Network Working Group M. Boucadair
Internet-Draft C. Jacquenet
Updates: 6824 (if approved) France Telecom
Intended status: Experimental July 6, 2015
Expires: January 7, 2016

Probing MPTCP Subflows
draft-boucadair-mptcp-probe-subflow-00

Abstract

This document specifies an extension to Multipath TCP (MPTCP) that is meant to assess whether a path used to establish a given subflow is MPTCP-friendly, i.e., intermediate nodes involved in that path do not alter nor strip MPTCP options, which would prevent the establishment of MPTCP communications along that path. A new flag bit, called Probe Flag (P-flag) is defined for this purpose.

This document updates RFC6824.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 7, 2016.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This document specifies an extension to Multipath TCP (MPTCP, [RFC6824]) that is meant to assess whether a path used to establish a given subflow is MPTCP-friendly. That is, intermediate nodes involved in that path do not alter nor strip MPTCP options, which would prevent the establishment of MPTCP communications along that path.

The problem is summarized briefly in Section 2 while the probe flag is defined in Section 3.

The solution proposed in this document allows to anticipate failures due to the presence of MPTCP-unfriendly devices in the communication paths.

2. The Problem

MPTCP supports a backup mode that relies on a dedicated flag, called backup flag carried in the MP_JOIN option: when set, this flag informs the remote peer that this is a backup subflow. Several problems may be arise such as. For example:

3. Probe Flag (P-flag)

As a solution to the problem described in Section 2, a meaning is associated with one of the reserved bits in MP_JOIN. This new flag bit is called: Probe Flag (P-flag). This flag bit is used to explicitly inform the remote peer that a probing procedure is associated with the corresponding subflow.

Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the required update to the MP_JOIN option format in SYN and SYN/ACK.

OLD: 

                           1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +---------------+---------------+-------+-----+-+---------------+
      |     Kind      |  Length = 12  |Subtype|     |B|   Address ID  |
      +---------------+---------------+-------+-----+-+---------------+
      |                   Receiver's Token (32 bits)                  |
      +---------------------------------------------------------------+
      |                Sender's Random Number (32 bits)               |
      +---------------------------------------------------------------+

NEW:
                           1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +---------------+---------------+-------+-+-+-+-+---------------+
      |     Kind      |  Length = 12  |Subtype|r|r|P|B|   Address ID  |
      +---------------+---------------+-------+-+-+-+-+---------------+
      |                   Receiver's Token (32 bits)                  |
      +---------------------------------------------------------------+
      |                Sender's Random Number (32 bits)               |
      +---------------------------------------------------------------+

      where "rr" are reserved bits for future assignment as
      additional flag bits. r bits MUST each be sent as zero and MUST be
      ignored on receipt.   

Figure 1: Join Connection (MP_JOIN) Option (for Initial SYN)

OLD:
                           1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +---------------+---------------+-------+-----+-+---------------+
      |     Kind      |  Length = 16  |Subtype|     |B|   Address ID  |
      +---------------+---------------+-------+-----+-+---------------+
      |                                                               |
      |                Sender's Truncated HMAC (64 bits)              |
      |                                                               |
      +---------------------------------------------------------------+
      |                Sender's Random Number (32 bits)               |
      +---------------------------------------------------------------+

NEW:
                           1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +---------------+---------------+-------+-+-+-+-+---------------+
      |     Kind      |  Length = 16  |Subtype|r|r|P|B|   Address ID  |
      +---------------+---------------+-------+-+-+-+-+---------------+
      |                                                               |
      |                Sender's Truncated HMAC (64 bits)              |
      |                                                               |
      +---------------------------------------------------------------+
      |                Sender's Random Number (32 bits)               |
      +---------------------------------------------------------------+

      where "rr" are reserved bits for future assignment as
      additional flag bits. r bits MUST each be sent as zero and MUST be
      ignored on receipt. 

Figure 2: Join Connection (MP_JOIN) Option (for Responding SYN/ACK)

When set, the P-Flag bit indicates to the remote peer that a probing is associated with this subflow. The probing logic is to be further defined in future versions of this specification. Only probing data MUST be sent over a subflow that is tagged to be under probing. Probing MUST NOT interfere with data exchange over regular subflows, if any.

An MPTCP endpoint that receives an MP_JOIN with a P-flag set, MUST echo the P-flag in the SYN/ACK if it supports the probing mechanism. If not, the P-flag MUST be ignored (i.e., the P-flag of the MP_JOIN included in the SYN/ACK must be set to 0).

P-flag can be set independently of the backup flag.

The handling of the B flag when P-flag is also set, is not altered by this specification.

4. Security Considerations

MPTCP-related security considerations are documented in [RFC6824] and [I-D.ietf-mptcp-attacks].

5. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any action from IANA.

6. Acknowledgements

TBC

7. References

7.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC6824] Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M. and O. Bonaventure, "TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple Addresses", RFC 6824, January 2013.

7.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-mptcp-attacks] Bagnulo, M., Paasch, C., Gont, F., Bonaventure, O. and C. Raiciu, "Analysis of MPTCP residual threats and possible fixes", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-mptcp-attacks-04, March 2015.

Authors' Addresses

Mohamed Boucadair France Telecom Rennes, 35000 France EMail: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Christian Jacquenet France Telecom Rennes, 35000 France EMail: christian.jacquenet@orange.com