MIPSHOP H. Deng Internet-Draft Hitachi (China) Intended status: Standards Track Z. Cao Expires: April 4, 2007 Peking University Y. Ma Hitachi (China) Oct 2006 Handover Key Hierarchy for Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 Mobility Management (HMIPv6) draft-deng-mipshop-hmip-hhokey-00.txt Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 4, 2007. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). Deng, et al. Expires April 4, 2007 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Handover Key Hierarchy for HMIPv6 Oct 2006 Abstract The Hierarchy Mobile IPv6 document introduces the Mobile Anchor Point, which improve the performance of IPv6 in terms of handover speed. This document specifies a proactive key distribution method (push mode) within the same MAP, while the use of the handover keying hierarchy among different MAPs is in a reactive mode (pull mode). Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. Push within MAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Pull across MAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Architecture Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 13 Deng, et al. Expires April 4, 2007 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Handover Key Hierarchy for HMIPv6 Oct 2006 1. Introduction The Hierarchy Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) document [I-D.hmipv6] introduces the Mobile Anchor Point, which improve the performance of IPv6 in terms of handover speed. The MAP is essentially a local Home Agent, and it is located at any level in a hierarchical network of routers. The MN only needs to send one Binding Update message to its MAP before any traffics form HA and CNs are re-routed to its new place, hence significantly improving handover performance. Unfortunately, the HMIPv6 document does not specifies a framework for authenticating the MN to the networks. Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is suitable do this job for HMIPv6. When the MN is in the visit network, it performs EAP exchanges with the local AAA Server which delegates the authentication service of the home AAA server. The Access Router and / or the MAP act as a pass-through authenticator. Although EAP Keying framework [I-D.ietf-eap-keying] provides guidelines for generation of the keying meterials, the handover keying problem is not solved until we have the Handover Key Problem Statement document [I.D.aaa-hokey-ps] and a handover keying hierarchy document [I-D.hokey-hierarchy]. According to the handover keying document, the HMIPv6 architecture is suitable to take advantage of the handover keying hierarchy. The MAP resembles the Access Domain Controller (ADC), while the AR is a kind of the Access Node. Currently use of handover key hierarchy engages in a reactive manner in which the Access Node pulls the corresponding key from its upstream key holders (e.g. the ADC). But we argue that in an administrative domain, it is suitable and proper to use the handover key hierarchy in a proactive manner. In this document, we define a proactive key distribution method (push mode) within the same MAP, while the use of the handover keying hierarchy among different MAPs is in a reactive mode (pull mode). Deng, et al. Expires April 4, 2007 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Handover Key Hierarchy for HMIPv6 Oct 2006 2. Terminology The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [RFC2119]. The following new terminology and abbreviations are introduced in this document and all the other general mobility related terms as defined in [I-D.ietf-eap-keying] and [I.D.aaa-hokey-ps] Push mode The proactive mode of key distribution in which the upstream key holder distributes the keys for downstream key holders under its control in advance. Pull mode The reactive mode of key distribution in which the downstream key holder requests the corresponding key from its upstream key holder when they are in need of this key. Deng, et al. Expires April 4, 2007 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Handover Key Hierarchy for HMIPv6 Oct 2006 3. Protocol Overview The key management within one MAP domain utilizes the push model, while key mananagemtn across different MAPs make use of the pull mode. The protocol operations are decribed in the following two subsections. 3.1. Push within MAP The handover within one MAP is decribed in Figure 1. The MN was originally authenticated to AR1 with a full EAP exchange. Then the AAA server pushes the corresponding key to the MAP. According to its configuration, the MAP pushes the keys to the ARs within its administrative domain. When the MN attaches to another AR (e.g. AR2 in Figure 1), the MN and AR2 assert their knowledge of the corresponding LSAP_MK by exchanges of the Secure Association Protocol (SAP), after which they arrive at the consensus of the LSK. MN AR1 AR2 MAP AAA | | | | | |<---EAP---->|<---------------RADIUS----------------->| |<=============== EAP Authentication=================>| | | | KeyPush | | | | |<------------| | | | | KeyPush | | | |<-------------------------| | | | | | | | Attach to AR2 | | | |------------------------>| | | | | | | | | | | | | |<======= SAP =======>| | | | | | | | Figure 1: Handover within MAP 3.2. Pull across MAP With our protocol, the handover across different MAPs utilizes the pull mode. The protocol operations are described in Figure 2, which is similar to [I-D.hokey-hierarchy]. For simplicity, we omit the ANs in Figure 2. According to [I-D.hokey-hierarchy], the HoReq sent by MN and HokeyReq sent by the MAP is authenticated by the AAA_REAUTH_KEY. The AAA Deng, et al. Expires April 4, 2007 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Handover Key Hierarchy for HMIPv6 Oct 2006 server will validate the authentication payload upon receiving the HokeyReq message. If the validation is successful, the AAA sends out the HokeyRep message to the new MAP (e.g. MAP2), and MAP2 confirms its receipt of the handover key by sending out a HokeyConf message to MAP1. MAP1 will also make the MN convinced of the handover by sending HoAck message to the MN. Finally, the MN and MAP2 finish the SAP exchanges and establish the communication following up. MN MAP1 MAP2 AAA | HoReq | | | |------------->| HokeyReq | | |---------------------------->| | | | HokeyRep | | | HokeyConf |<-------------| | HoAck |<-------------| | |<-------------| | | | | | | | | | | |<========== SAP ==========>| | | | | | Figure 2: Handover across MAP Deng, et al. Expires April 4, 2007 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Handover Key Hierarchy for HMIPv6 Oct 2006 4. Architecture Considerations As specified in [I-D.hokey-hierarchy], the ADC may locate off-path or on-path with respect to the EAP signalling. The MAP undergoes the same story of the ADC with no exception. o Off-path MAP: The MAP does not necessarily have to be on the EAP signaling path. In the off-path MAP arrangement, the EAP authenticator can be located at the serving AN. One downside of this arrangement is that it requires AAA functionality within the AN and it requires the AAA server to deal with two different AAA clients as part of security provisioning and authentication. The other downside is that there MAY be additional considerations on the key distribution protocol between the MAP and AN. +-+-+-+-+-+ | MAP |---+ +-+-+-+-+-+ \ | \ | \ V \ +-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+ \ +-+-+-+-+-+ | | | | +---| | | MN |--------| AN |-------------| EAP/AAA | | | | | | Server | +-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+ Figure 3: Off-path MAP o On-path MAP: The MAP is located on the path of EAP signaling. In the integrated scenario, the pass- through authenticator, AN and MAP MAY be located in one physical entity. In the standalone case, where MAP is disjunct from the AN, a choice on placement of pass-through authenticator in AN versus in MAP has to be made. Placing the pass-through authenticator in the AN is acceptable, as long as the AN is able to encapsulate the EAP signaling into AAA signaling and the MAP is able to act as a AAA proxy for AAA signaling. Deng, et al. Expires April 4, 2007 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Handover Key Hierarchy for HMIPv6 Oct 2006 5. Security Considerations Both the key lifetime, key scope in the hierarchy MUST comply with EAP keying framework [I-D.ietf-eap-keying]. Deng, et al. Expires April 4, 2007 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Handover Key Hierarchy for HMIPv6 Oct 2006 6. IANA Considerations This specification does not request the creation of any new parameter registries, nor does it require any other IANA assignments. Deng, et al. Expires April 4, 2007 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Handover Key Hierarchy for HMIPv6 Oct 2006 7. Acknowledgement TBD. Deng, et al. Expires April 4, 2007 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Handover Key Hierarchy for HMIPv6 Oct 2006 8. References 8.1. Normative References [I-D.hmipv6] Soliman, H., Castelluccia, C., ElMalki, K., and L. Bellier, "Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 Mobility Management (HMIPv6)", June 2006, . [I.D.aaa-hokey-ps] Nakhjiri, M., Parthasarathy, M., and al. et, "AAA based Keying for Wireless Handovers: Problem Statement", May 2005, . 8.2. Informative References [I-D.hokey-hierarchy] Nakhjiri, M., "A Keying hierarchy for managing Wireless Handover security", June 2006, . [I-D.ietf-eap-keying] Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework", . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Deng, et al. Expires April 4, 2007 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Handover Key Hierarchy for HMIPv6 Oct 2006 Authors' Addresses Hui Deng Hitachi (China) Beijing Fortune Bldg. 1701 5 Dong San Huan Bei-Lu Chao Yang District Beijing 100004 China Email: hdeng@hitachi.cn Zhen Cao Peking University No.1 Science Building Room 1534 5 Yi He Yuan Lu Hai Dian District Beijing 100871 China Email: caozhen@pku.edu.cn Yuanchen Ma Hitachi (China) Beijing Fortune Bldg. 1701 5 Dong San Huan Bei-Lu Chao Yang District Beijing 100004 China Email: ycma@hitachi.cn Deng, et al. Expires April 4, 2007 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Handover Key Hierarchy for HMIPv6 Oct 2006 Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Intellectual Property The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. Acknowledgment Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF Administrative Support Activity (IASA). Deng, et al. Expires April 4, 2007 [Page 13]