : E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED : 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89 : F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E : 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19 : BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65 : 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28 : 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9 : 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A : 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41 : FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C : EB 477 3: INTEGER 65537 : } : } : } 482 352: [3] { 486 348: SEQUENCE { 490 29: SEQUENCE { 492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) 497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 499 20: OCTET STRING : 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB : F0 53 A1 87 : } : } 521 31: SEQUENCE { 523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) 528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 530 22: SEQUENCE { 532 20: [0] : 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97 : B3 77 86 42 : } : } : } 554 14: SEQUENCE { 556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) 561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 564 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 566 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits : '1'B (bit 0) : } : } 570 24: SEQUENCE { 572 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) 577 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 580 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 582 12: SEQUENCE { 584 10: SEQUENCE { 586 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2) : } : } : } : } 596 97: SEQUENCE { 598 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31) 603 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 605 88: SEQUENCE { 607 86: SEQUENCE { 609 84: [0] { 611 82: [0] { 613 80: [6] : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE' : '2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl' : } : } : } : } : } : } 695 108: SEQUENCE { 697 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : authorityInfoAccess (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1) 707 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 709 94: SEQUENCE { 711 92: SEQUENCE { 713 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2) 723 80: [6] : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE' : '2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer' : } : } : } : } 805 31: SEQUENCE { 807 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7) 817 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 820 16: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 822 14: SEQUENCE { 824 12: SEQUENCE { 826 2: OCTET STRING 00 01 830 6: SEQUENCE { 832 4: BIT STRING : '010000000000000000000011'B : } : } : } : } : } : } : } : } 838 13: SEQUENCE { 840 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 851 0: NULL : } 853 257: BIT STRING : 97 1B 76 E4 55 1E 7B 4F AE 0A 27 53 1F EE 29 EC : 0B 77 BB 69 DC 80 77 06 4E C6 A0 DD 47 28 3E 37 : 04 FC 8D 49 81 02 51 BB D4 E2 33 88 8D 07 50 BB : 2D B7 5D D7 7D 60 31 D9 62 2F 91 90 DC FE 10 7C : A9 DF 92 E3 D1 E9 2D 55 F2 CB AA E9 94 F5 29 04 : 72 2C 9C 7E 10 F8 03 37 6A DB FE 28 E2 D1 33 8A : E9 12 8F 34 17 46 95 75 4B 8E D8 78 C7 FB AE D4 : EE 15 E7 81 8B 12 10 C0 3D 00 BC 21 49 B9 8A 7B : 4B FC 7C 75 33 5C 76 A6 D3 7F FA 3E 47 0F 75 D4 : 5D DD F1 D7 7C A2 B3 AB BB E7 C9 DB 03 B3 43 E3 : 42 4D 84 61 B9 24 D1 90 80 37 21 2F 82 10 CC 88 : 72 94 C3 42 F9 B2 94 8B 2C 8C 1F 3D CC AA 85 40 : 92 52 01 F3 A2 16 51 CB FB D8 C7 A4 AB E8 B8 E9 : 3F F0 DD 19 DA 1A 7E 31 ED 10 09 72 D5 49 5B 0D : DE E5 83 2B 16 74 1C BA E6 86 3A CD 10 72 8C 56 : EC 18 B8 5B B1 20 F1 F2 B5 7D DF DF E9 F8 D9 F7 : }¶
To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are not.¶
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1 zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/ eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo 18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651 IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg 26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6 O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----¶
Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF), yields the following detached CMS signature.¶
# RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 # MIIGQAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGMTCCBi0CAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggRaMIIEVjCCAz6gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZv # AwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0yNDA3MTkx # NTU1MzhaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggFgMIIBXDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI # wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBgGA1UdIAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIwYQYDVR # 0fBFowWDBWoFSgUoZQcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvc # nkvM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0Mi5jcmww # bAYIKwYBBQUHAQEEYDBeMFwGCCsGAQUFBzAChlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXB # sZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRT # I5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNlcjAfBggrBgEFBQcBBwEB/wQQMA4wDAQCAAEwBgMEAMAAA # jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAlxt25FUee0+uCidTH+4p7At3u2ncgHcGTsag # 3UcoPjcE/I1JgQJRu9TiM4iNB1C7Lbdd131gMdliL5GQ3P4QfKnfkuPR6S1V8su # q6ZT1KQRyLJx+EPgDN2rb/iji0TOK6RKPNBdGlXVLjth4x/uu1O4V54GLEhDAPQ # C8IUm5intL/Hx1M1x2ptN/+j5HD3XUXd3x13yis6u758nbA7ND40JNhGG5JNGQg # DchL4IQzIhylMNC+bKUiyyMHz3MqoVAklIB86IWUcv72Mekq+i46T/w3RnaGn4x # 7RAJctVJWw3e5YMrFnQcuuaGOs0QcoxW7Bi4W7Eg8fK1fd/f6fjZ9zGCAaowggG # mAgEDgBSRRlKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhk # iG9w0BCQMxDQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIzMDkyMzE1N # TUzOFowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4Vt # BHypfcEWMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAKZND7pKdVdfpB6zaJN89wTt+sXd0io # 0WULMc+o6gRJFt3wmKNW2nYPrDbocJ+Q/rDMGxbp4QetJ0MQtn1+AYAS8v5jPDO # 4a63U4/mJ2D3wSnQsDP0lUVknqRzfnS66HgHqiOVdHB0U+OnMEJuqHNTLx0dknb # L3zwxyDJTHdo+dMB0U9xdcjwpsPM3xqg57EXj5EIQK5JbardXCjrsysAnEdktUY # oyayGNbbQelANYJcOmuHhSXArR+qqzvNP2MDRqqKEcpd65YW6FSnqlVMIBH2M3P # D2F0p3sdm4IeGAZWaERVB4AXO1PUFDNdhamr4XpIwqIoAig7xiLm7j8qu5Oc= # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24¶