netmod O. G. D. Dios Internet-Draft S. Barguil Intended status: Standards Track Telefonica Expires: 27 April 2023 M. Boucadair Orange 24 October 2022 Extensions to the Access Control Lists (ACLs) YANG Model draft-dbb-netmod-acl-02 Abstract RFC 8519 defines a YANG data model for Access Control Lists (ACLs). This document discusses a set of extensions that fix many of the limitations of the ACL model as initially defined in RFC 8519. Discussion Venues This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. Discussion of this document takes place on the Network Modeling Working Group mailing list (netmod@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/netmod/. Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/oscargdd/draft-dbb-netmod-enhanced-acl. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 April 2023. Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Problem Statement & Gap Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Suboptimal Configuration: Lack of Support for Lists of Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. Manageability: Impossibility to Use Aliases or Defined Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3. Bind ACLs to Devices, Not Only Interfaces . . . . . . . . 9 3.4. Partial or Lack of IPv4/IPv6 Fragment Handling . . . . . 9 3.5. Suboptimal TCP Flags Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.6. Rate-Limit Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.7. Payload-based Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.8. Reuse the ACLs Content Across Several Devices . . . . . . 10 4. Overall Module Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.1. Enhanced ACL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.2. Defined sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.3. TCP Flags Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.4. Fragments Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.5. Rate-Limit Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5. YANG Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.1. Enhanced ACL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6. Security Considerations (TBC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 7.1. URI Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 7.2. YANG Module Name Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 1. Introduction [RFC8519] defines Access control lists (ACLs) as a user-ordered set of filtering rules. The model targets the configuration of the filtering behaviour of a device. However, the model structure, as defined in [RFC8519], suffers from a set of limitations. This document describes these limitations and proposes an enhanced ACL structure. The YANG module in this document is solely based on augmentations to the ACL YANG module defined in [RFC8519]. The motivation of such enhanced ACL structure is discussed in detail in Section 3. When managing ACLs, it is common for network operators to group match elements in pre-defined sets. The consolidation into group matches allows for reducing the number of rules, especially in large scale networks. If it is needed, for example, to find a match against 100 IP addresses (or prefixes), a single rule will suffice rather than creating individual Access Control Entries (ACEs) for each IP address (or prefix). In doing so, implementations would optimize the performance of matching lists vs multiple rules matching. The enhanced ACL structure is also meant to facilitate the management of network operators. Instead of entering the IP address or port number literals, using user-named lists decouples the creation of the rule from the management of the sets. Hence, it is possible to remove/add entries to the list without redefining the (parent) ACL rule. In addition, the notion of Access Control List (ACL) and defined sets is generalized so that it is not device-specific as per [RFC8519]. ACLs and defined sets may be defined at network / administrative domain level and associated to devices. This approach facilitates the reusability across multiple network elements. For example, managing the IP prefix sets from a network level makes it easier to maintain by the security groups. Network operators maintain sets of IP prefixes that are related to each other, e.g., deny-lists or accept-lists that are associated with those provided by a VPN customer. These lists are maintained and manipulated by security expert teams. Note that ACLs are used locally in devices but are triggered by other tools such as DDoS mitigation [RFC9132] or BGP Flow Spec [RFC8955] [RFC8956]. Therefore, supporting means to easily map to the filtering rules conveyed in messages triggered by these tools is valuable from a network operation standpoint. Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 2. Terminology The keywords *MUST*, *MUST NOT*, *REQUIRED*, *SHALL*, *SHALL NOT*, *SHOULD*, *SHOULD NOT*, *RECOMMENDED*, *MAY*, and *OPTIONAL*, when they appear in this document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. The terminology for describing YANG modules is defined in [RFC7950]. The meaning of the symbols in the tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340]. In addition to the terms defined in [RFC8519], this document makes use of the following terms: * Defined set: Refers to reusable description of one or multiple information elements (e.g., IP address, IP prefix, port number, or ICMP type). 3. Problem Statement & Gap Analysis 3.1. Suboptimal Configuration: Lack of Support for Lists of Prefixes IP prefix related data nodes, e.g., "destination-ipv4-network" or "destination-ipv6-network", do not support handling a list of IP prefixes, which may then lead to having to support large numbers of ACL entries in a configuration file. The same issue is encountered when ACLs have to be in place to mitigate DDoS attacks (e.g., [RFC9132] when a set of sources are involved in such an attack. The situation is even worse when both a list of sources and destination prefixes are involved. Figure 1 shows an example of the required ACL configuration for filtering traffic from two prefixes. { "ietf-access-control-list:acls": { "acl": [ { "name": "first-prefix", "type": "ipv6-acl-type", "aces": { "ace": [ { "name": "my-test-ace", "matches": { "ipv6": { "destination-ipv6-network": Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 "2001:db8:6401:1::/64", "source-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:1234::/96", "protocol": 17, "flow-label": 10000 }, "udp": { "source-port": { "operator": "lte", "port": 80 }, "destination-port": { "operator": "neq", "port": 1010 } } }, "actions": { "forwarding": "accept" } } ] } }, { "name": "second-prefix", "type": "ipv6-acl-type", "aces": { "ace": [ { "name": "my-test-ace", "matches": { "ipv6": { "destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:6401:c::/64", "source-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:1234::/96", "protocol": 17, "flow-label": 10000 }, "udp": { "source-port": { "operator": "lte", "port": 80 }, "destination-port": { "operator": "neq", "port": 1010 Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 } } }, "actions": { "forwarding": "accept" } } ] } } ] } } Figure 1: Example Illustrating Sub-optimal Use of the ACL Model with a Prefix List Such a configuration is suboptimal for both: - Network controllers that need to manipulate large files. All or a subset for this configuration will need to be passed to the underlying network devices * Devices may receive such a confirguration and thus will need to maintain it locally. (Figure 2 depicts an example of an optimized structure: Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 { "ietf-access-control-list:acls": { "acl": [ { "name": "prefix-list-support", "type": "ipv6-acl-type", "aces": { "ace": [ { "name": "my-test-ace", "matches": { "ipv6": { "destination-ipv6-network": [ "2001:db8:6401:1::/64", "2001:db8:6401:c::/64" ], "source-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:1234::/96", "protocol": 17, "flow-label": 10000 }, "udp": { "source-port": { "operator": "lte", "port": 80 }, "destination-port": { "operator": "neq", "port": 1010 } } }, "actions": { "forwarding": "accept" } } ] } } ] } } Figure 2: Example Illustrating Optimal Use of the ACL Model in a Network Context. Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 3.2. Manageability: Impossibility to Use Aliases or Defined Sets The same approach as the one discussed for IP prefixes can be generalized by introduing the concept of "aliases" or "defined sets". The defined sets are reusable definitions across several ACLs. Each category is modelled in YANG as a list of parameters related to the class it represents. The following sets can be considered: * Prefix sets: Used to create lists of IPv4 or IPv6 prefixes. * Protocol sets: Used to create a list of protocols. * Port number sets: Used to create lists of TCP or UDP port values (or any other transport protocol that makes uses of port numbers). The identity of the protocols is identified by the protocol set, if present. Otherwise, a set applies to any protocol. * ICMP sets: Uses to create lists of ICMP-based filters. This applies only when the protocol is set to ICMP or ICMPv6. A candidate structure is shown in Figure 3: +--rw defined-sets | +--rw prefix-sets | | +--rw prefix-set* [name] | | +--rw name string | | +--rw ip-prefix* inet:ip-prefix | +--rw port-sets | | +--rw port-set* [name] | | +--rw name string | | +--rw port* inet:port-number | +--rw protocol-sets | | +--rw protocol-set* [name] | | +--rw name string | | +--rw protocol-name* identityref | +--rw icmp-type-sets | +--rw icmp-type-set* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw types* [type] | +--rw type uint8 | +--rw code? uint8 | +--rw rest-of-header? binary Figure 3: Examples of Defined Sets. Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 3.3. Bind ACLs to Devices, Not Only Interfaces In the context of network management, an ACL may be enforced in many network locations. As such, the ACL module should allow for binding an ACL to multiple devices, not only (abstract) interfaces. The ACL name must, thus, be unique at the scale of the network, but the same name may be used in many devices when enforcing node- specific ACLs. 3.4. Partial or Lack of IPv4/IPv6 Fragment Handling [RFC8519] does not support fragment handling capability for IPv6 but offers a partial support for IPv4 by means of 'flags'. Nevertheless, the use of 'flags' is problematic since it does not allow a bitmask to be defined. For example, setting other bits not covered by the 'flags' filtering clause in a packet will allow that packet to get through (because it won't match the ACE). Defining a new IPv4/IPv6 matching field called 'fragment' is thus required to efficiently handle fragment-related filtering rules. 3.5. Suboptimal TCP Flags Handling [RFC8519] supports including flags in the TCP match fields, however that structure does not support matching operations as those supported in BGP Flow Spec. Defining this field to be defined as a flag bitmask together with a set of operations is meant to efficiently handle TCP flags filtering rules. 3.6. Rate-Limit Action [RFC8519] specifies that forwarding actions can be 'accept' (i.e., accept matching traffic), 'drop' (i.e., drop matching traffic without sending any ICMP error message), or 'reject' (i.e., drop matching traffic and send an ICMP error message to the source). However, there are situations where the matching traffic can be accepted, but with a rate-limit policy. Such capability is not currently supported by [RFC8519]. 3.7. Payload-based Filtering Some transport protocols use existing protocols (e.g., TCP or UDP) as substrate. The match criteria for such protocols may rely upon the 'protocol' under 'l3', TCP/UDP match criteria, part of the TCP/UDP payload, or a combination thereof. [RFC8519] does not support matching based on the payload. Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 Likewise, the current version of the ACL model does not support filtering of encapsulated traffic. 3.8. Reuse the ACLs Content Across Several Devices Having a global network view of the ACLs is highly valuable for service providers. An ACL could be defined and applied following the hierarchy of the network topology. So, an ACL can be defined at the network level and, then, that same ACL can be used (or referenced to) in several devices (including termination points) within the same network. This network/device ACLs differentiation introduces several new requirements, e.g.: * An ACL name can be used at both network and device levels. * An ACL content updated at the network level should imply a transaction that updates the relevant content in all the nodes using this ACL. * ACLs defined at the device level have a local meaning for the specific node. * A device can be associated with a router, a VRF, a logical system, or a virtual node. ACLs can be applied in physical and logical infrastructure. 4. Overall Module Structure 4.1. Enhanced ACL module: ietf-acl-enh augment /ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl: +--rw defined-sets +--rw ipv4-prefix-sets | +--rw prefix-set* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw description? string | +--rw prefix* inet:ipv4-prefix +--rw ipv6-prefix-sets | +--rw prefix-set* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw description? string | +--rw prefix* inet:ipv6-prefix +--rw port-sets | +--rw port-set* [name] | +--rw name string Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 | +--rw port* [id] | +--rw id string | +--rw (port)? | +--:(port-range-or-operator) | +--rw port-range-or-operator | +--rw (port-range-or-operator)? | +--:(range) | | +--rw lower-port inet:port-number | | +--rw upper-port inet:port-number | +--:(operator) | +--rw operator? operator | +--rw port inet:port-number +--rw protocol-sets | +--rw protocol-set* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw protocol* union +--rw icmp-type-sets +--rw icmp-type-set* [name] +--rw name string +--rw types* [type] +--rw type uint8 +--rw code? uint8 +--rw rest-of-header? binary augment /ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace /ietf-acl:matches: +--rw (payload)? +--:(prefix-pattern) +--rw prefix-pattern {match-on-payload}? +--rw offset? identityref +--rw offset-end? uint64 +--rw operator? operator +--rw prefix? binary augment /ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace /ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:l3/ietf-acl:ipv4: +--rw ipv4-fragment | +--rw operator? operator | +--rw type? fragment-type +--rw source-ipv4-prefix-list? leafref +--rw destination-ipv4-prefix-list? leafref +--rw next-header-set? leafref augment /ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace /ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:l3/ietf-acl:ipv6: +--rw ipv6-fragment | +--rw operator? operator | +--rw type? fragment-type +--rw source-ipv6-prefix-list? leafref +--rw destination-ipv6-prefix-list? leafref +--rw protocol-set? leafref Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 augment /ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace /ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:l4/ietf-acl:tcp: +--rw flags-bitmask | +--rw operator? operator | +--rw bitmask? uint16 +--rw source-tcp-port-set? | -> ../../../../defined-sets/port-sets/port-set/name +--rw destination-tcp-port-set? -> ../../../../defined-sets/port-sets/port-set/name augment /ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace /ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:l4/ietf-acl:udp: +--rw source-udp-port-set? | -> ../../../../defined-sets/port-sets/port-set/name +--rw destination-udp-port-set? -> ../../../../defined-sets/port-sets/port-set/name augment /ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace /ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:l4/ietf-acl:icmp: +--rw icmp-set? leafref augment /ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace /ietf-acl:actions: +--rw rate-limit? decimal64 Figure 4: Enhanced ACL tree 4.2. Defined sets The augmented ACL structure includes several containers to manage reusable sets of elements that can be matched in an ACL entry. Each set is uniquely identified by a name, and can be called from the relevant entry. The following sets are defined: * IPv4 prefix set: It contains a list of IPv4 prefixes. A match will be considered if the IP address (source or destination, depending on the ACL entry) is contained in any of the prefixes. * IPv6 prefix set: It contains a list of IPv6 prefixes. A match will be considered if the IP address (source or destination, depending on the ACL entry) is contained in any of the prefixes. * Port sets: It contains a list of port numbers to be used in TCP / UDP entries. The ports can be individual port numbers, a range of ports, and an operation. * Protocol sets: It contains a list of protocol values. Each protocol can be identified either by a number (e.g., 17) or a name (e.g., UDP). Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 * ICMP sets: It contains a list of ICMP types, each of them identified by a type value, optionally the code and the rest of the header. 4.3. TCP Flags Handling The augmented ACL structure includes a new leaf 'flags-bitmask' to better handle flags. Clients that support both 'flags-bitmask' and 'flags' matching fields MUST NOT set these fields in the same request. Figure 5 shows an example of a request to install a filter to discard incoming TCP messages having all flags unset. { "ietf-access-control-list:acls": { "acl": [{ "name": "tcp-flags-example", "aces": { "ace": [{ "name": "null-attack", "matches": { "tcp": { "flags-bitmask": { "operator": "not any", "bitmask": 4095 } } }, "actions": { "forwarding": "drop" } }] } }] } } Figure 5: Example to Deny TCP Null Attack Messages 4.4. Fragments Handling The augmented ACL structure includes a new leaf 'fragment' to better handle fragments. Clients that support both 'fragment' and 'flags' matching fields MUST NOT set these fields in the same request. Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 Figure 6 shows the content of a POST request to allow the traffic destined to 198.51.100.0/24 and UDP port number 53, but to drop all fragmented packets. The following ACEs are defined (in this order): * "drop-all-fragments" ACE: discards all fragments. * "allow-dns-packets" ACE: accepts DNS packets destined to 198.51.100.0/24. Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 { "ietf-access-control-list:acls": { "acl": [ { "name": "dns-fragments", "type": "ipv4-acl-type", "aces": { "ace": [ { "name": "drop-all-fragments", "matches": { "ipv4": { "ipv4-fragment": { "operator": "match", "type": "isf" } } }, "actions": { "forwarding": "drop" } }, { "name": "allow-dns-packets", "matches": { "ipv4": { "destination-ipv4-network": "198.51.100.0/24" }, "udp": { "destination-port": { "operator": "eq", "port": 53 } }, "actions": { "forwarding": "accept" } } } ] } } ] } } Figure 6: Example Illustrating Candidate Filtering of IPv4 Fragmented Packets. Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 Figure 7 shows an example of the body of a POST request to allow the traffic destined to 2001:db8::/32 and UDP port number 53, but to drop all fragmented packets. The following ACEs are defined (in this order): * "drop-all-fragments" ACE: discards all fragments (including atomic fragments). That is, IPv6 packets that include a Fragment header (44) are dropped. * "allow-dns-packets" ACE: accepts DNS packets destined to 2001:db8::/32. Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 { "ietf-access-control-list:acls": { "acl": [ { "name": "dns-fragments", "type": "ipv6-acl-type", "aces": { "ace": [ { "name": "drop-all-fragments", "matches": { "ipv6": { "ipv6-fragment": { "operator": "match", "type": "isf" } } }, "actions": { "forwarding": "drop" } }, { "name": "allow-dns-packets", "matches": { "ipv6": { "destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8::/32" }, "udp": { "destination-port": { "operator": "eq", "port": 53 } } }, "actions": { "forwarding": "accept" } } ] } } ] } } Figure 7: Example Illustrating Candidate Filtering of IPv6 Fragmented Packets. Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 4.5. Rate-Limit Traffic In order to support rate-limiting (see Section 3.6), a new action called "rate-limit" is defined. (#example_5) shows an ACL example to rate-limit incoming SYNs during a SYN flood attack. { "ietf-access-control-list:acls": { "acl": [{ "name": "tcp-flags-example-with-rate-limit", "aces": { "ace": [{ "name": "rate-limit-syn", "matches": { "tcp": { "flags-bitmask": { "operator": "match", "bitmask": 2 } } }, "actions": { "forwarding": "accept", "rate-limit": "20.00" } }] } }] } } Figure 8: Example Rate-Limit Incoming TCP SYNs 5. YANG Modules 5.1. Enhanced ACL file "ietf-acl-enh@2022-10-24.yang" module ietf-acl-enh { yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acl-enh"; prefix enh-acl; import ietf-inet-types { prefix inet; reference Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types"; } import ietf-access-control-list { prefix ietf-acl; reference "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs), Section 4.1"; } import ietf-packet-fields { prefix packet-fields; reference "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs), Section 4.2"; } organization "IETF NETMOD Working Group"; contact "WG Web: WG List: Author: Mohamed Boucadair Author: Samier Barguil Author: Oscar Gonzalez de Dios "; description "This module contains YANG definitions for enhanced ACLs. Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices."; revision 2022-10-24 { description "Initial revision."; reference "RFC XXXX: Extensions to the Access Control Lists (ACLs) Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 YANG Model"; } feature match-on-payload { description "Match based on a pattern is supported."; } identity offset-type { description "Base identity for payload offset type."; } identity layer3 { base offset-type; description "IP header."; } identity layer4 { base offset-type; description "Transport header (e.g., TCP or UDP)."; } identity payload { base offset-type; description "Transport payload. For example, this represents the beginning of the TCP data right after any TCP options."; } typedef operator { type bits { bit not { position 0; description "If set, logical negation of operation."; } bit match { position 1; description "Match bit. This is a bitwise match operation defined as '(data & value) == value'."; } bit any { position 2; description Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 "Any bit. This is a match on any of the bits in bitmask. It evaluates to 'true' if any of the bits in the value mask are set in the data, i.e., '(data & value) != 0'."; } } description "Specifies how to apply the defined bitmask. 'any' and 'match' bits must not be set simultaneously."; } description "How to apply the defined bitmask."; } typedef fragment-type { type bits { bit df { position 0; description "Don't fragment bit for IPv4. Must be set to 0 when it appears in an IPv6 filter."; } bit isf { position 1; description "Is a fragment."; } bit ff { position 2; description "First fragment."; } bit lf { position 3; description "Last fragment."; } } description "Different fragment types to match against."; } grouping tcp-flags { description "Operations on TCP flags."; leaf operator { type operator; default "match"; Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 description "How to interpret the TCP flags."; } leaf bitmask { type uint16; description "The bitmask matches the last 4 bits of byte 12 and byte 13 of the TCP header. For clarity, the 4 bits of byte 12 corresponding to the TCP data offset field are not included in any matching."; } } grouping fragment-fields { description "Operations on fragment types."; leaf operator { type operator; default "match"; description "How to interpret the fragment type."; } leaf type { type fragment-type; description "What fragment type to look for."; } } grouping payload { description "Operations on payload match."; leaf offset { type identityref { base offset-type; } description "Indicates the payload offset."; } leaf offset-end { type uint64; description "Indicates the number of bytes to cover when performing the prefix match."; } leaf operator { type operator; default "match"; Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 description "How to interpret the prefix match."; } leaf prefix { type binary; description "The pattern to match against."; } } augment "/ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl" { description "add a new container to store sets (prefix sets, port sets, etc"; container defined-sets { description "Predefined sets of attributes used in policy match statements."; container ipv4-prefix-sets { description "Data definitions for a list of IPv4 or IPv6 prefixes which are matched as part of a policy."; list prefix-set { key "name"; description "List of the defined prefix sets."; leaf name { type string; description "Name of the prefix set -- this is used as a label to reference the set in match conditions."; } leaf description { type string; description "Defined Set description."; } leaf-list prefix { type inet:ipv4-prefix; description "List of IPv4 prefixes to be used in match conditions."; } } } container ipv6-prefix-sets { description "Data definitions for a list of IPv6 prefixes Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 which are matched as part of a policy."; list prefix-set { key "name"; description "List of the defined prefix sets."; leaf name { type string; description "Name of the prefix set -- this is used as a label to reference the set in match conditions."; } leaf description { type string; description "A textual description of the prefix list."; } leaf-list prefix { type inet:ipv6-prefix; description "List of IPv6 prefixes to be used in match conditions."; } } } container port-sets { description "Data definitions for a list of ports which can be matched in policies."; list port-set { key "name"; description "List of port set definitions."; leaf name { type string; description "Name of the port set -- this is used as a label to reference the set in match conditions."; } list port { key "id"; description "Port numbers along with the operator on which to match."; leaf id { type string; description "Identifier of the list of port numbers."; } Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 choice port { description "Choice of specifying the port number or referring to a group of port numbers."; container port-range-or-operator { description "Indicates a set of ports."; uses packet-fields:port-range-or-operator; } } } } } container protocol-sets { description "Data definitions for a list of protocols which can be matched in policies."; list protocol-set { key "name"; description "List of protocol set definitions."; leaf name { type string; description "Name of the protocols set -- this is used as a label to reference the set in match conditions."; } leaf-list protocol { type union { type uint8; type string; //Check if we can reuse an IANA-maintained module } description "Value of the protocl set."; } } } container icmp-type-sets { description "Data definitions for a list of ICMP types which can be matched in policies."; list icmp-type-set { key "name"; description "List of ICMP type set definitions."; leaf name { type string; description Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 "Name of the ICMP type set -- this is used as a label to reference the set in match conditions."; } list types { key "type"; description "Includes a list of ICMP types."; uses packet-fields:acl-icmp-header-fields; } } } } } augment "/ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces" + "/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:matches" { description "Add a new match types."; choice payload { description "Match a prefix pattern."; container prefix-pattern { if-feature "match-on-payload"; description "Rule to perform payload-based match."; uses payload; } } } augment "/ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces" + "/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:l3/ietf-acl:ipv4" { description "Handle non-initial and initial fragments for IPv4 packets."; container ipv4-fragment { description "Indicates how to handle IPv4 fragments."; uses fragment-fields; } leaf source-ipv4-prefix-list { type leafref { path "../../../../defined-sets/ipv4-prefix-sets/prefix-set/name"; } description "A reference to a prefix list to match the source address."; } leaf destination-ipv4-prefix-list { type leafref { Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 path "../../../../defined-sets/ipv4-prefix-sets/prefix-set/name"; } description "A reference to a prefix list to match the destination address."; } leaf next-header-set { type leafref { path "../../../../defined-sets/protocol-sets/protocol-set/name"; } description "A reference to a protocol set to match the next-header field."; } } augment "/ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces" + "/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:l3/ietf-acl:ipv6" { description "Handles non-initial and initial fragments for IPv6 packets."; container ipv6-fragment { description "Indicates how to handle IPv6 fragments."; uses fragment-fields; } leaf source-ipv6-prefix-list { type leafref { path "../../../../defined-sets/ipv6-prefix-sets/prefix-set/name"; } description "A reference to a prefix list to match the source address."; } leaf destination-ipv6-prefix-list { type leafref { path "../../../../defined-sets/ipv6-prefix-sets/prefix-set/name"; } description "A reference to a prefix list to match the destination address."; } leaf protocol-set { type leafref { path "../../../../defined-sets/protocol-sets/protocol-set/name"; } description "A reference to a protocol set to match the protocol field."; } } augment "/ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces" + "/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:l4/ietf-acl:tcp" { Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 description "Handles TCP flags and port sets."; container flags-bitmask { description "Indicates how to handle TCP flags."; uses tcp-flags; } leaf source-tcp-port-set { type leafref { path "../../../../defined-sets/port-sets/port-set/name"; } description "A reference to a port set to match the source port."; } leaf destination-tcp-port-set { type leafref { path "../../../../defined-sets/port-sets/port-set/name"; } description "A reference to a port set to match the destination port."; } } augment "/ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces" + "/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:l4/ietf-acl:udp" { description "Handle UDP port sets."; leaf source-udp-port-set { type leafref { path "../../../../defined-sets/port-sets/port-set/name"; } description "A reference to a port set to match the source port."; } leaf destination-udp-port-set { type leafref { path "../../../../defined-sets/port-sets/port-set/name"; } description "A reference to a port set to match the destination port."; } } augment "/ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces" + "/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:l4/ietf-acl:icmp" { description "Handle ICMP type sets."; leaf icmp-set { Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 type leafref { path "../../../../defined-sets/icmp-type-sets/icmp-type-set/name"; } description "A reference to an ICMP type set to match the ICMP type field."; } } augment "/ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces" + "/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:actions" { description "Rate-limit action."; leaf rate-limit { when "../ietf-acl:forwarding = 'ietf-acl:accept'" { description "Rate-limit valid only when accept action is used."; } type decimal64 { fraction-digits 2; } units "bytes per second"; description "Indicates a rate-limit for the matched traffic."; } } } 6. Security Considerations (TBC) The YANG modules specified in this document define a schema for data that is designed to be accessed via network management protocol such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [RFC8446]. The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content. Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability: * TBC Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability: * TBC 7. IANA Considerations 7.1. URI Registration This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]: URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acl-enh Registrant Contact: The IESG. XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace. 7.2. YANG Module Name Registration This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" subregistry [RFC6020] within the "YANG Parameters" registry. name: ietf-acl-enh namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ietf-acl-enh maintained by IANA: N prefix: enh-acl reference: RFC XXXX 8. References 8.1. Normative References Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, . [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, . [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, . [RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011, . [RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, . [RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017, . [RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341, DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018, . [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, . [RFC8519] Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Huang, L., and D. Blair, "YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)", RFC 8519, DOI 10.17487/RFC8519, March 2019, . Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Enhanced ACLs October 2022 [RFC8956] Loibl, C., Ed., Raszuk, R., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules for IPv6", RFC 8956, DOI 10.17487/RFC8956, December 2020, . 8.2. Informative References [RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018, . [RFC8955] Loibl, C., Hares, S., Raszuk, R., McPherson, D., and M. Bacher, "Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules", RFC 8955, DOI 10.17487/RFC8955, December 2020, . [RFC9132] Boucadair, M., Ed., Shallow, J., and T. Reddy.K, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification", RFC 9132, DOI 10.17487/RFC9132, September 2021, . Appendix A. Acknowledgements Many thanks to Jon Shallow and Miguel Cros for the discussion when preparing this document. Authors' Addresses Oscar Gonzalez de Dios Telefonica Email: oscar.gonzalezdedios@telefonica.com Samier Barguil Telefonica Email: samier.barguilgiraldo.ext@telefonica.com Mohamed Boucadair Orange Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com Dios, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 32]